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KANSAS OPEN BOOKS FOREWORD

The Americanization of the West
and the experience of people on the frontier is a complex story that
has only gained more complexity over time. The stories and myths that
emerged about Native peoples, Mexicans, and Mexican Americans from
this period have since informed national perceptions of how race and
racial categories ﬁt in the psyche of the United States. These stories and
myths are seemingly innocuous, but, spanning across time, they are
often encoded into the structures and systems that deﬁne who we are.
Even the US Supreme Court could not escape the inﬂuence of frontier stories, exempliﬁed by the majority opinion concerning Native title
to land in Tee-Hit-Ton v. United States (1955).1 Here Justice Reed relied on supremacist stereotypes in the assertion that “every American
schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent were deprived
of their ancestral ranges by force.”2 The same Court that held this decision rendered the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954)3
decision just one year earlier, rejecting the racist “separate but equal”
doctrine that stood for nearly six decades in civil rights legal history
after Plessy v. Ferguson (1896).4 The perspective symbolized by “American schoolboys” and marking Tee-Hit-Ton would stand for sixty-ﬁve
years before the Court began to unravel some of the tightly spun racism
woven through US federal Indian law. This signiﬁcant unraveling began with the McGirt v. Oklahoma (2020) decision, delivered by Justice
Gorsuch. The Court afﬁrmed that it would “hold the government to its
word,” given in the 1832 Treaty with the Creeks, that “on the far end
of the Trail of Tears was a promise.”5
Those crafting the McGirt decision shed light on the civic purpose
of history, as described by Johann N. Neem. Unlike the philosophical
goal of history—pursue historical truth above all else—the civic goal
is to “help a community—a nation, a religious or ethnic group—understand the present in ways that orient that group to the future.”6
And, as demonstrated by the contrast between Tee-Hit-Ton and McGirt, historical truth alone is insufﬁcient. The public needs both, and
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it is shortsighted, at best, to leap over the civic use of history to focus
solely on determining one absolute truth. When we do so we ignore the
historical questions and answers relevant to the public at large rather
than to a small, elite academic community of inquiry. Even though we
may deny it, people are natural processors, best able to make decisions
ﬁtting who we want to be when we can chart a path. It seems ﬁtting
then that within a year of the historic McGirt ruling, the University
Press of Kansas has reissued The Frontier Challenge: Responses to the
Trans-Mississippi West as an open-access ebook.
This collection began with a 1969 conference honoring Professor
George L. Anderson as he transitioned out of his position after nearly
two decades as the History Department chair at the University of Kansas. The Frontier Challenge is an older work, which reminds us that
legal and policy change is rarely swift. The collection’s authors, directly
and indirectly, consider the role of race in the frontier movement from
roughly 1880 through 1915. The editor, John G. Clark, wove together
academic perspectives positioned in the latter half of the westward expansion of US European settlers from the original Atlantic Coast (seventeenth century) to the Far West (nineteenth century). As a collection,
the writing is held together by a focus on racial fears and fantasies
concerning multiethnic savagery, belief in the importance of material
or economic progress, or both. The legacies born on the frontier and
discussed in this volume continue into the early twenty-ﬁrst century
through multiethnic disparities related to Native dispossession as well
as Latinx, Asian, and Black disenfranchisement.
While the collection’s authors made efforts to more fully consider the
experiences of disparate peoples ignored in previous frontier histories,
the authors escaped the limitations of their times with varying levels
of success. These essays sometimes use harsh, noninclusive language
and sometimes indirectly expose even more severe academic attitudes
about life outside of white Western norms. While not a disparaging text,
these historical “truths” are occasionally presented without sympathy
for the cultural transitions necessitated by racialized positioning in the
frontier hierarchy. Speciﬁc, relevant contributions of frontier people
who were not of European descent were sometimes absent, perhaps
overlooked. At other times a community’s skills or motivations were
subtly questioned as suspect without recognition that this “truth” may
be more broadly attributable to a particular time and place than to a
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speciﬁc community trait. And, as an academic accounting of a period,
some language previously considered commonplace could be grating in
light of today’s period of racial unrest.
Thus we should not mistake these chapters as the full account of
reality for the communities whose lives serve to ground the collection. These communities include Mexicans deemed Americans after the
Spanish-American War, Paciﬁc Coast salmon-canning workers, Native
peoples negotiating land issues before allotment, and the non-Native
men who married into the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Tribes. The
Frontier Challenge only begins a conversation that is broader and more
complex than could be revealed here, and therein lies its importance.
While a helpful, insightful analysis on the frontier before, today The
Frontier Challenge speaks more directly as historiographies of perceptions of the frontier communities studied.
The Frontier Challenge—developed during the early emergence of
student protests and faculty advocacy for ethnic studies programs as
well as lesbian, gay, and women’s perspectives as subjects and scholars
of history—now illustrates why underrepresented students made those
demands. In contrast, the insights of historians with different sensibilities and afﬁnities were recognized and made more widely available
after publication of The Frontier Challenge, adding necessary insight
about the same historical subjects to the conversations begun in this
text. These ten essays cannot give a full trans-Mississippi West history.
Instead they illuminate how racialization, Western expansion, and the
frontier informed sociocultural views about Native and Mexican life in
the United States amid the folly of assimilative political processes.
These places of tension enhance rather than negate the importance
of this moment. The Frontier Challenge rerelease provides twentyﬁrst-century and future readers a unique opportunity to trace both historians’ investigations into the ideas that shaped the latter part of the
frontier period and earlier notions about its impact. On some level the
authors met history’s philosophical goal concerning Western expansion as much as possible in their moment in time. The Frontier Challenge’s rerelease allows for forward movement into a new perspective,
informed by our more recently developed collective sensibilities. With
it, history, ethnic studies, sociology, law, and policy-oriented readers
can track the history of ideas further. Reengaging with The Frontier
Challenge today also reengages the civic promise of history. In taking
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up the challenge anew, we might reassess our present in ways that orient us toward a better, more just future that better meets the promises
made and agreed upon by those before us.
April D. J. Petillo
Manhattan, KS
August 2020
NOTES
1. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 75 S. Ct. 313; 99 L.
Ed. 2d 314; 1955 U.S. Lexis 1186.
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PREFACE

In 1968, after nineteen
years as Chairman of the Department of History
at the University of Kansas, George L. Anderson
resumed his place as a full-time teacher-scholar
in the Department. As an appropriate means of
recognizing and honoring Professor Anderson's
years of distinguished service, the Department of
History determined to host a conference focusing
on the major area of Professor Anderson's research interests, the history of the Trans-Mississippi West. With the substantial support and
encouragement of various officers of the University of Kansas, ten prominent scholars of Western
America were invited to prepare papers for presentation at a Conference on the History of the
Trans-Mississippi West that was held on October
16--17, 1969. The University Press of Kansas generously offered to publish the papers, both for
their intrinsic value and as a permanent record
of the honor accorded to Professor Anderson.
In addition to those presenting papers,
numerous individuals contributed to the success
of the Conference. The Conference Planning
Committee of the Department of History, with
the indispensable aid of their colleagues and
University Extension, managed to get people
xiii

where they were supposed to be-and on time.
The Planning Committee wishes to thank William E. Unrau, Wichita State University, Stuart
Levine, University of Kansas, and Donald F.
Danker, Washburn University, for chairing sessions, and the discussants, Robert W. Richmond,
Kansas State Historical Society, Homer E. Socolofsky, Kansas State University, Rosalie and
Murray Wax, University of Kansas, and Lawrence H. Larsen, University of Missouri-Kansas
City. Francis Heller, Dean of Faculties, and
George R. Waggoner, Dean, College of Liberal
Arts and Sciences, of the University of Kansas
contributed pleasant glimpses into Professor Anderson's career, as did Nyle H. Miller, Kansas
State Historical Society, John Unruh, Bluffton
College, and Mark A. Plummer ( in absentia),
Illinois State University, Normal.
Conference Planning Committee
Donald R. McCoy, Chairman
John G. Clark
Grant K. Goodman
Lynn H. Nelson
W. Stitt Robinson
Ambrose Saricks
xiv

INTRODUCTION
John G. Clark
University of Kansas

In recent years, historians of the
Trans-Mississippi West have increasingly focused their investigative and analytic energies upon the diversity of responses of
people-individuals and groups-to a variety of unique geographical settings. Profiting from but pushing both empirically and
methodologically beyond the land-oriented frames of reference
employed by such significant innovators in the field as Walter P.
Webb and James C. Malin, recent historians have demonstrated
increasing awareness of the dangers in a reliance upon geographic
(or any other) determinism as an explanation of the various paths
of development manifest in the West.
Sufficient "chuck wagon" and "war bonnet" history has been
written to furnish grist for a century's worth of Hollywood .westerns and TV specials. It is no longer sufficient to chronicle the
hardships encountered by travelers on the Mormon Trail, the inhabitants of sod houses in Kansas and Nebraska, or the cattle
drovers along the Chisholm Trail. The problem now is to explain
what happened to the people, including the Indians, who survived
the great raid on Fort X; what did sod-house inhabitants do that
1
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enabled them to move into a balloon-frame house; what did
migrants do when they reached the end of the Mormon Trail? In
short, how did people develop and accommodate themselves to an
environment which was itself constantly altered by the presence
of a society in Hux. Innumerable variables are encountered in
explaining the process whereby American society penetrated and
captured the West from its original human inhabitants and then
domesticated the area by overcoming environmental obstacles of
the gravest kind. In the unfolding of this process of Americanizing the West, tragedy and joy, victory and defeat, human fulflllment and human degradation are visible in roughly equal
proportions. The historians whose papers follow are sensitive to
the fact that the goals, both realistic and unrealistic, of one group,
society, or culture are frequently pursued only at the expense of
other groups.
A volume of this type, in which the contributors have pursued
their own particular research interests, frequently results in an
incoherent, mixed bag of themes. To be sure, a variety of topics
and settings are encountered in the pages that follow. Nonetheless, two significant and related themes emerge-racism and a
belief in material progress-both of which are indispensable to an
understanding of the Trans-Mississippi West and both of which
will continue to be of consequence as this vast region chases its
future.
Skeletons abound in the closet of American history to a
greater extent than a populace convinced of its own virtue has
been willing to admit. Among the embarrassments of the American heritage is that of a conspicuous racism that has plagued the
nation since its origins. White antipathy to non-whites, and other
ethnocentric manifestations of intolerance, discrimination, and
exploitation have corrupted and negated the promises of the
American Dream and have caused blacks and Indians to speak
of the American Nightmare.
Several papers deal with the alien or non-white populations
on the different frontiers of the West. In each instance, the
author speaks of the exploitive and destructive effects of AngloAmerican society upon the alien groups or societies encountered
as original inhabitants of the land or introduced for their labor.
Paul W. Gates, William T. Hagan, and Rodman Paul narrate effec-
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tively the manner in which Anglo-American land laws and land
usage were utilized by white majorities ( and in some cases minorities) to despoil resident aliens of their property and livelihood.
Chinese laborers, imported to work in the salmon canneries, were
physically prevented from fishing on the Columbia River. In the
gold fields, foreign miners were subjected to inequitable taxes,
and white persecution drove most Hispano-Americans from the
fields by 1850.
These papers demonstrate that the pressures generated against
alien cultures were as much the product of attitudes toward economic development as of innate racism. The economic promises
of the American West called forth formulas for economic growth
that did not .include ethical, moral, or legal protections designed
to mitigate-let alone avoid-the suffering of the dispossessed or
to accommodate the traditional life styles of minority peoples. The
economic demands of the dominant race, as Francis Paul Prucha
indicates, were transmuted into an intellectual rationale for the
Americanization and Christianization of the Indians through their
removal from ancestral lands. Thus, for many well-disposed and
humane men, a shield was created, protecting their consciences
from the knowledge that removal implied an unending trail of
tears. The efforts of Prucha's reformers to isolate and educate
their wards, undermined by wnite intruders and by the federal
allotment and annuity policies described by Gates and Hagan,
were shattered by the irrepressible expansionism of land-hungry
whites. The American Mission of Stephen A. Douglas, as defined
by Robert W. Johannsen, rooted in the same idealism and belief
in progress that sustained the Indian Office during the 1840s, exploded all visions of Indian reform and made the reservation an
inevitable experience for the American Indian.
Promises of progress and equality of opportunity, however
irrelevant, if not actually destructive, to the life of many minority
cultures in the United States, rang loud and clear with a precise
meaning for the dominant elements in the nation. Stephen A.
Douglas articulated a vision of the West as the adhesive of the
Union, crisscrossed by railroads linking productive farms with
ambitious towns and vigorous cities. A major responsibility of
government at all levels throughout the West was the realization
of the Little Giant's dream. State and territorial governments in
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the West, as those of Eastern states had before them, attempted
to create an atmosphere conducive to economic growth. Federal
policies sought similar ends both in the West and in the nation at
large.
Variations in environmental circumstances conditioned responses within the different regions of the West. The frontier of
the Far West, as delineated by Earl Pomeroy, was characterized
by the development of cities-sometimes preceding almost all
else-that served as advanced bases for the occupation of their
hinterlands. A Western city such as San Francisco functioned as
the Far West's major financial center, making major economic
decisions for its backcountry. Kansas City, according to George
L. Anderson, acquired similar capabilities within the Plains region.
Access to urban populations and foreign markets, coupled with
an apparently inexhaustible supply of salmon, led, as Carstensen
describes it, to a canning industry characterized by relatively
large-scale and technologically progressive organizations that
called into being supportive industries in such growing communities as Portland and Seattle.
The federal government and state governments sponsored
growth in a variety of ways. Oscar 0. Winther emphasizes individual and corporate efforts to attract English capital and Englishmen to the "go-ahead" state of Kansas.• Alan C. Bogue offers an
analysis of Kansas promotional, permissive, and regulatory legislation, each type shading into the next, designed to attract capital
to the state through the medium of local bonding and land credit
laws. At both the national and regional levels, Anderson traces
the connection and interdependence between railroads, postal
savings banks, postal money orders, and the Kansas City clearing
house, all devices that worked to increase the amount of money
circulating by speeding up remittances, enhancing the security
and reducing the costs of transfers, and foreshadowing in some
degree aspects of the Federal Reserve system. Bogue and Anderson, from different contexts, both offer suggestions relative to
Populist motivation in the Plains region. Bogue points out a local
institutional dimension of protest against local politicians who had
allowed Kansas statutes to be drafted excessively in favor of nonstate monied interests. Anderson questions Populist remedies for
the so-called money problem as well as the actual shortage of a
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circulating medium, given the growing number and value of credit
instruments in use.
The essays that follow, then, while adding up to less than a
history of the Trans-Mississippi West, amount to considerably
more than ten separate and unconnected views of isolated segments of that history. Each essay must obviously stand upon its
own merits, but there are bonds uniting them, observational platforms shared, and common perspectives voiced which illuminate
both the tragedy and the accomplishments of historical experience
in the Trans-Mississippi West.

0 Professor Winther's many friends were saddened by the news of his
death in May, 1970.
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The Urban Frontier
of the
Far West
Earl Pomeroy, University of Oregon

Five years ago, in August, 1964,
the Bureau of the Census announced that as of July 1 the most
populous state in the United States was California, succeeding
New York. The announcement was no surprise to Californians
who had been celebrating or deploring the fact before the census
officially recognized it, and who had experienced it on the freeways entering San Francisco or a more hypothetical area, downtown Los Angeles. As an indicator of social condition it was both
early and late. By virtue of being third largest of the states in
area, following Alaska and Texas, California still was only thirteenth in density of population, well behind the states of the Atlantic seaboard, from Maryland to Connecticut. A more significant
index to the quality of Western life will appear in the percentages
7
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of urban population, when they are ready. Sometime in the middle 1960s, probably 1965 or 1966, California became first in this
category also, passing New Jersey. And probably in 1961 the
Pacific states became the most urban in the country, passing the
Middle Atlantic group. By the test of the census, they had been
more urban than the nation as a whole since the 1860s.
As an index of urbanness, the census commonly has underdescribed the West. The nineteenth-century standard of eight
thousand persons in incorporated places probably excluded most
of the mining and cattle towns. Not until 1949-1950 did a definition include part of the unincorporated urban fringe. 1 Since then
the new category of the standard metropolitan statistical area has
shown the West leading in rate of urban growth. 2 In 1950 the
limits of Los Angeles still enclosed more open fields than apartment buildings and skyscrapers, something like the plots laid out in
the Florida real-estate boom of the 1920s; but they left out much
more, both in the satellite towns that chose to maintain their separate governments and in unincorporated areas that were content
to be simply parts of Los Angeles County. The awkward but indispensable category of rural nonfarm population appeared only
in the census of 1920. It is particularly revealing for such nonagricultural states as Alaska, which in 1960 ranked third lowest in
percentage of urban population, just above North Dakota and
Mississippi, but highest in rate of urban growth and in percentage
of nonfarm population. Los Angeles, which in the 1950s was the
only one of the six largest American cities that gained population,
grew only one-twelfth as fast as Anchorage. Persons living on
farms in Alaska and other fast-growing Western states, moreover,
often have been more interested in selling the land than in raising
a crop on it. At the last census there were nearly thirty-five times
as many farm workers in Los Angeles County, within and around
the West's largest city, as in all the state of Alaska; and the two
groups of farm workers were much alike, serving city people
nearby, and emphasizing a factorylike kind of dairy-farming. It
was not until 1950 that rural farm population specifically excluded
persons in rural areas paying cash rents for house and yard only,
and persons in institutions, summer camps, motels, and tourist
camps, all of whom tended to occur more in the West than in
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other regions, and who were no more agricultural in occupations
and concerns than Marie Antoinette at the Petit Trianon.
The Far West was urban, and urban in distinctive ways, long
before the people of its cities spilled over into the countryside,
before jet aircraft lifted modern industrial equipment and labor
forces to a new mining frontier. (The public-address systems of
Alaska Airlines ask passengers to put on their seatbelts in an excruciating parody of Robert W. Service, but the red and gold flaps,
fringes, and tassels on the planes and the stewardesses recall that
the miners of '97, like those of '69, did not spend all their time in
the wilderness.) Looking around the rim of the Pacific, one may
be tempted to generalize that the newer the settlement, the greater
its cities. Not only Los Angeles but also Sydney, Hongkong, and
Jakarta, the children of other colonial powers, are larger than
Rome, Madrid, Constantinople, and Vienna, the great European
metropolises of the era of discovery; Mexico City is more than
twice as large as any of them; and most of the growth of these
new Romes has occurred within the last century.
Some of these Pacific cities may have developed at first chiefly
because of their distance from the European heartland, as termini
or way stations on world-wide systems of transportation so extensive that they required secondary centers, as a long-distance
telephonic cable requires amplifiers or repeaters. Anchorage, with
its abundance of airplane service connecting three continents, recalls Honolulu in the days when clipper ships,out of New England
stopped there on their way to Canton; or Singapore, which Sir
Stamford RafHes founded as the most strategic stopping place
midway between India and China, a then jungle-covered island
that remains a great city now without either the Royal Navy or
Malaya itself to support it. The thought cannot be altogether
reassuring if it takes us to other way stations that have lost their
traffic as trading routes have changed-to Gander, where we used
to stop on the way to Europe; or Fort Benton, head of navigation
on the Missouri River; or Greytown, which for a few years the
Vanderbilts used as the eastern transfer point on the Nicaraguan
route between the oceans and which might have been the Caribbean terminus for a Nicaraguan canal; or Seville, European port
for the Americas before the Guadalquivir River silted up; or
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countless heads of track on expanding railroad systems, each one
declining as track moved beyond it.
Early Far Western cities were also advance bases for the
occupation of their hinterlands. Instead of developing to handle
the surpluses of farmers who raised more than they could eat, or,
like some of the outposts of ancient Rome, to house the camp
followers and sutlers and pensioners who gathered about frontier
garrisons, Western cities sometimes preceded nearly all else. San
Francisco was the staging area first for the American military
occupation of northern California and then for the first great
swarming into the Western mines, when the Golden Gate opened
into the gold of the Mother Lode. The New York Volunteers came
there in 1847, speculating in city lots even before the city was
formally American. No one could know for several years where
the chief city on the Bay would be, whether it would be instead at
Benicia, or Alviso, or the half-forgotten site whose developers
called it New York of the Pacific. Each of these and others had
its boosters. But it was clear from the time the first Americans
came that they would need a city. They learned that they could
not move directly from the East to homesteads in this new West
as pioneer settlers along the Ohio River and its tributaries sometimes had simply picked homes while drifting downstream on
flatboats or rafts. The first important resident American merchant
in California, Thomas Larkin, had settled first at Monterey, the
Mexican capital and port for the cattle ranches of the Salinas
Valley, and had later opened a branch office on the other bay, at
San Francisco, as business developed there. And so Alaska has
needed Anchorage, which has some of the qualities of San Francisco-and also some of Las Vegas, which began as a construction
camp for the Salt Lake line and then for Hoover Dam-as Anchorage was construction camp for the Alaska Railroad and then
for Elmendorf Air Force Base.
Most of the great treks of the emigrants overland to the Far
West took place against backgrounds of wilderness, from the
Platte to the Humboldt and the passes of the Sierra Nevada, or
along the Snake and the Columbia. But they depended on settled
places that became cities, beginning with those on or near the
Missouri River, like Independence, where the companies assembled to gather supplies, make ready their wagons, choose their
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captains, plan the strategy of the journey, and await the day when
the prairies were firm enough after the winter's snows to bear
their teams and green enough to feed them. They headed, when
they could, for a settled place on the way, above all others Salt
Lake City, which lay off the direct route but was worth a detour
to exchange worn animals for fresh and to prepare to cross the
desert beyond.
The Mormons had planned Utah as a pastoral and agricultural colony, a modem Israel, but it became almost against their
will one of the most urban of Western territories and states. (It
was a Mormon with a taste for more urban opportunities than
Brigham Young proposed to develop, Sam Brannan, who shouted
the news of the first gold rush on the streets of San Francisco-"Gold, gold on the American Riverl"-after having first prudently
invested in San Francisco real estate and cornered the market in
mining tools.) Pushing on from the Mormon metropolis, most
companies of emigrants ~ispersed only when they reached Fort
Vancouver on the Columbia, where the Hudson's Bay Company
opened its stores and offered refreshment, or Sutler's Fort on the
Sacramento, or perhaps San Francisco itself.
The city remained important and necessary even when the
discovery of gold made men who had come to seek their fortunes
in San Francisco want to get away from it as fast as they could
and to the mines. In fact, the gold rushes, which briefly emptied
the city when the news first arrived, then filled it as never before
and made it more necessary. The miners came there more than
the farmers who had begun to make the journey in the early 1840s,
both because there were more of them and because more of them,
being Eastern men and in a hurry and well enough off to pay
their passage, came by sea. Ships required a poi:t, especially on a
coast that has few natural harbors, and so did seafaring men and
men who had begun their journeys at other ports and were accustomed to urban ways. They stopped for mail, for news of the new
country, and for supplies they would need in it. Then if they
found gold at the mines, they came to the city to spend it; or, if
they did not, to work for men who had found it; or to invest in the
new country; or to get out of it on their way back east. The city
offered relief from the hardships of the mines, well-cooked food as
a change from beans and salt pork, and other familiar creature
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comforts and entertainments. Along with store goods of all kinds,
by the yard, pound, and bottle, the city imported the best and the
worst of the theatre, and invented species of theatre peculiarly its
own. The entertainers that play at the hotels of Las Vegas today
descend from those that the saloonkeepers of San Francisco and
Seattle and other Western cities hired to supplement and encourage the traffic at the bar: the miners who came there from the
Mother Lode and later from the Yukon had much to make up for
since they last saw city lights, and to save time they liked to look
while they drank and drink while they looked. Eventually some
acts moved from saloons to theatres as family entertainment, and
miners' gold helped to finance vaudeville circuits that extended
along the newly completed railroads from Puget Sound to San
Francisco Bay, and to the north country as well. 3 Vaudeville became a significant item of export from West to East even before
the Far Western states began to ship more fruit, vegetables, and
lumber than gold, livestock, and wheat.
Much of the early Western city seemed temporary, expendable-composed of jerry-built houses that could not have lasted
long even without the fires that from time to time swept over it.
Where the climate permitted, and also where it did not, builders
often used burlap and paper for partitions and substituted them
for wooden siding. A decision to use masomy tended to represent
a judgment that the city would last as much longer as the difference in time between laying brick and stretching cloth, as well as
a judgment that the rates of return on trade had fallen to the point
where a man might not easily recover costs between fires. Speculation in land under tidewater at San Francisco became profitable
not because men joined in civic spirit to reclaim land but because
they dispersed without it to seek gold: the Bay had seemed a
forest of abandoned ships in 1849, as crews followed passengers to
the mines. The rotting hulls compacted into the mud; speculators
claimed their sites as city lots and built streets, houses, and conventional docking facilities over them; and the modern shoreline
took shape.
Individual city dwellers sustained the transient dimension of
the typical Western city well after it became clear that the city
itself would last. Many of them were single males rather than
heads of families, as the populations of some of the most Western
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of the Western states are still predominantly male today. We see
this now most clearly in Alaska, newest of the Western states,
where males exceed females by about one-third. But even California and Oregon, oldest of the Far Western states, are less female than the nation as a whole. When they married, the early
city dwellers, like the Alaskans today, still lived more than other
Americans in transient style, many of them in rented quarters,
hotels and apartments, rather than in their own houses. The
phenomenon of hotel-living in the early Far West was marked
enough to inspire frequent attempts to explain it. Some traced it
simply to the costs of rent, servants, and fuel. ( Because they could
not keep their homes warm, observed an agent of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, wives · went out during the day and husbands
after dinner, and so fell into temptation. 4 ) An alternative was
moving to a hotel, where the inconvenience of keeping children
was such that most people had none or only one or two, and so
could further postpone finding homes of their own. Mark Twain
left a record of such domestic arrangements when he complained
of trying to write to the accompaniment of childish voices at the
Lick House in San Francisco, and of how he turned to devising
lists of remedies to give to their mothers-for measles, tea with a
tablespoonful of arsenic; for fits, soaking in a barrel of rain water
overnight; for stammering, removing the underjaw; for brain
fever, removing the brains.5 Whether as cause or as effect, the
low incidence of the traditional family household in Western cities
made it appear that life there was unstable, poised for change.
The city was indeed a temporary abode for many who were
there at any one time, tourists and fortune-seekers. But many remained, some predisposed by their backgrounds to favor urban
residence and occupation. As a forty-niner observed, while the
older Western states drew their inhabitants from the outer circumferertce of settlement, and therefore chiefly from the rural
classes, California had drawn "a complete ready-made population
of active and capable men of every trade and profession"-a cross
section of the East.6 Relatively few of the early inhabitants of the
mining territories and states were prepared by experience or expectation for agriculture: either they came from commercial stock
or at least they came hoping for the more rapid advancement of
commerce and other urban occupations. For a long time the rich
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men of San Francisco and Portland and other cities, many of them
originally merchants, felt that they could increase their riches
more surely by reinvesting in merchandising than by venturing
into the less familiar risks of agriculture or, for that matter, into
mining and manufacturing.
The Americans' preference for city life left the Far Western
countryside disproportionately to immigrants from Europe and
Asia; to Englishmen who came to be sportsmen or ranchers rather
than financiers or clubmen; to Italians, Yugoslavs, and Japanese
who came to be freeholders ( if possible, homesteaders) rather
than tenants. A study of farmers in Oklahoma showed that those
who personified the standard American rural virtues were not native Americans but Czechs: they raised the best crops, kept the
neatest barns, bought the most machinery, earned the highest incomes, stayed the longest, went most often to church.7 Yet immigrants also turned to the city, sometimes because alien land laws
kept them from the agricultural life that they originally preferred,
sometimes because, arriving without money to buy land, they had
taken jobs digging ditches or carrying bricks, and then had found
other opportunities. While the average early Far Western city
offered little of the industrial employment that held so many newcomers in the East and Middle West in the late nineteenth and
· early twentieth centuries, wages in construction and at the docks
were good. Irishmen moved from track-laying into the building
trades. In many cities, particularly in the mining territories, German Jews dominated general merchandising. By the time some
immigrants became rural proprietors, it was as financiers or as
organizers of giant food-processing corporations that reached out
to control their sources of supply in the classic style of the vertical
trust, and with no more occasion to move to the land than J. P.
Morgan had to live at a coal mine. Others, who had gone early to
the land, in time became Americanized or Westernized enough to
leave it. Even the Basques, who moved from the Pyrenees to take
up their traditional occupation of sheepherder in Nevada and
eastern Oregon, moved on to town predictably enough so that the
stockmen insisted on special loopholes in the immigration laws, to
permit others to replace them.
Meanwhile the rural Far West achieved much of the shape of
the city, long before it became twentieth-century suburbs. Except
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in Utah, one of the geographically least promising parts of the
West, agriculture was slower to develop than in the older states.
Although some Western farmers made enormous profits in selling
foodstuffs to miners, the high cost of transportation that justified
local prices also discouraged raising crops for export, while the
market at mining camps was too small and unstable to support
substantial development. Insecure and experimental in the first
stages of settlement, so that the rapid turnover of farm population
that James C. Malin found in the first generation in Kansas 8 represented a fairly common pattern, Far Western agriculture tended
to be highly capitalized when at last it came into substantial production. While practical farming experience was more useful than
the promoters said, the dirt farmer often had to give way to the
capitalist and executive, and with him disappeared many traditional rural ways. Profits in raising wheat in California in the
1870s, as the Grangers discovered, depended on access to capital
for shipping as well as for machinery.9 When the Southern Pacific
sold land to family farmers, to foster more intensive agriculture,
the irrigationists of the San Joaquin Valley ended by paying heavy
tribute to the railroad and to Miller and Lux, who bought control
of an undercapitalized irrigation system. By the time refrigerated
cars were ready to carry Western fruits and vegetables to Eastern
markets, in edible condition and at rates that the sellers could
absorb, horticulture had changed along with transportation. The
lemon and cantaloupe and lettuce crops of the Southwest required
machinery and packing houses beyond the means of small owners.
Some of the "associations" that distributed them were not true
cooperatives but proprietors and processors on vast scales.10 Advocates of irrigation agriculture liked to describe an urban way of
life in the irrigated orchard lands of the Southwest, where a family
might support itseH on five or ten acres along an electric interurban railroad line that brought the city and its services to the
doorstep. But irrigation might mean not urban neighborliness for
small landowners but elaborate organization and heavy capitalization in units as large as the cattle ranches of Mexican times, and
a society that was urban in the sense that its leaders were well-todo businessmen and managers, who visited Los Angeles or San
Francisco as often as the cattle barons of the high plains visited
Cheyenne and Denver, if they did not live there.
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New techniques of production and distribution meant that
some of the mountain and desert states were able to shift from
mining to agriculture as their gold and silver mines gave out or
became less profitable in the 1880s and 1890s. For the most part,
however, they did not become less urban in way of life even while
vast new areas came under the plow or went into grazing. In the
hard-rock mining country, prospectors gave way to hired laborers,
most of them recent immigrants, though in the census records,
since many Western mining towns were small, they often appeared
as rural rather than urban population. The new miners were less
conspicuous than the old-the press said little of their style of life,
and politicians seldom catered to their interests-but the process
of assimilation to the conditions of Eastern factory-town life that
Rodman Paul has described in the gold mines of California11 was
more rapid and more complete in the technically more rural
copper-mining states.
Consolidation and mechanization came later but more rapidly still in the Western lumber industry, which like mining developed along significantly urban lines despite its legendary
picaresque heroes and its traditions of individualism. Frederick
Weyerhaeuser, who bought 900,000 acres at six dollars an acre
from the Northern Pacific in 1900, began manufacturing lumber
on a large scale in 1915, in a new electrified mill at Everett. 12 The
new organizations were slower to solve their human than their
mechanical problems, and the lumber industry faced as radical
and violent a species of unionism as the Western mining industry
had faced a few years earlier. In 1917, the same year when the
Russian Marxists established a Communist dictatorship in a country that according to Marxian dialectic was least ready for it among
the major powers, strikes of loggers and millworkers in some of
the newest Western American states threatened to stop production
of airplanes and ships needed in war.
The desperate conditions and violent conduct of Western
labor at Bisbee, Butte, Centralia, Everett, and other mining and
lumber centers brought attention to conditions that represented
concentration of control over natural resources in the West more
than they represented either the nature of Western cities or the
relation of Western society to them. Most Westerners have known
as little of conditions in company towns as the members of the
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Rockefeller family knew of conditions at their own mines at Ludlow, Colorado, in 1914. Dependent though they have been on
outside capital, restless under the decisions that outsiders have
made and the tolls that they have levied, Westerners have looked
much to financial centers of their own. The more typical and vital ·
instruments of Western economic development, at least since the
era of the factories and forts that the great fur-trading companies,
British, Russian, and American, built at York, Sitka, Astoria, and
Vancouver, have not been the compounds of corporations but
rather the Western cities themselves. Beginning often as facilities
for outsiders and transients, whose purposes they serve much as
the ports that an invading army builds handle military rather than
civilian traffic, the principal cities have become in varying degrees
autonomous forces. Even when they served to relay orders from
higher authority, their distance from the East and from Europe
permitted some of them to develop and exercise authority of their
own. The agent received or took the means to become the independent capitalist. Sometimes cities have played mixed roles.
Seattle was still waiting, hat in hand, on James J. Hill, whose
pleasure gave it the terminus of his railroad, when it began setting
conditions for life in Alaska. Especially on the coast, the regional
metropolises have ruled much on their own behalf over wide
though varying jurisdictions, rather than simply as agents of still
greater masters to the East. Making some of the major economic
decisions for their hinterlands, they have provided the financial
and managerial services that complex economic systems require.
San Francisco once was banker, broker, freight-forwarder, and
commission merchant for the Western part of the continent from
Alaska to much of Mexico. It is still the Far West's chief financial
center, outreaching Los Angeles in bank clearances.
The authority of the Far Western city and the respect it
commands rest on more than simple economic vassalage. For all
the contrast in landscape between metropolis and interior, attitudes and ways of life differ less than between city and farm in
the Middle West, the South, and the East. Westerners cherish
animosities toward each other, but slurs against Seattle are not
welcome in Seattle's territory as they are in Portland's, or against
Los Angeles in Los Angeles's territory as in San Francisco's. The
people of the Tanana Valley, the northern slope, and the south-
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eastern panhandle may resent Anchorage as Anchorage resents
Seattle, but they enjoy it and are proud of it, too. When Californians-at one time as far south as Los Angeles-and Nevadans
spoke of San Francisco simply as "the city," they did so not in
repugnance or enmity, as toward a Western Sodom or Nineveh
(though they were not necessarily prejudiced against Sodom and
Nineveh, either), but in familiar pride and affection. Mark Twain
wrote to his mother that when he took leave from his job at
Virginia City to visit San Francisco he felt as much at home on
Montgomery Street as on Main Street back in Hannibal; he called
the Occidental Hotel "Heaven on the half shell," since it would be
sacrilege to say "Heaven on the entire shell."13 Other Westerners
rejoiced more soberly in Portland, more spiritually in Salt Lake
City, more speculatively in Los Angeles, more alcoholically, if
that were possible, in Seattle, but rejoiced nonetheless, in appropriate tones of hyperbole.
The Westerner's identification with his metropolis, his acceptance of its standards, appeared in what he did when he came
into money. A few mining millionaires went to the East to live, or
to Europe, like James G. Fair, or Darius Mills, or William Andrews Clark, whether because they were ashamed of the wives
they had taken from behind the bar or before the washtub, or
because their wives were ashamed of them and wanted more
decorative husbands for their daughters. It was natural that some
of them should look to urban centers and societies other than their
own, especially since so many Westerners had thought of themselves as merely sojourners in a land too barbarous for permanent
residence, while many of those who by chance became rich had
been responsible enough for its reputation for barbarism so that
they might prefer to live among those who had not known them
when they were poor. Montana's graveyards were not big enough,
the saying went, so that some of her rich men retired to Florida or
to New York City, where William Andrews Clark spent seven
million dollars building a chateau on Fifth Avenue that even in
his time became a showpiece of bad taste, ridiculed in musical
comedy. ( Disappointed in his ambition to become ambassador to
France, Clark spent his last years filling his mansion with paintings of which he boasted that they ceased to have monetary value
from the moment that he acquired them. When he died in 1925,
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the Metropolitan Museum promptly agreed, in a sense he had not
intended, by refusing to accept them as a gift.) But Clark and
other copper millionaires may have had special reasons for leaving
Montana, beyond millionaire-sized social ambition; few men
formed strong sentimental attachments to Butte, a grim industrial
slum dominated by its vast open mine and by smelters that poured
out corrosive fumes on rich and poor alike. Other rich Montanans
built their mansions instead on comfortable hillside sites in Helena
and other towns where some of their families still live. The rich
men of Colorado concentrated their pride and their ambitions on
Capitol Hill; those of California first on Rincon Hill and then on
Nob Hill in San Francisco, where the new cable-car system served
the castles that the railroad tycoons built in the 1870s and 1880s.
Rincon Hill, recalled a member of an old San Francisco family,
was one of the few places "in those days where one could be born
respectably."14 For all the restless ambition with which Westerners moved about, like quicksilver, a cont~mporary said, staying
nowhere longer than the gold attracted them, many sought respectability in such neighborhoods in the cities that ruled their
parts of the West. What they did when they came into money
tells something about their purposes and their values when they
were still poor.
The members of the new Western plutocracy built their
brownstone and marble monuments to themselves early enough
to astound Eastern visitors by the speed with which they had
transformed a wilderness. Tourists who made conducted tours to
San Francisco in the 1880s saw town houses as Eastern or European as the Palace Hotel itself, finest of its kind anywhere
when it opened in 1875. Yet the priorities that Western citydwellers set for themselves appear more clearly in earlier scenes,
within the first decade after the gold rush, as forty-Diners began to have time to spend their money. Luxurious private residences usually came later than in Middle Western and Eastern
cities of comparable wealth; most urban services came earlier.
About all that tourists could desire were available when Richard
Henry Dana, returning to San Francisco in 1859, found himself in
a city of 100,000 inhabitants, his hotel on filled land in the sandy
cove where he and his shipmates had beached boats from the ship
Alert twenty-four years before. Dana marveled at newspapers,
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theatres, and cathedrals, as well as commerce surpassing that of
Liverpool.1 5 These represented some of the more portable of
urban customs, already well established, as a bivouacking army
establishes such services for its transient personnel alongside messhall and post exchange. If he had stayed longer, he would have
noted also the unusual counts of restaurants and laundries, especially Chinese and French, at different price levels, and of commission merchants, lawyers, bankers, physicians, booksellers, photographers, and barbers. The service trades flourished, and especially those that served and exploited single men away from home.
The distribution of occupations and facilities described a population younger and better educated than the national average,
whose tastes and spending habits corresponded closely-with
some allowance for youth and for distance from relatives and
neighbors who might disapprove-to its urban Eastern background. Often its tastes outreached its condition; one had to take
the measure of a Western city not merely by its size or even by
the pace at which it lived within small space, but by its aspirations, which made it strive to make visitors recognize it as equal
to the East, giving them Eastern entertainment within four walls
instead of taking them into the wilderness. ( It was only after
Westerners were confident that they had destroyed their distinctive wildness that they joined the Sierra Club to celebrate it and
to fight losing battles to preserve remnants of it.) The discrepancies between the raw Western setting of the nineteenth century
and the ways of Eastern immigrants sometimes were as marked as
those between the great cities of our time and the ways of refugees from rural poverty in Mississippi, Puerto Rico, or Mexico;
and often imported ways were fully as persistent. 16
Nearly four decades ago H. L. Mencken published in The
American Mercury a long article, in three sections, entitled "The
Worst American State." It consisted essentially of one hundred
and six tables in which he listed the states in order of rank in
different categories-literacy, income, rate of reproduction, alcoholism, reading habits, and so on-in most of which Mississippi
stood at one end. For the purposes of this paper the more pertinent fact is that most of the Far Western states, and particularly
those of the Pacific slope, clustered together at the other ends of
most distributions along with the most urban states of the East.17

The Urban Frontier of the Far West I 21

Similar resemblances between Far West and East have appeared
in some other surveys, particularly those in which education is an
essential factor. 18
Mencken's data correspond both to considerable literary evidence of Far Western traits in earlier times and to studies of
demography and ofleadership. They do not, however, cover some
interesting deviations from the Eastern urban model.
While in some respects San Francisco and the rest of the early
Far West copied and imported Eastern cities in colors as bold and
measure as generous as the originals, they also left some features
behind. That the gold rushers and their suc.cessors from California
to Alaska were an uncommonly literate breed was evident from
their voluminous and inveterate diary-keeping and letter-writing,
as well as from their appetites for newspapers, magazines, and
books. Virtually all Western cities of any size had their printing
and publishing businesses and their libraries, which sometimes
were adjuncts to saloons, like early theatres, before they branched
out on their own. As Mark Twain said, a flourishing literary paper
was the surest sign, with a crowded police docket, that money was
plentiful and business was good. Book peddlers and traveling
librarians operated urban extension services far into the mining
interior. But substantial colleges appeared much later than literary industries and college men.
The state of California established a university only in 1868,
twenty years after the discovery of gold and eighteen years after
statehood, when it had a population of about half a million. The
delay is especially striking because California was both richer
than other new states and more in need of the technical training,
as in mining and hydraulic engineering, that W estem universities
have since emphasized. Oregon waited almost as long, thirteen
years after statehood, to authorize a university, and then four
years more after that, until 1876, before providing the money for
buildings and a faculty. The states of the upper Mississippi Valley, which were roughly contemporary, established their universities either in the first legislature immediately following admission
or even before admission, although in general their people were
poorer than the Californians and Oregonians and less likely themselves to be college men. Thus Kansas-in this respect somewhat
more Middle Western than Far Western-founded its state uni-
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versity in 1865, understandably waiting four years after statehood.
Michigan had established its university in 1817, a full twenty years
before statehood, authorizing the faculty "to establish colleges,
academies, school libraries, museums, athenaeums, botanic gardens, [&] laboratories ... ," when its population was less than
eight thousand. But the territory's revenues and its intelligentsia
were both so slight that it economized by dividing the thirteen
professorships of the University between the president and the
vice-president, who also served as Presbyterian and Roman Catholic clergy respectively. The president and holder of seven professorships received a salary of $25 a year, the vice-president and
holder of six professorships $18.75.19 Nor did the lag in publicly
supported higher education in the Far West mean that instead
private institutions had developed on the scale of the East Coast:
the best-known private colleges appeared later still, Stanford and
the California Institute of Technology both in 1891, Reed College
in 1911, most of the Claremont group since the 1920s.
Eventually the Far Western states spent more on public
colleges per student and per taxpayer than the rest of the country,
which came to look to them for standards of support and service.
When in 1947 a presidential commission published a statement of
goals in higher education, it found that the states of the Pacific
slope on the average had reached them and that California had
exceeded them. From long before that, by the last decades of the
nineteenth century, expenditures for subcollegiate education and
public education as a whole had run high; and the earliest statistics available show that the Far West has been high in numbers
of college graduates and years of school completed. Apparently
the Pacific slope has lagged in building colleges while valuing
education not less than other parts of the country value it but
more. West Coast graduates of Eastern colleges, whose incidence
from the earliest years of American settlement has been high (as
in recent years the incidence of Western subscribers to the New
York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Christian Science
Monitor has been high on the coast), long have sent their sons
and daughters to out-of-state schools. Living at Monterey in the
1840s, Consul Larkin sent his boys to a school that New England
missionaries ran at Honolulu, and thence to Harvard-a fair distance away in the day of the clipper ship-thus exporting cattle
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hides and importing sheepskins. Down to the last years of the
century most of the students at the Far Western state universities
other than California's were in the preparatory departments, doing
essentially secondary-school work; they were ahead of the clientele in Michigan Territory, where the University began by founding primary schools. If students went further, there was a good
chance that it would be to a university out of state. The tradition
of going away to college, and especially of going to colleges in
older and more urban states, persists still in the newer states of
the Far West, including the newest and most remote of them,
Alaska and Hawaii.
To the extent that the argument of urbanhood depends on
finding traits, values, and habits in the Far West associated with
the urban Northeast, it may lose some of its force as the composition of the Western population changes. From the building of
the first transcontinental railroads, and still more from the building of the first low-priced automobiles, migration to the Far West
from rural Miqdle Western, Southern and South Central states has
increased relative to migration from urban Eastern states. The
growth of fundamentalist religious sects in the West, the recent
national prominence of some practitioners of California's peculiar
politics, and the failure of southern Californians to support effective public transportation and other urban services-or even to
keep the system of public transportation that they once had-seem
to reflect this shift in origins, first from New England and New
York to Iowa and Missouri, then to Oklahoma and Texas.
Yet there are indications that there has not been an essential
decline of urban traits, despite the changes in Far Western society
that have come to focus recently, at the Cow Palace in San Francisco in 1964, at Watts in 1965, at the state capitol in Sacramento
since 1967. Despite the visibility of emigrant sharecroppers from
rural Arkansas and Oklahoma in the thirties and from rural Mississippi in the forties and fifties, the newcomers of the last halfcentury on the average have only confirmed the urban shape of
the Far West; even at the height of migration from the dust bowl
to California, they raised the educational level of California's
cities.20 Meanwhile, traditional patterns of behavior, .including
those of a more traditionally urban age, continue to prevail even
in a region whose fluidity threatens to erode tradition: on close
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scrutiny, the new Western politics is not so new as it seems. 21
Further, much of the suburbanization and dispersion of Far Western urban life corresponds to what has been happening in other
parts of the country, including the East. If New York City does
not appear to be as fragmented a metropolis22 as Los Angeles, it
may be in part because more of it developed in the era of the
horsecar, less in the eras of the electric streetcar and the automobile. 23 The opening of the Far West in the 1840s and 1850s had
coincided not only with the acceleration of the American economy
that W. W. Rostow and others have called take-off but also with
still sharper shifts of population from countryside to city, which
made it natural that the new states should share heavily in the
new urban shape of the old. So the metropolitanization of the
countryside in the Northeast that began about the time of the
First World War inevitably had its counterpart in the rapidly
growing Far West, which by the 1940s and 1950s was moving
beyond the East in kind as well as in numbers. 24 This tendency
of the more rapidly growing parts of the nation to partake of
national trends in accentuated form is what a reporter for the
New York Times referred to when, describing traffic in Los Angeles, he wrote, paraphrasing Lincoln Steffens, " 'I have seen the
Future-and it doesn't work.' "25
Historians have been slow to recognize the urban dimension
of the American West, even while in national historiography as a
whole, as Roy Lubove has said recently, "the city threatens to
subsitute for the frontier, or settlement of the West, as the key
to ... the evolution of American life."26 Their slowness has been
especially striking in the Far West, where the Middle Western
frontier zone of two to six inhabitants per square mile meant as
little in cattle-grazing and prospecting country as in its urban
oases. Perhaps they could not easily believe in cities that not only
preceded farms but also employed their populations in service
trades rather than in either industry or agriculture, and whose
immorality often was not that of the rough frontiersman that Bret
Harte described for Eastern readers but rather that of the transient who refused to accept social responsibility, as Josiah Royce
pointed out, or, as some might say today, refused to become involved, because he thought of himself as an outsider away from
home. 27
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The urban Far West illustrates both the older and the newer
interpretations of American life, not only in that it paradoxically
has been and still is, more than other parts of the country, the
site of opportunity on the land and in space, and at the same time
has been and is urbanized, but also in that its people, who feel
free from the land even while they find opportunity on it, have
long resembled the immigrants of the urban East. 28 Well before
Robert E. Park and other social scientists traced marginal man in
East and West, one of the most eminent of applied sociologists,
William Randolph Hearst, identified him by reaching clienteles on
the two coasts that, despite their different schooling and social
origins, turned together from their private concerns to listen to the
message that Hearst shouted to them in large headlines. 29
Building cities when Congress supposed that they wanted
above all else farms, living in hotels rather than on homesteads,
Far Westerners in our time have abandoned the city in its traditional form, sometimes, as at Los Angeles, before they had finished
building it. By the time we recognized their urbanness, they were
no longer interested in transplanting Manhattan but had turned
more than other Americans to the intermetropolitan peripheries;
the westward movement brought forth a continuing Western
movement in a transurban civilization in which time replaced
space. 30 At first Far Westerners were mobile essentially because
most of them were male and, as economic men, so intent on their
economic goals that they could not take time to build homes and
raise families in the traditional settings of American family life; in
time they were mobile because the pursuit of amenities loomed
larger in their lives than the pursuit of gold and because in an
affiuent society where the family was no longer economically
necessary, low birth rates continued even after the sexes were
substantially equal. 31 Once they had aspired to build seaports
and railroad termini where geography promised large commercial
traffic; now they planned new towns for recreation and retirement, in areas whose main attraction was climate. Nineteenthcentury visions of Far Western commerce, with that of the Orient
surpassing that of North Atlantic and European ports, seem as
remote as Macaulay's vision of the traveler from New Zealand at
the ruins of London Bridge; but London Bridge itself is coming
to a city that exists more in the minds of its promotors than on a
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new Thames in the desert. Wherever the West-to-come will build
its principal metropolis, the prospect continues that by one definition or another the West will continue to be urban.
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The Spanish-Americans
in the Southwest,

1848-1900
Rodman W. Paul, California Institute of Technology

One of the mysteries of the current demand that more attention be paid to the history of ethnic
minorities has been the surprisingly slow development of an agitation to give the Mexican-Americans a more prominent place in
our histories. Probably one reason for the moderate nature of the
protest has been uncertainty as to how to classify the MexicanAmericans. Are they really a racial minority, when they range
through every degree of admixture of Indian and white blood?
Or are they more properly a cultural minority, rather like the
Mormons, a cultural minority whose special status is the result of
a complex blend of ancestral origins, language, religion, habits
and attitudes, level of vocational skills and education, and geographical influences?
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As a minority the Mexican-Americans have lacked cohesiveness. Groups in one of the Southwestern states have not been in
close touch with comparable groups in other Southwestern states,
and thus there has been little foundation for a regional, much less
for a national, movement of protest. Unity of effort has been particularly elusive because the flow of immigration has continued
for so long that at any given historical moment there have been
among the Mexican-American population many quite different
degrees of cultural adaptation to the peculiar mores of the United
States.
Today all but a small proportion of the four million people of
Mexican or Spanish antecedents 1 are either recent arrivals or are
the children or grandchildren of immigrants who have come to
this country since 1900, and more probably since 1910 or even
1920. In the main these Spanish-speaking Americans have come
here to work as seasonal or unskilled laborers, and in most Southwestern communities they have been relegated to minority status,
which means that they have been excluded from full participation
in the life of the predominant society.
But in a historical sense there stand behind these twentiethcentury Mexican-Americans several small but exceedingly interesting groups of nineteenth-century predecessors. To call them
ancestors would be an exaggeration. Some were in the Southwest
when the Anglo-Americans arrived, and had been there for
periods varying from several decades to several generations;
others infiltrated from northern Mexico during the half-century
after 1848; still others were the offspring of these pioneers, and
being born under the American flag, were American citizens from
the beginning, however Hispanic their daily life.
Roughly speaking, and with some allowance for the later
addition of the Gadsden Purchase territory, there seem to have
been a little less than 75,000 Spanish-speaking people, other than
Indians, in the Southwest at the time of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo in 1848. To this original 75,000 should be added a second
75,000 who were recorded by the census of 1890 as constituting
the Southwest's Mexican-born immigrant population in that particular census year. 2 Neither of these two ascertainable figures
gives any clue to two large unknowns: how many children were
born to Spanish-speaking United States citizens during the second
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half of the nineteenth century and were raised in what the social
scientists term a "culturally Spanish" environment; and how many
Spanish-speaking immigrants other than the 75,000 Mexicans recorded in 1890 had come and gone since 1848, after having been
for a few years or a few months a part of the life of the Southwest.
Both of these unknown elements must have been of significant size. One would expect a high birthrate among a rural
Catholic population that traditionally has loved children and emphasized the family. As for temporary immigrants, we are told
that during the Gold Rush years a folk migration of several
thousand Mexicans came north each year and returned home at
the end of the mining season, while Chileans and Peruvians, in
smaller numbers, likewise formed a part of the Gold Rush population.3 After the migrations of the Gold Rush, there was the
unascertainable factor of Mexicans from the northern provinces
of Sonora, Chihuahua, and Coahuila who crossed and recrossed
the long and largely unguarded border between Brownsville and
Baja California during the course of fifty years. Lacking a reliable basis, any estimate of the size of the "culturally Spanish"
population of the late nineteenth century becomes guesswork. It
is hard to see how the total can have been less than several hundred thousand by the end of the century.
Generalization about these nineteenth-century stocks is difficult. Carey McWilliams has remarked that "there is no more
heterogeneous ethnic group in the United States than the Spanishspeaking."4 Looking back upon the Spanish-speaking pioneers
who made the first settlements in the Southwest, a modern Hispano-American scholar has declared:
The colonial Hispanos were not culturally homogeneous. The
Nuevo Mexicanos, settled in the region as early as 1598, were
different from their cousins, the Californios and the Texanos,
who arrived much later. The date of migration and settlement, the attendant cultural concomitants, geographic isolation, natural resources, the number and kind of Indians
among whom they settled, and many other factors resulted in
not one Spanish-speaking people but several, each with distinctive cultures. The outlook on life and the values, the
allegiances, the biology, the very speech of these colonial
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settlers varied greatly; and though all were Spanish-speaking,
they can be thought of as different peoples. 5

If they differed in their colonial origins, so did these older
stocks continue to display a high degree of diversity in their later
history. Everything made for dispersion. Their principal centers,
such as San Antonio, Santa Fe, Tucson, San Diego, and Monterey,
were separated from each other by extraordinarily great distances
and geographical obstacles, not to mention hostile Indians in the
earlier years and Americans in the later ones. In the pastoral,
agricultural; and semiliterate societies in which most HispanoAmericans lived, there were neither economic, social, nor intellectual incentives to frequent contact and communication between widely separated points. A few engaged in long-distance
freighting, packing, or driving in order to haul in American-made
goods and export hides, wool, livestock, and other simple products,
but most of them rarely ventured beyond visits to kinfolk, fellow
villagers, or not-too-distant rancher-friends.
Localism was pronounced, and nowhere was localism more
evident than in the richly varied pattern of assimilation to AngloAmerican culture. The adjustment made in California was quite
different from that of Texas; Arizona's was unlike that of its
neighbor New Mexico. Within the single territory of New Mexico
there were upper-class families that became so thoroughly Americanized as to be able to slip into Anglo-American society at will,
while the mass of the rural population remained "culturally Spanish" and spoke English with difficulty or not at all, even after their
families for several generations had passed·their entire lives under
the jurisdiction of the United States. With medieval agricultural
practices and rudimentary economic arrangements, these New
Mexican farm villages survived into modem times as retarded
alien enclaves of American citizens on American soil, precisely as
if they were candidates for economic aid to an underdeveloped
foreign country.
To a surprising degree the older stocks of Hispano-Americans
held themselves apart from the several populations that in successive periods surrounded them. In the very beginning of the
colonial era, the small number of Spanish men of course bred with
Indian women-as the early settlers in Old Mexico had, because
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there was no alternative-so that the Spanish-speaking people of
the Southwest became of predominantly mixed descent (mestizo);
but once a supply of eligible young women of mixed blood had
been established, intermarriage became infrequent. Something
similar happened when the first Anglo-Americans arrived. As
with all frontier populations, women were scarce among the new
arrivals. Therefore some took brides from among the HispanoAmerican women, and today many a Southwestern family that
boasts of its pioneer lineage claims an ancestress with a Spanish
name. At the annual fiestas much is made of these ties with a
romanticized "Spanish" past. But the scant evidence as to matrimonial arrangements after, say, 1880 suggests that as a large
"Anglo" population developed, intermarriage became much more
rare. Nor have the older Hispanic stocks been eager to associate
with the twentieth-century Mexican immigrants. Looking down
upon the latter as social inferiors, in most communities the older
stocks have shunned intermarriage, just as they have sought to
keep their residential districts separate.
At the opening of the American era, New Mexico had by far
the largest Spanish-speaking population, perhaps as much as fourfifths of the total in the Southwest. Most of the New Mexicans
were illiterate peasants who led an unprogressive, poverty-stricken
life in small villages or as hands on great ranches. They were
very much subject to the authority of the small class of rich landowners (ricos) or the much larger number of those who served as
patr6n or headman in each village. Only the priest approached
the power of the patr6n and rico over the lives of the common
people. Between them, rico, patr6n, and padre ruled a thoroughly
paternalistic society that was medieval in the serflike dependency
of the many upon the few.
Some of the peasants of the mid-nineteenth century were held
in debt-peonage that constituted virtually permanent bondage-and through the ignorance and helplessness of its victims this
practice continued for many years, despite the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and despite a specific
prohibitory federal statute of 1867. A federal territorial official
asserted in 1856 that, on the whole, Southern Negro slaves were
better off than New Mexicanpeons. 6
For most peasants life centered in the village and the ex-

36 / Rodman W. Paul

tended family (the familia). Both were organized as authoritarian
structures. The patr6n was the father figure of his village. He
controlled what little credit was available, owned the store if there
was one, and performed the limited middleman functions that
connected the isolated peasants with the outer world. Politically
he controlled "his" peasants, and when the Americans introduced
notions of elective government, the patr6n was quick to discover
the profit involved in delivering whatever popular vote had been
contracted for by higher authority. Within each family the senior
married man was not only a husband and biological father, but
was also the dominant, decision-making figure whose presence
gave definiteness and unity to the extended family group.
This authoritarian pattern of village and family, when taken
in conjunction with an unchanging, labor-consuming type of cropraising and livestock-herding that was medieval if not biblical in
inspiration, made the life of the peasant seem to the contemporary "Anglo" observer to be utterly devoid of incentive or opportunity for progress, while at the same time the frequency of crop
failures and stock losses in that high, dry, and sometimes Indianinfested land seemed a guarantee of perpetual debt or at least
poverty. More discriminating observers, especially after the social
sciences began to suggest whole new frames of reference for
judging alien societies, have pointed to the psychological values
inherent in this unquestionably unprogressive rural society. Life
in both the family and the village were familiar, predictable, and
congenial, however pinched in terms of income and food supply.
They were based upon a highly developed pattern of community
cooperation, best illustrated by the decisively communal nature of
New Mexico's local irrigation systems. Together the family and
the village offered a certainty in relationships and values and a
sociability unknown to the Anglo-American who, as an individual,
was aggressively trying to thrust his way into the life of the
Southwest. 7
The weakness of this psychologically tranquil, resigned existence was that it prepared the villager and his children for
nothing but a continuation of the same. Physically there was a
margin neither for safety against bad years nor for growth and
change; intellectually there was no basis for experimentation and
innovation. (The federal census of 1870 reported that more than
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half the population over ten years of age could neither read nor
write.) Natural increase of population would have put an unbearable pressure upon the scant supply of irrigable and pasture land
even if no other factors had changed. But in fact the amount of
land available to the villagers decreased greatly because acquisitive Anglos found ways to displace ignorant peasants by substituting new written land titles for the familiar unwritten customary
use of the soil. By the end of the nineteenth century the need for
additional income was so pressing that the men of the villages
were absenting themselves for months at a time in order to work
as transient laborers in other parts of the West. For a unit as
cohesive as the familia, this meant a severe social strain, mitigated
only by the role of the women, who by Hispanic tradition were
supposed to remain at home, and thus were available as a force to
hold the family together during the absence of the male head of
the household. The practice common among Negro families of
sending the wife and mother out to work as a domestic was not
popular among Spanish-speaking people.
By the opening of the twentieth century the high, dry lands
of rural New Mexico began to stand forth as a cultural island of
poverty, illiteracy, and premodem customs-however picturesque
and quaint to the eyes of Eastern visitors. While this was the fate
of probably a majority of New Mexicans during their first halfcentury under the American flag, there were some notable exceptions that showed how alert men with the right "connections"
could actually profit from the stratified and unprogressive nature
of New Mexican society. The rico class of landed proprietorsmasters of great estates (haciendas) whose varied economies produced most of the articles that they consumed and still had an
exportable surplus-had a remarkably strong position in New
Mexican life. Linked together by extensive intermarriage and
united in a typically Latin American acceptance of nepotism and
"influence," they were the obvious ruling class with whom the
incoming Anglo-Americans must deal.
Even in the 1840s some of the great families, such as the
Otero and Chavez clans, ·had in fact anticipated the new era by
sending their sons across the plains to the Missouri frontier to be
forwarded to American schools and colleges located all the way
from St. Louis to New York. Other young New Mexicans, whose

38 / Rodman W. Paul

families wished them to have practical training, were placed in
the dispatching-point headquarters of the mercantile and freighting firms that sent American-made goods to New Mexico and
handled in return New Mexico's few productions, such as wool
and hides. A class of English-speaking aristocrats was thus developed who soon moved still further into Anglo-American life by
intermarrying and forming business partnerships with "Anglos."8
The simplicity of New Mexican economic life prior to the
railroads, with a stress on freighting across the plains and handling
government supplies on contract, permitted a type of business in
which merchandising, transportation, and finance were essentially
one operation and had distinct political overtones. The abler of
the American-trained Hispano aristocrats fitted easily into this
undifferentiated politico-economic activity.
A similar development characterized the field of land titles.
Shrewd, opportunistic Anglo lawyer-politicians found their chance
in the fact that, unlike the expedient adopted for California, no
special agency to handle the tangled land titles was created by
Congress until 1891. For more than forty years land titles were
determined by special acts of Congress and by surveys, investigations, and decisions made by appointive officials in Santa Fe
and Washington. This was just the type of opening that determined lawyer-politicians wanted, and in exploiting it they formed
what came to be known as the "Santa Fe Ring," an informally
constituted, frequently changing group dedicated to fattening
their own pocketbooks through speculation in land and land
titles.9
Just as Anglo businessmen and English-speaking Hispanos
found it both advantageous and pleasant to form matrimonial and
business alliances, so the Ring impartially drew into its transactions anyone whose influence could further the group's profits.
Since Hispanos occupied most Qf the seats in the territorial legislature, dominated elections in the local constituencies, held some
of the territorial offices, and in the beginning controlled the big
landholdings, quite a few of them were able to share in the
plunder.
Whether Hispanos really were the big gainers from the operations of either the Ring or the early business houses may be
doubted. One suspects that their Anglo associates were too re-
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sourceful for that. And in any event, while some of the Hispano
upper class were prospering, many of their cousins, through inexperience with American ways, including the intricacies of acquiring legal titles to real estate, and through a proneness to
borrow and spend too freely, were losing ownership of the land
that had been the traditional basis of their power. So at best only
a portion of even the favored class were better off at the end of
the century than they had been in 1848. Still, for them the opportunity had been there, and the prominence of a few of them,
symbolized by the appointment of Miguel Antonio Otero as governor of New Mexico under McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt,
suggests that so long as New Mexico remained a predominantly
Hispanic, tradition-bound society, its accustomed Spanish-speaking leaders, quite unlike their peon dependents, might expect to
play a role of considerable importance.
Immediately adjacent to New Mexico, and at one time legally
a part of it, was the territory of Arizona. The key to understanding early Arizona is to appreciate that even at the peak of Spanish
pioneering, Arizona had never had but a very small population,
and when Mexico succeeded Spain, devastating Apache raids very
nearly brought Hispanic settlement to an end. By the close of the
1840s Spanish-speaking civilization had shrunk back to the single
frontier garrison town of Tucson. Through the Gadsden Purchase
of 1853 Tucson and Arizona south of the Gila River were transferred to the United States. This was the only part of Arizona that
had been touched significantly by Spanish and Mexican efforts to
establish missions, ranches, farms, or mines.
During the later 1850s Tucson became a crossroads and
supply center for California-bound traffic, and a few mines,
ranches, and farms were reopened. In the almost abandoned and
hitherto dispirited region, a bicultural society began to emerge,
with Tucson.as its focal point. In addition to the little group of
Spanish-speaking settlers that had never left Tucson (probably
less than one thousand in total), 10 a few English-speaking men,
not always of the most desirable sort, drifted in from both California and the Missouri frontier, while a much larger number of
Mexicans from Sonora and Chihuahua came in to form the biggest single element in the new society. The latter came chiefly as
laborers and brought with them some of their womenfolk and
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some unattached girls. Raids by Confederates, Sonoran bandits,
and Indians during the American Civil War temporarily cleaned
out the territory once more, but with the arrival of volunteer
federal troops from California, the bicultural society resumed its
slow growth, and this time with the additional asset that some
distinctive personalities from the California military contingent
decided to remain in Arizona when they were mustered out of the
volunteer force.
In several senses Arizona was more Hispanic than American
between 1853 and the later 1870s. Tucson, the largest and most
important community and the headquarters for the major business
of supplying the Army and the Indian reservations, was decisively
"Spanish" in appearance, language, and customs.11 Throughout
the territory as a whole, the census of 1870 showed that of the
nearly ten thousand total population, somewhat more had been
born in Mexico than in the United States.12 On the other hand, in
the 1860s and 1870s most Arizonans with Spanish names were
employed in simple jobs, especially in the catchall category of
"laborer." They served also as miners, teamsters, farmers, and
ranchers, with only a few functioning as craftsmen, small tradesmen, saloon keepers, liquor dealers, butchers, or merchants.13
A disproportionately large amount of leadership in business
and local government was supplied by Americans and by immigrants from the United Kingdom and Germany-in other words,
by what was the minority element in the population. Poor education, lack of capital, unfamiliarity with American economics and
politics, and perhaps a differing set of values that made for different incentives, all of these factors worked to discourage the
Spanish-speaking settlers and Mexican immigrants from seizing
the opportunities that the numerically fewer Anglo-Americans
and European immigrants found in this reconstituted society. It
is significant that the leading Spanish-speaking merchant and
political figure, Estevan Och6a, was a Chihuahua-born person
who, like the New Mexico aristocrats, had as a boy gone to Independence, Missouri, to learn English and business methods. 14
Some members of the so-called old Spanish families of
Tucson were always to be found in lesser political offices, including one or two in each session of the territorial legislature. More
significantly, until the 1880s some of the larger business firms in
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Tucson included partners from both the "Spanish" and "Anglo"
elements. If few Hispano-Americans save Ochoa rose to the levels
achieved-by the rico class in New Mexico, that was partly because
the opportunities were so much more limited in Arizona.
But the fact that the Spanish-speaking population tended to
take a secondary place in business and political life does not indicate the totality of their influence. Those early English-speaking
settlers of the 1850s and 1860s rarely brought their womenfolk
with them. Instead, as they began to establish themselves as
merchants, they married the daughters of Tucson's "old Spanish"
families. Lesser Americans and European immigrants married, or
in many cases simply bred, with the graceful, black-eyed girls
who accompanied the supply trains and crews of laborers that
came up from Mexico. Not infrequently the resourceful Mexican
girls entered a household by taking employment as cook and
housekeeper, graduated to the status of mistress, and won promotion to the rank of de facto wife by the simple expedient of
producing several children. Any estimate of the significance of
the Spanish-speaking people in early Arizona must allow for influence exercised via the bedroom, nursery, and kitchen.
What happened in the thinly settled, initially almost empty
territory of Arizona was thus quite unlike developments in the
stratified, more populous territory of New Mexico. California's
experience revealed still a third variant. Here the controlling force
was the unbelievable number of people from all over the world
who started coming to California during the gold rush and kept
on coming throughout the nineteenth century. Beginning with an
1848 population of perhaps 14,000, other than Indians, California
boomed to about 100,000 by 1850 and nearly 1.5 million by 1900.
Of that original 14,000, only about 7,500 were of Spanish or
mestizo stock.
Sudden engulfment by so immense an alien society was more
than any small provincial group could have endured without
suffering virtually total eclipse. Perhaps, instead of asking, Whatever happened to the original Hispano-Californian element? one
should ask, How did they manage to preserve their identity at
all? As a distinctive group, they were ill-prepared to cope with
the Americans and European immigrants who so soon became
their competitors. Quite aside from an imperfect command of
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English, few Hispano-Californians of any class had had experience with American legal, financial, or business practices, least of
all with sharp practices. The harsh realities of taxes, loans, and
mortgages, and the use of politics by pressure groups, all had to
be learned abruptly. Often they were either not learned, or were
learned reluctantly and imperfectly, because of the difference
between the values and incentives of the newcomers and those
familiar to the established Hispano-Californians.
The latter's had been a slow-moving pastoral and agricultural
rather than a rapidly changing commercial and money economy
and society. The level of education, even among the upper class,
had not been high. Fewer modern ideas and less familiarity with
English than might have been expected were introduced by the
assimilation into Hispano-Californian society during the 1830s and
1840s of several hundred Americans and Britons, who learned
Spanish, married daughters of the local families, acquired land,
and entered into a variety of business relationships characteristic
of the undifferentiated Californian economy of that day. It is
worth noting that some of these Hispanicized Anglo-Americans
were not much more successful than their in-laws in adjusting to
the revolutionary changes that swept California after the gold
discovery of 1848.
That sudden event, with its vast unforeseen results, took
place in the northern half of the province, which was precisely the
part of California in which Hispano-Californian influence had
been challenged even before Marshall made his great discovery.
Most of a large new influx of Americans just before and during the
Mexican War had settled in areas tributary to the province's one
great interior waterway, the chain of bays and rivers that led from
San Francisco past fertile valleys to the lower reaches of the
Sacramento and San Joaquin. It could be argued that the effect
of the gold rush in northern California was simply to accelerate
immensely a transfer .to Anglo-American dominance that was already foreshadowed by the geographical pattern of settlement of
the middle and late 1840s.
In the coastal cow country from Monterey down through
Santa Barbara and Los Angeles to San Diego, on the other hand,
the older Hispano-Californian way of life was unchallenged in
1848, having successfully absorbed most of the few Anglo-Amer-
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icans that had appeared, and was to yield only slowly during the
1850s and early 1860s. What makes generalization so difficult in
the case of California is that both before and after 1848 HispanoCalifornian influence shaded off from south to north, and was able
to last especially long in some rural areas and back country.
Finding themselves in a hopelessly small minority within the
northern half of California, the upper-class Hispano-Californians
struggled ineffectively against the unfamiliar language, legal system, tactics, and, above all, the values of a formerly alien minority
that overnight had become their masters. To survive at all they
needed, and to some degree received, extensive help from American lawyers in coping with the confusing, expensive, and delaying
procedure set up in 1851 for confirming title to Spanish and
Mexican land grants. They needed equally, and by nature of the
problem could rarely receive, help in dealing with an AngloAmerican population that pushed them aside, outsmarted them at
law and politics, threatened them with physical violence, and led
them into such booby traps as mortgages and loans at high interest. In a masterly understatement a historian recently summed up
the fate of the ranch lands that had been the traditional source
of the Hispano-Californians' wealth, prestige, and power: "In the
north of California, then, the basis of landownership had changed
drastically by 1856. Through armed struggle, legislation, litigation, financial manipulation, outright purchase, and innumerable
other tactics, Yankees had obtained a good deal of interest in the
land."111
South of Monterey, and more particularly south of Santa
Barbara, the Hispano-Californian upper class fared better. Their
land-title cases seem to have been settled with less contention in
court and much less squatter violence outside of court, presumably because land in southern California did not yet have a high
value and was not yet subject to population pressure. Economically the great cattle ranches not only continued but indeed
flourished with a temporary and quite misleading prosperity,
caused by the high price of meat required for the greatly enlarged
northern consumer population.
Through bad judgment on their part, instead of using their
unexpected income to clear debts and develop their ranches for
the future, the southern "Californios" tended to spend for cur-
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rent desires, including the luxuries and elaborate parties that have
been described so often, and when even their inflated income
proved insufficient, they borrowed. Horace Bell, whose life in
southern California from 1852 onward brought him into contact
with everyone, claimed that most of his friends lost their money
and land not through gambling, idleness, and profligate living, as
critical "Anglos" customarily alleged, but through the fact that
they "knew not the value of money or the crushing power of
compound interest" on debts. 16
A later observer, whose years as a Los Angeles lawyer
handling land cases gave him an especial insight, pointed to the
effect upon Hispano-Californians of another unfamiliar devicereal estate taxes. Frequently lands were lost for a "meager tax"
due. Again, to pay off one lien, a mortgage would be taken out
on an undivided interest in lands. Such a step could lead to long,
expensive, and disastrous litigation if the rights to the undivided
interest fell into the hands of a new owner who insisted on bringing action to divide the property.17
And yet, despite a continuing loss of land to Anglo-Americans, the southern Californios as a whole retained enough of
their estates to live in style and remain "the dominant influence"
-until they were struck by blows inflicted not by man but by
nature. California rather favors extremes: either too much or not
enough. Heavy floods in the winter of 1861-1862 gave way before
an unprecedented drought, which began in 1862 and did not really
yield until the fall of 1865. Long before it was over, ranch managers were reporting that "there is absolutely no grass," and were
forcing their emaciated cattle upon the market regardless of price.
Soon thereafter cattle were sold for the hides alone, and later still
were left upon the range to die beside the dried-up water holes
and vanished creeks. Coming on top of the Hispano-Californians'
earlier troubles over land titles, debts, taxes, and extravagances,
this natural disaster meant the loss of most of the ranches and the
end of the dominance of the ranchero class. 18
It is well to speak first of the ranchero class, because the
members of that privileged order were once the controlling force.
They were the California equivalent of the ricos of New Mexico.
Like . the ricos, each lived in patriarchal style on his big, undeveloped estate or in his sprawling town house. At either place
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children, relatives, and retainers swarmed about the large adobe
building to create a typically Hispano-American sense of living in
the midst of an extended family. The authority of the ranchero
over the considerable assemblage that ate at his board was unquestioned. These places were unlike the haciendas of New
Mexico, in that Indians, under the supervision of major-domos
who were usually mestizos, did most of the manual labor, domestic service, and handling of animals that in New Mexico was
performed by peons. Horace Bell scornfully described such ranch
Indians as being the "vassals" of their lordly employers. 19
Neither at the ranches nor in the relatively few towns did a
class of debt-bonded peons develop; nor were there peasant villages, each ruled by its patron, on the New Mexico model. The
nearest approximation was a practice sanctioned by the city
fathers of Los Angeles during the American era of selling the services of Indian jail inmates in lieu of fines or punishment.
But there was a population of working-class mestizos. Some
were to be found serving as vaqueros and major-domos on the
ranches; others, who dwelt in the towns, earned their living as
small farmers, craftsmen, tradesmen, teamsters, and the like.
Often a miserable colony of former mission Indians lived a bare
existence on the edge of the town, apparently content with what
little work they could get. Typical of a Spanish-American community, the sum total of all available talents still left wide openings in the trades, crafts, businesses, and professions. It was these
opportunities that attracted a steadily growing number of Americans and European immigrants.20
A most intriguing question is, What happened to the mestizos
as the ranchero class lost control of its lands and the towns began
to fall under the economic control of "Anglos"? An answer is
difficult to give, because so many were largely illiterate people
who left no personal records, and because such evidence as we do
have is confused by a circumstance that stemmed directly from
the gold rush. In the early phase of the gold rush literally thousands of Spanish-speaking people of both sexes were to be found
in the mines, engaged sometimes in mining or running pack trains,
sometimes in operating restaurants, saloons, gambling houses, and
brothels. Many a fight in the mining towns started in rivalry for
possession of a "Spanish" woman.

46 I Rodman W. Paul

A grossly unfair tax on foreign miners and a virulent persecution of the Spanish-speaking people drove most of the Hispanic
element out of the mining regions in 1850. In bitterness some
packed up and returned to their native countries; others fled to
the seacoast to take refuge in the towns where the h_umbler
Hispano-Californians had long been established. In Los Angeles
so many Mexicans came in from the mines that the "quarter" they
occupied came to be called "Sonora-town" and so continued until
at least as late as 1888, at which time a guidebook reported that
"this Spanish population is rapidly disappearing. Death and emigration are removing them from the land."21 In its early years
Sonora-town's fame rested more on its "hells," lawlessness, and
squalor than on the picturesqueness that attracted tourists in the
1880s. After 1850, therefore, the population of Los Angeles and
other towns included a mixture of the original Hispano-Californians, numerically chiefly mestizos, and these later additions of
other Spanish-speaking people, chiefly from northern Mexico,
together with a remnant of bedraggled Indians.
Jf the census reports are to be trusted, there must have been
little continuing immigration from Mexico or other Spanish-speaking countries after the early 1850s, for the figures for California
residents born in those countries show a stationary or slightly declining total for the censuses of 1860 through 1890. A severe
epidemic of smallpox in southern California in 1862-1863 was
particularly hard on Indians and other poor Spanish-speaking
people in the congested districts, where no medical help was available and the disease spread fast. Deaths were so numerous as to
retard considerably any expansion of the working-class part of the
Spanish-speaking community. 22
As the years passed and their familiar jobs disappeared, some
of the mestizo ranch hands drifted into the growing cities and
towns to join the colonies of their own cultural group and, too often,
there to deteriorate in unaccustomed idleness. Others sought continued employment at the tasks they knew best. Throughout the
remainder of the century, scattered reports of "Californian cowboys" indicate the continuing presence of these expert riders and
livestock handlers out on the remote, by now American-owned
ranches to which the cattle industry had retreated after the disasters of the 1860s. Still others withdrew into the mountains and
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deserts, to places so isolated or arid that no one would bother
them. There, in lonely dignity, they and their families ran small
"ranches" that were little more than hardscrabble homesteads.
In what has been said so far, emphasis has been on the attempts of the several kinds of Spanish-speaking Californians to
continue their familiar ways despite an increasingly unfamiliar
surrounding society and economy. The most striking venture into
entirely new ways was the readiness of upper-class HispanoCalifornian girls to marry "Anglos" and the willingness of their
parents to sanction such unions. Marriage and the establishment
of family lines that thereafter bore Anglo-American surnames may
well have been one of the most enduring contributions of HispanoCalifornians to the new mixed society.
In business and politics the position of the Hispano-Californians was inherently weaker than that of their compeers in
New Mexico, .where the continuance of a Spanish-speaking majority throughout the rest of the century ensured respectful attention from alert Anglo-Americans. Parallels with the Spanishspeaking community in southern Arizona are dubious, because
basic conditions were so very different. Although there were
"Spanish" partners in some "Anglo" business and law firms in Los
Angeles for many years after 1848,23 it is difficult to point to
Hispano-Califomians who achieved a prominence in economic
life comparable to that of the Otero clan in New Mexico or Ochoa
in Arizona, and even such eminence as they did achieve passed as
the city's population shifted away from a Spanish-speaking majority. Of the two earliest known directories of Los Angeles, the
one for 1875 shows that all but a very few of those with Spanish
surnames were in simple, often humble occupations. Most were
'1aborers," others were grocers and fruit dealers, clerks, saddle
and harness makers, shoemakers, farmers, saloon and billiard-hall
proprietors, barbers, waiters, dressmakers, hostlers, and so forth.
Only three, all well-known figures, were listed under such substantial-sounding categories as "capitalist."24
This paucity of Spanish names among the higher-income
businesses and professions at as late a date as 1875 is the more
interesting because by then there had been ample time for a new
generation to come to maturity. Contemporaries remarked that
whenever a young Hispano-Californian sought a good education
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and made an effort, he did as well as anyone else, but that too
many seemed unwilling to compete on Anglo-American terms. 25
That same Los Angeles directory for 1875 reveals something
else about Hispano-Califomian participation in American life.
Some locally famous names appear in the pages devoted to public
officials. One of the Sepulveda family was district judge, a Carrillo was city marshal, three members of the common council of
the city bore Spanish names, and on the county's board of supervisors at least two members plus the interpreter had names of
Spanish origin. So did two policemen, a deputy sheriff, and all
of the officers of a forty-member militia company.
Since the average proportion of people with Spanish surnames in Los Angeles County was down to one-fourth or less by
1880, 26 this list correctly suggests that the Hispano-Californians
did well in "cow county" local politics-that is, at town, city, and
county level in southern California-prior to the 1880s. In addition to the fairly solid support that they were able to count upon
from the large Spanish-speaking bloc, the patriarchal nature of
Hispano-Califomian society and the network of marriage relationships and blood ties gave them an initial advantage in soliciting
votes locally. When they moved outside southern California local
politics, the Hispano-Californians became relatively ineffective.
They did elect two of their members to the office of state treasurer, several to the state legislature, and for a few months had
the psychological satisfaction of seeing Romualdo Pacheco, who
had been elected lieutenant governor, serve out the remainder of
the former governor's term.
To complete this study, something should be said about
Colorado and Texas. Colorado had no Spanish-American communities in 1848. When a few courageous Spanish-speaking pioneers
came into the San Luis Valley from New Mexico in 1851, they
sought to duplicate in southernmost Colorado the rural life they
had known in the province to their south. The isolated villages
that they built were planned as compact, enclosed units, with an
eye partly to protection from the dangerous surrounding Indians,
and partly to preserving the social values so fundamental to New
Mexican rural society. In the late nineteenth century these villages, while no more progressive than those in New Mexico,
showed a remarkable stability and continuity. As in New Mexico,
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a well-established pattern of community cooperation, especially
in regard to water supply, was of key importance. 27
Texas involves a more complex story. There is no intent here
to talk of the Texan Revolution and the Texan Republic, nor indeed of relations between cultural groups in eastern Texas after
1848, for the dominance of Anglo-Americans in the more-developed part of the state was well established by that date. Bancroft
guessed that in Texas as a whole "the Mexican element," as he
termed it, "at this time numbered about 4,000 souls." This was in
contrast to a total population that different censuses from 1847 to
1850 listed as ranging from 136,000 to 213,000. 28 All that will be
attempted here is to say something concerning life in the westernmost part of Texas, where the Spanish-speaking element continued to be important. Roughly, this is the area from the coast
at Corpus Christi, up through San Antonio, and across the Edwards Plateau and Staked Plains (Llano Estacado) to Amarillo.
Even within this western strip the influence of the Spanishspeaking people was subject to challenge from an early date.
When Frederick Law Olmsted, the noted traveler, visited San
Antonio in 1857, he found that that town was already a "jumble of
races, costumes, languages and buildings." On the streets Olmsted
noticed "sauntering Mexicans ... bearded Germans and sallow
Yankees," just as he observed buildings that clearly reflected the
work of those three distinct nationalities. As he reflected on the
probable future of relations between the English-speaking and
the Spanish-speaking, Olmsted coined some unforgettable
phrases: "The mingled Puritanism and brigandism, which distinguishes the vulgar mind of the South, peculiarly unfits it to harmoniously associate with the bigoted, childish, and passionate
Mexicans. They are considered to be heathen; not acknowledged
as 'white folks.' Inevitably they are dealt with insolently and unjustly. They fear and hate the ascendant race, and involuntarily
associate and sympathize with the negroes."29
Whatever possibility there may have been of developing
better relations was made vastly more difficult by the lawless nature of society throughout broad strips on both sides of the Rio
Grande international border. On the Mexican side, in addition to
persistent problems of poverty, political instability, and erratic
law enforcement, there was a hatred for Anglo-Texans that dated
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back to the Texas Revolution but was refreshed in each few years
by some new act of arrogance or cruelty alleged against the
Texans. On the Texan side there was the controlling circumstance
that the area between the Nueces River which had its mouth at
Corpus Christ( and the Rio Grande was a no-man's-land for
many years, starting with the Texas Revolution. So great was the
confusion and danger that the Spanish-speaking ranchers who had
pioneered the region had to abandon it, and down into modem
times a tradition has persisted that when reoccupation became
possible, the original Spanish-speaking grantees transferred their
lands to Anglo-Texans under conditions suggestive of forced
sales.30 To this the reply has been that only the courage and
ability of Anglo-Texans made it possible to resume life at all in
that region.
It was a situation in which misunderstanding and bitterness
came easily. Wild Indians, bandits, smugglers, and cattle thieves
plundered on both sides of the Rio Grande and took refuge on
whichever side temporarily offered the better haven. Runaway
American slaves and Mexican peons fled past each other in opposite directions. Vigilantes, filibusters, and revolutionaries gathered
on both sides of the line and were not particular about whom they
killed or robbed.
In this turbulent setting, relations between English-speaking
and Spanish-speaking groups deteriorated rather than improved
as the years passed. Speaking of the period prior to the American
Civil War, a well-known historian has remarked of the two linguistic stocks: "The former were sometimes selfish, aggressive and
overbearing; the latter were suspicious, underhanded, often proud
and sensitive.''31
Nor was there improvement after the Civil War. The principal student of this problem has asserted:
From the close of the War between the States to 1880,
friction along the Texas border was intense, and almost continuous. The lawlessness of a frontier cattle range was aggravated by international complications and inter-racial hostility
involving Mexicans, Indians, and Americans. There were
thieving, murder, arson, armed expeditions of outlaws or irregular bands of both Mexicans and Americans, and clashes
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of troops of two nations and of the State of Texas. It is not
strange that there was also intensification of animosities already well developed by the experiences of many years. 32
Despite these towering international and intercultural difficulties, the land south of the Nueces began to enjoy successive
booms in the last third of the nineteenth century. First it was
cattle, then sheep, then cotton and vegetables. Anglo-Texans were
the dominant force and the principal landowners, although they
were always a numerical minority of the total population of the
area. Spanish-speaking workers came into the region in relatively
small numbers in the days when cowboys, sheepherders, or sheep
shearers were all that was needed; their numbers increased
sharply after irrigated agriculture began. Some of the workers
came from Texas itself, many from Coahuila Province, Mexico,
and others from more distant Mexican provinces. As in Arizona at
an earlier date, the Spanish-speaking population thus became in
the late nineteenth century a mixture of American-born and
immigrant stocks.
Most were of too simple origins to play much of a role
beyond that of low-paid wage earner. Their slowness to learn
English proved a severe handicap. In sharp contrast, the survivors of the older "Spanish" upper-class families remained near
San Antonio, just as they did near Santa Fe, Santa Barbara, or
Tucson. They intermarried with the "Anglos" and received a
comparable education. Like the daughters of the California aristocracy, their womenfolk were said to be "quite as white as the
Americans, ... a fine-looking and elevated race ... of wonderful
beauty."33 They contributed to the founding of many a family
that today bears an Anglo-American surname.
Politically the importance of the Spanish-Americans of Texas
varied greatly. In the rural areas their influence was never great,
even if they were in a majority. In some towns and cities they
were courted briefly at each election, occasionally paid so much
per head for their vote, and then dismissed until needed next time.
Where they lived in towns that were overwhelmingly Hispanic,
they sometimes had real power. In Laredo in the 1880s the leading Mexican-American families were supplying the chiefs for both
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local parties, even though the merchants and professional men
included people of many national origins. 34
To conclude this study it would be well to look back across
the whole spectrum of events in the era, so as to examine the
several conclusions that stand out. First, in their initial halfcentury under the American Hag the historical experiences of
Spanish-speaking populations in the several Southwestern states
were strikingly varied. In considerable part this was the result of
their respective histories prior to 1848. New Mexico, by far the
oldest, had built up a sufficiently substantial population base and
a sufficiently cohesive society so that throughout the rest of the
century the Spanish-speaking remained in_the majority and rural
New Mexican culture remained largely unchanged, save for the
very serious loss of needed farm and pasture lands. Arizona had
been so thoroughly cleaned out by Indian troubles that when
revival came under American auspices, a new mixed society
emerged on a basis that for two decades at least offered to all
hands an equal chance to profit from the new opportunities, even
though in practice it was Americans and European immigrants
who took advantage of the possibilities. In California the gold
rush so accelerated the process of Americanization that had already begun that thereafter the performance of the relatively
small population of Hispano-Californians constituted a kind of
prolonged retreat from one area to another, as the Americans and
European immigrants increased in numbers and gradually took
possession of the land, business, and politics. In westernmost
Texas, recent history had already established an unhappy pattern
of mutual antagonism, lawlessness, and violence. Retention there
of a Spanish-speaking majority was not sufficient to prevent a
takeover by Anglo-Americans under turbulent, angry conditions
that left a heritage of bitterness.
Secondly, it 'is hard to see that in any of the Southwestern
states Spanish-speaking cultures proved resilient or resourceful in
meeting the challenge of the aggressive, acquisitive Anglo-American intruding groups. To no small degree the encounter between
the two stocks was a collision between old-fashioned pastoral and
agricultural societies, characterized by practices that dated back
to the Renaissance if not to the Middle Ages, and an advancing
society that had already experienced to the full the commercial
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revolution and was now well into the industrial revolution and a
comparably great change in transportation and finance. A poor
level of education throughout the Hispanic lands and a limited
knowledge of the modem world made the contest an unequal one,
but so did the one group's instinctive wish to have life continue
without basic alteration, while the other was opportunistically
ready either to promote change or to exploit the status quo,
whichever seemed more profitable.
In New Mexico more than in any other state some members
of the well-to-do upper class did show a high degree of agility in
taking advantage of the economic and political opportunities
brought by the invasion of Anglo-Americans. The initial status of
upper-class New Mexicans was one of unusual strength, and their
position was preserved by the very slowness of their state to develop or grow. To a lesser degree, upper-class Californians were
able to exploit their land ownerships and otherwise favored situation so as to profit at least temporarily, although many proved
unable to keep wealth once they had it, or to find for themselves
a permanent place of distinction in the new society that they
found arising around them.
Thirdly, the great majority of the Spanish-speaking people
who were in the Southwest in 1848, or came as immigrants thereafter, were simple people who stood far down on the social and
economic ladders of their own societies. Of mixed blood and often
much darker-skinned than the aristocracy, they were the ones
most likely to encounter racial prejudice when they came into
contact with Anglo-Americans. Being illiterate or semiliterate,
without capital, and possessed of only modest skills vocationally,
they had little more chance of advancing in the unfamiliar, pushing world of the Anglo-Americans than they had had in their own.
As manual laborers, miners, cowboys, mule packers, sheepherders,
sheep shearers, and agricultural workers, they made a contribution
to the labor force of a region that was perennially short of
manpower.
Unwittingly, by so doing they prepared the way for a veritable flood of new immigration from Mexico that began at about
the tum of the century, when many new job openings were created in railroad construction and repair, in the new intensive agriculture, in mining, and in some types of industry. Coming in
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numbers many times greater than any previous influx of Spanishspeaking people, the newcomers drowned from sight the struggling older groups, except in slow-moving rural New Mexico. In
the twentieth century the "Spanish-American problem" thus became a question of how to help recently arrived immigrants who
were only just beginning acculturation. The public tended to
forget that hidden somewhere were older groups, composed partly
of much earlier immigrants who had been long in the United
States, but partly of people who should not be called immigrants
at all, since they were the descendants of pioneers who were
second in time only to the Indians in their occupancy of the Southwest. Perhaps the most important service this paper can contribute is to recall to our momentary attention this often-forgotten
aspect of Western history.
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The Fisherman's Frontier
on the Pacific Coast:
The Rise of the
Salmon-Canning Industry
Vernon Carstensen, University of Washington

The rise of the salmon-canning
industry on the Pacific Coast represents a minor theme in the long
story of the ardent exploitation of the "inexhaustible" resources of
North America. In a way, it also represents a minor failure of the
exploiters and destroyers; Like the sky-darkening flocks of passenger pigeons of the Midwest and the enormous herds of buffalo
of the W estem plains, the great salmon runs invited the attention
of market hunters and sportsmen, but the West Coast salmon,
although hard pressed, were not pushed.to extinction, as were the
passenger pigeons, or nearly to extinction, as were the buffalo.
They have survived in sufficient numbers to serve both commercial and sports fl.shermen. 1
In 1874 the Portland Oregonian claimed that the salmon in-
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dustry of the Columbia River was surpassed in value only by the
wheat crop, and for many years the claim would be made by the
fishing interests that the canned-salmon industry, not gold, provided the true economic base for Alaska. 2 Whatever the relative
importance of the industry, there can be no doubt that the salmon
fisheries and the salmon-canning industry were very important for
varying periods of time in the developing economies of Oregon,
Washington, British Columbia, and Alaska. Yet the fisheries, like
the lumber industry, have attracted the interest of relatively few
historians. The interest of American historians in the North American fisheries could almost be said to have begun and ended with
the great cod fisheries of the Atlantic. The history of the freshwater fisheries, like that of the West Coast, has been largely ignored except when someone has said something about Ramsey
Crooks' attempt to shore up the declining fur business by developing a trade in whitefish or has wanted to explain the presence of
Icelandic people in the area of the Great Lakes. West Coast
salmon have been much written and talked about by icthyologists,
newspaper reporters, editorial writers, and politicians, but not by
historians. Yet the salmon had been in view and of great importance to the people of the Pacific Coast long before the first whites
visited the area.
Salmon were found in large numbers in the Pacific from
Monterey north to the Arctic. They seemed designed to serve the
needs of man, since the mature fish returned from the sea to
spawn in the fresh-water streams that fall into the Pacific.3 Just as
the great herds of buffalo played a large part in sustaining the
Plains Indians, so the great salmon runs of the West Coast served
the Indian tribes of the area. The runs became a vital part of
their economy and of their religion. No doubt some of the lateeighteenth-century traders considered trying to make something
out of the great quantity of salmon, but they left no record. When
Lewis and Clark reached The Dalles on the Columbia in October,
1805, they saw the Indians catching and packing fish. The dried,
pulverized salmon was packed into woven basketlike containers
lined with dried salmon skins. Each container, they estimated,
held from ninety to one hundred pounds of salmon pemmican.
"Great quantities," they recorded, "are sold to white people who
visit the mouth of this river as well as to the natives below."4
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Whatever business in salmon pemmican the Indians had
developed with the occasional maritime fur traders was not to be
theirs for very long. Shortly, Astor's men built a post at the mouth
of the Columbia, and in a few years they gave way to the Northwest Company. Then, in the early 1820s after the union of the
Hudson's Bay Company_ (HBC) and the Northwest Company, the
HBC organized the Columbia District and installed John McLoughlin as chief factor. His primary business was to collect furs,
but almost immediately he sent barreled salmon to England to see
whether a market could be found. In July, 1824, the governor and
committee of HBC wrote saying that the fish could not be used.
A year later a second shipment arrived in London, and although it
was found to be in better condition than the first, the company
officers declared that they were "of the opinion that from the
difficulty of curing the fish properly, and the length of time it must
unavoidably continue in pickle, that it will not answer as an article
of commerce."5
Although discouraged from packing salmon for the London
market, the HBC men in the Columbia District during the next
decades barreled salmon and sought and found markets for it in
San Francisco, South America, and Hawaii. 6 But much as Governor Simpson and McLoughlin would have liked to maintain a
monopoly of the salmon fisheries, they did not succeed. In April,
1831, Josiah Marshall's brig Owhyhee returned to Boston after
three years of trading in the North Pacific. Besides fur and some
sperm-whale oil, she brought fifty-three barrels of pickled salmon
which, it was reported, had been "taken by the Indians, sold green
to the master of the ship and cured by him." The collector of
customs at Boston accordingly ruled that they were "foreign
caught fish" and imposed a duty of two dollars a barrel. The fiftythree barrels were sold to a Boston buyer at fourteen dollars a
barrel, but one observer wrote disparagingly that the Pacific
Northwest salmon was a "large white and coarse fish" more like
the hake than the Atlantic salmon. He added with malicious
pleasure that the buyer of the cargo had not yet been able to sell
any of the fish. Nevertheless a ship leaving Boston that fall carried salt and staves and hoops for a thousand barrels-it was
assumed that it would seek Pacific Coast salmon. 7
Apparently the Boston fish market, like that of London, saw
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little more of West Coast salmon during the next decades, but
Boston investors must have heard a great deal. In the early 1830s
Nathaniel Wyeth launched substantial ventures to exploit the
Columbia River salmon fisheries, but he failed, and, in the next
years, in the correspondence of McLoughlin, we have glimpses of
other New Englanders who entered the river with the intention
of taking fish. Few returned for another try, and this pleased
McLoughlin. 8 Presumably for every New Englander who actually
ventured to take fish in the Columbia or elsewhere on the Pacific
Coast, there were many others who dreamed of developing the
salmon fisheries. Indeed, in 1871 J. L. McDonald wrote a book
under the title Hidden Treasures or Fisheries around the Northwest Coast, which was intended to publicize the great promise of
the western fisheries. Appropriately enough the book was published in Gloucester, Massachusetts, and it exhibited a proper
attitude toward fishing and fishermen. Not only did McDonald
describe in glowing terms the abundance of desirable fish in the
North Pacific, but he showed that he was aware of what went into
the settlers• and immigrants' guidebooks that sought to encourage
the migration of farmers into the new areas of the West. In many
of the immigrant guides-and of course in many other places-the
argument was advanced that farm settlers deserved special treatment and privileges because they were, after all, carriers of civilization. McDonald suggested that fishermen who ventured into
new waters were also carriers of civilization.9
But whether the fisherman was the carrier of civilization or
not, it seems reasonably clear that neither the HBC nor those it
regarded as interlopers enjoyed a substantial success in exploiting
salmon in ·the years between 1823 and 1864. The fish-taking gear
employed by the whites was somewhat more efficient than that of
the lndi~, but no new methods of preserving fish were introduced. Fish were ·dried or they were pickled in brine. A few
attempts were made to develop a market for dried salmon bellies
-probably because the Indians had used this part of the fish as a
kind of primitive K ration-but salmon bellies had little appeal in
the marketplace. 10 San Francisco newspapers in 1864 reported a
small but widespread international trade in barreled salmon.
Shipments of barreled salmon were reported as having gone to
New York and Boston, Mexico, the Hawaiian Islands, Australia,
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China, Japan, and "other countries."11 In 1864, however, a salmon
cannery was established on the Sacramento River, and the day of
rapid expansion of the salmon fisheries was at hand.
The art of preserving food in hermetically sealed containers
was discovered in France early in the nineteenth century. Shortly
thereafter an Englishman contributed the idea of using tin-plated
iron to make the container, so that before the end of the second
decade of the century the principal ingredients for this new
method in the art of preserving food were brought together. Not
until the 1890s would the art move toward becoming a science,
when H. L. Russell of the College of Agriculture, University of
Wisconsin, and other bacteriologists began to bring the relatively
new discipline of bacteriology to the service of the food-canning
industry, and by that time canning had become a big business. In
the intervening years canners of fish, meat, fruit, and vegetables
had measured their success by such crude devices as the number
of filled cans that exploded in their warehouses or elsewhere, the
amount 'of other spoilage, and the extent to which their customers
complained of food poisoning or succumbed to botulism. 12
The French and English were relatively quick to adopt the
new art of canning, and some Americans, by the 1830s, sought to
preserve fruits and vegetables by this method. By the 1840s some
seafood was· canned with success along the East Coast, and it is
repofted that in 1843 lobsters and salmon were canned at Eastport, Maine. Canned sardines were known, if not widely used, for
a decade before the California gold rush. In fact, it might be said
that "modem food technology" touched the Late Stone Age when
Sir William Drummond Stewart carried canned sardines into the
Rocky Mountains in the 1830s.13 San Francisco newspapers of the
early 1860s show a regular importation of canned goods such as
lobsters, scallops, and sardines and suggest that canned salmon
was fairly widely known. In May of 1865 the San Francisco Daily
Evening Bulletin reported that canned salmon was quoted in
Australia at sixteen shillings per dozen one-pound tins. In the
middle 1860s a fruit and vegetable cannery was established near
Sacramento and attracted some newspaper attention. Perhaps the
remarkable thing is that no one tried to can salmon on the West
Coast until 1864.
Three men from Maine, William and George W. Hume and
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Andrew Hapgood, launched their business across the river from
Sacramento in the spring of 1864. William, the oldest of the
Hume brothers, had come to California in 1852, and after a try at
gold mining, had turned to earning his living as a fisherman and
hunter for the San Francisco market. His father had worked as a
salmon fisherman in Maine, and William apparently knew something about the business. In 1856 he had been joined by two of
his brothers, John and George, and the three continued as fishermen and market hunters. In 1863 George, on a visit to Maine,
encountered a boyhood friend, Andrew Hapgood, a tinsmith, who
had done some canning on the Maine coast and had even canned
a few salmon on the Bay of Chaleur. Fisherman and canner
worked out an arrangement to pool their skills, and Andrew Hapgood came to California in March, 1864, with the tools and equipment to launch a cannery.
Later reminiscences have it that the partners obtained tinplate on credit from a San Francisco dealer, borrowed a boiler
from a neighboring farmer, and purchased a scow on which they
built their cannery. They anchored it across the river from Sacramento and enlarged their cabin to serve as a tinshop. No newspaperman visited this pioneer cannery, and no contemporary ac0
counts of the operation have come to light. In 1904, however,
R. D. Hume, youngest of the Hume brothers, furnished for the
Pacific Fisherman a detailed and probably fairly accurate description of the laborious and awkward work of making carts, the
process of butchering, cleaning, and cutting up the fish and filling
the cans. The lid was then soldered on and the filled can pushed
into the cooking department, which was called the bathroom.
Here Andrew Hapgood presided over what was supposed to be
the secret process. The cans of fish were cooked for a period of
time, the cans were then vented, resoldered., and cooked some
more;' They were then cooled, cleaned, and painted red;..._the
color which for several years was to mark canned salmon. The
amount of the first pack is usually given as 2,000 cases, forty-eight
one:..pound cans to a case, and is probably approximately correct.
It was also recalled that only about half of the pack exploded., and
what was left found a slow sale in San Francsico, at about five
dollars a case. The first season was not a brilliant success, but
neither was it a failure. Indeed, in view of the inexperience of the
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canners, and the crudeness of the machinery and the procedures,
perhaps the remarkable thing is that the whole pack didn't
explode.
The partners continued on the Sacramento River for two
more seasons, but in 1866 they moved to the Columbia River.
Several reasons were given for this move. Salmon were decreasing
in the Sacramento in consequence of pollution of the stream and
the destruction of spawning grounds by the gold dredges. Perhaps
more important was the far greater supply of salmon reported on
the Columbia. The Humes were apparently satisfied that they
had mastered the canning process and that they could find a market for a greater amount of fish than they could produce on the
Sacramento. They sought to keep the process a secret for the next
few years, but in view of the amount of work that had to be done
in the "bathroom" this was impossible. 14
The Humes and Hapgood enjoyed wonderful early success
on the Columbia. In 1867, 18,000 cases of salmon were packed; the
next year, 28;000; and in 1869, a total of 100,000 cases.16 Markets
apparently developed to absorb all they could produce. In March,
1868, the Oregonian carried a story on the salmon fisheries on the
Columbia and reported that Hapgood and the Humes expected to
pack 300,000 pounds of salmon that season by employing a new
process that involved putting the fish in tin cans which, the reporter declared, "keep fresh for years." Hume and Hapgood, the
report said, already had a good reputation. Most of the canned
salmon would be sent to Australia. 16 Scattered details on the
search for markets are found in a small miscellaneous collection
of letters and accounts of the Hapgood and Hume cannery at Oak
Point for the years 1869 to 1872. Apparently the commission
merchants Platt and Newton of San Francisco and New York
managed the sale of the Hapgood and Hume canned salmon. Incomplete accounts for 1870 show sales in Hong Kong, Valparaiso,
Singapore, and Melbourne. There are later references to additional sales in Wellington, Callao, New York, and London. Entry
into the English market was vigorously pushed. In early 1872
George Brett, the London agent of Platt and Newton, reported
that he had been unable to sell Columbia canned salmon to Crosse
and Blackwell. He found that some English purchasers complained "of the red color of American salmon and thought it to be
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artificial." Nevertheless Brett was elated that he had an order for
5,500 cases of salmon from J. T. Morton of Leadenhall Street, the
largest handler of canned salmon in London. He also reported to
his employers a conversation during which Morton remarked that
in view of the quantity of salmon in the North Pacific, the canners
in that area could capture the London market. Brett responded,
"I said that was exactly what I had come to do." But he warned
the Columbia canners to maintain the high quality of their goods
and to conform to English taste. He sent out several cans of
Scotch and Irish salmon to show the men on the Columbia what
their competitors were doing, and he bought and shipped some
red paint of the color preferred by the English. Parenthetically,
the same year that Brett reported his large sale in England, Platt
and Newton reported to Hapgood and Hume that they had sold
first 100 and then 500 cases of canned salmon to the commissary
department of the U.S. Army.17 This may not have been the first
sale, but it shows the very early use of canned salmon by the army
-a use that would continue, although canned salmon was challenged on the army menu during the Second World War by
Spam.18
The sales in England grew rapidly in the early 1870s. In 1877
it was reported that well over half the entire pack on the Columbia
was shipped directly to England. Very little found a market inside the United States. A decade later this situation had changed
substantially.19
Accounts of the great riches made in salmon-canning on the
Columbia brought a number of other canners to the Columbia,
which was the principal salmon-canning stream until the middle
1870s. In 1873 there were fourteen canneries on the river, more
than half of which were either wholly or partly owned by the
Humes, and competition for the fish was beginning to be very
keen. After the middle 1870s the canners established themselves
on the coastal rivers of Oregon and California, in the Puget Sound
area, in British Columbia, and in Alaska. Before 1900 an American-built cannery was established on the Kamchatka River, and
it was only a few more years before canneries would be tried on
the rivers flowing into the Siberian Arctic. 20
In 1878 R. D. Hume took the first steps toward obtaining
virtually complete control of the Rogue River in Oregon. He
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purchased the fishery already in operation there and set about to
obtain possession of all land on both sides of the Rogue from the
ocean to the mountains, and an appropriate amount of ocean
frontage. He built a cannery, a fish hatchery, a company townhe even established his own newspaper and race track, and once
brought his steam-powered automobile there for the summerand he sought to enjoy complete possession of his own river. Until
his death in 1908 he claimed his prescriptive right to all salmon in
the river. He also claimed, and perhaps deserved, the title of King
of the Rogue, although he did have unruly subjects, some of
whom he dealt with directly, others he faced in courts of law. 21
The rapid expansion of the business is reflected in the production figures. In 1882 the North Pacific canneries reported over
one million cases of salmon packed, more than half of which came
from the Columbia; in 1895 the total pack exceeded two million
cases; in 1900, three million; and in 1901, five million. The spread
of the productive fisheries to the new districts is reflected in the
annual statistics of the industry compiled by John N. Cobb.
Salmon-canning was resumed on the Sacramento in 1875 and built
up to 200,000 cases in 1882, before it declined again and virtually
disappeared. In 1876 there were reports of the first canned salmon
from British Columbia, where the business grew slowly but steadily. In 1893 the pack there exceeded a half-million cases for the
first time, and four years later, in 1897, it exceeded a million cases
but promptly dropped again. There was a modest return from
Alaska in 1878; in 1889 production passed the half-million mark;
and ten years later more than a million cases were packed. From
that time on, Alaska would be the largest producer of canned
salmon. Around five thousand cases were produced in the Puget
Sound area in 1877, but the business increased relatively slowly.
In 1895 the canneries .of the Puget Sound area produced more
than a hundred thousand eases, in 1897 almost half a million, and
in 1901 a million. These rapid increases in production did cause
some marketing problems in the late 1880s. In 1891 the Alaska
canners formed a marketing pool that led to the formation of the
Alaska Packers Association, which sought to control both production and marketing. This was shortly followed by similar associations in the Puget Sound area and in British Columbia, but not
until the end of the 1890s did something approaching an associ-
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ation find acceptance on the Columbia River. 22 By this time the
old Hapgood and Hume cannery at Oak Point was in the hands of
two men whose conservatism was reflected in their annual boast
that they still packed salmon in the old-fashioned way and still
painted their cans red. They had few customers. Meanwhile the
supply and marketing center was in process of moving northward
from San Francisco. 23
The spectacular increase in the productivity of the canneries
reflected rapid technological advances in almost every part of the
business from taking the fish to can-making, butchering, packing,
processing, and packaging, and in the related businesses. The
Indians and the first white fishermen had used dip nets, spears,
and small seines. The first drift or gill nets were apparently used
in the Columbia in 1851. In 1877 the Daily Astorian printed a
letter from an old fisherman who claimed that when he began
fishing in the lower Columbia in 1847, he could catch more salmon
than he could manage in a thirty-fathom seine-now such a seine
would not bring in a single fish. R. D. Hume stated that in 1871 a
cannery on the Columbia had been able to pack 25,000 cases of
salmon in a ninety-day season and employed only four fishing
boats, each supplied with a drift net 125 fathoms in length and
twenty-five to thirty meshes deep. Nets were initially hand woven,
but in 1877 a Portland mechanic devised a machine to weave nets
at half the cost of handweaving. By this time nets had lengthened
to 200 fathoms and shortly would reach 300.24 So efficient and
abundant did the fishing gear become, that by 1883, sixteen years
after the business was launched, the Columbia River registered
the largest production of Chinook salmon in the history of the
river. In 1888 the Corps of Engineers made an inventory of the
fishing gear in use on the Columbia. There were 1,600 drift nets
in use, averaging 300 fathoms, or 1800 feet; this amounted to
about 2,888,000 feet or 545 miles of net. There were also 136 fish
traps installed on the lower Columbia. In addition there were an
unknown number of seines-some worked by boats, some by
horses-and seven fish wheels located at the Cascades and The
Dalles. The first fish wheel was put in operation at The Dalles in
1878 and attracted much attention. Upriver canners declared it to
be a marvelous fish-catching machine which took fifty thousand
pounds of fish a day. Downriver gill netters denounced it as a
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murderous device that took all fish regardless of size or species.
They called it the fish pump. 25 The remarkable thing is that any
fish at all reached the spawning grounds. The Engineers thought
that all this fishing gear actually slowed qown the flow of water in
the Columbia.
The large amount of fishing gear in the river reduced the
number of fish a single fisherman could catch and forced up the
price. When the business started in 1867, fishermen were paid
twenty cents a fish. It was expected that three fish would produce
forty-eight pounds of canned salmon. Hence fish weighing less
than twenty pounds often were not paid for. As the gear improved, the number of fishermen increased, and the catch per
boat diminished. Fishermen asked for more money and occasionally struck to enforce their demands. The price per fish went to
twenty-five cents in 1873, to fifty cents in 1879, and to seventy-five
cents in 1882. After the price reached one dollar in 1890, the
canneries began to pay fishermen by the pound. 26
The gill netters on the Columbia were mostly transients,
drawn from San Francisco for the fishing season. An observer in
the early 1880s characterized them as mostly Italians, although
they included some Slavs, Greeks, Portuguese, and Spaniards.
More than two-thirds were unmarried, and most were illiterate.
Astoria served as their headquarters during their stay on the Columbia, and the Oregonian viewed that city as "the most wicked
place on earth for its population." It once declared, however, that
some respectable men also fished on the lower Columbia. The
Post-Intelligencer, no doubt in a mood of exasperation, described
the fishermen of the lower Columbia as a rough, tough, lawless
group of Greeks, Austrians, Russians, and Finns, and later as a
bunch of "piratical dagoes" who were trying to terrorize the
peaceful upriver American fishermen. The Americans, according
to the Post-Intelligencer, consisted of "Scandinavians and
others."27
The life of gill netters on the lower Columbia was rough and
dangerous. In George Brown Goode's great compendium on fisheries and fishing, twenty-two pages are given to the dangers of
fishing. Three short paragraphs dispose of the Columbia. Some
skillful sober fishermen and others who were drunk or asleep,
drifted too close to the bar and were lost. The statement continues
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"in stormy weather some men are drowned every night," and unless their bodies were caught in drift nets, they were carried out
to sea and never found. In 1879 forty fishermen were drowned
and "more than that number" in 1880. Neither the canners nor the
local newspapers seemed much interested in making public announcements of the loss of itinerant and nameless gill netters. In
a great storm on the Columbia on May 3 and 4, 1880, somewhere
between sixty and three hundred and fifty gill netters lost their
lives on the Columbia bar, but newspaper interest in the disaster
subsided within four days. 28
George Hume began using Chinese laborers inside his cannery in 1872, and thereafter the Chinese furnished most of the
cannery labor throughout the industry, although no Chinese were
permitted to fish on the Columbia. 29
The fishing season was relatively short and the catches often
very large, so successful canners were forced to take whatever
steps they could to speed the work and to mechanize all processes
that would yield to mechanization. Work was carefully scheduled
and often highly specialized. For example, when tin cans first were
used for canning, it was claimed that a good tinsmith could make
only sixty cans a day when he performed all steps in the process by
hand. Can-making had improved somewhat by the time Hapgood
and the Humes opened their first cannery, but even so, a large
part of the winter and early spring was spent in making cans. But
very quickly machines were devised to cut out the ends and body
pieces, and crews of can makers were carefully organized. A
visitor to a cannery in 1877 reported that can-making had been
broken down into fourteen necessary steps and that a gang of
twenty-two men produced 15,000 cans a day. The next year the
Daily Astorian announced with great pleasure that a local mechanic had a soldering machine, run by a two-horsepower steam
engine, that could solder twenty-five to thirty thousand cans a
day. 30 It appears that almost every canner contributed something
to the mechanization of can-making. Gordon Dodds, in his biography of R. D. Hume, credits Hume with twenty-four patents on
can-making machinery, including one machine that shaped and
soldered the body and then attached and soldered the bottom of
the can. 31 The most impressive innovations were made in the
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1890s and later by Axel Johnson, a Swedish immigrant, who came
to the industry by way of Chicago machine shops.32
Much of the apparently inescapable handwork of the cannery
came in cleaning and cutting the fish for packing. Gang-knives
for cutting the cleaned fish appeared early, but a mechanical fishcleaner and -slimer was slower in coming, although by the 1890s
there were reports that such a machine would soon be inventedand it was. Edmond Augustine Smith, the inventor of the first
successful fish-cleaning machine, was as alien to the salmon-canning business as Axel Johnson. Born in London, Ontario, his
farmer-parents brought him to Victoria, British Columbia, as a
youngster. He worked at various jobs and then came to Seattle as
a brickmaker and terra cotta presser. A natural tinkerer, he got
interested in the problem of making a mechanical fish-cleaner
around 1901, and in 1903 he had a machine ready. It was tried at
Bellingham in 1903 and cleaned 22,000 fish during the first eighthour run. Improvements were added, and within a few years it
was claimed that one machine could do the work of a crew of fifty
Chinese butchers. Smith was described as a fat and happy man.
A Seattle newspaper once stated that he weighed under five
hundred pounds, but not much. 33
There were innumerable less dramatic improvements. For
example, it was thought that the English customer would buy
canned salmon only if the cans were painted red; and besides the
can needed some protection against rust. When only a few thousand cases of salmon were produced during the season, this was
not an impossible arrangement; but paint dried too slowly to serve
well when production increased. The canners sought a fast-drying
paint and failed to find one. They tried varnish and found it unsatisfactory. They then experimented with shellac and found that
it served admirably. The shellac bath became a part of the canning process. Similarly, once the salmon pack passed fifty thousand cases a year, the canners faced a minor problem of obtaining
the wooden boxes in which to store and ship their goods. Manufacturers in Portland organized box-making factories, and in 1877
John Harlow's factory employed a crew of forty-five men and
produced 2,500 boxes a day using a box-nailing machine. 34
The salmon-canning business hardly fits the pattern most
historians like to employ in describing economic development in
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the Western United States-although in some respects it resembles the fur trade. Almost from the beginning it was characterized
by relatively large-scale organization and absentee ownership; it
was seasonal, it depended on transient labor, and it sought a
world market. Moreover, although the salmon canners were
beneficiaries of whatever technology they could borrow from
Europe and the Eastern United States, they also made numerous
important contributions to canning technology themselves. Perhaps they shouldn't have done this in an economically underdeveloped area, but they did.
The canners conducted their business in isolated places, unsupervised except by the market. They were either responsible or
lucky in that they were not touched by anything resembling the
"embalmed-beef scandal" of the Spanish-American War, and only
a little harassed by Upton Sinclair's disclosures of conditions in
the stockyards of Chicago; but analysis of their product by the
North Dakota state chemist did embarrass them. It was more in
amusement than in anger that the Pacific Fisherman reported in
1912 that an English newspaper had charged that American
salmon was nothing more than cod dyed pink by the Yankees, and
that another, no doubt influenced by Upton Sinclair, charged that
American salmon were usually packed in brothels and often were
unintentionally adulterated with the human hands, feet, and other
parts lopped off during the canning operation. 35 In 1918 the
whole Alaska salmon pack was purchased by the U.S. government
and subjected to a cursory inspection. The stuff stood up fairly
well. Most of what was found in the cans was reported to be
salmon, but it had not be~n carefully packed. Of 817,000 cases
inspected in Seattle, 108,000 were rejected. 36 This experience led
the leading salmon canners to propose industry-wide inspection at
the canneries. 37 The proposal itself probably indicates that the
old order had vanished beyond recall.
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E. E. Rich, ed. ( 3 vols., Toronto, Ont., 1941, 1944, 1945); Letters of Doctor
John McLaughlin, 1829-32, Burt Brown Barker, ed. (Portland, Ore., 1948).
The persistent hope of HBC officers of developing a profitable salmon trade
is reflected in a letter of Simpson, written to the governor and committee
from Honolulu on March 1, 1842. He reported the abundance of superior
salmon in the North Pacific, for which he was sure U.S. and Chinese markets
would grow. The fish commanded from ten to twelve dollars for a 180-pound
barrel in the Sandwich Islands. "I think," he concluded, "the fisheries of this
coast are highly deserving of attention as a growing and almost inexhaustible
source of trade." "Letters of George Simpson, 1841-42," Joseph Shafer, ed.,
American Historical Review, XIV ( October, 1908 ), 83-84.
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7. S. E . Morison, "New England and the Opening of the Columbia
River Salmon Trade, 1830," Oregon Historical Quarterly, 28 ( June, 1927),
111-32.
8. In a letter to the governor and committee, October 29, 1832, McLoughlin reported the arrival of Wyeth with eleven Americans and said they
proposed to investigate the possibility of going into the salmon-curing business as well as the fur trade. McLaughlin Letters from Vancouver, I, 108-9.
Wyeth recorded his salmon-fishing experience in his Journals, F. G. Young,
ed. ( Eugene, Ore., 1899), and in a letter of February 4, 1839, printed in
Report from Mr. [Caleb] Cushing from the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Territory of Oregon, Supplemental Report, Feb. 16, 1839. House of Representatives Document No. 101, pt. 2, 25 Cong. 3 Sess., serial 351, pp. 12-14.
Scattered through the McLoughlin letters are angry and denunciatory references to American sea captains who entered the Columbia to take salmon.
Although HBC never managed to get barreled salmon to England in
good shape, efforts continued and are reflected in the letters. The business
never attained the prosperity in the Pacific that officers of the company apparently hoped for; so long as HBC remained at Vancouver, however, the
company continued to take and pack salmon. An 1846 drawing of Fort
Vancouver shows the salmon store and wharf prominently among the buildings of the establishment. McLaughlin Letters from Vancouver, III, 48.
9. Apparently spokesmen for the fishermen had over the years sought to
reap such benefits as might accrue from identifying themselves as "carriers
of civilization." Eighty years before McDonald published his book, Talleyrand, having engaged in land speculation in New York and New England,
declared that lumbermen and fishermen were among the less valuable members of society. "Fishing," he said. "closely resembles idleness"; and of
fishermen, "There is no place they love, they know the land only by the
poor house in which they live. . . . When some political writers have said
that fishing was a sort of agriculture they have said something which seems
brilliant but which has no truth. All the qualities, all the virtues which are
attached to agriculture are lacking to the man who engages in fishing."
Talleyrand in America. As a Financial Promoter, 1794-96: Unpublished Letters and Memoirs, H. Huth and Wilma J. Pugh, trans. and eds. (Annual Re~
port uf the American Historical Association, 1941, 3 vols., Washington, D.C.,
1941 ), II, 81.
10. There are scattered references to the salmon trade on the Columbia
in the 1850s in H. H. Bancroft, History uf Oregon ( 2 vols., San Francisco,
Calif., 1888), II, and History uf Washington, Idaho, and Montana 18451889 (San Francisco, Calif., 1890). James G. Swan, The Northwest Coast,
or Three Years Residence in Washington Territory (New York, N.Y., 1857),
107 and passim, provides a description of the nets and seines used in salmonfishing in the 1850s and a brief comment on the decaying Indian ceremonies
that attended capture of the first salmon in the spring.
11. San Francisco Daily Evening Bulletin, October 19, 1864, January
14, 1865. I am indebted to Peter C. Carstensen, now an attorney in the
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Department of Justice, for searching the files of California newspapers for
trade and other data relating to the salmon fisheries.
12. General histories of the canning industry are both rare and inadequate. James H. Collins, The Story of Canned Foods (New York, N.Y.,
1924) has some useful information but is seldom reliable on details; Earl
Chapin May, The Canning Clan: A Pageant of Pioneering Americans ( New
York, N.Y., 1937), 31-38, also untrustworthy on details, devotes a chapter to
Russell's work, with wild disregard for accuracy of detail. He provides, pp.
433--41, a list of somewhat capriciously selected "important dates" in the
history of canning. Most useful is A. W. Bitting, Appertizing: or, The Art of
Canning: Its History and Development ( San Francisco, Calif., 1937), who has
looked at many of the important documents and who, on pages 47-49, reprints H. L . Russell's report on gaseous fermentation in the canning industry
from the 12th Annual Report of The Wisconsin Agricultural Experiment
Station, 1895, 227-31. See also E. H . Beardsley, Harry L. Russell and Agricultural Science in Wisconsin ( Madison, Wisc., 1969 ), 19-21; and Paul F.
Clark, Pioneer Microbiologists of America ( Madison, Wisc., 1961 ), 266.
13. Historians of canning, like most other historians, supply dates and
places to identify beginnings and "firsts," but they seldom agree. Bitting, The
Art of Canning, 796, 805, 812, states that lobsters were "first" canned at
Eastport, Maine, in 1842; salmon at Aberdeen, Scotland, 1824; and sardines
at Nantes, France, 1834. May, The Canning Clan, 435, states with a (?)
that Crosse and Blackwell established "the world's first salmon canning factory" at Cork, Ireland, in 1849. The authors of a recent biography of William Drummond Stewart mention that among the supplies Stewart took to
the mountains on his trips into Western America during the early and middle
1830s were canned sardines which he doled out on rare occasions to mountain men and presumably Indians. See Mae Reed Porter and Odessa Davenport, Scotsman in Buckskin: Sir William Drummond Stewart and the Rocky
Mountain Fur Trade (New York, N.Y., 1963 ), 132, 146.
14. Few contemporary records give so much as a glimpse of this enterprise on the Sacramento. Robert E. Draper, Sacramento Directory for 1866,
lists neither the Humes nor Hapgood. The Sacramento Union says nothing
from June to October about the salmon canners working across the river from
the city. A year after the Humes established their cannery on the Columbia
the Oregonian, March 10, 1868, carried a brief account of their cannery.
Thereafter newspaper and other accounts appear. The story of the establishment and management of the Sacramento cannery rests almost entirely on
the recollections of R. D. Hume, the youngest of the seven Hume brothers,
four of whom played a part in the salmon-canning industry. R. D. arrived
in California in the spring of 1864 in time to help with the first salmon pack.
Details of his account changed from time to time, but the story remains much
the same. See R. D. Hume, Salmon of the Pacific Coast (n.p., 1893); "The
First Cannery," Pacific Fisherman, January, 1905, pp. 19-20 (printed with
the article was a sketch picturing the first cannery made under "direct supervision" of R. D. Hume), and ibid., January, 1908, pp. 25-26; obituaries of
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R. D. Hume and George W. Hume appear in ibid., February, 1909, p. 21,
and March, 1912, p. 17 respectively. A biography of William, who died in
1902, by R. C. Clark is in the Dictionary of American Biography. The Daily
Astorian, January 6, 1883, carried an article on George W. Hume. R. D.
Hume wrote an autobiography of sorts and published it serially in his newspaper, the Radium ( Wedderburn, Oregon), 1904-6. This has been reprinted,
with Gordon B. Dodds as editor, under Hume's title, A Pygmy Monopolist:
The Life and Doings of R. D. Hume Written by Himself and Dedicated to
his Neighbors ( Madison, Wisc., 1961).
There is some confusion about the date of the first pack of salmon on
the Columbia. Most writers give 1866 as the year during which the Humes
and Hapgood began canning salmon on ·the river. However, the best evidence-the recollections of George W. and R. D. Hume and the report in
the Oregonian in 1868-clearly indicates that the 1867 season marked the
beginning of salmon-canning on the Columbia. For many details on the
Columbia River fisheries see also T. E . Craig and R. L. Hacker, History and
Development of the Fisheries of the Columbia, Bull. 32, Bureau of Fisheries,
1940.
15. John N. Cobb assembled the data on the salmon fisheries for the
U.S . Bureau of Fisheries. His first bulletin was published under the title of
The Salmon Fisheries of the Pacific Coast in 1911, and thereafter the bulletin
appeared in enlarged editions in 1917, 1921, and 1930 under the title of

Pacific Salmon Fisheries.
16. The Daily Oregonian (Portland), March 10, 1868.
17. Hume and Hapgood Business Records, University of Oregon, include the George Brett letters, January 10, 1872, to the New York and San
Francisco offices of Platt & Newton. The Army sales were reported to Hume
and Hapgood on May 4, 1872, and in June, 1872.
18. The long relation of the Anny with canned salmon is underscored
by three pages or so devoted to salmon and salmon-canning in the Handbook
of Subsistence Stores, published by authority of the Secretary of War, for use
in the Anny of the United States, War Department Document No. 19 (Washington, D.C., 1896), 146-49.
19. A Review of the Commercial, Financial and Industrial Interest of
the State of Oregon for the Year 1877 (Portland, Ore., 1878), 11-12; Cobb,
Pacific Salmon Fisheries ( 1917), 162. The Review reports a total of 274,360
cases of salmon sent to England in 1877 out of a pack of 380,000. Oregonian,
September 8, 1881, reported that 1881 was the first year of substantial
canned-salmon trade with the United States. It was anticipated that 150,000
cases would be sent .to New York by sea and that soon it would be possible
to ship by railroad. Oregonian, January 1, 1890, reported that in 1883-1884
the pack was almost equally divided between domestic and foreign sales; in
1884-1885 domestic sales exceeded foreign substantially.
20. Cobb, Pacific Salmon Fisheries ( 1917), provides the principal statistical and other •data showing the spread of the canneries. The Pacific
Fisherman Yearbook, 1915, 66-67, offers a short account of salmon-canning
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in Siberia. It reports that the first plant was bought in San Francisco by the
Kamchatka Trading Company and put in operation in 1898, and lists other
canneries established after that.
21. See Gordon B. Dodds, ed., A Pygmy Monopolist, and The Salmon
King of Oregon: R. D. Hume and the Pacific Fisheries (Chapel Hill, N.C.,
1959 ), for full accounts of R. D. Hume.
22. Statistical data is all drawn from Cobb, Pacific Salmon Fisheries
(1917) . Two volumes prepared by Jefferson F . Moser, both bearing the title
The Salmon and Salmon Fisheries of Alaska and reporting the operations of
the United States Fish Commission Steamer Albatross, the first for the year
ending June 30, 1898, the second for the year ending June 30, 1901 (Washington, D.C., 1899, 1902), provide a full account of the Alaska fisheries at
the end of the century and offer some descriptive data on the Alaska Packers
Association, although one must look elsewhere for a characterization of the
often coercive tactics employed by the APA. The association grew out of a
pooling arrangement made in 1890 by several Alaska salmon packers. The
next year, in the expectation of a substantial glut of the market, a larger
number of packers combined to dispose of some 360,000 cases of salmon. In
1892, according to Moser, thirty-one canners formed an association under
which a committee was created to direct all operations of the members.
Under this arrangement only nine canneries were operated that season and
profits were prorated among all members whether their canneries worked or
not. In 1893 steps were taken to provide formal organization and incorporation under the name Alaska Packers Association. The association sought to
control both production and marketing of Alaska canned salmon. Although
the APA reduced substantially the number of canneries operating in Alaska,
this reduction had slight effect on total quantity of canned salmon produced
in Alaska. Production increased throughout the decade. The competition for
markets was, however, much reduced. Moser estimates that the APA controlled 74 percent of the production in 1897. In 1901 the amount was down
to 50 per cent. For an account of the tactics employed by APA against one
competitor, see Dodds, The Salmon King of Oregon, 10-18. The full history
of the APA, and indeed the history of the West Coast fisheries, richly deserves to be written.
23. In 1915 the Pacific Fisherman reported that only the Alaska Packers
Association still used San Francisco as a base. Other salmon business tended
to center in Portland, Astoria, and Seattle, with Seattle as the dominant
supply, storage, and marketing point. The move to Seattle had probably
been heralded in 1912 when the Fisherman reported that through the efforts
of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce, the Astoria Iron Works was in process
of arranging to transfer its plant to Seattle. Land had been leased on the
Duwarnish from the county commissioners, "and after the bodies of the Potter's Field, for which the ground is now being used, have been disinterred
and incinerated, work will start on the construction of the large buildings
which the Astoria Iron Works will occupy." The company was a large manufacturer of canning machinery, marine gasoline engines, etc.
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24. F. F. Victor, All over Oregon and Washington (San Francisco,
Calif., 1872), 61; Daily Astorian, October 24, 1877; Radium (Wedderburn),
November 7, 1907; The West Shore, June, 1877, p. 159; Cobb, in an article
in the Pacific Fisherman Yearbook, 1916, provides a detailed description of
virtually all types of fishing gear used to catch salmon. Much of this material
is found in the various editions of his Pacific Salmon Fisheries.
25. Letter from the Secretary of War transmitting, in response to Senate
Resolution of Jan. 27, 1887, report of the salmon fisheries of the Columbia
River, Senate Executive Document No. 123, 50 Cong., 1 Sess., serial 2510,
provides a full and somewhat melancholy picture of the fisheries on the
Columbia of that year and indicates the enormous speed with which fishtaking gear had developed. The number of fishing boats had increased from
15 reported in 1867 to 1,500 by 1882. See also Daily Astorian, October 22,
1882, for an early comment on the fish wheel. The gill netters disliked the
fish-trap men as intensely as they did the fish-wheel operators, and this conflict led to a number of "salmon wars" and many casualties. Violence followed the fishermen to other fishing places and is appropriately celebrated
by Rex Beach, The Silver Hoard (New York, N.Y., 1909). The Pacific
Fisherman approved of Beach as the truthful chronicler of the fisherman's
epic.
Improvement of gear was of course coupled with a relative decline in
the efficiency of the gill netters and others. The Oregonian reported in 1887
that in 1876 the average catch had been 3,850 fish per boat for the season.
In 1887, with nets twice as long, it was 600 per boat, Oregonian, August 11,
1887.
26. The price data is provided in the letter from the Secretary of War
cited above, 59-60. The North Pacific Coast (Portland), August, 1881, p. 51,
reported that on the Columbia it was still expected that three salmon would
provide seventy-two pounds of raw fish, enough to make a forty-eight-pound
case of canned salmon.
27. George Brown Goode and Associates, . The Fisheries and Fishing
Industries of the United States, prepared through the cooperation of the
Commissioner of Fisheries and the superintendent of the tenth census. Senate Miscellaneous Documents No. 124, 47 Cong., 1 Sess., serials 1998-2003.
Section 2, 608, and Section 4, "The Fishermen of the United States," 29-43.
The data was collected in the early 1880s but was not published until several
years later. Oregonian, September 8, 1881; Post-Intelligencer (Seattle),
April 30, 1890.
28. Goode, The Fisheries and Fishing Industries of the United States,
pt. IV, 104-26.
Newspaper reporting of the great disaster of May, 1880, was tentative
and capricious. During most of April the fishermen at Astoria were on strike,
and the events surrounding the strike were followed regularly by the Portland Oregonian ( April 22, 23, 24) and the Daily Astorian ( April 24), and
there was much approval when the strike was settled on April 24. Fishermen
apparently tried to make up for lost earnings by taking risks they might

The Fisherman's Frontier on the Pacific Coast I 77
otherwise have avoided. Ahnost the whole fishing fleet went out on May 3
(fishermen went out in the evening and fished at night) and were caught in
a great gale followed by sudden squalls. In a report dated May 4, the reporter for the Oregonian said there were rumors that many fishermen had
been lost in the storm, that some boats had been towed in without crews.
The reporter further declared that such accidents wouldn't happen if fishermen would not drift close to the bar and would also avoid drinking whiskey
after spreading their nets. ( Oregonian, May 6, 1880.) The Daily Astorian
reported on May 5 that there were rumors that many fishermen had lost their
lives in the great storm, but the editor was reassuring. He was sure the reports had been "exaggerated." On May 7 the Oregonian carried another
story on the disaster in which it was estimated that at least twenty-five men
and ten to fifteen boats were lost. The next day the Astorian told its readers
that there had been a great loss of life in the storm and that the reporter of
the Oregonian had apologized for charging fishermen with drunkenness.
With this account the interest of the newspaper waned. On August 1 the
Daily Astorian announced the end of a very successful salmon-canning season but also remarked that "Not less than from seventy-five to a hundred
men have been lost." The editor promised his readers that he would get
more details on this loss and present them in a later article, but seems not to
have gotten around to it. Early in September, however, many of the fishermen having returned to San Francisco, the San Francisco Chronicle carried
a somewhat garbled account of losses on the Columbia and quoted fishermen
whose estimates of loss of life ranged from 200 to 350. Cannery owners, it
was reported, admitted that sixty men were lost. One of the fishermen said
that cannery men never reported half their losses. The Daily Astorian reprinted the piece from the Chronicle on September 10, 1880, but the editor
expressed his doubts about the truth of the reports. A year later the
Oregonian, in a review of the industry and the fishing season, acknowledged
that sixty men had been lost in the storm the year before ( Oregonian, September 7, 1881). This figure was subsequently adopted officially. ( Fifth and
Sixth Annual Reports, Fish and Game Protector and Report of the State Fish
Commissioner of Oregon, 1898.) . But even that number shrank through
time. In December, 1950, an Astoria newspaper, the Columbia Press, declared that "more than a dozen" gill netters were lost in the great storm of
May 3-4. However, J. A. Gibbs, Pacific Graveyard: A Narrative. of Shipwrecks Where the Columbia River Meets the Pacific Ocean (2nd ed., Portland, Ore., 1964), 238, says two hundred fishermen were drowned in the
storm.
29. The Chinese were restricted to work in the canneries. It was reported that if they tried to enter fishing, they disappeared at night. Daily
Astorian (quoting San Francisco Chronicle), September 10, 1890. However,
on the Columbia and elsewhere from 1872 until well into the twentieth century, they performed most of the work in the canneries. Proportions of Chinese to other laborers in the canneries were often given at four Chinese to
one white (North Pacific Coast, August, 1881 ). The Oregonian, September
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8, 1881, reported some 7,500 persons engaged in the business on the Columbia, 4,000 of them Chinese. Chinese labor was supplied to the canneries by
Chinese labor contractors, some of whom appear as shadowy figures in the
pages of the Paci-fie Fisherman, see January, 1903, p. 13; April, 1903, p. 2;
February, 1903, p. 4; April, 1906, pp. 7-8.
30. The West Shore, June, 1877, p. 160; Daily Astorian, May 24, 1878.
31. Dodds, The Salmon King of Oregon, 195.
32. The Paci-fie Fisherman, Yearbook, 1916, pp. 58 ff., paid tribute to
Johnson with a full page picture accompanying the article.
33. The Paci-fie Fisherman carried stories early in 1903 about the Smith
fish-cleaning machines and about several other mechanical fish cleaners that
were in process of being built. In September, 1903, p. 12, the Fisherman
printed an article reporting the successful use of the Smith machine, soon to
be called the Iron Chink, by the United Fish Packing Plant at Fairhaven,
Washington. The editors declared that the manager of this plant was the
only one in the whole industry who had been freed from the necessity of
hiring Chinese labor. Despite the enthusiasm of the editor, canners were
wary. Smith continued to improve the machine in the next years, and in 1907
he announced there were no further improvements he could make, ibid., September, 1907, p. 26. Meanwhile, in 1904, he had announced the machines
would be leased, not sold, to canneries for a royalty of three cents a case on
all salmon packed, Fisherman, December, 1904, p. 16. This permitted him
to improve all machines already in operation or substitute improved models.
By 1906 the Fisherman Yearbook assumed that the Iron Chink had captured
the market and that the Chinese butcher gangs would soon disappear. The
Iron Chink, it was reported, could handle three thousand fish an hour, two
of the machines could supply enough cleaned fish to keep seven lines of
packing machinery busy, the machine wasted less than hand-butchering, and
one machine could do the work of fifty Chinese ( Fisherman Yearbook, 1906,
pp. 19-30, 45--47). The Fisherman returned to the story with more superlatives in the Yearbook, 1907, pp. 53-54; in February, 1909, the Fisherman
announced that the Smith Iron Works had been moved to a new building.
In June the Fisherman announced the death, following an automobile accident, of Edmond Augustine Smith. Smith's short obituary appeared in June,
1909, pp. 19-21.
34. From time to time the Paci-fie Fisherman presented accounts of the
supporting industries of the canning industry. An article on salmon labels
with many color reproductions appeared in The Yearbook, 1905, pp. 24,
27-31; lacquer is discussed in the Yearbook, 1916, pp. 85-86 and in The
West Shore, June, 1877, p. 160. Misbranding and fraudulent labels were matters of dispute from time to time throughout the early years of the industry.
35. Paci-fie Fisherman, August, 1903, p. 5; September, 1912, p. 26.
36. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 (Quartermaster Corps) of the
Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, 66 Cong., 1 & 2
Sess., 1919-1920, pts. 17-20 of serial 5, are devoted to purchase and return
of canned salmon. Part 19, 919-26, contains data on the inspection of Alaska
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canned salmon at Seattle. A sketch of the dimensions, organization, and
operation of the business as of 1918 appears in a publication of the Federal
Trade Commission as a part of a general investigation of canned foods, Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Canned Foods: Canned Salmon,
December, 1918 (Washington, D .C., 1919).
37. John N. Cobb gives a laconic account of the development in Pacific
Salmon Fisheries (1930) , 529- 31. He says that the widespread suspicion
that the 1918 pack was below standard caused the canners a substantial
monetary loss and led to the approval by the salmon canners in February,
1919, of an arrangement for inspection of their plants under the direction of
the National Canners Association. This in itself did not prove effective, but
it was accompanied by the establishment of a branch laboratory in Seattle in
1919 with scientists to assist canners in dealing with their problems. "The
quality of the annual pack," he wrote, "has been wonderfully enhanced."
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American Indian Policy
in the 1840s:
Visions of Reform
Francis Paul Prucha, Marquette University

The decade of the 1840s was an
interlude of relative quiet in American Indian relations, and it
gave the federal government the opportunity to promote with
sincetity and enthusiasm a program for the civilization and advancement of the Indian nations with whom it had long been in
contact; By 1840 the removal of these Eastern Indians to new
homes west of the Mississippi had largely been accomplished,
bringing to a culmination the removal policy that had been the
answer to the "Indian problem" of the generation of James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and Andrew Jackson. Now there
stretched ahead an indefinite future in which the officials of the
Indian Office envisaged the flowering of earlier attempts to ameliorate the condition of the Indians. In their visions these men
81
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shared in the vital optimism of their age. Betterment of all mankind seemed within easy reach, and concern for society's unfortunates (the delinquent, the insane, the indigent poor, the deaf, and
the blind) appeared everywhere. Crusades for peace, for women's
rights, for temperance, for education, and for abolition of slavery
marched with refoianing zeal and a strange na"ivete through the
land. Words like "benevolence," "philanthropy,'' and "perfectability" slipped easily from men's tongues. The plans for civilizing
and Christianizing the Indians who had been removed from the
main arena of American life partook of this evangelizing spirit.
The Indian policy of the 1840s, indeed, must be considered in the
light of what Arthur M. Schlesinger has called "the first great
upsurge of social reform in United States history."1
Such a reform movement, of course, was not new, for there
had always been voices raised on behalf of the Indians. Removal
itself, its advocates within the federal government thought, was a
humanitarian measure. They did not think that they were acting
as harshly toward the Indians as their critics at the time and as
later historians have claimed. Rejecting infeasible alternatives to
solving the Indian problem, they sought to remove the red men
from contact with white society and beyond the reach of jurisdictional disputes between the states and the federal government.
The War Department put together what it considered a liberal
offer to the Indians. In return for the agreement on the part of
the Indians to give up their lands east ~f the Mississippi for ·comparable lands west of Missouri and Arkansas, the federal government offered to assume the costs of removal, to subsist the Indians
for a year in the n~w land, and to. provide substantial annuity
payments. Beyond this simple exchange the United States committed itself to provide more general aid and protection. Altogether, the stipulations and pledges were thought to be so bene,
Bbial to the _tribes that the Indian leaders could not refuse to
acC"ept removal.
President Monroe, in a special message to Congress on Indian
removal delivered on January 27, 1825, set the general tone and
pattern. He urged for the Indians "a well-digested plan for their
government and civilization, which should be agreeable to themselves, would not only shield them from impending ruin, but
promote their welfare and happiness." He recommended some
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sort of internal government for the tribes in the West, with sufficient power to hold the tribes together in amity and to preserve
order, to prevent intrusion on the Indian lands, and to teach the
Indians by regular instruction the arts of civilized life. "It is not
doubted," he concluded, "that this arrangement will present considerations of sufficient force to surmount all their prejudices in
_favor of the soil of their nativity, however strong they may be.'' 2
Andrew Jackson, in his first annual message on December 8,
1829, spoke in the same way. In the West, he asserted, the Indians
"may be secured in the enjoyment of governments of their own
choice, subject to no other control from the United States than
such as may be necessary to preserve peace on the frontier and
between the several tribes. There the benevolent may endeavor
to teach them the arts of civilization, and, by promoting union and
harmony among them, to raise up an interesting commonwealth,
destined to perpetuate the race and to attest the humanity and
justice of this Government.''3 Similarly, Lewis Cass, in his first
annual report as Secretary of War, spoke of removal as presenting
"the only hope of permanent establishment and improvement." He
recommended instruction in the "truths of religion, together with
a knowledge of the simpler mechanic arts and the rudiments of
science," and he listed seven fundamental principles, which he
asserted would constitute the best foundation both for American
efforts and for Indian hopes. In addition to a solemn pledge that
the land assigned to the Indians would be a permanent home and
that an adequate force would be provided to suppress intertribal
hostilities, he encouraged severalty of property, assistance in
opening farms, 'a nd employment of persons to instruct the Indians. He spoke also of leaving the Indians free to enjoy their
own institutions insofar as they were "compatible with their own
safety and ours, and with the great objects of their prosperity and
improvement."4 The government clearly intended, therefore, to
promote the civilization of the Indians in their new homes.
The 1840s were years for fulfillment of the promises. The
men in charge of Indian affairs in that decade were convinced of
the wisdom of the removal policy and eager to make it work for
the Indians. "It will be the end of all," T. Hartley Crawford, the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs appointed by President Van
Buren, wrote after his first year in office, "unless the experiment
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of the Government in the Indian territory shall be blessed with
success." He admitted that the outcome was uncertain, but he
was not disheartened and he urged perseverance. 5
As Crawford warmed to his job, he became bolder in his
praise of removal as essential for Indian betterment. He considered other alternatives that might have been pursued-assimilation of Indians into the mass of white society and life as farmers
on their lands in the East-and rejected them as infeasible. Removal to the West, he judged, was "the only expedient-the
wisest, the best, the most practicable and practical of all." His
view of the advantages to the Indians was idyllic, his goals utopian. The Indians, he prophesied, would find "a home and a
country free from the apprehension of disturbance and annoyance,
from the means of indulging a most degrading appetite, and far
removed from the temptations of bad and sordid men; a region
hemmed in by the laws of the United States, and guarded by
virtuous agents, where abstinence from vice, and the practice of
good morals, should find fit abodes in comfortable dwellings and
cleared farms, and be nourished and fostered by all the associations of the hearthstone. In no other than this settled condition
can schools flourish, which are the keys that open the gate to
heaven and God." He foresaw for the Indians in their new Western homes a great flowering of the solid Puritan virtues-"temperance and industry, and education and religion." Imbued with this
attitude, he could not but urge the speedy removal of those
Indians who had not yet migrated. 6
These sentiments Crawford repeated year after year while he
was Commissioner of Indian Affairs. A treaty with Wyandots in
Ohio was looked upon as a means to promote their comfort and,
as a consequence, their advance in morals, civilization, and Christianity, although the Commissioner was not so obtuse that he did
not appreciate the advantages to the whites in obtaining the
Wyandots' Ohio acres. Like so many others, from Thomas Jeffer~
son on, he rejoiced that the duty of Americans toward the Indians
coincided with their own interests. Removal from the lands that
the whites wanted would bring to the Indians seclusion and protection from the contaminating influences of white civilization. 7
Crawford's vision was reflected in the statements of the Secretaries of War. Joel R. Poinsett in 1840 spoke of removal as the
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only way, not only to civilize the red man, but to perpetuate his
existence. John C. Spencer remarked two years later that the end
of the removal process was in sight. "It is to be hoped that the red
man will then be suffered to rest in peace," he concluded, "and
that our undivided efforts will be bestowed in discharging the
fearful responsibilities we have incurred to improve his intellectual and moral condition as the only means of rendering him
happy here or hereafter."8
For the whites, the removal of the Indians from the East
was an end in itself, since the lands they coveted could then be
acquired and developed. For the Indians, on the other hand,
removal was only a means to an end. Relocation was to make
possible their civilization. The instrument that would bring all
this about, the panacea for all the ills besetting the Indians, was
education.
That the Indians were educable was a basic tenet of the reformers. It was admitted, of course, that the present state of the
Indians was one of semibarbarism. The aborigines were indolent,
a condition aggravated by the lack of individual property, which
alone would give incentive to work. They were erratic, wandering from place to place without permanency of residence. They
were warlike, for their culture elevated war into an advantage and
violence into a virtue. Contrasted with the Americans, who extolled thrift, perseverance, enterprise, domestic peace, and Christian morality, the Indians were an inferior people, standing in the
way of progress. But the unfortunate condition of the red men
was not irremediable. The government officials did not believe in
a racial inferiority that was not amenable to betterment. "It is
proved, I think, conclusively," Crawford remarked of the Indian
race, "that it is in no respect inferior to our own race, except in
being less fortunately circumstanced. As great an aptitude for
learning the letters, the pursuits, and arts of civilized life, is evident; if their progress is slow, so has it been with us and with
masses of men in all nations and ages.''9 Circumstances and education alone made the difference between them and the whites;
and Indian agents, missionaries, and traders contributed evidence
that the red men were suspectible of improvement. There would
be no racial obstacle to the eventual assimilation of the Indians
into the political life of the nation. 10
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So, schools for Indians were advocated with great enthusiasm,
befitting an age in which education was considered the "universal
utopia."11 The promotion of schools as the agency to swing the
Indians from a state considered to be barbarous, immoral, and
pagan to one that was civilized, moral, and Christian took on new
exuberance when the Indians were safely ensconced in the West,
where the "experiment" could be carried out unhindered. Indian
schools, Commissioner Crawford asserted in 1839, formed "one of
the most important objects, if it be not the greatest, connected
with our Indian relations. Upon it depends more or less even
partial success in all endeavors to make the Indian better than he
is." The Commissioner hammered tirelessly at this same theme.
"The greatest good we can bestow upon them," he said in 1842, "is
education in its broadest sense-education in letters, education in
labor and the mechanic arts, education in morals, and education
in Christianity."12
The initial problem was how to intrigue the Indians, both the
youths to be educated and their parents, into accepting the schooling. It was all too evident that simply duplicating white schools
in the Indian country or sending Indian children to the East for
formal education was not the whole answer. Leaming in letters
alone was not appreciated by the Indians and did not give any
practical advancement to the young Indians, who became misfits
within their own community. The answer, rather, lay in manuallabor schools, whose full importance was made explicit by
Crawford:
The education of the Indian is a great work. It includes
more than the term imports in its application to civilized
communities. Letters and personal accomplishments are what
we generally intend to speak of by using the word; though
sometimes, even with us, it has a more comprehensive meaning. Applied to wild men, its scope should take in much
more extensive range, or you give them the shadow for the
substance. They must at the least be taught to read and write,
and have some acquaintance with figures; but if they do not
learn to build and live in houses, to sleep on beds; to eat at
regular intervals; to plough, and sow, and reap; to rear and
use domestic animals; to understand and practise the me-
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chanic arts; and to enjoy, to their gratification and improvement, all the means of profit and rational pleasure that are so
profusely spread around civilized life, their mere knowledge
of what is learned in the school room proper will be comparatively valueless. At a future day, more or less remote,
when those who are now savage shall have happily become
civilized, this important branch of Indian interest may be
modified according to circumstances; but at present, when
every thing is to be learned at the school, and nothing, as
with us, by the child as it grows up, unconsciously and without knowing how or when, the manual labor school system is
not only deserving of favor, but it seems to me indispensable
to the civilization of the Indians; and their civilization, with
a rare exception here and there, is as indispensable to real and
true Christianity in them. 13
This apotheosis of white cultural traits and insistence upon
them, willy-nilly, for the Indians is an overpowering indication of
the ethnocentric viewpoint of the white reformers. Once the way
of life was accepted, then more formal education in arts and letters would be seen to be advantageous, and the desire to attain it
would motivate the Indians to attend and promote traditional
schools. As civilization advanced, Christianity could be promoted,
and moral improvement would follow. The desire for material
well-being would stimulate industry, which would in turn accelerate the whole process. It was a wonderful white man's carrousel.
The practical model for the Indian Office planners was the
Methodist mission school established in 1839 for the Shawnees at
the Fort Leavenworth Agency, which seemed to embody all the
characteristics demanded to accomplish the goal. In 1840 it bad
some fifty students, in about equal proportions of boys and girls,
running in age from six to eighteen years. "They can nearly all
read, many can compose and write sentences, and a number are
acquainted with the rule of three," Crawford reported. "They are
taught out of school to split wood, plough, mow, &c.; and when
all the appliances are ready for use, will learn the mechanic arts.
The girls have made the same average progress in letters, and are
taught the various branches of housewifery." Two three-story
brick buildings had been erected and a third was under way.
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There were houses for the principal and for the blacksmith, and a
shop, a barn, and stables. Between five hundred and six hundred
acres of land were fenced and in cultivation. "The spirit manifested in thus reclaiming the wild woods," the Commissioner
noted, "has been extended to the much more important work of
mental culture." Plans called for accommodations ultimately for
two hundred students, at a yearly expense of not more than seventy dollars each. Crawford considered the school as "the strongest evidence I have yet seen of the probability of success, after all
our failures, in the efforts made by benevolent and religious societies, and by the Government, to work a change in Indian habits
and modes of life; while it is conclusive proof that these sons of
the forest are our equals in capacity."14 For its good work, and
even more as a harbinger of greater things to come within the
Indian territory, the school won praise from the highest sources.
Manual-labor schools for all the Indians became the goal of the
War Department and the Indian Office. 15
Two other principles, in connection with manual-labor education, were adopted by the Indian Office. One of these, as was
appropriate in a period that saw the first organized crusade for
women's rights, was that Indian schools should teach girls as well
as boys, if civilization was to be forwarded. When Crawford,
early in his term of office, noted that more boys than girls were
being educated, he asked, "Upon what principle of human action
is this inequality fom;ided?" And he set forth his argument in
strong terms:
Unless the Indian female character is raised, and her relative position changed, such an education as you can give the
males will be a rope of sand, which, separating at every tum,
will bind them to no amelioration. Necessity may force the
culture of a little ground, or the keeping of a few cattle, but
the savage nature will break out at every temptation. If the
women are made good and industrious housewives, and
taught what befits their condition, their husbands and sons
will find comfortable homes and social enjoyments, which, in
any state of society, are essential to morality and thrift. I
would therefore advise that the larger proportion of pupils
should be female.16
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"The conviction is settled," he reiterated in 1841, "that the civilization of these unfortunate wards of the Government will be effected through the instrumentality of their educated women, much
more than by their taught men."17 Although the Commissioner's
goals were never met, promotion of female education continued.
A second principle, gradually developed during the decade,
was that Indian youths should be taught in the Indian country
where they lived and not sent off to Eastern schools. There had
been a tradition of sending select Indian boys to white schools in
the East, where it was supposed they could more quickly absorb
the white man's civilization. The Cherokee leaders John Ridge
and Elias Boudinot, for example, had been educated at Cornwall,
Connecticut. The Choctaws had made arrangements with Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky, by which he established an academy
for boys at Blue Springs, Kentucky, in 1825. The school was directed by the Baptists and supported enthusiastically for many
years by the Choctaws. Twenty-five boys entered this Choctaw
Academy in 1825, and the enrollment in some years ran to more
than one hundred and fifty students. Other tribes, too, sent their
boys to the school.1 8 But complaints arose about the school, and
by 1841 the Choctaws had decided to educate their sons within
the nation. Such a move was in accord with the Indian Department's views.
Crawford advised from the first against sending Indians away
from home to distant schools, and in 1844 Secretary of War William Wilkins argued that education should be diffused as equally
as possible through the whole tribe by establishing common
schools within the Indian country. The education of a few individuals in a college or school away from their tribe did not promote the designs of the government, Wilkins argued, for he was
afraid that men more highly educated than the mass of the tribe
might employ their talents for selfish acquisition and oppression
of their uneducated brothers. 19 By 1846 the Indian Department
had clearly decided to adhere to the new policy.20 "The practice
so long pursued of selecting a few boys from the different tribes,
and placing them at our colleges and high schools," Commissioner
William Medill repeated in 1847, ''has failed to produce the beneficial results anticipated; while the great mass of the tribe at home
were suffered to remain in ignorance." The plan would be com-
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pletely discontinued as soon as existing arrangements could be
changed, and the resources of the Indian Office would be applied
solely to the schools within the Indian country, where education
could be extended to both sexes and generally spread throughout
the tribe. 21
To carry out the educational reform considerable money was
expended in the Indian country. The civilization fund of $10,000
a year, which Congress had authorized in 1819, was apportioned
among the various missionary societies in small amounts of a few
hundred dollars each.22 The effect of these small allowances in
stimulating contributions by missionary groups is hard to evaluate,
for other federal funds also were poured into the mission schools.
Chief among these were the funds specified for education in
treaties made with the Indians or designated from annuity moneys
by the tribes themselves for educational purposes. Thus the Choctaw treaty of 1830 stipulated that the government was to pay
$2,000 annually for twenty years for the support of three schoolteachers, and the tribe itself in 1842 voted to apply $18,000 a year
from its annuities to education. 23 A treaty with the Ottawas and
Chippewas in 1836 specified that in addition to an annuity in
specie of $30,000 for twenty years, $5,000 each year would be
given for teachers, schoolhouses, and books in their own language, and $3,000 more for missions. These payments were to run
for twenty years and as long thereafter as Congress would continue the appropriation. 24 In the year 1845, $68,195 was provided
by treaties for Indian education, to which was added $12,367.50
from the civilization fund. 25 Subsequent treaties added to the
school funds available. A treaty with the Kansas Indians in 1846,
for example, provided for the investment of the sum paid for the
cession of lands, and $1,000 a year from the interest was directed
to schools within the Indian country. The treaty of 1846 with the
Winnebagos provided that $10,000 of the cession payment was to
be applied to the creation and maintenance of one or more
manual-labor schools. 26 To these government funds were added
those supplied by the missionary societies themselves. The government also built schools and churches and supplied agricultural
implements and domestic equipment, which could be used in the
manual-labor sort of education that the men of the 1840s advocated.
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Although the number of students in the Indian schools was
small, the optimism of the Indian Office and the missionaries was
not without foundation. The Choctaws, although more interested
in education than many of the tribes, offered an example of what
was possible. They began to build schools as soon as they arrived
in the West. The missionaries of the American Board reported
eleven schools with 228 Choctaw students in 1836, and in addition
there were five schools supported by the Choctaw Nation and the
three district schools provided by the 1830 treaty. In 1842 a comprehensive system of schools was begun. Spencer Academy and
Fort Coffee Academy were opened in 1844; Armstrong and New
Hope academies two years later. The national council also supplied support to four schools established earlier by the American
Board. By 1848 the Choctaws had nine boarding schools supported by tribal funds, and neighborhood schools had been
opened in many communities.27 The Commissioner in that year
reported exceptional progress as well among the Osages, Chickasaws, Quapaws, and Miamis. 28 The Cherokees also made remarkable progress, until they had a better common-school system than
either Arkansas or Missouri. 29
Comparative numbers give some indication of the progress,
although reports were often incomplete. In 1842 forty-five schools
(out of a total of fifty-two) reported 2,132 students enrolled. In
1848 there were sixteen manual-labor schools with 809 students
and eighty-seven boarding and other schools with 2,873 students;
in 1849, although some reports were missing, a further increase in
students was noted. 30
These schools would have been impossible without the devoted work of Christian missionaries, and Indian education was a
beneficiary of the missionary impulse of the Protestant churches
that was an important element in the reform ferment of the age. 31
The Indian Office felt this influence strongly, for its goals and
those of the missionary societies in the 1840s were identical: practical, moral, and religious education of the Indians, which would
bring both Christianity and civilization to the aborigines. 32 Since
the civilization fund that the federal government had at its disposal was small, the money had been used from the beginning as
a stimulus to missionary societies to enter the work of Indian education. The government thus consciously and eagerly consum-
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mated a partnership with the churches by which federal funds and
church funds were united to support the Christian missionariesa union of church and state in which the participants seemed
unaware of any Jeffersonian wall of separation. 33
Reliance on the missionaries, indeed, was uppermost in the
minds of the federal officials. Commissioner Crawford noted in
his report of 1839: "No direction of these institutions [Indian
schools] appears to me so judicious as that of religious and benevolent societies, and it is gratifying to observe the zeal with which
all the leading sects lend themselves to this good work; discouragements do not seem to cool their ardor, nor small success to
dissuade them from persevering efforts."34 So successful was the
Methodist school for the Shawnees that the War Department was
eager to support similar establishments directed by other religious
groups, "equally zealous, no doubt, in spreading the light of the
Gospel among the Indians, and equally disposed to advance their
moral culture."35 The report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1847 indicates how enamored the Indian Office had
become of its missionary auxiliaries:
In every system which has been adopted for promoting
the cause of education among the Indians, the Department
has found its most efficient and faithful auxiliaries and laborers in the societies of the several Christian denominations,
which have sent out missionaries, established schools, and
maintained local teachers among the different tribes. Deriving their impulse from principles of philanthropy and religion, and devoting a large amount of their own means to the
education, moral elevation and improvement of the tribes,
the Department has not hesitated to make them the instruments, to a considerable extent, of applying the funds appropriated by the government for like purposes. Their exertions
have thus been encouraged, and a greater degree of economy
at the same time secured in the expenditure of the public
money. 36
Agents in the field who were close to the missionaries and
their work were strong in praise of the efforts of the churches.
Thus Thomas H. Harvey, Superintendent of Indian Affairs at St.
Louis, argued that the schools for the Indians should always be
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entrusted to missionaries. "I conceive that the missionary, or
teacher of the Christian religion, is an indispensable agent in the
civilization of the Indians," he said. "No one who is not steeled in
prejudice can travel through the Indian country where they have
missionaries without observing their beneficial influence." Harvey
saw the schools of the missionaries as the centers of ever-widening
influence, for the educated Indians would soon give tone to the
larger society. 37
Much of the optimism of the officials in Washington regarding Indian improvement rested upon the reports of the missionaries. It was common for the church groups to describe the results
of their efforts in highly favorable terms, and the Indian Office
seemed ready to accept the reports uncritically. But this acceptance, unwarranted as it might have been at times, emphasizes the
utopian, reform-minded views of the age. 38
The visions of reform that the Indian Office and the missionaries had for the Indians, however, met serious obstacles. Removal
of the Indians to lands west of the Mississippi had not in fact
sequestered them from all contact with evil men. Traders under
license were permitted in the Indian country according to the laws
governing trade and intercourse with the Indians, and whereas
traders had traditionally been drawn to the Indians in search of
furs, they now came to the emigrant Indians principally to provide
goods in return for annuity money. Concern for the Indians in the
1840s included a critical attack upon the system of annuity payments as it then existed and strenuous efforts to have the system
changed.
Commissioner Crawford in his annual report of 1841 devoted
a long section to the problems connected with annuity payments.
The annuities did the Indians for whom they were intended little
good, for the money was almost completely absorbed by traders,
to whom the Indians had become indebted and who sat at the
annuity-payment grounds ready to pounce upon the funds. "The
recipients of money," Crawford complained, "are rarely more than
conduit pipes to convey it into the pockets of their traders." He
objected, too, to provisions in treaties for payment of debts owed
to the traders by the Indians.39 The annuities aggravated the very
conditions that the Indian Office was trying to correct. As long as
the Indians were assured of receiving their annual stipend, they
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did not exert themselves to earn a living, thus defeating the efforts
of the reformers to tum them into hard-working farmers. Much of
the annuity money was spent for worthless goods or trivial objects,
so that the bounty of the government was misappropriated. 40 The
annuity problem, furthermore, was closely tied to the problem of
intemperance among the Indians, for the money was easily
drained off into the pockets of the whiskey venders. 41
The attack on the problem was made on several fronts, all
aimed at directing the annuities toward the benefit of the Indians.
A change was demanded, first, in the method of paying the annuities. The act of 1834 that reorganized the Indian Department
provided for payment to the chiefs of the tribes. 42 The funds often
did not reach the commonalty but were siphoned off by the chiefs
and their special friends for purposes which might not benefit the
tribe as a whole. To correct this deficiency, Congress on March 3,
1847, granted discretion to the President or the Secretary of War
to direct that the annuities, instead of being paid to the chiefs, be
divided and paid to the heads of families and other individuals
entitled to participate or, with consent of the tribe, that they be
applied to other means of promoting the happiness and prosperity
of the Indians. The new law, in addition, struck boldly at the
liquor problem. No annuities could be paid to the Indians while
they were under the influence of intoxicating liquor nor while
there was reason for the paying officers to believe that liquor was
within convenient reach. The chiefs, too, were to pledge themselves to use all their influence to prevent the introduction and
sale of liquor in their country. Finally, to protect the Indians from
signing away their annuities ahead of time, the law provided that
contracts made by Indians for the payment of money or goods
were null and void. 43
The War Department immedi~tely took advantage of the
discretionary authority provided by the act, and instructions were
sent to the superintendents and agents to pay the annuities in all
cases to the heads of families and other individuals entitled to
them. The law, Commissioner Medill said in sending out instructions, "is probably one of the most salutary laws affecting our
Indian relations that has ever been passed."44 Although there were
complaints from parties adversely affected by the new policy, the
Indian Department was well pleased. Medill reported in 1848
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that the per capita mode of paying annuities had been attended
with "the happiest effects." It prevented extortion of the Indians
through the means of national credits, and it gave to everyone a
knowledge of his just rights. "In the whole course of our Indian
policy," he said, "there has never been a measure productive of
better moral effects."45
The profligacy of the Indians who squandered their annuities
in quick order and then were destitute for the rest of the year was
attacked by Medill at the same time. The annuities of many tribes
were much larger than their wants required at the time of payment. In consequence, when immediate necessities had been provided for, the excess in funds enabled the Indians "to indulge in
idleness and profligacy" or to buy items of no real value to them.
Then when spring came they would be in a state of destitution
and would resort to hunting for subsistence instead of turning
their attention to farming. The Commissioner's solution was to
divide the annuities when they were sufficiently large and to pay
them semiannually. Benefits were sure to follow. "The spring
payment will so far supply their necessities as to enable them to
put in their crops, and, to some extent at least, await their maturing," he wrote; "where not sufficient for the latter purpose, a portion can resort to hunting, and the others remain to attend to the
cultivation of the crops; and they will be encouraged to pursue
this course. In this way much more attention may be paid to the
peaceful and more profitable pursuits of agriculture, which will
tend greatly to their advancement in civilization, and to increase
the resources and comforts of civilized life among them."46 The
results of this policy, too, seemed satisfactory, and Medill, noting
that opposition had been less than anticipated, recommended that
the policy be continued. 47
The stipulations of past treaties about payment and use of
annuities were rigorously adhered to, but it was the sentiment of
the Indian Office that efforts should be made to encourage the
Indians to make use of their funds for worthwhile purposes that
would lead toward the ultimate goal of civilization. Medill noted
in 1848 the pernicious effects of large money annuities upon the
welfare and prosperity of a tribe, and in all future negotiations
with the Indians he wanted the government to have as much of
the purchase money as possible set aside for purposes that would
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elevate and improve the condition of the tribes. He wanted, further, to induce tribes to whom large sums were already due to
consent to the application of the funds to such purposes. The goal
was always the same: "The less an Indian's expectations and resources from the chase, and from the government in the shape of
money annuities," he said, "the more readily can he be induced to
give up his idle, dissolute, and savage habits, and to resort to labor
for a maintenance; and thus commence the transition from a state
of barbarism and moral depression, to one of civilization and
moral elevation."48
Another attempt to meliorate the condition of the Indians
was a renewed attack upon the private traders. Secretary of War
John C. Spencer declared in 1842 that the system in operation did
not lead to the "improvement of the moral and intellectual condition of the Indians." Although Spencer acknowledged the presence of many honest and faithful traders, he noted the recklessness
of the Indians, who purchased worthless goods or quantities of
supplies far beyond their needs. These they wasted or bartered
for liquor and soon were as destitute as before. He noted, too, the
undue influence that the traders acquired over the Indians, which
was greater than that of the government agents and sometimes
used in opposition to government policy. 49
The Secretary of War supported the plan put forth by Indian
Commissioner Crawford for a new government "factory system,"
which Crawford first broached in his annual report of 1840. While
emphatically asserting that he did not propose a return to the old
factory system, which had been "rightly abolished," Crawford
deemed its principle to be valuable. Because of the increased
annual disbursements to the Indian tribes, the improved facilities
for transportation, the greater need the Indians had for protection
as they became surrounded by white population, and the growing
dependency of the Indians upon their annuity payments, he urged
an alternative to the existing system that would be more beneficial
to the Indians. He outlined his plan in some detail:
I would make a small establishment of goods, suitable to
Indian wants, according to their location, at each agency. I
would not allow these goods to be sold to any one except
Indians entitled to a participation in the cash annuities, and
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I would limit the purchases to their proportion of the annuity;
so that the Government would, instead of paying money to
be laid out in whiskey and beads, or applied to the payment
of goods at two prices bought from others, meet the Indians
to settle their accounts, and satisfy them that they had received, in articles of comfort or necessity, the annuity due
them for the year, at cost, including transportation. The Indians would be immensely benefited; and the expense would
not be greater than that of the money-payments now almost
uselessly made them. 50
Under such a system Crawford believed that the government
Indian agents would gain the position of weight with the Indians
that they ought to have. The Indians would look to the government as its best friend, for from it would come the goods they
needed. He was sure that the secret of the great attachment of
the Indians in Canada to the British government was that the
Indians received everything from the officers of the government.
In contrast, the United States government paid the Indians what
it owed them but then left them a prey to the traders, who absorbed all that the Indians had received. There was no intention,
however, for the agents to enter into the fur trade as the old
factors had done. Such business would be left to traders under
license; but with competition from the government agents, the
traders would be forced to furnish quality goods at fair prices or
get out of the business. 51
In subsequent years Crawford repeated and strengthened his
original recommendations. 52 The House Committee on Indian
Affairs took up the proposal in 1844 and reported a bill to authorize the furnishing of goods and provisions by the War Department, but the action died in the House. 53 Crawford did not give
up. His plan, he asserted, would increase the comfort of the Indians; the comfort in turn would be a "leading string ... to conduct them into the walks of civilization," and general improvement
of the Indians would soon be seen everywhere. 54 But Crawford
left office, and his scheme died. It was too much to ask in an age
of private enterprise that the government go back into the Indian
trade. Control of the evils of the Indian trade reverted to the old
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attempt to enforce the licensing system that was part of the traditional setup.
A strong movement in that direction came in 1847, under the
direction of William Medill, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and
W. L. Marcy, Secretary of War. Although previous laws and regulations called for a careful surveillance of the traders and the
elimination of those deemed unfit for dealing with the Indians,
Medill found that lax enforcement had allowed licenses to be
given to many persons who should never have been permitted to
go into the Indian country. He insisted that licenses should be
granted to "none but persons of proper character, who will deal
fairly, and cooperate with the government in its measure for meliorating the condition of the Indians." He drew up new and
tighter regulations, therefore, which were promulgated by the
War Department. 55 The Secretary of War reported in 1848 that
the new regulations and the rigid supervision over the conduct of
the traders had put an end to many evils and abuses. How much
real success this new drive had, nevertheless, is hard to judge, for
at the end of the decade Orlando Brown, the new Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, again urged circumventing the traders by paying
the annuities in goods rather than in money.56
All problems or obstacles in improving the Indians' condition
seemed to stem from or to be aggravated by intemperance. The
cupidity of white men, who were eager to sell vile concoctions to
Indians at exorbitant prices, could not be struck at directly, and
restrictions on the sale of liquor to Indians were impossible to enforce. A primary justification for removing the Indians to the
West had been to place them in a home free from temptations. In
an age of reform, when many considered excessive drinking to be
an important factor in the problems of delinquency and dependency among the general public, temperance was to be one of the
agencies opening up "the fountains of hope" for the red man in
the new lands.117
But removal alone did not prevent intemperance among the
Indians. The whiskey venders were if anything more virulent on
the Western frontier than in the settled regions of the East, and
the means of stopping their nefarious commerce were less effective. Crawford began the decade almost with a cry of desperation:
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. . . [any] improvement, or attempt at benefiting the Indians, will meet the great obstruction to every effort of meliorating their condition-the inordinate use of ardent spirits. If
you could civilize and christianize them, you might possibly
correct the evil; but the misfortune is, that it must be eradicated before you can effect the former. To reason with them,
experience has shown to be vain; to rely upon their own reflection and resolution for doing the good work, would be infatuation; . . . The remedy lies in keeping the poison beyond
their reach. 58
The Commissioner did not quite believe in the vicious circle
he described, and as a man of his times, he pinned much of his
hope for eradicating the vice upon education. "Whatever we can
do to save them from self-immolation we are bound to do," he
declared in 1841, "but, after all, the great security against this, as
against every other vice, is education and civilization-for men
have in all ages cast off the grosser vices, particularly, in the proportion in which they have advanced as social and intellectual
beings." He believed that if the Indians themselves turned their
attention earnestly to the subject, they could accomplish more
than the United States and the states or territories combined. 59 In
1843 he reported that the exertions of the Indian Department had
been strenuous and unremitting to prevent the use of ardent
spirits by the Indians, and he described attempts on the part of
the Territories of Iowa and Wisconsin to prevent the trade. But
his outlook was pessimistic that any final solution would come
from legal enactments. His hope lay with the efforts of the tribes
themselves, and he noted with pleasure that temperance societies
had been organized in several of the tribes and that some tribes
had passed laws to put down the sale and use of whiskey. 60
Crawford professed to see signs of success. "The increase of
temperance, and a contempt for the degradation of drunkenness,
which has been most strikingly manifested in the Southwest," he
wrote, "has been accompanied by a strong disposition to extend
the means of Indian education." There were other indications,
,too, that there was some lessening in the evil. The Superintendent
of Indian Affairs at St. Louis reported "a wonderful decrease in
the quantity of spirituous liquors carried into the Indian country,"
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which he attributed mainly to the increased vigilance of the officers of the Indian Department. 61
While Crawford and others worked diligently to promote
temperance through education, they did not neglect the frontal
attack on the liquor trade in the Indian country that had long been
a staple of American Indian policy. Laws in 1802, 1832, and 1834
had prohibited the introduction of whiskey into the Indian lands
and had provided for fines for violations. 62 But the legislation had
not been completely successful, and liquor continued to flow.
Secretary of War James M. Porter in 1843 called for further legislation to prevent persons from introducing ardent spirits among
the Indians, and his successor, W. L. Marcy, in 1845 called for a
revision in the system of trade with the Indians by imposing more
restrictions and severer penalties upon those who brought in
liquor. 63
Finally, on March 3, 1847, Congress acted. In addition to the
fines provided by the act of 1834, the new law provided imprisonment up to two years for anyone who sold or disposed of liquor to
an Indian in the Indian country and imprisonment up to one year
for anyone who introduced liquor, excepting only such supplies
as might be required for the officers and troops of the army. In all
cases arising under the law, Indians were to be competent witnesses. 64 The Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary
of War, however, were not satisfied to let the law serve by itself.
New regulations, dated April 13, 1847, were promulgated by the
War Department, which called attention to the provisions of the
new law and the pertinent sections of the law of 1834 (copies of
which were included with the regulations). The regulations then
spelled out in detail just what duties were imposed by these laws
upon the military officers and the Indian agents, who were enjoined to be vigilant in the execution of their duties and were
threatened with removal from office if they did not succeed. 65
Federal laws and regulations to control the liquor traffic had
effect only within the Indian country and not in the adjoining
states. In an attempt to prevent the Indians from moving across
the line to obtain liquor, Secretary of War Marcy wrote a strong
letter on July 14, 1847, to the governors of Missouri, Arkansas, and
Iowa, invoking their aid. The stringent laws of Congress, he
pointed out, failed to reach the most prolific source of the evil,
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which lay within the limits of the nearby states. He described the
evils resulting from the trade and noted that the insecurity of the
frontier whites often was the result of Indian retaliation for such
injuries. 66
The efforts to prevent whiskey from reaching the Indians met
with considerable success. But all the laws of Congress and the
strenuous efforts of the Indian agents and military officers on the
frontier to enforce them did not end drunkenness. The frontier
was too extensive and the profits to the whiskey dealers too large
to make complete prohibition possible. More reliance was urged
upon a system of rewards and punishments operating directly on
the Indians themselves. 67
The general reports of progress that came from the reformers
as the decade neared its close were surely optimistic despite the
lack of perfect success. The government officials held firm to their
views of the perfectibility of the Indians, of the red man's ability
to attain the civilization of the whites. Whatever evidence pointed
in that direction they eagerly latched onto. They were convinced
that the advances in education among some of the tribes proved
conclusively that all Indians were amenable to such attainments,
immediately or in the near future. They were sure that their
efforts had contributed to the good result, and they spoke in
justification of the faith they had had. Only a few voices were
raised in opposition, not to deny the possibilities nor even some of
the accomplishments, but to point to the slowness of the progress.
Removal had caused tremendous disruptions in the Indian
nations, yet many of the Indians made a rapid adjustment to their
new homes. The Superintendent of the Western Territory wrote
glowing reports of the progress and condition of the Choctaws,
Chickasaws, Creeks, Seminoles, and Cherokees living under his
jurisdiction. "Civilization is spreading through the Indian country," he reported as early as 1840, "and where but a few years past
the forest was untouched, in many places good farms are to be
seen; the whole face of the country evidently indicating a thrifty
and prosperous people, possessing within themselves the means of
raising fine stocks of horses, cattle, and hogs, and a country producing all the substantials of life with but a moderate portion of
labor."68 The Superintendent of Indian Affairs at St. Louis in 1846
reported rapid improvements among many of the tribes in agri-
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culture and the general comforts of life. He listed the Shawnees,
Wyandots, Delawares, Kickapoos, Munsees, Stockbridges, Ottawas, and Potawatomis as the tribes among whom the improvements were most visible, and he attributed the success to the
influence of the missionaries and their schools. 69 The Choctaw
chief Peter Pitchlynn, remonstrating in 1849 against a movement
to establish a federated government for the tribes in the West,
drew a pleasant picture of the advances of his nation:
Our constitution is purely republican, the gospel ministry is
well sustained, and our schools are of a high order. Our
people are increasing in numbers. Peace dwells within our
limits, and plenteousness within our borders.
Schools, civilization upon Christian principles, agriculture, temperance and morality are the only politics we have
among us; and adhering to these few primary and fundamental principles of human happiness, we have flourished and
prospered: hence we want none other. We wish simply to be
let alone, and permitted to pursue the even tenor of our
way.10
By the end of the decade success seemed assured and was in
fact proclaimed from on high. Secretary of War Marcy in December, 1848, reported: "No subject connected with our Indian affairs
has so deeply interested the department and received so much of
its anxious solicitude and attention, as that of education, and I am
happy to be able to say that its efforts to advance this cause have
been crowned with success. Among most of the tribes which have
removed to and become settled in the Indian country, the blessings of education are beginning to be appreciated, and they generally manifest a willingness to co-operate with the government
in diffusing these blessings." The schools, he concluded, afforded
evidence that nearly all of the emigrated tribes were rapidly advancing in civilization and moral improvement, and he gave full
credit to the Indian Department for the improved condition of the
numerous tribes. 71 In the same year William Medill, then Commissioner of Indian Affairs, acknowledged the earlier decline and
disappearance of the Indians. "Cannot this sad and depressing
tendency of things be checked, and the past be at least measurably
repaired by better results in the future?" he asked. His answer
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was cautious but reassuring. "It is believed they can," he wrote;
"and, indeed, it has to some extent been done already, by the wise
and beneficent system of policy put in operation some years since,
and which, if steadily carried out, will soon give to our whole
Indian system a very different and much more favorable aspect."72
The optimism of the next Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
Orlando Brown, knew no bounds, but his report of 1849 differs
only in degree and not in kind from the enthusiastic appraisals of
his predecessors. "The dark clouds of ignorance and superstition
in which these people have so long been enveloped seem at length
in the case of many of them to be breaking away, and the light of
Christianity and general knowledge to be dawning upon their
moral and intellectual darkness," he wrote. Brown gave credit for
the change to the government's policy of moving the Indians toward an agricultural existence, the introduction of the manuallabor schools, and instruction by the missionaries in "the best of
all knowledge, religious truth-their duty towards God and their
fellow beings." The result was "a great moral and social revolution" among some of the tribes, which he predicted would be
spread to others by adoption of the same measures. Within a few
years he believed that "in intelligence and resources, they would
compare favorably with many portions of our white population,
and instead of drooping and declining, as heretofore, they would
be fully able to maintain themselves in prosperity and happiness
under any circumstance of contact or connexion with our people." In the end he expected a large measure of success to "crown
the philanthropic efforts of the government and of individuals to
civilize and to christianize the Indian tribes." He no longer
doubted that the Indians were capable of self-government. "They
have proved their capacity for social happiness," he concluded,
"by adopting written constitutions upon the model of our own, by
establishing and sustaining schools, by successfully devoting
themselves to agricultural pursuits, by respectable attainments in
the learned professions and mechanic arts, and by adopting the
manners and customs of our people, so far as they are applicable
to their own condition."73
This was a bit too much, for we know that the Indians did
not reach utopia. But it was quite in tune with the age, when
zealous reformers saw no limit to the possibilities for ameliorating
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and perfecting the human condition, when the insane were to be
cured, the slaves freed, the prisons cleansed, women's rights recognized, and Sunday Schools flourish. Certainly we can believe that
they hoped for no less for the American Indian.
Why were not the hopes more fully realized? What darkened
the visions of reform that seemed so bright to the officials of the
1840s?
Fundamentally, the work was a slower process than anyone
at the time appreciated. Cultural transformation was not to be
accomplished within a single generation, no matter how excellent
the schools or how devoted the teachers. 74 The goals of the white
society, which the missionaries and the men of the Indian Office
accepted unquestioningly, did not seem so obviously good to many
of the Indians. Perhaps if the isolation from white contacts behind the "permanent Indian frontier" had indeed been permanent,
the happy beginnings depicted in the 1840s might have grown and
blossomed in accordance with the visions. But this did not occur.
New problems came to absorb the interests and energies of
the Indian Office, and new forces developed that cracked the fragile beginnings of effective Indian betterment. Manifest Destiny and
the Mexican War renewed and reemphasized the expansion into
Indian lands that the removal proponents had expected to be
permanently closed. Emigrant whites moving to the Pacific Coast
in unprecedented numbers brought a demand for an extinguishment of Indian titles to lands along their path and a greater concentration of the colonies of Indians in the West, which presaged
the ultimate restriction of the Indians to small reservations. Wild
tribes of the plains and Rockies, resisting the invasion of their
lands by emigrants to Oregon and California, made the predominant concern of the Indian Office once again defense not civilization, and the Indians of Oregon and Texas required administrative attention that severely strained the facilities of the Indian
Office. These new developments had their roots in the 1840s and
grew to such dimensions that the peaceful attempts to advance
the Indians in white civilization received less emphasis, though
they by no means completely disappeared. 711
Although the attempts in the 1840s to improve the condition
of the Indians did not fulfill all the hopes of the reformers, we
cannot dismiss them as inconsequential. Although the goals were
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frequently unrealistic, we cannot accuse the Indian commissioners, the agents, and the missionaries of insincerity or worse
still of hypocrisy. Other reform movements, too, petered out, only
to reappear with new vigor at a later time. Much of the work of
those who sought Indian betterment was substantial and enduring, and it was a foundation upon which future generations of
reformers built.
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Stephen A. Douglas
and the
American Mission
Robert W. Johannsen, University of Illinois

The idea of mission has always
been deeply irnbedded in American thought and action, its roots
extending back to the earliest settlement of the continent and its
expression continuing down to the present day. Seldom, however,
did it attain such wide acceptance as in the middle decades of
the nineteenth century, when the belief that the American people
had been chosen to fulfill certain high and lofty purposes became
a dominant theme in their democratic faith. Nurtured by the
circumstances of national growth and position, the idea of mission
embraced concepts of progress and destiny. The expansion of
democracy, the rise of technology, and the appearance of a largescale movement to ameliorate the human condition gave credence
to the idea. Born of revolution, free from the restraints of tradi-
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tion, and enjoying a unique geographic position, the young United
States seemed to embody the hopes and ideals of men everywhere.
Isolated physically from the rest of the world and poised on the
edge of a vast and empty continent, the youthful nation occupied
an advantageous position for bringing its glorious destiny to realization. The United States, wrote one editor of the period, must
"carry forward the noble mission entrusted to her of going before
the nations of the world as the representative of the democratic
principle and as the constant living exemplar of its results." Democracy, he pointed out, was the cause of Humanity. It was a
challenge and a charge to a generation already stirred by a reforming zeal. 1
Comprehensive in scope, including both idealistic and materialistic elements, the idea of mission provided a strong impulse to
American politics and gave an evangelical character to much of
the political expression. Some of its most dedicated disciples were
men of action, the political activists who sought to realize their
ideology of hope and optimism through direct, positive, and practical programs. Such an individual in the 1840s and 1850s was
Stephen A. Douglas, who from his position at the center of national activity became a spokesman for national growth and
hegeJilony and an advocate of tl].e American mission in its broadest dimensions.
Two important influences shaped Douglas's faith during the
formative years of his life. The popular image of Andrew Jackson
captured his allegiance and he became imbued with the equalitarian ideas that the "Old Hero" seemed to represent. Of greater
importance was the Western environment in which he served his
political apprenticeship. "I have become a Western man," the
twenty-year-old Douglas recorded shortly after his arrival in
Illinois, "[and] have imbibed Western feelings principles and interests." Years later he recalled, "I came out here when I was a
boy and found my mind liberalized and my opinions enlarged
when I got on these broad prairies, with only the Heavens to
bound my vision."2 Combining his zeal for popular democracy
with shrewd political acumen, Douglas embarked on a remarkably successful career in state and national politics, developing a
fierce attachment to the institutions of American government and
a fervent belief in his nation's future. For Douglas, as for others
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of his generation, it was a basic conservatism tempered by a missionary impulse. "From early youth," he proudly confessed, "I
have indulged an enthusiasm, which seemed to others wild and
romantic, in regard to the growth, expansion, and destiny of this
republic."3
For Douglas, the American mission was intimately related to
the development of democracy and democratic institutions. The
American Revolution, which severed the ties with a declining and
decadent Europe, and the Constitution, which established a flexible and adaptable federal system, were clues that the United
States would perform a unique role in the world community. That
this role would be played from the vantage point of a vast, rich,
and empty continent further demonstrated that the nation's mission was part of an irresistible plan. North America, Douglas
declared, had been "set aside as a nursery for the culture of republican principles." The nation was guided by a force larger
than itself or its people, a force which Douglas sometimes referred
to as the "spirit of the age" or as the "genius of progress which is
to ennoble and exalt humanity" and more rarely as simply "Divine
Providence."4 Democracy, he told an audience in 1852, had a
"mission to perform. It is the great mission of progress in the arts
and sciences-in the science of politics and government-in the
development and advancement of human rights throughout the
world." Improvement began at horn~, and one of the first tasks
was to develop "correct principles here," for only through the
force of its own example could the nation expect to fulfill its
mission. Laws and policies were temporary, to be altered as the
times themselves change, but "democratic principles are immutable, and can never die so long as freedom survives." To see that
freedom not only survived but prospered and expanded as well
was the particular obligation of the American people. The responsibility was awesome, requiring constant exertion. Democratic principles were eternal, but "perpetual action and undying
energy" were necessary to give them force and carry them into
effect. 11 As agents of democracy, Americans became the instruments of civilization itself.
With this charge, Douglas believed, the prospects for national growth were limitless. American destiny could not be precisely defined, for to define it would be to limit it. "You cannot
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fix bounds to the onward march of this great and growing country," he stated. "You cannot fetter the limbs of the young giant.
He will burst all your chains. He will expand, and grow, and
increase, and extend civilization, christianity, and liberal principles."6 No government had done more to elevate the condition
of the people nor had any other nation so furthered the cause of
civilization. "What nation on this globe," he asked, "has been so
wonderfully and so ,bountifully blest as this people under our
Constitution. We have progressed more rapidly in numbers, in
wealth, in the extension of our territory, and in all things which
make a people prosperous and happy, than any nation on earth.
If our history can be taken as an evidence of a kind Divine Providence," Douglas concluded, "we are the favored nation of the
world.''7 American character and opportunity guaranteed a glorious future. "With our broad expanse of country, our fertile soil,
and our universal enterprise, who can predict the destiny and
greatness of this people."8
The American mission was to provide the model for the world
to emulate. Lovers of freedom and democracy everywhere,
Douglas believed, had their eyes fixed on the United States. "Our
success is the foundation of all their hopes."9 He saw a world
conflict between democracy and aristocracy in which the young
nation, with its freshness and vigor, was pitted against all the
reactionary forces of European monarchism. America's principal
antagonist was England, "an old, decrepit nation, tottering and
ready to fall to pieces." Douglas's patriotism was always marked
by an outspoken and almost blind Anglophobia. "I cannot recognize England as our mother," he shouted. "If so, she is and ever
has been a cruel and unnatural mother."10 England was not only
America's chief competitor, Douglas constantly reminded his listeners, but she also represented all the forces against which the
United States must struggle if the national mission were ever to
be fulfilled.
America's example, Douglas was convinced, already ex~rted
a powerful influence on Europe, and the revolutions that convulsed western Europe in the late 1840s seemed to substantiate
his belief. "A great movement is in progress," he announced,
: which threatens the existence of every absolute government in
Europe. It will be a struggle between liberal and absolute princi-
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ples-between Republicanism and Despotism." Bound by its own
revolutionary past and by its obligation to mankind, the United
States could not "remain cold and indifferent spectators" to the
upheavals. Douglas urged Congress to extend the hand of sympathy and fellowship to those who struggled against oppression.
"I think that the bearing of this country should be such as to
demonstrate to all mankind that America sympathizes with the
popular movement against despotism, whenever and wherever
made." When the Hungarian revolt was put down by Austria and
Russia, he went beyond moral support, insisting that the United
States had the right "to interfere or not, according to our convictions of duty.''11 The time had arrived when America should take
her pqsition among the nations of the world and "assert those
principles which her destiny and her mission demand she should
maintain."12 As the revolutions failed, Douglas held out his hand
to their leaders, asserting that America must also serve as "the
asylum of the oppressed of all nations on earth.''13
In order to dramatize the youth and vitality of the American
mission, Douglas frequently contrasted the Old World with the
New, to the great disadvantage of the former. Europe ever remained the seat of declining power and decadence, a land of
princes and monarchs thwarting the popular will and stifling
democratic aspirations. In the spring of 1853, he drew one of his
most graphic comparisons:
Europe is antiquated, decrepit, tottering on the verge of
dissolution. When you visit her, the objects which enlist your
highest admiration are the relics of past greatness; the broken
columns erected to departed power. It is one vast grave-yard,
where you find here a tomb indicating the burial of the arts;
there a monument marking the spot where liberty expired;
another to the memory of a great man, whose place has never
been filled. The choicest products of her classic soil consist
in relics, which remain as sad memorials of departed glory
and fallen greatness! They bring up the memories of the
dead, but inspire no hope for the living! Here everything is
fresh, blooming, expanding, and advancing. 14
A few months after he uttered these sentiments, Douglas left the
United States for an extended visit to Europe, but nothing he saw
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or heard altered his opinions. He quarreled with the ministers of
the British Queen over the matter of court dress and in the end
refused an audience with the monarch; he visited the Ottoman
Empire but found it inconvenient to confer with the Sultan; and
he snubbed the Pope.
Douglas returned to the United States more confident than
before that this "is the first nation upon the face of the globe." The
American mission demanded a vigorous foreign policy, adapted
to the "spirit of the age," designed "to enhance our own power and
greatness," and pursued without regard for the wishes of other
nations and without fear of reprisal. "We should act in fear of
God, performing our duty to ourselves and to mankind, and leave
the world to form its own opinion." In the wake of the European
revolutionary movements, he mapped the course of American
policy and defined the nation's role as a defender of democracy
throughout the world-sympathize with every liberal movement,
recognize the independence of all republics, form commercial
treaties with them, protest against "all infractions of the laws of
nations, and hold ourselves ready to do whatever our duty may
require when a case shall arise." While Douglas often spoke of
the "laws of nations," a vague notion of international polity which
he never defined, he made it increasingly clear that special rules
applied to the United States. He wanted no treaties that would
inhibit the American mission; in any case, such agreements could
hardly withstand the irresistible force of national growth. The
growth of the United States was inevitable, he exclaimed, and
"the barriers of any treaty would be irresistibly broken through by
natural causes, over which we had no control."15 America's pursuit
of its destiny became a law of nature!
The responsibilities imposed on the American people, however, went beyond relations with other countries and the active
promotion of the American example. The American mission also
demanded excellence in the arts and sciences, in agriculture, in
commerce, and in manufacturing. 16 Douglas sang the praises of
the nation's inventive genius and saw in the developing technology of his time part of the unfolding destiny of which he spoke so
enthusiastically. The "power of great conceptions, the aspiration
and the will, the mental faculty and the manual skill" which
characterized the American progressive temperament had been
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aroused 'by the triumphant spirit of liberty which throbs in the
great heart of our continent." He paid tribute to the mechanic,
to whom the nation owed its rapid progress more than to any other
class of citizens. "And why is it," Douglas asked, "that the American mechanic excels all others? It is because he has, under our
institutions, a right to think freely and boldly."17 New discoveries
in the sciences and developments in the arts went hand in hand
with technology, and Douglas never tired of enumerating America's achievements. The application of steam power to transportation on land and sea, improvement in the means of communication and the spread of intelligence, the recognition accorded
American artists, and the mechanization of agriculture were cited
as evidence of America's commitment to progress. Science, technology, and the arts were not the domain of an intellectual elite;
they belonged to the people, and this, to Douglas, was the secret
of American success.
Douglas not only pointed with pride to the results of American inventive genius but became himself an active promotor of
technological development. Receptive to new ideas, he used his
position in Congress to secure their acceptance. The rapid transmission of news by means of a magnetic telegraph captured his
interest, and he became one of the most persistent supporters of
the "oceanic telegraph" or Atlantic cable. The latter not only had
its practical benefits but it would also bring honor and glory to
"American genius and American daring." Steam power had revolutionized transportation, and Douglas was eager to place this
technological advance in the service of national growth through a
network of intersectional railroads. He was equally convinced
that steam, if properly and speedily utilized, would bring mastery
of the seas to the United States; and to this end, he urged the
approval of government subsidies which would facilitate the construction of mail steamers. Not content with promoting transportation on land and sea, Douglas was fascinated with the possibilities
of "aerial navigation." The construction of balloons that could be
used for war purposes as well as for the transportation of passengers and mail, Douglas thought, was worthy of government
support. 18
"Two great objects of individual and general prosperity,"
began a document endorsed by Douglas in 1851, are "the develop-
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ment of the natural resources of our country, and the promotion
of practical science." To accomplish the former, he sought unsuccessfully to secure grants of land to the states for the support
of geological surveys, and for the latter he urged the introduction
of practical science as a subject of primary instruction in the
schools. "Agriculture and mechanism" were two leading objects
of human pursuit; educatiorn:il institutions should, therefore, be
charged with instruction in those sciences most closely related to
these pursuits. Geology, chemistry, geometry, and botany ought,
he thought, to be "treated in a clear, specific, practical manner
adapted to the use and capacity of the plain farmer, the mechanic,
the laborer." When Jonathan Baldwin Turner proposed a system
of national industrial universities which would provide instruction
for farmers and mechanics, Douglas was among the first to support the project. Convinced that the United States would soon
become the great center of the world's agricultural production, he
urged the creation of an agricultural bureau in the government's
executive branch and the establishment of a national agricultural
society through which scientific information might be made
available to the nation's farmers. 19 Douglas's concern for the
promotion and dissemination of practical scientific knowledge was
reflected in his long association with the Smithsonian Institution.
Appointed a Regent in 1854, he remained active in its affairs until
his death seven years later. 20
Douglas was not unmindful of the importance of the arts and
letters in the pursuit of national greatness, but the developments
that excited him most were those that helped to tame the land, to
bring civilization into the wilderness, and to promote economic
and commercial supremacy. He was obsessed with practicality
and utility. Steamships, railroads, the telegraph, mow.ers... and
~eapers-these were the true monuments to the spirit otpu2gress
that animated the American people. "We in America," he proudly
announced, "are accustomed to spend money for works of utility,
not on those of mere ornament, pomp, and show."21
One of the sources of America's strength, Douglas believed,
was in its people. Immigration produced a heterogeneous population, giving vitality to American society and infusing "into the
national temperament those influences without which we might
have become inert and stagnant." The United States was "a cross
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of all nations," its population "the most peculiar and superior
people on the face of the earth." The gates, he urged, must never
be closed to the immigrant.22 Every American, whether native or
foreign-born, was an agent in the nation's rapid advance "to maturity and perfection." Progress, Douglas contended, ultimately
depended upon individual expression and aspiration. "Pride of
character, self-love, the strongest passions of the human heart," he
declared, "all impel a man forward and onward." Progress, "the
desire for free institutions," must first find an abiding place in the
hearts of the people. When the people shall come together, united
in their quest for perfection, then the nation will make giant
strides toward the fulfillment of its mission. 23
The catalyst in America's surge toward its manifest destiny
was what Douglas always called the "Great West," for it was his
basic Western orientation and identification that gave reason and
vitality to his concept of the American mission. To this young,
dynamic politician the West was America. It was the one great
feature that distinguished the United States from other nations,
that gave the American dream its clearest impulse, and that insured its invincibility. The West provided the powerful cement
that held the Union together and impelled it onward; it was the
seat of progress and strength, providing space, resources, and opportunity to forward-looking Americans. The Great West constituted the hope of the nation and hence of the entire world.
Douglas's West was an ever-growing, expanding region. In
area it embraced all that lay west of the Appalachians, extending
to the shores of the Pacific and even beyond, but its heart and soul
was always in the Mississippi Valley. It was a vantage point from
which to observe the true course of national development and to
recognize the true needs of national growth. "It so happens in this
Confederacy," Douglas once complained, "that no man can see
anything west of him. Whatever his locality may be, he thinks he
must stand and look eastwards towards the rising sun." Men may
stand at New York, Buffalo, Detroit, or Chicago, but always their
look is eastward. "The consequence is," he concluded, "that the
man furthest west has a better knowledge of the topographical
and locality of the internal resources of this great Republic." But
the West was also much more than an area and a vantage point.
It was the stage on which the drama of American growth and
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progress was being acted out. Douglas could proclaim, as he did
in 1854, "I belong to no section," only because the West to him
was the nation and to be Western was to be national. 24
In an era of rising sectional tensions, the role of the West
became even more obvious and more imperative. "I am by no
means certain," he noted in 1852, "but that the sectional strife,
jealousy, and ambition engendered between the North and the
South would ere this have dissolved this glorious Union had it not
been for the Great West." Her population "intelligent and patriotic," drawn from "each of the great geographical divisions of the
Union," her trade flowing through the Great Lakes to the North
and down the Mississippi to the South, the West bore the lineaments of a great internal empire, bound tenaciously to both North
and South. The Mississippi Valley was "the heart of the Republic,
more extensive, powerful and glorious than any empire that the
world ever beheld."25 In a masterful statement, spoken during one
of the nation's great political crises, Douglas summed up his
position:
. . . there is a power in this nation greater than either the
North or the South-a growing, increasing, swelling power,
that will be able to speak the law to this nation, and to execute the law as spoken. That power is the country known as
the great West-the Valley of the Mississippi, one and indivisible from the gulf to the great lakes, and stretching, on
the one side and the other, to the extreme sources of the Ohio
and Missouri-from the Alleghanies to the Rocky mountains.
There, sir, is the hope of this nation-the resting-place of the
power that is not only to control, but to save, the Union. We
furnish the water that makes the Mississippi, and we intend
to follow, navigate, and use it until it loses itself in the briny
ocean. So with the St. Lawrence. We intend to keep open
and enjoy both of these great outlets to the ocean, and all
between them we intend to take under our especial protection,
and keep and preserve as one free, happy, and united people.
This is the mission of the great Mississippi valley, the heart
and soul of the nation and the continent.26
The nation's strength was in the West and it was upon the
growth and development of the West that America's future great-
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ness depended. When he first went to Congress in the mid 1840s,
Douglas carried with him a dedication to Western development
that influenced virtually all of his subsequent legislative activity.
He lost no time in articulating a Western program to which he
remained committed for the rest of his life. Presented first to
Congress and later amplified in a letter to the railroad promoter
Asa Whitney, Douglas's proposals involved (1) territorial expansion, (2) the development of improved transportation and communication in and through the West, (3) the encouragement of Western settlement, and (4) the extension of organized government to
the West. 27 His efforts on behalf of these proposals were always
justified in terms of American destiny and mission.
Territorial expansion, for Douglas, was not only a primary
obligation but it was also a natural law which Americans were
powerless to resist. "This is a young, vigorous, growing nation,"
he maintained. "Increase is the law of our existence and of our
safety. Just as fast as our population increases our territory must
expand. You cannot arrest this law. He is unwise who voluntarily
places himself in the path of American destiny.''28 It was a "law
of progress" that could not be stayed. "You may like it or you may
dislike it," he told a Southern audience in 1858, but "you can never
fulfill your destiny without it.'' The extension of territory, he had
declared thirteen years before, would result "as natural consequences from causes over which we have no control.''29 Douglas
eschewed passivity and called upon his fellow citizens to recognize the inevitable through a course of action. The expansion of
America's boundaries and the extension of American influence, he
contended, served a cause that was larger than the nation for it
would be carried out in the name of progress, humanity, and
civilization.30
As a fledgling Congressman, Douglas demanded that the
limits of the United States be extended from ocean to ocean. "I
would make this an ocean-bound republic, and have no more disputes about boundaries or red lines upon the maps." The area of
freedom would be made as broad as the continent itself. The institutions of democratic government and technological advance
were the handmaids of expansion. The American federal system,
with its "great conservative and renovating principle" of states•
rights, was "as well adapted to the whole American continent as
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it was to the thirteen original States of the Union." The development of steam power in transportation and the improvements in
communication would bring the extremities of the continent closer
together with respect to time than were the various parts of the
republic at its formation. With such advantages, "we might extend our republic safely to the extreme parts of the continent, and
even further if necessary."31
When he first urged American expansion, Douglas seemed
content to limit the nation to the Pacific shore, unwilling, he said,
to go beyond the boundaries which the "God of nature" had provided. In later years, he overcame his reluctance to expand beyond the sea and broadened his position: "When I speak of our
country being well adapted to an ocean-bound republic, of course
I mean to include the islands on this side of the main channel of
the two great seas." The Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico,
he added, are American waters, to be treated as "closed seas to the
exclusion of all European powers."32 Nor was he solely interested
in expansion into contiguous areas. "I do not want Central America," Douglas once conceded, "but the time will come when our
destiny, our institutions, our safety will compel us to have it." So
also with the island of Cuba. "I do not care whether you want it
or not. . . . we are compelled to take it, and we can't help it."
Douglas prescribed a different set of ground rules, however, for
expansion into areas that were already heavily populated. "I do
not say that we ought, at one blow, to acquire a vast amount of
new territory," he explained. Rather, the task was to "Americanize" these areas before the question of annexation could be met.
The process, he warned, would be slow, gradual, and steady, but
it was one which would serve the cause of civilization. "I would
like to see the boundaries of the Republic extended gradually and
steadily, as fast as we can Americanize the countries we acquire
and make their inhabitants loyal American citizens when we get
them."33
Douglas became a close student of Western geography and
needs until, as he boasted, he understood the country between the
Mississippi River and the Pacific Ocean quite as well as he knew
the older states of the Union. 34 In both House and Senate he was
selected to head the Committee on Territories, and in the Senate
for a time he sat on the Foreign Relations Committee. He viewed
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his responsibilities broadly; everything that pertained to Western
expansion and development, he insisted, came under his purview.
His outspoken advocacy of expansion, with its constant and often
tedious reference to manifest destiny, frequently invited ridicule
from colleagues who contrasted Douglas's diminutive stature with
the scope of his ideas. "He is fond of boasting," said Delaware's
distinguished Senator Clayton, "that we are a giant Republic; and
the Senator himself is said to be a 'little giant'; yes, sir, quite a
giant, and everything that he talks about in these latter days is
gigantic." Thomas Hart Benton, with whom Douglas tangled on
more than one occasion, bellowed, "He thinks he can bestride this
continent with one foot on the shore of the Atlantic, the other on
the Pacific. But he can't do it-he can't do it. His legs are too
short."311
When Douglas entered Congress, the question of Texas annexation was approaching its final stages of discussion, and Westerners were looking with increased longing at the Oregon country.
Illinois was in the center of the agitation. The Texas issue, observed one local politician, was "a flame ... burning from one
end of the State to the other"; at the same time, Illinoisans were
gripped by what some called "Oregon Fever."36 Emigrant companies had been formed in the state, and many of its citizens were
on their way to the Pacific Northwest. Oregon meetings were
scheduled, in some of which Douglas participated, and the cry
was raised for the immediate acquisition of that disputed territory.
Douglas lost little time in placing himself at the head of both
movements.
Texas annexation, it was argued, would strengthen the
United States, but it would also achieve higher ends. By giving
Texas "the protection of our laws, the benefits of our institutions
and a full share of the blessings which flow from our happy form
of Government," the nation would "increase the sum of human
happiness."37 In keeping with his broad view of national destiny,
Douglas placed annexation on practical as well as idealistic
grounds. Texas was a key to the defense of the Mississippi Valley;
it would strengthen the market for American cotton abroad and
would open a large new area (including northern Mexico) to
. American manufactures. National honor and faith required an-
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nexation; but it was also a measure "which appealed to all our
interests, alike commercial, agricultural, and manufacturing."38
In December, 1844, Douglas submitted a series of resolutions
providing for annexation which, after much parliamentary maneuvering, formed the basis for the joint resolutions that eventually passed the House and Senate. Looking back on his role,
Douglas reaffirmed his position. Texas had been acquired "upon
broad national grounds ... considerations which addressed themselves to the patriotism and pride of every American-considerations connected with the extension of territory, of commerce, of
navigation, of political power, of national security, and glory."39
He expressed contempt for those who sought to distract the nation
from its mission by relating Texas annexation to the issue of
slavery. Their efforts, he concluded, were an "insidious attempt"
to excite one part of the Union against another; Texas had been
added to the United States for reasons that were "elevated far
above, and totally disconnected from, the question of slavery."40
For Douglas, it was an early encounter with a question that he felt
was not only subordinate in importance but completely unrelated
to the American drive toward its destiny.
Texas did not stand alone in Douglas's program for national
expansion. Title to the whole of the Oregon country, he maintained, was "pedect and indisputable," and he called for "bold,
immediate, speedy action" to bring that vast area within the nation's boundaries. Texas and Oregon were like man and wife"when separated, the welfare and happiness of both were seriously injured; but when once united, they must be kept together
forever." The same reasons that impelled the extension of American rule over Texas demanded the acquisition of Oregon. "Interest and patriotism-national glory and security-all .unite in
prompting us to embrace the 'present golden opportunity' to extend the principles of civil and religious liberty over a large
portion of the continent."41 Oregon's fertile soil and genial climate
were superbly adapted to American agriculture, but the value of
the Oregon country was not to be measured supply by "the number of miles upon the coast," nor did it depend solely on the
character of the country and the quality of the soil. "The great
point at issue," he said, "is for the freedom of the Pacific ocean,
for the trade of China and of Japan, of the East Indies, and for the
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maritime ascendancy on all these waters."42 In short, the Oregon
question not only involved the responsibilities of the American
mission in their most idealistic sense, but it also involved the
highest commercial and economic interests of the country.
Douglas's arguments for Texas and Oregon were spurred by
his flerce and almost irrational Anglophobia. England, the representative of reactionary monarchism in the world struggle for
democracy, stood in the way of American destiny. A threat to the
national mission, she was also America's chief competitor for economic and commercial supremacy. The villainous British lion
crouched, he was convinced, ready to spring upon helpless Texas.
Britain's aim was apparent even to a blind man: "It was to check
the growth of republican institutions on this continent, and the
rapidity with which we have progressed, not only in political
power, but in trade and national glory."43 He denounced those
who would compromise the Oregon boundary at the forty-ninth
parallel; and to those who proposed arbitration, Douglas replied
that the American people, "being a peculiar people, with a peculiar system of government unlike that of the balance of the
world, which excites the prejudices of other nations of the world
against us," could not safely place their rights in the hands of
others. Title to all of Oregon was indisputable, and Douglas
would not be satisfied as long as Great Britain "shall hold possession of one acre on the northwest coast of America."44
Douglas's belligerent tirades alarmed many of his colleagues
who feared that the nation might be drawn into a needless war
with Great Britain. For Douglas, however, war as an instrument
for advancing American destiny was only a last and unlikely resort. American expansion, he reiterated, was part of "the natural
progress of things" and could be achieved "without war, without
force, without violation of treaty, and without infringement of the
rights of others," requiring only a bold, dynamic, and fearless
policy that was commensurate with the dimensions of the national
mission. 45 Why should America quail before British power? he
asked. Britain had tried once before "to check the progress of this
nation by a war" and had undoubtedly learned her lesson. 46 The
Oregon controversy was settled peacefully and, as far as the expansionists were concerned, ignobly. Douglas suffered deep and
bitter disappointment when the treaty establishing the boundary
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at the forty-ninth parallel was ratified in 1846. His zeal for expansion, however, was hardly dimmed, for by the time the dispute
with Great Britain had been resolved, a new opportunity for
advancing national destiny had opened.
Relations between the United States and Mexico had deteriorated long before the Texas issue reached its climax, and, for
Douglas, conflict could not be avoided. Just as he counselled bold
action as a deterrent to war in the case of the British, Douglas
now argued that a firm policy against Mexico earlier would have
rendered war unnecessary. Americans, however, had "allowed
their sympathy for the weakness and degradation of a nominal
sister republic to prevail over their sense of duty to the citizens
and :flag of our own country." Mexico, mistaking sympathy for
weakness, "magnanimity for pusillanimity," had responded to the
government's just complaints with contempt and defiance. Misplaced American sympathy had encouraged Mexican bellicosity.
Douglas denied that the Mexican War was one of conquest. It
was, on the contrary, a "war of self-defence, forced upon us by
our enemy, and prosecuted on our part in vindication of our
honor, and the integrity of our territory."47
Having found justification for the Mexican War, Douglas
quickly discovered a place for it in the drama of progress and
mission which Americans were acting out. As rumors of a clash
on the Rio Grande raced through the West in the summer of 1845,
Douglas advised President Polk, "The Northern Provinces of
Mexico including California ought to belong to this Republic, and
the day is not far distant when such a result will be accomplished.
The present is an auspicious time."48 These lands would presumably be annexed through the operation of the natural law of
American expansion, but Douglas was ready to assist the forces
of destiny with more immediate measures. An expedition should
be raised immediately, he informed the President, to occupy New
Mexico and California. When war was declared less than a year
later, he was not slow to grasp its significance to the national
mission. The acquisition of California, he explained, had been as
important to him as Oregon; both were essential "to the fulfilment
of our destiny as the first maritime nation upon the globe." Anyone "capable of comprehending our manifest destiny" could see
that California "was soon to be a part of this great confederacy."49
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The war with Mexico meant more than new lands and harbors; it
was "a fervent, glorious, patriotic zeal to advance the great cause
of freedom." The shouts of America's victorious armies would
strike terror in the hearts of all enemies of republican institutions,
demonstrating the superiority of American arms as well as of
American democracy. Europe, already jealous "of our growing
greatness and importance among the nations of the world," could
not help but heed the lesson. 50
Half a million square miles of territory were added to the
United States as a result of the Mexican War, enough, it would
seem, to thrill the hearts of every expansionist. California and
New Mexico were acquired, and the United States more than
doubled its Pacific coastline. But for Douglas, the Treaty of
Guadalupe-Hidalgo proved as disappointing as the Oregon
boundary settlement. Not enough territory had been taken, but
more important the United States disavowed any further acquisitions in Mexico without that nation's prior consent. Who can
say, Douglas asked, that "amid the general wreck and demoralization in Mexico" a regard for American rights and safety as well
as the interests of humanity might not compel the United States to
annex additional territory without Mexican consent?51 The treaty,
however, like the earlier one with Great Britain, was ratified
despite Douglas's opposition.
In spite of his disappointments, Douglas looked back on the
years of the Polk administration with great satisfaction and pride:
When we trace the changes which have taken place within
the last four years in our domestic policy-in the development of our national resources-in the expansion of our commerce-in the enlargement of our territory-in the augmentation of our power-and in the respect and awe with which
the renown of our arms has impressed the world-the mind is
startled and dazzled as if beholding at one panoramic view
the mighty work of ages. 52
Douglas's own role in this "mighty work" had labeled him as one
of the most extreme and uncompromising of expansionists. His
conception of manifest destiny reflected not only the often wild
enthusiasms of the West but also a deep and more sober faith in
the progress and future growth of the United States. His was not
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a narrowly conceived manifest destiny nor was it based solely on
idealistic premises. Harbors and ports were as much a part of
Douglas,s conception of manifest destiny as was his determination
to make the area of freedom as broad as the continent itself. At
the same time, his concept of destiny involved much more than
territorial expansion. The enlargement of the nation,s boundaries
was not an end in itself. National destiny and mission also required the development of the West, and to accomplish this
Douglas turned his attention in other directions and to other
projects.
At first urged as a means for strengthening the American
claim to frontage on the Pacific, Douglas,s Western program became even more meaningful and urgent once expansion had been
accomplished. The grand project, which he described in detail as
early as 1845, was the construction of a Pacific railroad, the first
step in the ultimate development of "a continous line of rail roads
to the Pacific ocean." Such a project, however, would be the
"work of years"; in the meantime, he urged the immediate adoption of several measures that would insure the completion "of this
great railroad communication within the period that the course of
events will render necessary." The first of these was the extension
of territorial government to the growing settlements on the Pacific
and to the vast intervening country between Missouri and the
Rockies. Secondly, a railroad route to the Pacific should be selected and surveyed. Finally, in order to encourage the settlement
of the country through which the railroad would run, Douglas
asked that Western lands be donated in 160-acre tracts "to the
actual settler." These proposals, Douglas conceded, were "crude
and undigested," but they revealed the dimensions of his plans for
the West and formed a program that would occupy his attention
during the remaining years of his public service.53
Douglas had early been captivated by the immense possibilities for national growth provided by railroad transportation.
"No man," he once wrote, "can keep up with the spirit of this age
who travels on anything slower than the locomotive."54 Railroads,
he believed, could serve the nation by binding the Union together.
For years he dreamed of uniting the Mississippi Valley with a
railroad that would link the Great Lakes with the Gulf of Mexico,
allaying sectional antagonisms between the North and South and
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harmonizing the people of the West. His dream was finally realized with the construction of the Illinois Central Railroad. Similar
purposes attended his advocacy of a Pacific railroad. First proposed before the expansion of the 1840s, he believed it would
provide an irrevocable bond between the nation's heartland and
the continent's far shore. As settlements on the Pacific grew, a
railroad became essential to their continued allegiance to the
United States. "People 3000 miles off," wrote one of Douglas's
correspondents, "separated by dreary wastes & snowy mounts
will never consent to be governed by the people of the Atlantic
States unless some more rapid communication can be established."55 As his plans for a Pacific railroad became entangled
with sectional politics, Douglas became more insistent lest Congressional inaction encourage separatism in Oregon and California. "It is the first and highest duty of this nation," Douglas
declared in 1853, "to see that this road is made." The integrity of
the Union, and hence the thrust of its mission, depended upon the
completion of the road. "When we have connected the Atlantic
and the Pacific by a railroad, there is no power on earth, no question which is in existence ... which can sever the bonds of the
Union."56
Douglas considered the projected transcontinental railroad
to be much more than a force for unity. It would also serve as the
means by which the trans-Mississippi West would be peopled,
converted "from a wilderness into one of the most densely populated and highly-cultivated portions of America." Railroads would
play an active role in extending civilization to the unsettled West.
The work of construction itself would attract laborers, storekeepers, and mechanics, thus creating "one of the best markets
that can be opened to the agriculturists anywhere." Permanent
settlers would soon follow the construction gangs, farms would be
cultivated and towns founded. Enterprising miners would move
into the mountains to tap the region's valuable mineral resources.
The country would be rendered secure by this "quiet, silent occupation," and the West, settled by "a hardy and industrious population," would soon become the scene of great production as well
as a large new market for manufactured goods and merchandise. 57
He refuted the charge that the land to be traversed by the Pacific
railroad was nothing more than great impassable and uninhab-

130 I Robert W. Johannsen
itable deserts. The desert myth, Douglas suggested, had been
perpetrated by explorers who compared the plains with the lands
they had left in the Mississippi Valley, with the result that everything they saw seemed desolate. "It will not do," he declared, "to
judge every section of the country by the one in which you have
been raised." The vast deserts reputed to exist west of the Mississippi, he predicted, would disappear "before investigation and
settlement, in the way that other deserts have." 58
Douglas envisioned not one but a large number of railroad
lines to the Pacific-"the valley of the Mississippi will require as
many Rail Roads to the Pacific as to the Atlantic."59 Practically,
he proposed legislation for the construction of three lines, following northern, central, and southern routes. When it seemed likely
that only one would succeed, he supported the central route in
order to give North and South equal advantages. A bond of Union,
the basis for settlement and economic strength in the transMississippi West, the Pacific railroad would also connect America's growing commercial activity in the Pacific with the "great
heart and center of the Republic." "If we intend to extend our
commerce-if we intend to make the great ports of the world
tributary to our wealth," Douglas insisted, "we must penetrate the
Pacific, its islands, and its continent, where the great mass of the
human family reside-where the articles that have built up the
powerful nations of .the world have always come from."60 The Pacific railroad, he concluded, would enable "America to assume
the position to which she is now entitled ... the first commercial
and maritime .Power upon the face of the globe." 61 It was
essential to America's destiny and mission.
"To those vast multitudes, who wish to change their condition, and select new homes," Douglas wrote in 1845, "the promised
land is westward." The Pacific railroad would serve as an inducement to settlement, but "a further necessity for the road" would
also be created by the natural tide of emigration. 62 In his anxiety
to foster the settlement of the trans-Mississippi West, Douglas
gave little thought to the fate.of the area's Indian inhabitants. He
denounced the idea of a permanent Indian reservation on the
plains as a barbarian wall that would restrain "the onward march
of civilization, christianity, and free government." The Indian
must simply give way. Lashing out at those who expressed con-
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cern for the rights of the Indians, he urged that the government
could not longer "keep that country a howling wilderness . . .
roamed over by hostile savages."63 One way to penetrate the Indian barrier, protect emigrants to the West, and at the same time
lay the foundations for permanent settlement was the establishment of military colonies along the main routes of travel. Volunteers, to be paid as soldiers, would build posts of native materials
and supply their own provisions by turning the land to cultivation.
After three-years' service, each would be granted six hundred and
forty acres of land. 64 After the plains had been rendered secure
from Indian attack and provided the basis for settlement, the way
would be open to the pioneer farmer. In his original plan for a
Pacific railroad, Douglas proposed that alternate sections of land
along the route be granted to the states and territories through
which it ran, the proceeds to be applied to the costs of construction. Land in the other alternate sections could then be thrown
open to settlement, and Douglas suggested that they be granted
in one-hundred-and-sixty-acre parcels to actual settlers. From
this early suggestion emerged his support for a free-homestead
policy.
Douglas was not alone in his advocacy of a free-land policy,
nor was he among the first to support such a proposal. By 1849,
however, when he introduced his first homestead bill, the idea had
become an integral part of his scheme for Western development.
The true policy of the government, he declared, was "to grant the
public lands, in limited quantities, to actual settlers who shall
reside on it for some years." In urging the passage of his bill, he
extolled the role of the pioneer farmer and denounced the activities of land speculators. "The man who goes into the wilderness,
and makes the first settlement, who erects his house, who makes
his improvements, who undergoes the privation to which pioneers
are subject, is entitled to the preference over him who purchases
the land merely for purposes of speculation."65 Coupled with his
later development of the principle of popular sovereignty for the
Western territories, a free-homestead policy would be the instrument by which the West would be peopled by independent Northern farmers, thus guaranteeing freedom rather than slavery to the
frontier, a facet of Douglas's thinking that has not always been
appreciated. By the end of the 1850s he had become more con-
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vinced than ever of the merits of a free-land policy. The system
that offered public lands at auction, placing the speculator on an
equality with the actual settler, he declared in 1860, was "vicious
and defective." The preemption and homestead policies should be
applied to all public lands, allowing the title to remain in the
national government until the actual settler should avail himself
of their opportunities. "My policy," he maintained, "always has
been to make every inhabitant of the new states and territories a
land-holder, as far as it was possible to do so, by our legislation."66
Perhaps the most important element in Douglas's program for
the West, certainly the one that consumed most of his energy as a
member of Congress, was the extension of American laws and
institutions to the frontier through the organization of territories.
For Douglas, territorial organization was the logical partner of
territorial expansion; his proposals for a Pacific railroad and for a
free-land policy were intimately related to, indeed dependent
upon, the establishment of territorial government in the transMississippi West. At the same time, the extension of government
to the nation's ever-expanding frontier fulfilled a vital requirement in America's drive toward its inevitable destiny by increasing
the scope of the democratic institutions to which Douglas was
committed. The great advantage of the American form of government, he was fond of saying, was the flexibility of its federal system, adaptable to infinite expansion without endangering the
liberties of the people. The admission of new states, each sovereign within its own local sphere, strengthened the whole without
weakening any of the parts. The territorial stage of government
was an integral part of this process, to which Douglas would extend the counterpart of states' rights for the territories, his principle of popular sovereignty. 67
From the time Douglas first proposed the organization of
Oregon and Nebraska territories as a young Congressman in the
mid 1840s, he remained closely identified with the frontiersman's
interest in the character of his local government. He was appointed chairman of the Committee on Territories in both the
House and the Senate, and he discharged the responsibilities of
his position with single-minded devotion until his removal for
political reasons late in 1858. "The preparation of the various bills
necessary to give government to the people of the territories, and
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prepare them for admission as states," he told a group of Californians in 1851, "required labor and investigation. But it was a
work of love-a labor in which duty and inclination ran in the
same channel."68 Between the end of the Mexican War and 1854,
Douglas was instrumental in securing the organization of seven
Western territories-Oregon, Minnesota, Utah, New Mexico,
Washington, Kansas, and Nebraska. During the decade of the
fifties he fought for several more that did not make it-Arizona,
Colorado, Nevada, and Dakota. The establishment of territorial
government in the West was, he repeated, a national necessity, as
essential to the settlement and development of the area as it was
to the initial expansion of the United States. During the debates
over the organization of the Mexican Cession, Douglas evolved
his doctrine of popular sovereignty, and from that time on it was
irrevocably linked to his interest in the territories and in the West.
His commitment to popular sovereignty was the deeper because
he recognized in it a formula that would (he hoped) bridge the
differences between the North and South on the slavery question,
thus preserving the Union that was so essential to his national
faith. Like the West with which it was identified, the doctrine became a force for national unity in a time of rampant sectionalism.
Popular sovereignty, to Douglas, was simple, pragmatic, and
just. He once defined it as the "right of the people of an organized
Territory, under the Constitution and laws of the United States,
to govern themselves in respect to their own internal policy and
domestic affairs." 69 From the point of view of the West, Douglas's
espousal of popular sovereignty was a happy development, for it
accorded with a long-standing frontier demand. Since the early
days of the republic, frontier communities had leveled sharp and
bitter attacks against the nation's territorial system, which vested
virtually absolute control over the territories in the executive and
legislative branches of the national government. Douglas's doctrine appeared as a long-overdue innovation that would diminish
the odious "foreign" control and broaden the area of territorial
self-government; to many Westerners Douglas became the champion of frontier rights. 70 The pioneers who emigrated to the
Western territories "were as capable of self-government as their
neighbors and kindred whom they left behind them," he said in
1850, "and there was no reason for believing that they have lost
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any of their intelligence or patriotism by the wayside, while crossing the Isthmus or the Plains." Moreover, Douglas added, "after
their arrival in the country, when they had become familiar with
its topography, climate, productions, and resources, and had connected their destiny with it, they were fully as competent to judge
for themselves what kind of laws and institutions were best
adapted to their condition and interests, as we were who never
saw the country, and knew very little about it." To question their
competency, he insisted, was to deny their capacity for selfgovemment. 71
Popular sovereignty, as one manifestation of democratic
development, played a dominant role in Douglas's concept of
American destiny and mission. With territorial expansion, territorial self-government was necessary to "the cause of freedom, of
humanity, and of republicanism." 72 It soon became clear that
expansion and popular sovereignty-manifest destiny and democracy-overshadowed all other aspects of Douglas's program. By
the end of the fifties, he had reduced his belief in the American
mission to its essentials. "I am in favor of expansion," he observed,
"as fast as consistent with our interest and the increase and development of our population and resources." But, he added, "I
am not in favor of that policy unless ... the right of the people
to decide the question of slavery, and all other domestic questions,
for themselves shall be maintained." By following these pathways,
the United States would have a more glorious future than any
other nation in history. "Our Republic will endure for thousands
of years," and "progress will be the law of its destiny." This was
in 1858, and Lincoln's "House Divided" speech was fresh in his
mind. Lincoln, Douglas believed, suffered from a narrowness of
vision; his famous statement seemed to be a call for uniformity
and conformity in policy as well as institutions. With expansion,
Douglas countered, new states will be admitted to the Union and
with every new state the nation will gain strength. "The more
degrees of latitude and longitude embraced beneath our Constitution, the better." Variety was among America's greatest assets,
"making us the greatest planting as well as the greatest manufacturing, the greatest commercial as well as the greatest agricultural power on the globe."73 Local self-government, he insisted,
must be scrupulously protected wherever it existed. It was an
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"inherent, inalienable right of all American citizens ... to govern
themselves in respect to their local and domestic concerns," and
Douglas would apply that principle to the territories as well as to
the states. "Let it only be observed," he concluded, "and this
people can live in peace forever." The Union, with all its heterogeneity, "can continue to exist in all time to come."74
America's mission and America's destiny were beyond the
power of its people to alter or control. "Steady growth and
gradual expansion is one of the laws of our national existence,"
Douglas maintained. "It is the decree of Providence." The North
American continent had been reserved as a nursery for liberty and
an asylum where the world's oppressed population might take
shelter "under the shadows of the great tree of Liberty." "A wise
man," he advised, "always conforms his action to a policy which
he cannot prevent, and hence I say, Let America have a policy in
harmony with her destiny. Let us be what our numbers and what
our position require us to be-not only an example to the friends
of liberty, but a terror to the oppressors of man throughout the
world.''75 In all of this, the West played a leading and vital role.
As the representative and the guardian of truly national interests,
the West, to Douglas, was identified with the nation, a bulwark
against the sectional storms that increased in fury; the American
mission, to a very large extent, was a Western mission.
Stephen A. Douglas was not a systematic thinker in an
abstract sense. He was a pragmatic, professional politician, frequently bumptious and full of bluster, subject to outbursts of
oratory that were not always designed to clarify the issues under
discussion. His politics, nevertheless, were founded on certain
deeply and sincerely held principles, and one of these was his
profound faith in America's future. His concern for Western
development bordered at times on obsession; but, for Douglas,
the West embodied all the hopes and aspirations that focused
upon the young republic, and it was in the West that the nation's
destiny was being revealed. Douglas was a representative of his
times-captivated by technological advances, seized by naive enthusiasms, swayed by ill-defined and even indefinable concepts of
national greatness; but he was always persuaded of the superiority
of American institutions and passionately devoted to their advancement. In the end, however, the national destiny that Doug-
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las pursued proved illusory. As deep as were his convictions, he
found difficulty in adjusting them to the hard, cold political realities of the prewar years. Indeed, his devotion to the chimerical,
even mythical, goal of national greatness may have blinded him
to the more urgent requirements of his age. His energies were
distracted by issues he clearly regarded as secondary to the major
thrust of American policy, and his latter years were spent in a
fruitless attempt to find their adjustment so that the nation could
get on with its more important business. Douglas died a saddened
and disappointed man. America's mission was not only unfulfilled
but the Union itself, the great agent of progress, wavered in the
balance. His program for the West had fallen short of achievement-American expansion had been blunted, the Pacific railroad
and the free-land policy still awaited passage. Popular sovereignty
had become hopelessly entangled in abstract discussion over the
slavery question. Still, a brief look at Douglas's own picture of
America, his faith in its mission and his hopes for its future, may
provide us with a better understanding of his generation. It may
also help us to appreciate the quality and the dimensions assumed
by the ideas of progress, destiny, and mission during the exciting
and often puzzling years of the mid nineteenth century.
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Indian Allotments
Preceding
The Dawes Act
Paul W. Gates, Cornell University

To some historians of the West
the policy of breaking up Indian reserves by allotting them in
severalty seems to have had its origin in the Dawes Act of 1887
when a combination of land-hungry Westerners and impractical
Eastern idealists are said to have put this allotment act through
Congress. The fact that allotments had been made to Indians in
the colonial period, were resorted to increasingly in the early
years of nationhood, and long before 1887 had become a regular
feature of American policy toward the red men is quite neglected.
Many thousands of allotments for more than seventeen million
acres had been patented to Indians by 1887.1
Allotments and individual reserves, generally of 160 to 640
acres, early appeared in treaties with Indians-granted to chiefs,
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subchiefs, and other headmen, to traders, agents, m1ss10naries,
half-breeds, and other influential people who had a part in wresting from the aborigines surrenders of their land.2 That the allotments when patented quickly fell into the hands of traders and
agents who had written provisions into the treaties providing for
them is a clear indication of the purpose for which they were
granted. Individual reserves were also another way of enabling
the chiefs and headmen to settle their obligations to traders.
Associated with provisions for these reserves were sections requiring that much of the money being paid for the cessions of land
should go to John Jacob Astor and his partners in the American
Fur Company, Pierre Chouteau, and the firm of W. G. & G. W.
Ewing and other trading firms, to satisfy their claims.
The first of a long line of individual reserves or grants
appears in a treaty of 1805 made with the Choctaws. This was a
reserve of 5,120 acres in southwestern Alabama which was to be
conveyed to the two daughters of Samuel Mitchell "by Molly, a
Chaktaw woman." It was later partitioned and sold by the
Mitchell family. A second reserve of 1,500 acres was to be conveyed to John M'Grew. 3 How threats and bribes were combined
to induce compliance may be seen in negotiations involving Andrew Jackson that led to a treaty and a cession of land by the
Chickasaws in 1816. Major Levi Colbert ("beloved chief') and
Colonel George Colbert were promised three well located tracts
of land on the Tennessee and Tombigbee rivers. These grants were
confirmed and later sold back to the United States. Another tract
of 640 acres was reserved for John M'Cleish and in 1816 confirmed
to him and his heirs. In addition to rations and liquor provided
during the negotiations, it was stipulated that in consideration of
the conciliatory disposition evinced during the negotiations of this
treaty, ten chiefs including Levi Colbert and an interpreter should
be paid $150 each in goods or cash and to thirteen military leaders
$100 each and to William Colbert should be provided a lifetime
annuity of $100. Two years later the Chickasaws again were induced to surrender land, this time in western Tennessee; and in
consideration of a "friendly and conciliatory disposition," twentyone chiefs including Levi and George Colbert were to be given
$100 or $150 each. 4
In two treaties of 1817 and 1819 with the Cherokees-who
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were under the greatest pressure to remove west of the Mississippi, as were all the Five Civilized Tribes-the allotment plan
and the cession of land in trust were resorted to. These were to
become the means of extensive abuses in the future. These allotments and trust lands were never to become a part of the public
domain and subject to the land laws. Every Cherokee head of a
family who might wish to become a citizen was to be given an
allotment of 640 acres to include his improvements "in which they
will have a life estate with a reversion in fee simple to their
children." In the event of the allottees' removal, their lands were
to revert to the United States. Grants in fee simple of 640 acres
were made to thirty-eight named persons, and one grant of 1,280
acres was made to Major John Walker. Some ninety thousand
acres in Alabama were ceded "in trust for the Cherokee nation as
a school fund." 5
The difficulties into which the federal officials fell in trying
to administer the individual reserves and allotments provided for
in the Cherokee treaty of 1819 scarcely argued for a continuation
of this practice. Some 311 Indians accepted allotments, but neither
Georgia nor North Carolina would concede the right of the federal government to convey them, and instead compensation had
to be given the Indians in the Treaty of New Echota of 1835, by
which the Cherokees ceded all their tribal lands remaining in
Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee, and North Carolina. In return,
they received a fee title to seven million acres in present Oklahoma, $5 million for the surrender of their land and $600,000 to
pay for allotments denied them, for other claims, and for the cost
of migrating to their new reserve. 6
The Choctaws were the next of the Civilized Tribes to give
way before the inexorable pressure of the settlers intruding into
their lands, the states extending their jurisdiction over them, and
the federal officials threatening, cajoling, bribing, and dividing
them into conHicting groups. In return for the cession in 1820 of
a choice tract of west-central Mississippi, including a portion of
the Yazoo Delta, a tract of equal size in present western Arkansas
was promised, and a blanket, kettle, rifle gun, bullet moulds and
nippers, and ammunition sufficient for hunting and defense for one
year were given to each member who would emigrate. Also
145,920 acres were to be sold for the benefit of Indian schools.
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Members of the tribe who had made settlements within the surrendered area and wished to remain on them were each to have
640 acres surrounding their homes. Members preferring to move
from their improved land were to be paid its full value. 7
It soon appeared that the Arkansas tract had already been
taken up in part by settlers, and in 1825 the Choctaws again had
to go through the same dreary charade of being urged, bribed, or
compelled to surrender a tract for the promise of another in the
West. Federal officials, including John C. Calhoun, are described
as systematically corrupting and intoxicating the Indians during
the negotiations leading to the treaty of 1825. Those Indians who
preferred to remain on their 640-acre allotments were given the
right to sell them in fee simple with the approval of the President. 8 Previously inalienable allotments were opened to sale,
subject to the consent of an officer of the government. This was
the route most later allotments were to take.9
Land-hungry Mississippians were not satisfied by the slow
removal of the Indians and the long withholding of parts of the
state from settlement. To speed the migration of the Indians, the
state extended its laws to persons and property within the remaining reserves, thereby compelling the United States to take more
drastic steps against the unwilling natives. A treaty forced upon
the Choctaws at Dancing Rabbit Creek in 1830 by systematic
bullying by Secretary of War Eaton provided for a new country
for them west of Arkansas Territory to which they were given
title in fee simple in exchange for another huge cession in central
Mississippi and Alabama. 10
The Choctaws were rashly promised that "no Territory or
State shall ever have a right to pass laws for the Government of
the Choctaw Nation .. . , and that no part of the land granted
them shall ever be embraced in any Territory or State." Members
who preferred to remain on their 640-acre allotments east of the
Mississippi and who should live on them for five years were to
have a fee-simple title. In addition to the 640-acres each head of
a family was entitled to, he might have 320 acres for each unmarried child over ten years of age and 160 acres for each dependent
child under ten. Finally, 20,420 acres were to be divided among
twelve chiefs, and 458,600 acres as cultivation claims were to be
allowed to 1,600 heads of families, who were entitled to sell them
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to the government for fifty cents an acre.11 One could well say
that rarely was the treaty-making power so used to convince the
headmen that they could profit by signing personally and quickly,
no matter how badly past policies were repudiated. Supplementary articles to the treaty provided for additional allotments
amounting to 54,880 acres to named individuals. If the varieties
of claims and allotments seems complicated, the management and
disposition of the allotments and trust lands involved the government in even more intricate questions. 12
Negotiations with the Chickasaws in 1832 and 1834 produced
treaties whereby the Indians ceded in trust all their lands east of
the Mississippi after making allotments of lands to members of the
tribe and white men who had cooperated with them. Allottments
were to range from 320 acres for orphans to 640 acres for each unmarried person over twenty-one, 1,280 acres for families of two
to five persons, 1,920 acres for families of six to ten, and 2,560
acres for families of more than ten. Ownership of one to nine
slaves entitled one to 320 acres extra, and for more than ten slaves,
640 acres. The allotments were to be granted in fee simple, but
were subject to alienation only with the approval of two chiefs
and an officer of the government. In addition to these allotments,
four sections each were to be given to "their beloved and faithful
old Chief' Levi Colbert and to George and Martin Colbert and
three other headmen. Twelve and a half sections were granted
other influential Indians and white men. 13
After the survey of the cession, the selection of the allotments,
and special reserves, the remaining lands were to be offered for
sale as trust lands and not public domain, at $1.25 an acre.
Fearing that combinations of buyers might prevent competitive
bidding, as was a common practice at public-land sales, the
Chickasaws insisted that no such combination should be permitted without, however, determining how the usual buyers club
law could be avoided. Unsold lands continued to be subject to
purchase after the auction at $1.25 an acre for a year, when their
price was to be reduced to $1.00 an acre; during the next year they
could be sold at $.50 an acre, in the fourth year at $.25, and
thereafter at $.125. After the deduction of all costs of survey and
sale, the income was to be available for the Indians.
The reader will not be surprised to learn that within a short
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time the bulk of the allotments had passed into the hands of
speculating individuals, partnerships, and land companies whose
acquisitions ranged as high as 210,658 acres for the American
Land Company, 206,787 for the New York and Mississippi Land
Company, and 334,602 for Edward Orne, who represented three
other land companies. Mary Young found that the first thirtythree buyers acquired ownership of 1,576,484 acres of allotments.
An additional 461,437 acres were sold in amounts of 1,000 to
10,000 acres. 14
The trust lands were offered in 1836 when 1,304,150 acres
were sold for an average of $1.66 an acre. The graduated prices
allowed by the treaty brought yearly average prices down to $.18
in 1840 and $.13 in 1850. What is more important, a combination
of speculators got much of the land just as they and others had
engrossed so many of the allotments. Sixty-one buyers acquired
1,380,311 acres in amounts of 10,000 or more. Buyers whose purchases exceeded 2,000 acres acquired 1,990,592 acres. Of the
6,718,856-acre cession of Chickasaw lands, at least two-thirds of
the allotments and trust lands passed to large buyers. On none of
the land were squatters given protection through preemption. 15
Step by step the Creek Indians, once the possessors of the
greater portion of Georgia, surrendered their claim between 1790
and 1827, retaining only a five-million-acre tract west of the Chattahoochee in Alabama. Then in 1832 they, too, were compelled to
cede this reserve, but outright, not in trust. However, the treaty
provided for ninety full-section reserves to as many principal
chiefs and half-section allotments for every head of a family and
twenty sections in trust to be sold for the benefit of orphan
members of the tribe. Altogether, 2,187,200 acres were allotted.
As in other treaties providing for allotments and in accordance
with the wishes of the local people, there was no indication that
the grants were intended to aid the natives in becoming permanent residents of their tract. Alienation of the allotments was
made easier than was the case with individual reserves of other
Indians, and there was a scramble by white speculators to buy
them. So badly gouged and cheated were the Creeks, despite
some slight efforts by the government to assure that a fair price
was paid, that it was even proposed to have the allotments bought
up by the government and possibly made a part of the public
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domain. Mary Young lists twenty-four groups and individuals
who obtained 1,443,002 acres of Creeks allotments, the largest
acquisition being 477,089 acres. Purchasers of 2,000 to 10,000
acres obtained an additional 276,986 acres. The disposal of the
allotments to speculating groups brought little return to the Indians as well as great confusion over the right and fairness of the
conveyances to the officials involved and surely to the ultimate
developers of the land. 16
North of the Ohio, individual reserves and allotments first
appeared in Indian treaties in 1817, setting precedents not easy to
overlook in later negotiations. In his instructions to Lewis Cass
concerning proposals for discussions with the Indians, George
Graham, Acting Secretary of War, suggested that those natives
who wished to remain in Ohio might be given "a life estate" in
individual reserves "which should descend to his children in fee
... and that those who do not wish to remain on those terms
should have a body of land allotted to them on the west of the
Mississippi." Graham added somewhat indiscreetly that there was
little expectation that any large cession of land could be obtained
for the prices previously paid. 17
Lewis Cass and Duncan McArthur, the two negotiators who
met with the Wyandot, Seneca, Delaware, Shawnee, Potawatomi,
Ottawa, and Chippewa tribes, had reason to be apprehensive that
they went too far in providing individual reserves and in promising annuities for the cession they secured. In return for the
surrender of 3,880,320 acres in northwestern Ohio, northeastern
Indiana, and southern Michigan, the tribes were to receive small
increases in their annuities. These were slight enough to be considered "unconscionable" by the Indian Claims Commission nearly
a century and a half later. The questionable parts of the treaty
were the provisions for limited reserves, individual and group,
amounting to 271,800 acres, which were to be patented in fee
simple with the power of conveying them. In the prose of Cass
and McArthur, the persons to whom the reserves were to be given
were "almost all ... Indians by blood." In all cases "it was the
urgent wish of the Indians that land should be granted to these
persons. To have refused these requests would have embodied
against us an interest and created obstacles, which no effort of
ours would have defeated or surmounted." It is likely that the
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traders who expected to gain ownership of the reserves threatened
to prevent any cession until the individual reserves were included
in the treaty. 18 It was later charged that some of the individual
reserves provided for in this treaty and in a treaty with the
Chippewas of 1819 were intended for whites who had assumed
Indian names and fraudulently claimed Indian children, thus being entitled to consideration. Cass's marked reliance on the word
of traders had apparently led him into a serious error. 19
Congressmen expressed strong doubts about the "unprecedented" privilege of allowing the grantees of individual reserves
to sell them to whomever they wished. It was "at variance with
the general principles on which intercourse with Indians had been
conducted," said the Committee on Public Lands. If alienable
reserves were allowed, there would soon be pressure to have
reservations allotted to members of the tribes, and the very basis
of government policy toward the Indians would be weakened.
Secretary of War Calhoun said that the Senate would "probably
ratify no treaty which recognizes in the Indian the right of acquiring individual property with the power of selling, except to
the United States."20 Because of the strong opposition of Congress, a second treaty was arranged with the tribes whereby a
number of group reservations were enlarged but their status was
changed. They were to be held "in the same manner as Indian
reservations have been heretofore held," that is as occupancy
rights that could only be sold to the government, and individual
reserves were made alienable only with the approval of the
President. For a time thereafter, a similar restriction was written
into other treaties. It came to mean approval by the Office of
Indian Affairs, and this, in notable instances, was not difficult to
secure. 21 George Graham, Commissioner of the General Land
Office, said in 1825 that there was "generally no objection to the
Sale of the Lands reserved to Indians," but he thought care should
be taken to assure that a fair price was obtained. 22
Once the importance of including individual reserves in
treaties was conceded by the Indian Office, it was found almost
impossible to win concessions from the more advanced tribes
without them. Such groups were already influenced by and
deeply obligated to traders who were turning to land speculations
as the fur trade declined. This was notably true of the negoti-

Indian Allotments Preceding The Dawes Act I 149
ations with tribes of the Ohio Valley and the border lands of the
Great Lakes. Examples are treaties with the Potawatomis, the
Weas, and the Delawares in which seventeen individual reserves
containing 11,360 acres alienable only with the approval of the
President were granted. In a treaty with the Miami tribe of
Indiana, whereby a large part of central Indiana and a small tract
in Ohio were ceded, there appeared a variation in favor of a chief
who was notoriously influenced by traders. Individual Miamis
were to be given 31,360 acres of which 25,600 were alienable only
with the "approbation of the President," but 5,760 acres, granted
to Principal Chief Jean Baptiste Richardville, were conveyed in
fee simple without any restriction on alienation. All the reserves
were located close to prospective town sites along the Wabash and
St. Mary's rivers. 23 In two treaties of 1819 and 1821 with the
Saginaw Bay Chippewas and the combined Chippewa, Ottawa,
and Potawatomi tribes, by which nearly half the lower peninsula
of Michigan was ceded, twenty-one small reserves containing
162,000 acres were withheld and forty-five tracts containing 26,240
acres were assigned to individuals. They were "never to be leased
or conveyed by the grantees or their heirs . . . without the permission of the President."24
The Chouteau family of St. Louis was long and profitably
associated with the Osage Indians, whose claim to land in present
Kansas, Missouri, and Arkansas exceeded eighteen million acres.
In 1825 the Osages were persuaded to cede some ten million acres
of their huge claim, in return for which they were to be paid an
annuity of $7,000 in merchandise or money for twenty years and
were to be provided with supplies upon ratification. A debt of
$1,000, said to be owed to Augustus Chouteau, was to be paid,
and forty-two square-mile tracts were reserved for half-breeds,
including James G. and Alexander Chouteau. Fifty-four tracts of
640 acres each (34,560) were to be set aside as trust lands and sold
for the support of schools for the Osages. In the same year the
Kansas Indians agreed that Fran~is Chouteau was to be paid
$500.25 These were small sums, however, in comparison with
those later conceded the Chouteau family and associates.
The Miami treaty of 1826 called for special reserves in
Indiana of 17,600 acres of which 2,240 acres were for Jean or John
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B. Richardville, making his personal ownership 8,000 acres. Other
members of the Richardville family received 2,560 acres in the
two Miami treaties. Four sections, or 2,560 acres, were assigned
to Lagrow, a Miami chief. Seven days after the treaty was signed,
it was arranged that the land was to go to John Tipton upon the
death of Lagrow. Lagrow died just two months later, and when
news of the conveyance to Tipton, who had been the chief person
negotiating the treaty, became known, it created a scandal. The
validity of the transaction was questioned, but President Jackson
seems to have approved it. Eight years later Tipton paid Lagrow's
heirs $4,000 for the 2,560 acres to quiet gossip, though probably
not to satisfy his conscience. 26 Persons like Tipton were shrewd
enough to locate the individual reserves on spots where towns and
cities were likely to develop.
Article 7 of the Miami treaty also provided for the purchase
by the United States of 6,720 acres which had been granted to
individuals in the treaty of 1818. For this acreage $25,708 was to
be paid, or $3.83 an acre. One wonders if these eight-year-old
reserves purchased at this price were then sold as public lands at
$1.25 an acre. 27
As Governor of Michigan Territory and Superintendent of
Indian Affairs for the Michigan-Indiana area (1813-1831) and later
as Secretary of War (1831-1836), Lewis Cass played a leading role
in the administration of Indian relations. He had negotiated
nineteen Indian treaties 28 and had long since learned that cessions
of land could only be obtained if individual reserves were granted
and provisions were made for the payment of the Indians' trader
debts. In 1826 Cass had a part in drafting the treaties with the
Chippewas, the Potawatomis, and the Miamis whereby large
tracts of strategically located as well as rich lands suitable for
agriculture were surrendered, large sums in money or goods paid,
the annuities increased, and many individual reserves granted. In
the Chippewa treaty of 1826 the half-breeds were promised section reserves on the St. Mary's River in Michigan. The reserves
were to be laid out "in the ancient French manner" of six- to tenarpents ·frontage on the river and forty-arpents deep. Also some
seventy-seven allotments amounting to 49,280 acres were assigned
mostly to the Indian wives and children of white traders and
trappers, presumably without power of alienation. 29
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In 1826 the Potawatomis ceded a 130-mile tract bordering the
Wabash. To the members of the Burnett family, who had been
assigned 5,120 acres in the treaty of 1821, an additional 4,480 acres
were now granted. To other chiefs, half-breeds, and orphans
were given 15,840 acres, and to fifty-eight "scholars in the Carey
Mission School" of Isaac McCoy were given 160 acres each. All
individual reserves were alienable only with approval of the
President. 30
Cass next negotiated a treaty with the Potawatomis in 1828,
which provided eighteen individual reserves totaling 10,240 acres
and authorized the purchase of an individual reserve of 640 acres
granted by the treaty of 1821 for $1,000. Other treaties that came
under Cass's jurisdiction provided for 8,960 acres in individual
reserves in Michigan to the Chippewas, Ottawas, and Potawatomis and 26,880 acres of reserves partly in the mineral district
of Illinois and Wisconsin to the Winnebagos. 31
Trust lands appear again in a treaty of 1830 with the Delawares, in which 23,040 acres of "the best land" within a larger
cession in southeast Missouri were to be sold to raise a fund for
the support of schools. 82
Although there was strong opposition to granting alienable
reserves to full-blooded Indians, except for the Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Creeks of the South, there was less objection at the
time to giving reserves to half-breeds. In a treaty of 1830 with
the Sac and Fox and three Sioux bands-Omaha, Iowa, and Missouri-two tracts were set aside "to bestow upon half breeds."
The tracts were to be held "by the same title, and in the same
manner that other Indian Titles are held," but the President was
authorized to convey to any of the half-breeds up to 640 acres in
fee simple. Because the Sioux half-breeds refused to have anything to do with the 200,000-acre reserve in Minnesota, it was
bought back by the United States for $150,000 in 1851. After the
allotment of most of the second reserve in Nebraska, the balance
of 6,500 acres was sold between 1878 and 1882 for $21,531. 38
In the Winnebago treaties of 1829 and 1832 wherein large
areas in Wisconsin and Illinois were surrendered, 30,720 acres in
individual reserves were granted, of which the families of Pierre
and John B. Pacquette received 9,600 acres, Catherine Myott re-
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ceived 1,280 acres, and her daughter received 640 acres. 34 One of
the elder Myott's sections was conveyed to Henry Gratiot, who
signed the treaty in which it had been allowed, and the other was
acquired by Nicholas Boilvin, son of a long-time Indian agent at
Prairie du Chien. The conveyance of these individual reservations
shows that they were floating rights which could be located anywhere within the cession. The Boilvin tract was used to lay out a
town. There is no indication that official approval was needed to
sell the tracts. 35
Between 1831 and 1842 the Ohio Indians were divested of
title to their remaining lands, amounting to 419,384 acres plus
4,996 acres in Michigan. The Sandusky Senecas, the Senecas and
Shawnee of Lewistown, the Shawnee, the Ottawas, and the Wyandots were promised in exchange five reservations containing
449,000 acres in the eastern front of the Indian country to which
Eastern tribes were being moved. Since all but the Wyandots
held their Ohio reservations in fee, their Kansas reserves were
also granted in fee, but the Wyandot reserve was not so granted.
Actually, the 109,144-acre tract promised them in 1842 was never
turned over to them, and instead they were compelled to buy
23,040 acres at the junction of the Kansas and Missouri rivers from
the Delawares for two dollars an acre. This included the site of
present Kansas City, Kansas. In 1850 the Wyandots were paid
$185,000 for the reserve they never received, which equalled $1.25
an acre, or all that the United States could hope to derive from
the sale of the land. 36
Three hundred thousand acres of the 419,384 acres thus
ceded by the Seneca, Shawnee, Ottawa, and Wyandot Indians
were surrendered in trust with the stipulation that they were to
be sold to the highest bidder. After the deduction of the costs of
survey and sale, the sums advanced to the natives, and $1.25 an
acre for the 40,000 acres conveyed by the Sandusky Senecas and
$. 70 an acre for the other lands, the balance was to be held for the
respective tribes.
In the treaty of 1833 with the Ottawas the six Indian grantees
were denied the power of alienation without presidential approval; the other grantees presumably were to have that power.
By the Wyandot treaty of 1836 seven chiefs were allowed the full
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price the government received for a section each in the reserve
being ceded. Extraordinarily valuable floating rights of 640 acres
to be patented in fee simple were granted thirty-five leaders of
the tribe by a treaty of 1842. They could be located on "any land
west of the Missouri set apart for Indian use, not already claimed
or occupied by any person or tribe." Like the better known Valentine scrip of a later time, because of the ease and speed with
which it could be laid on prospective town sites, these floats were
used by speculators to enter the land on which Lawrence, Emporia, Manhattan, and Topeka were later established. 37
Altogether there were thirty-two individual reserves granted
by these treaties to thirty-seven mixed-bloods, orphans, chiefs, and
whites in Ohio for a total of 21,960 acres. All were made alienable
sooner or later, including those of Indians. There is little evidence
that they remained the property of the grantees for long.
Traders working with the Potawatomi and Miami tribes
whose homes were in the Kankakee and upper Wabash valleys
succeeded in having the largest quantity of individual and group
reserves made in this early period, if we accept the record of
allotments made for the Civilized Tribes of Alabama and Mississippi. In the previously cited treaties of 1818, 1826, and 1828 with
the Potawatomis, provision was made for 39,840 acres of reserves;
and in treaties of 1818 and 1826 with the Miami tribe 45,280 acres
were similarly reserved. Treaties of 1832 gave the Potawatomis
an additional 179,200 acres as reserves, making their total, mostly
in Indiana, 219,040 acres. The Potawatomis were also promised a
reserve in fee simple on the Osage River in the Indian country
"sufficient in extent, and adapted to their habits and wants."38 The
ink was scarcely dry on the 1832 treaties with the Potawatorirls
before the latter were being urged to sell their reserves, and in a
series of treaties 97,280 acres were bought for $.62 to $1.25 an acre,
or an average of $1.06 an acre. At these rates there was no prospect of the government recovering its investment from the lands;
·only the traders had profited.
In the drafting of the treaties with the Miami Indians in 1834,
1838, and 1840, when the last of their tribal possessions were
surrendered, the practice of making individual reserves reached
its most absurd extent. Instructions of July 19, 1833, from the War
Department to the agent in charge of negotiations with the Mi-
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amis stressed that as many as forty individual reserves could be
given, if necessary, and prescribed a top figure of $.50 an acre for
a Miami cession. Actually, in the resulting treaty of 1834, only
twenty-five individual reserves were granted, but the price paid
for the cession was a dollar an acre. 39
John B. Richardville, principal chief of the Miamis, who
already had received 8,000 acres in individual reserves, was given
an additional 20,320 acres, and all his holdings were to be conveyed to him in fee. He was also to have $31,800. Francis Godfroy, already the grantee of 4,480 acres, was given 6,400 more and
$17,612. The three Miami treaties brought the total reserves
granted them to 112,800 acres. A total of $1,133,000 was to be paid
for the cessions of these three treaties, a sum far larger than the
United States could expect to recover from their sale. The Miami
were also promised a reservation in the Indian country of 500,000
acres which was to be guaranteed "to them forever." 40
So generously paid were the Potawatomi and Miami Indians
for their Indiana land that they became among the best-endowed
of all Indians. In 1853 the per capita return to the Miamis in the
form of annuities and other payments was $87, that of the Eel
River Miamis was $68, in both cases exceeding that of all other
tribes. The per capita payments of annuities and other grants to
the Potawatomis were exceeded by those paid three other tribes
(the Sac and Fox of Missouri, the Sac and Fox of Mississippi, and
the Winnebagos), but the total paid the Potawatomis, $91,804, was
only exceeded by that of the Winnebagos, $97,485.41
Some Indian officials were becoming increasingly troubled
by the fact that individual reserves were being granted so extensively. It is not clear, however, whether their concern stemmed
from knowledge that for the most part the reserves quickly fell
into the hands of traders and others exploiting the ignorance of
the natives. After Lewis Cass (that warm friend, and some would
say pliant tool, of the traders) became Secretary of War, he instructed commissioners to treat with the Potawatomis for cessions
of their land in 1833 as follows:
Decline, in the first instances, to grant any reservations either
to the Indians or others, and endeavor to prevail upon them
all to remove. Should you find this impracticable, and that
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granting some reservations will be unavoidable, that course
may then be taken in the usual manner and upon the usual
conditions. But I am very anxious that individual reservations
should be circumscribed within the narrowest possible limits.
The whites and the half-breeds press upon the Indians, and
induce them to ask for these gratuities, to which they have
no just pretensions; and for which neither the United States
nor the Indians receive any real consideration. The practice,
though it has long prevailed, is a bad one and should be
avoided as far as possible.42
A combination of able and aggressive traders stationed at Fort
Wayne and Logansport, Indiana, who worked at times closely
with Senator John Tipton, completely ignored all such instructions
in securing cessions from the Miami and Potawatomi Indians
without any sharp disapproval from Cass, but elsewhere in the
upper Mississippi Valley individual reserves were halted or kept
to a minimum. 43
The government's reluctance to grant individual reserves is
best displayed in the negotiations for three treaties with the combined Chippewa, Ottawa, and Potawatomi Indians of 1833 and
with the Ottawas and Chippewas of 1836, whereby some five
million acres in Illinois and Wisconsin and from one-third to onehalf of Michigan were surrendered to the United States. It was
found that the traders who had close relations with these Indians
and whose support was essential could be satisfied if provisions
were included in the treaties for the payment of the debts of the
Indians, real or imaginary, and sums of money equivalent to what
the traders might have expected to get from individual reserves.
Both these conditions were well met. In the two treaties with the
combined tribes $100,000 was provided for "sundry individuals,
in behalf of whom reservations were asked, which the Commissioners refu~ed to grant." One hundred and fifty thousand dollars
was provided to satisfy the claims of traders and $600,000 for
miscellaneous purposes, including an annuity. Three lists of
claimants and persons to whom the tribes wished to grant favors
were included in the treaty, in all 351 individuals, groups, or companies, some of which were listed for multiple claims. Milo M.
Quaife, historian of Chicago, speaks of "the striking display of
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greed and dishonesty" of many of those who strove to have doubtful claims included. 44 Largest of the claims were those of the
American Fur Company ($20,300) and of members of the Kinzie
family ($23,216), who had previously had $7,485 paid them under
treaties of 1828 and 1829. Many of the payments were for claims
that Quaife thinks should rightly have been assumed by the
United States, not by the Indians. He expressed surprise that
numerous beneficiaries on the three lists signed the treaties, being
apparently unaware that government negotiators had long worked
with and through traders who received direct and indirect boons
from the treaties, which they had aided in extorting from the
natives and which they had signed as witnesses. The combined
tribes were given a reservation of five million acres in western
Iowa in exchange for their lands in Illinois, Wisconsin, and
Michigan.
During the negotiations leading to a treaty of 1836 with the
combined Ottawa and Chippewa, the traders demanded individual reserves and inclusion in the treaties of specific provisions
for the payment of stipulated claims. Rix Robinson, agent of the
American Fur Company, was heavily in debt to the company, and
the only way he could square his obligations was to get them
paid by the Indians. Ramsay Crooks of the American Fur Company in his numerous instructions to Robinson, who was with the
Indians throughout the discussions leading to the treaty, continually emphasized that payment for Robinson's claim must be included in any treaty of cession. Individual reserves, with their
chances of hidden profits, were much wanted, and the tribes were
anxious to provide them for their half-breeds; but "the President
having determined" not to allow any, it was agreed that $300,000
was to be allowed for the payment of debts, $150,000 should be
divided among the half-breeds, and $48,180 should be paid the
half-breed children of traders in place of 19,040 acres of individual
reserves, previously assigned. Included in the latter was the sum
of $23,040 for the family of Rix Robinson, most of which, if not
all, went to the American Fur Company. Another claim of $5,600
was included for an employee of the company and his family. The
. employee had become blind, and Crooks used his influence to get
a position for him as an interpreter and aid for other members of
his family, thereby passing the burden to the govemment. 411
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Michigan Chippewas were denied the right to assign individual reserves but were allowed to cede 107,720 acres in trust in
1836 and 1837 with a stipulation that specifically exempted this
land from preemption. Because the Indians feared that a combination of purchasers would prevent them from getting the actual
value of their land when sold at auction, it was stipulated that for
the first two years they were to be sold at no less than $5 an acre
and any land remaining thereafter was to be held at $2.50. After
five years, remnants of the land could be sold at $.75. 46
Floating reserves, free to be located within broad areas or
whose boundaries were not clearly defined, were much sought
after by speculators, as were also reserves specifically located on
sites almost certain to be valuable for town locations. In 1825
twenty-seven Kansas half-breeds were assigned full-section re' became the
serves on the north side of the Kansas River, which
object of much intrigue by speculators because of their choice
location. Similarly, we have seen how the Wyandot fl.oats of 640
acres each were in great demand because of the priority given
them in the selection and entry of land. One unusual reserve was
included in a treaty of 1835 with the Caddo Indians of Louisiana,
unusual because of its size and because individual reserves were
not common iil Louisiana or Arkansas. The reserve was for four
square leagues-23,040 acres. The grantee, Francois Grappe, a
black man, had never been known to have any interest in this
· land, though it was later estimated to be as much as 34,500 acres
because of the way it was blocked out. It was laid on rich alluvial
soil bordering the Red River and was subsequently estimated to
be worth somewhere between $100,000 and $900,000. The basis
for the reserve was an alleged donation of the land by the Indians
some thirty-four years earlier. After ratification of the treaty and
the approval of the patent, accusations of gross fraud led to a
congressional investigation which in 1841 brought out the fact
that the tract had been acquired by the commissioner in charge
of negotiating the treaty and that in all likelihood arrangements
for the purchase from Grappe had been made beforehand. Witnesses also testified that the tract had been improved by white
planters, who had a good title dating back to the Spanish period,
and furthermore that it was not a part of the Caddo reservation
and that the Indians had no right to include it in their cession. The
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House Committee on Indian Affairs considered the conduct of
the commissioner "unfortunate" and "highly imprudent," scored
the testimony in his behaH as utterly worthless, deplored the
many fabrications of documents, and was deeply troubled by evidence that the commissioner had not only abused the treatymaking power and suppressed evidence contrary to his interest
but had also grossly cheated the Indians in the rations and supplies the government had intended for them. The committee
concluded that the district attorney should bring suit to recover
the tract, which it declared had been "improperly or fraudulently"
included in the treaty. 47 There was a close parallel between the
Caddo fraud and the Lagrow reserve which John Tipton had acquired. One may well wonder how Cass could have favored, or
the Senate ratified, the Caddo reserve, the largest included in any
of the treaties in a period in which reserves were being frowned
upon.
One may conclude that thus far, individual reserves to chiefs,
orphans, Indian children of white traders, and political hangers-on
were not planned with any real thought of enabling the Indians
to move from communal or tribal ownership. Instead, they were
used in the South as a means of eliminating the Indians by giving
them property whose value and use they had no conception of
other than as a means to a few drinks. The authors of the allotment policies in the treaties with the Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Cherokees were aware that the lands would shortly be
in the possession of whites. In the North, the individual reserves
offered a means by which the support of traders could be obtained
for cessions of land and the removal of the Indians, which would
mean ·the end of their profitable business with the natives. Also,
the reserves and stipulations for payment of debts in the treaties
would permit the chiefs and headmen to rid themselves of those
obligations that the traders had permitted, if they had not actually
encouraged, them to accumulate. If the debts were listed in the
treaties and it was stipulated that they were to be paid out of the
large sums authorized for this purchase, the traders were sure of
collecting. Few of the treaties did so list the sums to be paid, but
those that did are useful in showing how business was conducted
with the Indians and the way in which they were exploited.
Largest of the traders' claims to be paid was that of $133,997
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to Pratte, Chouteau & Co., and members of the prolific Chouteau
family. Second largest was the $76,587 paid to the firm of W. G.
& G. W. Ewing and family. It was G. W. Ewing who informed
Senator Tipton of Indiana that the Potawatomi Indians would
never leave the Wabash until his firm was paid the full debt owed
it. 48 The third largest of the sums paid for Indian debts went to
John Jacob Astor and the American Fur Company, $59,961. Actually, the total received by the Astor-American Fur Company was
far larger, for they had a major share in the Pratte, Chouteau &
Co.; $20,961 assigned to others in the Chicago treaty of 1829 was
collected by Astor, and other sums appearing under other names
were either for Astor or for the company. G. W. Ewing also had
at least $37,000 of claims confirmed in addition to those included
in treaties. 49
The Wisconsin Herald of September 27, 1845, a paper published in Prairie du Chien, where more gold and silver was distributed in the form of annuities to Indians than in any other
place north of St. Louis, described the scramble by whites to get
their hands on the funds being paid the Indians:
Everybody claimed kin with the Indians and could bring
proof of his genealogy about annuity day. How this money
was watched all the way from Washington. Speculators,
sharpers, gamblers and knaves followed it, and were in Prairie du Chien thick as buzzards when the annuities were to be
paid. Princely was the sum disbursed, but thousands . . .
stood eager to share it, and the money passed away like the
dew.
By 1853 the Indians had surrendered their lands east of the
Mississippi and in the first tier of states west of that river with the
exception of northern Minnesota and small reservations elsewhere
and had moved to the Indian country west of Missouri and Arkansas. In 1844, 85,473 tribesmen lived in the Indian country, much
the larger number being iii the region west of Arkansas. In 1854,
8,002 intruded Indians were reported in Kansas. 50 There, on
clearly defined reservations they dwelt in misery, partly sustained
by inadequate government aid and denied the freedom from
white intrusions that their treaties had guaranteed them. Westward-moving Mormon refugees seeking relief from religious per-
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secution, pioneers and traders looking for new opportunities in
Oregon and New Mexico, and the rush of gold seekers to California in 1849 meant new trouble for the intruded Indians, as did the
demand for their removal from the better lands in the Nebraska
Territory that had been promised them in perpetuity.
The induced or forced migration of Eastern tribes to the west
of the Mississippi began before definite plans for an Indian country had been adopted. Cherokee and Choctaw Indians were assigned reservations in Arkansas, and Delawares and Kickapoos
were given tracts in Missouri; but by 1825 the granting of reservations in states or territories was halted. Thereafter, with a few
exceptions, Indians were moved into unorg~nized areas west of
Missouri and the Territory of Arkansas.
In 1830 Congressional policy was somewhat crystallized by
an act of May 28, which restricted removals to areas that were
not included in a state or organized territory but for which the
Indian title had been extinguished.111 This effectively defined the
Indian country of present Oklahoma, eastern Kansas, and southeastern Nebraska and Iowa and Minnesota. To induce the Indians
to give up their more eastern reserves, the President was authorized solemnly to assure them that "the United States will forever
secure and guarantee to them, ... the country so exchanged ...
and if they prefer it ... will cause a patent of grant to be made
and executed to them for the same." Then followed negotiations
·with the Senecas and Shawnees; the Kickapoos; the federated
Kaskaskia, Peorias, Piankeshaws, and Weas; the Iowas, the Chippewas, and Wyandots, which provided for their removal across
the Missouri line; and with the Creeks, Choctaws, Seminoles,
Chickasaws, and the Seneca-Shawnees for their removal to reservations in what was to become Indian Territory.
The area west of Arkansas and Missouri contained much
first-rate arable land that was suitable for grain and livestock
production and capable of sustaining a large population. By 1850
many Westerners had come to the conclusion that an earlier
generation had made a major error in designating the region
permanent Indian country.
All of Indian Territory, except the panhandle, and the entire
front of Kansas were in the possession of some 85,000 intruded
Indians. They had been promised their reservations "in full and
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complete possession ... as their land and home forever." What
then was the prospect of creating new territories and states out of
the Indian country? Congressmen knew the way and proceeded
to follow it. First, in 1853 they added to the annual appropriation
bill for the Office of Indian Affairs a section authorizing the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to negotiate with the Indians west of
Missouri and Iowa for the extinguishment of their titles "in whole
or in part" and appropriated $50,000 to further that end. Meeting
no favorable response, the Commissioner had to report failure in
his first effort. 52 Notwithstanding this failure and its plighted
word, Congress next adopted the Kansas-Nebraska Act on May
30, 1854, for the creation of two territories and the opening of
them to settlement. True, the rights of the Indians were to be
preserved, and their reservations were excluded from the territories "until the tribes gave their assent'' to such inclusion.
The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act was the signal for
thousands of land-hungry people, looking for the economic opportunities that new territories provided, to rush across the Missouri
line into Kansas. They disregarded Indian ownership, marked out
their claims, built improvements that would justify preempting
the land, established local government and put it into operation.
The carpetbag officials whom the Pierce administration sent in to
"rule" and officers of the Army united with the land seekers to
break down the morale of the Indians and compel them to remove.
Officers at Fort Leavenworth permitted the creation of a town on
the Delaware lands and participated in the speculation without
making any protest, though all was contrary to law. This lawless
example led hundreds of Missourians to penetrate into the Delaware tract and into other reservations, disregarding the admonishments and warnings of Indian officials. The territorial governor
took up office on Indian lands, and the legislature .authorized
polling places and held its session on Shawnee lands and extended
county organization over some reservations, all in violation of the
treaties and the territory's organic act. Protests to the Secretary
of War and to the President were all to no avail; no one save the
Indian Commissioner paid any attention to the rights guaranteed
the Indians, and he was later to be displaced by a commissioner
who was more sympathetic to Western attitudes.
Everywhere "trespass and depredations of every conceivable
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kind" were committed against the Indians. They were "personally
maltreated, their property stolen, their timber destroyed," and all
their rights jeopardized. There seemed no alternative to surrender
and removal. 53
In the twenty-four days before Franklin Pierce signed the
Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs had
wrested from the reluctant Indians along the eastern border of the
Indian country six treaties surrendering portions of their reserves
in trust and portions outright, and providing that other parts were
either to be retained in tribal ownerships for a time or were to be
distributed in allotments to chiefs, headmen, heads of families,
and half-breeds. The swarms of land seekers that swept across
the Missouri border found no public lands in easy reach but met
up with Indian trust lands, allotments, floating allotments, di~
minished reserves, and reserves still intact. On all of these lands
settlement or intrusion by whites was illegal. The conflicts that
emerged between the Indian occupants and owners on the one
side and the intruders on the other, and the desperate struggles
between contending whites for town sites, railroad terminals,
county seats, the territorial capital, and land claims I have discussed as a major theme in the Kansas conflict in Fifty Million
Acres: Con-fl,icts over Kansas Land Policy, 1854-1890.54
A summary of the management and disposal of the Kansas
Indian lands shows that few tracts in eastern and southern Kansas
ever became a part of the public domain but instead were either
allotted (at least 525,000 acres) or sold in trust for the benefit of
the Indians (10,888,000 acres). On none of this land was homestead to apply, nor could military warrants with their reduction in
cost to settlers be accepted for entries. To this extent had Congress permitted setting aside the public-land laws for most of
eastern and southern Kansas.
The inclusion of allotments to chiefs, heads of families, and
half-breeds had shown land-hungry elements how to hasten the
opening of Indian lands and overcome the reluctance of the natives to surrendering their tribal reserves. With the opening of
Kansas and Nebraska territories the allotment of Indian lands in
severalty became a regular feature of the treaties being negotiated
with tribes in the two new territories and in Minnesota, Oregon,
Dakota, Colorado, Utah, Montana, Arizona, Idaho, and Wyoming
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territories and in Michigan. In the seven years following 1854,
forty treaties included provisions for surveying the reservations
and alloting the lands to individual Indians in amounts from 80 to
320 acres. Fourteen of the treaties applied to Kansas tribes, five
to Washington tribes, and smaller numbers to tribes in other territories. In 1867 Indian commissioners included in treaties provisions allowing patents of 160 acres to Indians who had 50 acres
fenced, plowed, and in crops (Sisseton and Wahpeton Sioux) or
patents to each 40 acres of which 10 acres were cultivated, up to
160 acres (Chippewa of Minnesota). Provisions for assigning land
to interested Indians, issuing certificates showing their exclusive
possession, and for listing the certificates in the land books of the
tribes were included in treaties with the Cheyenne and Arapaho,
the Crow, the Sioux, the Navajo, the Shoshone, and the Ute
Indians in 1867 and 1868.5 a
Indians in Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Nebraska, and
Kansas were either given alienable titles or titles that could be and
were made alienable by officials of the Department of the Interior,
but the treaties with the "wild" Indians farther west offered no ·
promise of alienation short of twenty-five years. In these latter
cases the title in the allotments was only possessory and could only
be conveyed to the United States or to the tribe, or in the event
of disease of the allottee, his right could pass on to heirs though it
remained inalienable. It was less possible for officials to speed
the process of patenting these allotments, as they had done so
extensively with allotments in Kansas, Indiana, and Michigan; and
these allotments were not subject to taxation, mortgage, or lease.
Commissioners of Indian Affairs Manypenny, in 1855, Dole,
in 1863, and E. P. Smith, in 1873, emphasized allotments as a
means of inducing the redmen to make improvements on their
tracts and to become farmers. The commissioners regarded the
policy as the only one that offered a hope of ending tribal ownership and gradually assimilating the Indians into the acquisitive
white culture of the frontier. 56 The Board of Indian Commissioners, which was appointed to scrutinize the operations of the
Indian Office and to bring to public attention any mismanagement
it uncovered, recommended in its first report in 1870 a general
allotment policy. In the words of Angie Debo, it thereafter
"regarded the extent of allotment as the measure of progress in
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Indian advancement." . It urged, however, that titles should be
inalienable for two or three generations. 57 Carl Schurz, Secretary
of the Interior from 1877 to 1881, threw his influence behind allotment, as did Senator Henry L. Dawes and other so-called
humanitarians. Yet the evidence that the allotments failed to
effect this objective was already clear wherever they had been
given. The Kansas story should have been sufficient to deter
experimenting with an allotment policy. The record of allotments
in Michigan is perhaps less well known.
By treaties of 1855 and 1864 with the Ottawas and Chippewas
parts of six townships in Michigan were set aside for allotments of
80 acres each, and some 1,735 Indians were given patents by 1871.
E. A. Hayt, Commissioner of Indian Affairs in the Hayes administration, related the sad story of the victimization of the owners
despite their relatively advanced state. So certain were the Indians that they would be removed, despite their allotments, that
they were disinclined to improve or in any way make use of their
land, an attitude expressed in the reports of the Indian Office. A
major portion "fell victims to the greed of unscrupulous white
men, and, one by one," parted with or were defrauded of their
lands. "Every means that human ingenuity can devise, legal or
illegal, has been resorted to for the purpose of obtaining possession" of the lands. Many sold their allotments for as little as
$.25 an acre when they were worth $5 to $25 an acre. Collusion
between the agents and the purchasers, liberal use of whiskey, the
application of unequal taxes, and mortgaging, all contributed to
lead the Indians to sign away their rights. In 1875 it was estimated
that not one in ten of the allotments was still held by the Indians.
Hayt's analysis shows that the Michigan record was almost a
duplication of the Kansas frauds of a few years earlier. 58 Ten
years later the local agent concluded that giving Indians titles
they could convey resulted "in the almost entire dispossession of
their land by bartering them away without scarcely any equivalent therefore." He asserted that allotments of the lands and their
transfer to whites was part of "a well-laid scheme contemplated
many years ago, ripened and consummated openly . .. . without
the intervention of the Government" whose duty it was to protect
the Indians against the wiles of the exploiters "who have grown
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wealthy by their ill-gotten gains, taken from the people whom
they now despise."59
At least 11,763 patents for allotments bad been issued by
1886, in Kansas, Nebraska, and other states of the Upper Mississippi Valley. 60 This does not include the many thousands given
the Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws, and Chickasaws in Alabama
and Mississippi. There was little or nothing in the record of allotments, however, to encourage the belief that they promised a
humane and practical solution of the Indian problem. Yet since
further concentration of the redmen in Indian Territory and in
one or two other large reservations was unacceptable to the West,
as Loring Priest has admirably pointed out, allotment was increasingly stressed as the only long-range solution, the more so as the
errors of the past were glossed over or forgotten. 61 Fonner Commissioner Manypenny might well have been listened to in 1885
when he declared that had he been able to foresee how completely
the allotment policy would be discredited, "I would be compelled
to admit that I had committed a high crime" by pursuing it in
Kansas. 62
Neither Congress nor the authorities in the Indian Office were
prepared to oppose the allotment policy when legislation to establish it generally was considered. It is true that the Coeur
d'Alene, Yankton Sioux, Potawatomi, Kickapoo, Wyandot, Iowa,
and the Five Civilized Tribes had made known their opposition
so strongly that the Commissioner mentioned their views in his
report, somewhat reluctantly, it appears. Other natives, however,
he reported as anxiously awaiting the allotment of their reserves.
J. P. Kinney marshaled some evidence showing that Indians
domiciled on allotments in New Mexico, Minnesota, Nebraska,
and elsewhere were making progress toward independence and
full ownership of their tracts; but his information is drawn from
the reports of agents who were committed to the policy. In 1883
"over fifty" Santee Sioux were reported to have obtained patents
for their allotments; but all such information is from strong supporters of allotments, and no later information is given concerning
the retention of ownership once the fee title had passed. Information concerning the progress of allotments among the other
Plains tribes before 1887 is not accessible. 63 Most supporters of
allotments agreed that extensive experience with them indicated
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that final ownership should be long delayed, except for those
making unusual progress.
Henry Moore Teller, for many years Senator from Colorado,
who commonly reflected Western and particularly Colorado sentiment on most questions, as Secretary of the Interior from 1881 to
1885 favored a different policy toward Indian lands, not, however,
because of any humane concern for the Indians, for he callously
neglected Indian rights and needs. He was both aware of, and
frankly admitted, the fact that the great mass of Indians were
violently opposed to allotment, an admission that required some
courage at that time. To satisfy the land hunger of the West,
Teller favored drastic reduction of the reserves and the opening
of the surplus lands to settlers only. At the same time he would
give the tribes a fee-simple title to th~ir diminished reserves,
which, he thought, would remove from them the fear of the loss
of their lands and their consequent unwillingness to develop or in
any way improve them. While Teller took a strong stand in opposition to allotment, his Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Hiram
Price, supported the allotment policy as strongly as his chief
opposed it. He maintained that "the best results" had followed
from allotment and declared, "I shall, therefore, adhere to the
policy of allotting lands wherever the same can legally be done
and the condition of the Indians is such as to warrant it." Like his
predecessors in the Indian Office, he reported that many Indians
were clamoring for allotments. 64
Senator Joseph N. Dolph of Oregon was one of the few
Western members of Congress who foresaw the evils in the allotment policy. He predicted in 1887, when the measure to provide
for forced allotting of Indian lands was under consideration, that
they would be swiftly disposed of to whites, the proceeds squandered, and the Indians would not be prepared for self support and
would again be dependent on governmentbenevolence. 611
The .West, Congress, the Indian Office, and some of the true
friends of the Indians wanted a general allotment act which would
require its application to all Indians or to all but those in the
Indian Territory, where opposition was intense. Such a combination was too powerful to resist. The Dawes General Allotment
Act became law on February 8, 1887.611 It followed previous
measures in the size of allotments and the twenty-five-year period
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before fee-simple titles could be obtained, and provided for the
sale of surplus lands only to actual settlers. Whatever the motives
of those who worked for the enactment of the measure, its success
in achieving its avowed object-the gradual assimilation of the
Indian population-was dependent on sympathetic, honest, and
understanding administration; and that the Dawes Act did nothing to assure. One need not wonder why the Act has come in for
penetrating criticism in later years in the light of the demoralizing
effect its incidence had upon the economy of the Indians.
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Squaw Men on the Kiowa,
Comanche, and Apache Reservation:
Advance Agents of Civilization
or Disturbers of the Peace?
WIii/am T. Hagan,
State University of New York, Fredonia

One of the fixtures of reservation
life in the late nineteenth century was the squaw man. In the
preceding three centuries many white men had formed alliances
of some degree of formality and permanence with Indian women.
Within the last several years the phenomenon has attracted some
attention. John Ewers probed an aspect of the relationship in his
scholarly article "Mothers of the Mixed-Bloods: The Marginal
Woman in the History of the Upper Missouri.''1 More recently,
Walter O'Meara exploited the sensational possibilities of the subject in Daughters of the Country. 2 Neither study comes past mid
nineteenth century, and Ewers's is confined geographically to the
Upper Missouri. O'Meara ranges more widely but has produced
principally an account of the relations of fur traders and trappers
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with Indian women of Canada and the northern United States.
Two earlier writers to treat the subject were Stanley Vestal
(Walter S. Campbell) and Clark Wissler. Vestal delivered himsell
of the verdict: "One suspects that the term 'squaw-man' was invented by some spinster from the East, who came west to find a
husband, only to discover that the Indian women had married all
the best men."3 It is not quite that simple, as Wissler made clear
thirty years ago in a chapter entitled "The Enigma of the Squaw
Man" in his Indian Cavakade. 4
The term squaw man apparently did not come into general
use until the 1850s. Its derivation is unknown, but it was widely
employed throughout the second hall of the nineteenth century in
a derogatory sense. In a popular play by that name first produced
in 1905, audiences were entertained by the story of an expatriate
English gentleman who took an Indian wife in the American West.
One of the play's highlights is when the squaw man reveals his
predicament to a fellow Englishman who has happened on him.
"Socially ostracized," is how this squaw man described his situation, explaining, "You see we have our social distinctions, even
outhere."5
In objecting to the stigma of the term squaw man, Vestal
made the point that "the foremost men" of our pioneer period had
married Indian women, citing the cases of William Bent, Kit
Carson, and Jim Bridger. 6 He might have added the names of
hundreds of men from earlier frontiers, with John Rolle heading
the list, followed by such luminaries as William Johnson, Lachlan
McGillivray, and Henry Schoolcraft.
Aside from the romantic attraction Indian women held for
white men, there were practical reasons for their making such
domestic arrangements. A helpmate who could do the camp
chores, make snowshoes and moccasins, and help prepare furs for
market was a real asset to a trapper or trader. An alliance with
the family of a chief helped a trader both dispose of his goods and
collect the debts owed him. Or the relationship might have significance in international affairs. The English regarded Pocahontas's
betrothal to John Rolle as putting the seal on the alliance with her
father, Powhatan; 7 and in the lull following Queen Anne's War the
Board of Trade took note of French success in this regard and
recommended marriages between Indians and English settlers.8
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Thus by 1850 the practice of intermarriage was long established, and while not completely socially acceptable, had not yet
produced that term of opprobrium "squaw man." And new types
of relationships were developing, ones of greater duration than
were typical of the fur trade. These were established in the backwash of the frontier among relatively advanced tribes like the Five
Civilized. According to a census taken in 1825, nearly one hundred and fifty white men had married among the Cherokees and,
even more remarkable, about half that many white women had
chosen Cherokee mates and life with the tribe.9
The problems presented responsible officials by the introduction of such large numbers of whites into the Indian country became apparent within a few years. In the late 1830s the agent for
the Five Civilized Tribes deplored the lack of legislation empowering him to cope with the influx of whites, pointing out that
they were generally fugitives from the law or others not "calculated to advance the interests of the Indians."10 The incidence of
such remarks in agents' correspondence increased rapidly in the
1840s and 1850s. The suggestion that Indian annuities had attracted some of the intermarried whites was voiced by D. D.
Mitchell, superintendent at St. Louis. "It will readily be seen that
such men add nothing to the stock of Indian morality!" observed
Mitchell, and he particularly charged them with contributing to
the liquor problem among the tribesmen. 11 Other agents were
concerned about the influence the intermarried white man could
exert in tribal politics. Thomas Twiss, a West Pointer turned
Indian agent on the upper Platte who himself had an Indian wife,
was one of the most vehement in his denunciation of whites living
among Indians. He maintained many were fugitives from justice
and "addicted to all of the lowest and most degrading vices." But
worst of all, Twiss felt, was the tendency of these white men to
conspire against the agent and "allure them [the Indians] on to
ruin step by step."12
Not all observers were so alarmed as Mitchell and Twiss at
the influence of intermarried whites. A few looked upon them as
catalysts for the civilization process. Potawatomi agent Richard
S. Elliott went so far as to claim that, "Whatever advances the
Pottawatomies have made towards civilization have been promoted in a greater degree by the intermixture of whites with the
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tribe, than any other cause." As he saw it, emulation was at the
heart of the improvement, the houses and farms of intermarried
whites challenging the Indians to progress.13
Two others who saw it this way were Thomas Fitzpatrick
and James H. Norwood, both stationed among Plains Indians. 14
However, the views of these three agents ran counter to those
generally held, and two of the three, Fitzpatrick and Norwood,
never held administrative responsibility for a real reservation.
Reservations of a sort had appeared as soon as the first waves
of settlers had bypassed remnants of Eastern tribes, remnants
which lingered on as enclaves in white society. But the reservation
system, whose vestiges we see today, was a product of the obvious
impossibility of maintaining in the West a huge, thinly populated
"Indian country" in the face of a burgeoning, aggressive white
population. A solution seemed to be to pare the Indian holdings
to satisfy the demands of whites while leaving enough land to
serve as the setting for the transformation of the Indian from
savage hunter to civilized farmer. 111
The concept of the reservation as a civilizing institution had
among its basic elements the necessity for isolating the Indians
during this critical period. 16 Experience had shown that Indians
on the borders of white settlements usually contacted a class of
whites interested in exploiting and corrupting, not civilizing, them.
Thus, to work their magic, reservations had to be forbidden to
whites other than agency employees. By the Kiowa and Comanche Treaty of October 21, 1867, which provided the legal framework for the reservation experience that those Indians had had for
more than a quarter-century, the United States solemnly pledged
"that no persons except those herein authorized so to do and
except such officers, agents, and employes of the Government as
may be authorized to enter upon Indian reservation in discharge
of duties enjoined by law, shall be permitted to pass over, settle
upon, or reside in the territory described in this article."17
However, at the time this treaty was signed, a few white men
had already established connections with the Penateka band of
Comanches. These first contacts had occurred on the Comanche
Reservation on the Clear Fork of the Brazos in Texas. There the
few hundred who been persuaded to give up the life of plains
nomads were exposed to the rudiments of civilization.
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Recognition of the inability to do much with the fraction of
the tribe on the reservation while most Comanches followed the
buffalo, led to plans as early as 1855 to secure a larger reservation
which would support all the Comanches. 18 Before this could be
worked out in detail, the Texans, their long-standing opposition
to any Indians exacerbated by raids on frontier settlers, virtually
drove the Comanches and several smaller tribes from the state.
These Indians were then located in a district the government
leased from the Chickasaws and Choctaws.
The Civil War delayed plans to locate all the Comanches in
the Leased District, but this was finally provided for in 1867- by
the previously mentioned treaty. Under its terms the Comanches, ,
and the Kiowas who had joined them in earlier negotiations with
the United States, accepted a three-million-acre reservation as
their future home. In a separate document the Comanches and
Kiowas agreed to incorporate the Kiowa Apaches and share their
reservation, annuities, and government services with the latter
tribe. 19
Eight years were to pass before all the Comanches, Kiowas,
and Kiowa Apaches were located on the new reservation. The last
bands did not settle down until June, 1875, and then only after
army columns and the declining buffalo herds had combined to
make life on the plains impossible. The agent for this reservation
was also made responsible for the neighboring one set aside for
the Wichitas and several other small tribes. In 1878 the headquarters for the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Agency was moved
to Anadarko from Fort Sill, and the administration of the two
agencies was merged completely, making it the Kiowa, Comanche,
and Wichita Agency. 20
By the time the agency was located at Anadarko, squaw men,
as they were now known, were becoming conspicuous in agency
affairs. Three stand out by 1878, William G. Williams, J. J. Sturm,
and William Chandler. Williams and Sturm had married Caddo
women, and Chandler was the husband of a Mexican captive of
the Comanches. All three men had entered the reservation as
employees of the government, from whose ranks most squaw men
came.
Agency employment usually attracted single men, for which
there was a ready explanation. Life at the Kiowa, Comanche,
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and Wichita Agency held few attractions for a man with family
responsibilities. In the early 1870s it was about two hundred miles
ftom the nearest railroad, and the triweekly stage ftom that point
took two full, bone-jarring days and nights to reach the agency,
that is if the creeks and rivers were not flooding, in which case
the trip might drag out to a week or two. The isolation was made
even less acceptable by conditions for the employees. Until the
late 1880s, when several cottages were built, there usually was no
separate housing for employees other than the agent himself.
Families might have two rooms in a dilapidated structure, which
they would share with other agency staff members. Nor were the
salaries sufficient to support a family, most agency employees
receiving annual pay in the $400-$600 range, with perhaps $250
of that going for board. Given this situation, it is not strange that
the possibility of making homes with the reservation's women
proved attractive to agency employees. 21
The connection of Sturm and Williams with government
service dated back to the days when the Caddoes were living on
a separate reservation. Sturm was an agency farmer on the Brazos
reserve in Texas in 1857,22 and Williams entered government
service in 1863, after the Caddoes had moved to the Leased District.23 Chandler, who was part Cherokee or Creek, first met the
Indians among whom he was to make a home when he began to
supply beef to the government for the reservations on the Brazos.
When the Indians moved ftom Texas, he moved with them and in
time became an agency interpreter. Meanwhile, he had married
Tomasa, a young Mexican captive for whom he had paid two
dollars and a chicken. 24
Within a few months after the opening of the agency at Fort
Sill, the question of the rights of white men on the reservation
arose. The names of Chandler, Sturm, Williams, Horace P. Jones,
and Philip McCusker were submitted to the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs as candidates for adoption by tribes associated with
the agency. 25 Neither Jones nor McCusker had Indian wives, but
all five were represented as men who had long resided with the
Indians and whose presence among them was beneficial. The response of the commissioner was typically cautious where legal
questions might be involved. He vetoed the adoption procedure,
indicating that there was ample precedent for white men-par-
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ticularly those with Indian wives-being permitted to reside with
tribes. But if they were not legally adopted members of the tribe,
it was also easy to expel them from the reservation if they
misbehaved. 26
What must have been behind the interest of the five in adoption became apparent within two years, when Joseph Chandler
applied for a grant of land under the 1867 treaty. 27 A clause of
this agreement, designed to encourage the transition from hunter
to farmer, had provided that the head of a Kiowa, Comanche, or
Apache family might receive a deed to as much as 320 acres of the
reservation if he were prepared to "commence farming." Although
the deed was made out to Chandler, the commissioner subsequently held that since he was not a Comanche, the title to the
land could only rest in his wife Tomasa.28
As complaints about squaw men came in from agents throughout the service,29 an effort was made in 1876 by Representative
Julius H. Seelye of Massachusetts to amend the Indian Appropriation Bill He sought to forbid "the issue of rations or supplies of
any kind to any white men living with Indian women, or to any
Indian women or their children who are married to or living with
such white men," and to ensure "that no such white men shall
claim any rights on any Indian reservation by reason of such real
or pretended marriages." After a short debate featuring, on the
one hand, references to "miscegenation" and "la~y and loose white
men" and, on the other, testimonials to the wisdom of encouraging
the "intermingling" of the races, the amendment was defeated. 30
By the time of the debate Joseph Chandler was dead, but
Sturm and Williams lived on to be joined by a new crop of squaw
men. One of these, George W. Conover, came to the Indian
Territory with the Army and remained there when he was discharged in 1870, entering the agency service. In ·1873, while
employed by the government as a laborer at forty dollars per
month, he quit that job to work briefly for a cattleman and then
entered the employ of Chandler's widow, Tomasa. For nearly two
years he helped her manage her 320 acres, meanwhile working for
a time for an agency trader, purchasing hides from the Indians.
He and Tomasa were married in 1875.31 By 1878 the now Mrs.
Conover had the largest herd of cattle of any of the reservation
inhabitants.32 At least some of the residents of the reservation
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clearly were awakening to the opportunities in the cattle business.
In this, squaw men seem to have been foremost.
As it took money to stock a ranch, and few squaw men had
much of that commodity, one possibility was to use any range
rights that a squaw man might be able to claim or inveigle, to
graze the cattle of another party. This Sturm attempted to do in
1878 on the Wichita Reservation, only to be denied permission by
the commissioner. But that official did indicate that Sturm might
run his own cattle on the reservation. 33
The Wichita Reservation contained nearly three-quarters of a
million acres, and the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache about three
million, most of both reservations offering good grazing for cattle.
The sight of this grass going to waste was too great a temptation
to white men. The same thing happened at this agency as happened elsewhere when such conditions existed. The squaw men,
in the words of the commissioner in 1879, "assume that ... they
have all the rights of full-blooded Indians, and they endeavor to
exercise these rights not only in the possession of cattle themselves,
but also in ranging and pasturing . . . large herds belonging to
other white men."34
That a new era was approaching for squaw men of the Kiowa,
Comanche, and Wichita Agency was apparent by 1885. The incumbent agent was P. B. Hunt, who had taken over the office in
the spring of 1878. For the first few years the intermarried whites
seem to have been no particular problem to him. Some were
dependable subordinates contributing their bit to the smooth
functioning of the agency, others were rather harmless reservation
hangers-on who inspired a mixture of contempt and pity.
In his annual report of 1884, however, Hunt spoke with some
bitterness of his recent experience. "I had been nearly five years
in office before I met with the common experience of a U.S. Indian
Agent's trouble with squaw men." "There are some good men
among this class," he acknowledged, "but there are others, whose
character and influence are so bad that it is futile to expect peace
as long as they are permitted to remain among the Indians;"35
Hunt's ire had been aroused by William G. Williams, James
M. Davis, and C.R. McKinney, all three married to Caddo women
but attempting to exploit their connections, not only with the
Wichita Reservation of which their wives were legal residents, but
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also the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Reservation administered
by the same agent.
Williams transgressed by purchasing twenty-two head of
cattle from Comanches at prices si~ificantly lower than Agent
Hunt deemed proper. 36 The agent directed his Indian police to
seize the cattle and return them to their original owners, but Hunt
did not require that the Indians return Williams's money to him,
presumably using this as a means of punishing the squaw man.
The commissioner first sustained Hunt's action by directing that
Williams be ordered from the reservation if he repeated the offense. But after the squaw man got a Congressman to intercede
for him, the commissioner directed that either the cattle or the
money be restored to Williams. Hunt was furious. He felt his
·efforts to encourage the Indians to build up herds would be in vain
if his rule forbidding Indians to sell cattle to white men was thus
undercut. The agent could not point to legislation sustaining the
position he had taken, but he was very concerned about the impact on the two reservations if the squaw man successfully
appealed his decision. Particularly disturbing was the position
taken by the commissioner that only he could order the removal of
an offending white man. "To make public your letter," wrote Hunt
with some heat, "will destroy what little discipline we have here
and will start white men to running 'rough shod' over the reservation." He commented despairingly that "if a white man gets ...
an Indian woman to become his wife, then that man is a fixture in
the reservation and it makes no difference what he may do he can
only be removed by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs . . . and
... the Agent is a mere figure head." 37
Even as Hunt's concern for protecting the Indians' herds had
produced problems for him, so would his efforts to protect Indian
land. This situation involved the other two squaw men, C. R.
McKinney and his father-in-law, J. M. Davis, both married to
Caddoes and originally located on the Wichita Reservation. 38
Hunt had erred initially by doing McKinney a favor. In 1880 he
had permitted the squaw man to move onto the Kiowa, Comanche,
and Apache Reservation to be nearer to a job that he held in the
Chickasaw Nation. Then, without the agent's permission, Davis
had quietly joined his son-in-law, and the two men and their
families lived there uneventfully for three years. But with the
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increase in herds on the reservation, fences began to go up, and
one that the agent authorized deprived McKinney of a portion of
a range he had been using. McKinney boldly proceeded to complain to Washington, citing the labor and money he had expended
in improving the property and charging the agent with discrimination. Particularly galling to Hunt, who received a copy of
McKinney's complaint, was the squaw man's claim to "have as
much right here as he [Hunt] has."39
As had been the case in the Williams affair, Hunt was asked
to provide a full report on the incident, which had the effect of
putting him on the defensive. To strengthen his position, Hunt
called a council of chiefs and headmen and elicited from them the
request that the agent order both McKinney and Davis. off their
reservation. ( He had not seen fit to ask their permission to let
McKinney on in the first place.) The commissioner approved, but
only after subjecting Hunt to the always embarrassing experience
of an investigation by a special agent. McKinney and Davis were
permitted to sell their improvements if they could find a purchaser, but he had to be on the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache
Reservation. When one of them sold fence rails, the purchaser was
denied permission to remove them to the Wichita Reservation.
Only a river might divide them and the same agent might preside
over both, but the line between the two reservations was strictly
maintained for some purposes. 40
Considering the embarrassment, challenge to his authority,
and added paper work that Williams, McKinney, and Davis had
caused him, Hunt might be pardoned for taking a dim view of
squaw men: "And as some of [them] seem to believe that the fact
that their having once cohabited with a squaw secures to them
not only the much cherished right-'the right to live on an Indian
reservation'-but also the right to do pretty much as they please,
some decision is required defining their status."41 Some progress
toward defining the rights and privileges of intermarried whites at
the Kiowa, Comanche, and Wichita Agency was made under the
colorful ex-Texas Ranger J. Lee Hall, who succeeded Hunt in
188.5,
Hall had been in office but a few weeks when he queried the
commissioner about the right of squaw men to employ other
whites or rent them land on the reservation. 42 The commissioner
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did not respond immediately, but he was being pressed by other
parties for action on the squaw-man problem. An inspector had
reported the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Reservation overrun
by undesirable whites, and the agent for the adjoining Cheyenne
and Arapahoe Reservation was complaining of similar troubles. 48
The commissioner, when he did reply to Hall's query, discussed
the general problem at length. Describing it as "one of the most
complex features in the Indian service" and "a mixed evil," the
commissioner harked back to the isolation concept which was
basic to the reservation as an instrument of civilization. "Bad"
white men could be ordered off the reservations immediately, the
commissioner decreed, calling on the military for aid if necessary.
No squaw man could rent land to another white man, and any
white laborers a squaw man might hire must be approved by the
agent. But the commissioner was forced to admit that there was
little that could be done if the intermarried whites behaved.
Nevertheless, the agent must see that they did not "enrich themselves at the expense of other members of the tribe," nor "monopolize large tracts of the best land on the reservation." The commissioner requested Hall and the Cheyenne and Arapahoe agent to
provide him with statistics about whites present at their agencies. 44
The reports by the two agents revealed the extent of the
problem. Hall identified fifteen squaw men on the ·reservations
under his jurisdiction, and twenty-four were counted on the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Reservation. Of Hall's fifteen, four were Mexican and two were employed at the agency. Among them the four
Mexicans farmed only 140 acres, held twelve head of cattle, and
employed five helpers on their farms. The two agency employees
did no farming and held no cattle. Neither of these categories
posed serious problems in administering the reservations. But the
other nine squaw men made up for it. Although not all were
involved in each of these activities, among them they ran a total
of 4,575 head of cattle on the reservations, farmed 1,370 acres, and
employed twenty-four whites and five Indians. 45
Of the nine, four we have already encountered: Conover,
Williams, Sturm, and Davis. The other five were H. P. Pruner,
W. F. Deitrich, E. L. Clark, Robert L. Curtis, and Emmet Cox.46
They provide an interesting cross section of the type. They had
been on the reservation an average of about nine years each.
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Three ( Pruner, Clark, Cox) were at some time or other employees
of the agency. One (Cox) came with the Texas cattlemen when
they began to lease range, and another (Clark) as a soldier stationed at Fort Sill Four of the five married into prominent Indian
families, Cox being successively a son-in-law of Comanche chiefs
Quirts-quip and Quanah Parker, Deitrich marrying a daughter of
Mrs. Conover, Pruner wedding the daughter of the Delaware chief
Black Beaver, and Clark choosing as a wife a daughter of Moxie,
a Comanche band chief.
As husbands of Indian residents of the agency, the fifteen
white men had some justification for being there, troublesome as
they might be on occasion. The most that could be done about
them was to insist that they be legally married to their consorts
and to propose legislation that would make the requirement binding. Explicit in the discussion of the topic was the conclusion that
any increase in the ranks of the squaw men would be unfortunate.47 As Agent Hall summarized it: "My opinion of 'Squaw
Men' does not differ from most of other Indian Agents; that the
presence of such men as are willing to marry Indian Women is
not conducive to their moral advancement." Nor did Hall leave
much room for romance in such arrangements: "There are no
white men who marry Indian Women, especially amongst the lest
civilized tribes, but do so from mercenary motives ... the privilege
of occupying land and raising live stock within the Indian reserve."48 This view of the motivations of intermarried whites was
one generally held in the Indian Service, from the top down.
Hall's superior, the Secretary of the Interior, lumped squaw men
with mixed-bloods, the "chief interest in the Indians of both" being
"to drive sharp bargains ... and to make money out of his [sic]
ignorance, unsuspecting confidence, and characteristic liberality
and hospitality."49
Addressing himself to an additional cause of concern, the
increasing number of white farm laborers and herders in the employ of squaw men, Hall advised that preference for these positions
go to married applicants. That perhaps would serve to discourage
the steady increase in the number of intermarried whites. But as
has been previously noted, reservation life did not attract family
men, and all that the authorities in Washington could do was to
require that the agents clear with them the admission of white
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farm laborers or herders to the reservation. Theoretically, these
white men could be employed only if the applicant for such assistance was incapable of maintaining his own property. In actual
fact, agents were quite lenient in interpreting the rules, and
Washington officials generally accepted their recommendations,
although they complained as the number of white men on reservations steadily increased.
Washington did take a strong stand on the legal sanction for
the union of Indians and whites. The commissioner advised Hall
that the Secretary of the Interior and he agreed that white men
living with Indian women should be married to them "according
to civilized use" or be removed from the reservation. 50 As the
commissioner had described it in his letter to the secretary, "The
institution of proper and lawful marriage would be a great step
in the way of the ultimate civilization of the Indians, and a safeguard in perpetuating title to lands held in severalty."51
That the Indians were not as impressed by the formality of
the white man's ceremony was apparent in an incident involving
one Charles Rider and an Indian girl, Eva Pickard. Rider asked
Hall's permission to marry the girl, and Hall insisted that Rider
get the consent of her fellow tribesmen. They refused, and Hall
ordered Rider off the reservation. Not so easily denied, the white
man took Eva with him and got a minister to marry them. Hall
warned the agitated Indians that the marriage was legal, but they
ignored him, located the girl, and forced her to return to the reservation. Eva seems to have been rather passive throughout the
adventure, although once back with her people, she refused to
rejoin her husband. 52
Although the Indians had disposed of Rider as a reservation
problem, the general situation remained the same. An effort to
ease it was made by the Fiftieth Congress. Originating in a recommendation of Secretary of the Interior, L. Q. C. Lamar, a bill
to restrict the rights of squaw men was introduced by Senator
Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, who was best known for his championing
of severalty. Discussions of the bill in both houses evoked some
highly derogatory remarks about whites who settled among the
Indians. In contrast with the discussion of the proposed legislation in 1876, no one came to their defense. A typical comment
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was that by Representative John H. Rogers of Arkansas which
termed many of the squaw men "fugitives from justice" or "those
who do not wish to pay their debts" or those "who are willing to
sacrifice everything like civilization for the purpose of getting beyond the law and gaining head-rights among the Indian tribes."53
The important provision of the law approved August 9, 1888,
banned the acquisition by the intermarried white man of "any
right to any tribal property, privilege, or interest" in the tribe of
his wife. 54 This was essentially the position the Indian Office had
been taking for several years, 55 and the law provided more of a
legal bulwark for current policy than a new departure. Certainly
it didn't remove the burden from the agents.
Between the end of Hall's administration in 1887 and the
opening of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Reservation in
1901, nine different men presided over the destinies of the Indians.
All of them faced the problem of the squaw men, and their responses could be anticipated in terms of their general approach
to their responsibilities. Those agents who eschewed innovation
and were willing to live-and-let-live had the least trouble with
intermarried whites. But an agent who conceived of himself as
the real guardian of the Indians, or who resented the pressures
both subtle and overt that squaw men could bring to bear on him,
would soon be fighting to save his job or his authority.
But even then there would be a distinct note of ambivalence
in the comments on the intermarried whites. There were occasions when agents did battle in their behalf. A trusted subordinate
with ten to twenty years' experience on a reservation, with family
ties among the Indians, and with the ability to speak at least one
of the several Indian languages used at the agency could be a
godsend to an agent fresh from the grocery business in Maryland
or a lumberyard in Missouri. The cases of Thomas F. Woodard
and John Nestell exhibit some of the possibilities.
Nestell had come to the agency about 1875.56 Entering the
government service, he held increasingly responsible positions,
being superintendent and overseer by 1888. Implicated in charges
that led to the dismissal of Agent Hall, he resigned that post.
Meanwhile, he had married a Mexican captive of the Kiowas and
continued to reside on the reservation. After the passage of a few
months he apparently was rehired in another capacity and con-
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tinued in government employment for several years, despite
sporadic efforts on the ·part of Washington officials to get rid of
him. An agent who entered office several years after the J. Lee
Hall affair defended Nestell as a Union veteran and one who held
"the confidence of all the people of this reservation." At least to
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs the agent professed to believe
that Nestell's previous troubles had been a peccadillo involving a
few spools of barbed wire. 57
Nestall was a good clerk; Woodard was an even rarer but
absolutely essential commodity, a good interpreter. 58 As a young
man of twenty-two, Woodard had come to the Wichita Reservation with a newly appointed agent. Over the years he had held
a variety of positions on the agency staff and had lived informally
with a Kiowa girl. The latter activity got him into trouble in 1889,
when the Commissioner of Indian Affairs ordered his discharge
after an inspector charged Woodard with immorality. The agent
rallied to his defense, stating that Woodard had married the
woman since the inspector's visit and that "his influence among
the Kiowas and Comanches was simply wonderful as they trust
him implicitly, and rely more on his word, than that of any other
man on the reservation." The previous summer Woodard had
helped calm the Kiowas in a dispute over their religious practices,
a dispute which might have required the use of troops had it gone
further. The agent also added that Woodard was a "man of sober
habits," a Mason, a churchgoer, and, last but not least, "the most
reliable interpreter on the reservation."59
Such a man clearly was more valuable than the $500 he
received a year as interpreter. And it is apparent that Woodard
had other sources of income. As a squaw man he had access to
free range for his cattle, and with the collusion of the agent there
were other possibilities as well. Hauling from the railroad the
many tons of freight the agency received every year was one of
the earliest types of employment for Indians. Presumably, they
received preference over white freighters, yet in one quarter in
1894, Woodard was paid $481 out of $788 the agent expended for
the hauling of freight. And he earned it under his Indian name,
''Wah-che-kah," which, however, did not escape the careful
scrutiny of an inspector. 60
Another example of the collusive relationship that could exist
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between squaw men and agents was revealed in connection with
the negotiation of the Jerome Agreement in 1892.61 This was the
instrument for applying severalty to the Kiowa, Comanche, and
Apache Reservation and required the approval of three-fourths of
the adult males. As there was considerable opposition to the
agreement, its negotiators, aided and abetted by the agent,
dredged up every signer possible. Two signatures turned out to
be the Indian names of squaw men Thomas F . Woodard and E. L.
Clark. 62 Elsewhere in the document both were listed by their
proper names as squaw men who should receive allotments on the
same basis as the regular members of the tribes. To add the final
touch to this classic example of conflict of interest, Clark was also
one of the official interpreters for the negotiations! The agent,
needless to say, was fully cognizant of the several faceted roles of
Woodard and Clark in the negotiation of the Jerome Agreement.
The foregoing suggests that an agent's view of a squaw man
related most closely to whether the !I}an was working with the
agent or against him; per se there was nothing wrong with squ~w
men from an agent's point of view.
Officials in Washington could be much more objective, as
they were not forced to rely upon the good will and cooperation
of intermarried whites to ensure smooth operation of an agency.
When one of the short-term occupants of the agent's position at
Anadarko registered a mild complaint about squaw men, suggesting that many of the cattle grazed by them really belonged to
others who were paying the white men for access to the range, he
felt it necessary to describe the squaw men as "an industrious class
of citizens" with whom his relations had been "pleasant."63 But
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs responded that they had no
rights themselves to hold cattle upon a reservation and should be
removed immediately if they attempted it. Their wives, of course,
could, but the commissioner suggested a guide for determining
how many-divide the reservation's Indian population into the
number of cattle the range should be able to support, and the
resultant figure would be the number a single Indian could graze
free. Any in excess of that figure should be charged for at the
same rate that applied to others who leased grazing land from
the tribes. 64
Nevertheless, the problem persisted and would be a bone of
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contention between conscientious agents and squaw men. Two
years later a new agent made a comparable protest and received
the same reply. 65 The issue came to a head under still another
agent, Captain Frank D. Baldwin.
Baldwin was not a fugitive from a lumberyard or a grocery
store. On special detail from the Army, he was one of the young
men who had entered service during the Civil War and had then
passed long years at frontier posts on the plains. Baldwin had
been cited for gallantry in action against both the Northern and
Southern Plains Indians, winning the Medal of Honor in a battle
with Comanches. He at least thought he knew Indians, and Baldwin had the army officer's dim view of the type of white men
attracted to reservations.
In the seven years since Hall had left office, seven agents had
presided over the destinies of the Indians of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Wichita Agency. Inevitably, the employees who managed to hold on through this succession of agents, together with
the squaw men and traders who were relatively permanent fixtures on the two reservations, exercised even more influence than
usual in agency matters. A man of Baldwin's temperament could
not permit this.
Captain Baldwin assumed responsibility for the agency in
December, 1894, and hardly a month had passed before he had
been initiated into the complexities of agency politics. Representatives of the Conservative Comanche faction complained to
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs about several things, among
them the squaw men who were leasing Indian land to other white
men and engrossing most of the farm implements sent to the
agency for distribution to all its residents. Leaders among the
complainants were an odd trio-Big Looking Glass, White Wolf,
and William Tivis.66
Both Big Looking Glass and White Wolf were band chiefs in
their sixties, men prominent in Comanche affairs since prereservation days. In contrast, William Tivis was a young man who had
spent about one-third of his years at the Carlisle Indian School
under the tutelage of Captain Richard H. Pratt. The thing that
brought them together was opposition to the prevailing Progressive faction in agency affairs headed by Quanah Parker of the
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Comanches and Ahpeahtone of the Kiowas, a faction normally
allied with the agent and the government. 67
The Conservative complaints about squaw men did lead
Captain Baldwin to investigate the position of intermarried whites
under his jurisdiction. In a week-long tour of his agency the
Captain discovered that squaw men had been "most liberally
supplied" with farm implements and also that they were "occupying the very best part of this reservation."68 As he began to press
the whites about their reservation holdings, they fought back, and
the war was on. J. J. Sturm, one of the oldest squaw men on the
reservation, pied his case directly to the Secretary of the Interior.69
Another senior resident, George Conover, employed an attorney. 70 By the fall of 1895, less than a year after Baldwin had taken
office, the Kiowa, Comanche, and Wichita Agency had become
the scene of a test of strength between the agent and squaw men.
Or perhaps, "some squaw men" would be more · appropriate, as
Baldwin, like other agents before him, found some intermarried
whites useful and cooperative. His fire was centered on only six
of perhaps twenty to twenty-five squaw men at his agency. His
particular targets were Thomas Woodard, J. J. Sturm, William F.
Deitrich, and George Conover (all of whom have been discussed
previously), James Jones, and James D. Myers.
James D. Myers appeared at the agency as an employee of a
cattleman only shortly before Baldwin assumed charge.71 According to the agent, Myers married an Indian girl after declaring he
was tired of paying for a grazing lease and was now going to get
free grass for his cattle. 72 James Jones was originally an agency
employee and held various posts on the agency staff, from herder
to chief of police, until he married a Kiowa girl nearly twenty
years after arriving at Fort Sill. 73
Baldwin accused the squaw men of a variety of transgressions : getting more than their fair share of tools and wire issued to
the Indians, paying the Indians ridiculously low prices for their
cattle, cutting hay from reservation pastures, pasturing the cattle
of themselves and other white men at the expense of the Indians,
and contributing to factionalism among the tribes. "When the
time comes when they cannot cheat and defraud the Indians,"
Baldwin wrote the commissioner, "then they will starve to death,
they won't work,"74 Of the charges Baldwin brought against the
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squaw men, the most serious were the ones relating to their use of
reservation pastures and their incitement of factionalism.
During the mid 1890s, the Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches
were leasing about half of their three-million-acre reservation to
cattlemen. From the "grass fund" the agent distributed annually
to the Indians about $80,000 "grass money."75 As their total annuity from the 1867 treaty was $30,000 and their only other cash
income came from occasionally hauling freight to the agency or
selling a beef to the government for the ration issue, the amount
of land they leased at six cents per acre was a matter of real concern to them. The Indians of the Wichita Reservation were even
more dependent on this grass money. Nevertheless, the tribesmen
usually suffered in silence as the squaw men appropriated thousands of acres to their personal benefit while never failing to line
up at the time of per capita payments to collect grass money for
their wives and children.
In 1895 Captain Baldwin was operating on the basis of a
precedent established by his predecessors and allowing any Indian
or squaw man twenty acres of pasture for each head of stock he
held on the reservation. Both he and the commissioner regarded
this as excessive, 76 and Baldwin was later to cut this to ten acres
per animal. 77 The commissioner also advised limiting the number
of acres any individual could hold to what he would be entitled to
in a per capita division of the reservation. In the case of the
Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches this meant about one thousand
acres each. But a squaw man could also use the shares of his wife
and children and end up controlling several thousand acres. This
much Baldwin was prepared to countenance; it was when the
white man .became too greedy that Baldwin reacted.
Frequently it was difficult to determine exactly how much
land the intermarried white held. And by this time several of
them were leasing large pastures, although the agent suspected
they were occupying more than they were paying for and subleasing their holdings at substantial profits. Baldwin uncovered
an example of the latter in George Conover.
When the agent required the squaw men to report on their
holdings, Conover had established his at not more than 23,000
acres. Baldwin was confident the tract actually exceeded 30,000
acres and forced him to pay for an additional 5,000 acres, which
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meant an additional $300 in the grass fund. But as time passed
there were other interesting revelations. A survey of the pasture
revealed that Conover was holding not 23,000 acres, nor even the
28,000 Baldwin held him for officially, but 36,640 acres. This
could not have come as a total surprise to Conover, although it
may have been to the cattleman to whom he had subleased it. The
cattleman had understood he was acquiring range rights to 40,000
acres. Conover had collected $2,600 from the cattleman, while
paying the Indians only $300, a nice profit for being the husband
of a woman and the father of children on the Comanche tribal
rolls. 78 It is little wonder that when Baldwin threatened to interfere with the profitable position Conover had carved out for
himself, Conover hired a lawyer with influence in Washington.
William F. Deitrich and Thomas Woodard were detected by
the agent in similar activities. Baldwin charged they were making a profit of $1,500 by subleasing a pasture assigned to them.
Woodard had compounded his crime by making room for his
lessee by shifting his own herd of 500 head of cattle to other
reservation range for which he paid nothing. 79 Baldwin flatly
accused him and Deitrich of "defrauding the Indians of $1,500;
and you are stealing the products of the soil that belongs to them
in common." Never one to mince words, the agent said that he
had given them enough rope and that they had demonstrated that
"your only interest in these Indians is what you can make by
dishonest ways out of them." Baldwin-also informed them that
he was aware of their joining Conover in retaining an attomey. 80
It is hard to say what disturbed Captain Baldwin the most
about the squaw men's activities. He exhibited righteous indignation at the exploitation of Indian resources, but the challenge to
his authority may have produced the greater reaction. An agent
might have to clear with Washington the purchase of a milk cow
or the erection of a shed for it, but to people in Indian country he
often seemed the total autocrat with a private court and police
force to back his decisions. Certainly, as P. B. Hunt had demonstrated, he resented any suggestion that he did not run his agency
and that it might be profitable to appeal an agent's decisions to
Washington. Even a weak agent would object to this, and Captain
Baldwin certainly was not that. And as a member of the peacetime army, his talents for controversy had been honed by the
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constant jockeying for position that went on among career officers.
Captain Baldwin reacted predictably to the report that some
of the squaw men had hired an attorney. Conover, Woodard, and
Deitrich had secured the services of William C. Shelley, who had
held a position in the Washington office of the Indian Service
before signing a contract with the Kiowas, Comanches, and
Apaches to defend them against the numerous depredation claims
being filed. Again Baldwin would have been unhappy with any
attorney the squaw men retained, but he felt, understandably,
that Shelley might have difficulty defending the Indians's interests
while in the pay of the intermarried whites. The agent also was
severely irked by the attorney's name-dropping. Shelley, in his
visits to the Indians, left the impression that he retained personal
ties with the Washington office and had access to correspondence
relating to the Kiowa, Comanche, and Wichita Agency. 81 The
tenor of letters written by Special Agent G. B. Pray to Commissioner of Indian Affairs W. A. Jones in 1897 and 1898 does suggest
that Shelley had special ties with them. 82 Jones's predecessor,
however, had exhibited no favoritism and chided the attorney
for conduct about which Baldwin had complained. 83
Baldwin's zeal for Indian welfare, reenforced by his often
harsh and abusive language, brought him quickly at odds not only
with the squaw men, but also with some of the men licensed to
trade at the agency. The traders; another powerful interest group,
intimidated the typical agent by their long-established ties with
Indian leaders and their Washington contacts. But Baldwin was
not the typical agent, and he embarked on policies that soon produced a hostile coalition of squaw men, traders, and Indians.
Four of the eight trading firms at the agency were represented in
this active opposition to the agent, with Dudley P. Brown and
C. A. Cleveland in the van. Brown had secured a license to trade
during the regime of his uncle P. B. Hunt and was a good friend
and drinking companion of Captain Baldwin during the captain's
early months on the reservation. 84 Cleveland's uncle, who was the
first trader at Fort Sill, had also influenced Cleveland's relationship with the agency. Cleveland was employed by him until
opening his own store at Anadarko in 1879.85
As virtually all of the annuity and grass money ended up in
their hands before Baldwin took over the agency, the traders
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understandably opposed any change in this situation. But Baldwin proposed to divert some of the Indian income to good causes:
the construction of houses and a new school, and the purchase of
young cattle to build up the Indian herds. But every dollar that
went for those purposes escaped the traders. Nor were some of
them happy with the agent's decision to make annuity and grass
payments at several points besides Anadarko-which hurt store
operators at Anadarko. Baldwin also intervened to prevent D. P.
Brown from garnisheeing the funds of Indians, ending up in court
with them, and he forced the traders to increase by 50 percent
the price paid Indians for cow hides. He climaxed his activities in
this area by condoning, if not encouraging, his charges to seek
better bargains in the towns now appearing on the borders of the
agency. 86 The traders, particularly those at Anadarko, had good
cause for hoping to see Baldwin returned to active duty with the
Anny.
To front for them, the squaw men and traders hostile to
Baldwin had no trouble recruiting Indians from the Conservative
faction in agency politics. The Kiowas Lone Wolf and Big Tree
and the Comanche Big Looking Glass were generally found in
opposition to government policies, and Lone Wolf and Big Tree
had been hurt financially by the agent's reforms. Squaw man
James Jones testified that in the early 1890s he had not paid a cent
into the grass funds for a pasture he had leased to a cattleman for
$900 a year. But he had paid Lone Wolf $25 a month on the side,
and had provided Lone Wolf, and others who had enough influence to cause him trouble, an occasional beef. 87
The George Conovers, D. P. Browns, and Lone Wolfs soon
taught Baldwin the penalty for interfering with their vested interests. Indian delegations were inspired to travel to Washington to
complain about their agent; charges of misconduct were filed by
Attorney Shelley; and various inspectors, special agents, and even
a Commissioner of Indian Affairs descended upon the embattled
Baldwin.
The . captain called on his allies, including Quanah Parker
and Ahpeahtone among the Indians, Captain Hugh L. Scott (and
through him General Nelson Miles), 88 and squaw men Emmet Cox
and Frank Farwell. Cox, as previously noted, was the son-in-law
first of Chief Quirts-quip and next of Chief Quanah Parker and
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had profited from his family ties. He held a trading license, but
not at Anadarko, and also was one of the largest leasers among
the squaw men. 89 Cox sometimes served in the highly sensitive
post of interpreter. As one of the "good" squaw men, he was a
real asset to Baldwin, and the latter did his best to help Cox retain
his trading license and operate his store where he wished. 90
Farwell, addressed as Captain by his associates, had married
a Comanche girl a few years after coming to the agency as an
employee.91 During Baldwin's tenure, Captain Farwell served
as chief of the Indian police and loyally supported his superior.
In tum, Baldwin endorsed his application for adoption into the
Comanche tribe, which would have made him eligible for a per
capita share in any land distribution under the Jerome Agreement.92
Apparently Farwell and Cox and his other supporters enabled Agent Baldwin to maintain an edge over his opponents until
the change in administration in March, 1897. The new commissioner, W. A. Jones, visited the agency himself. Baldwin later
wrote the commissioner: "It is very evident to me that you are
fully under control of that gang of people who have heretofore
defrauded and cheated these Indians."93 This was strong language
for an agent to use with a commissioner, and Baldwin's position
was rapidly becoming precarious.
The commissioner had struck at Baldwin's influence with the
Indians by forcing Quanah Parker and Ahpeahtone from the Court
of Indian Offenses and replacing them with Conservatives aligned
with the Lone Wolf-Big Looking Glass faction. 94 The same faction dispatched a petition to Washington designed to accomplish
Quanah's removal as the ranking Comanche chief, and a month
later several of them appeared in Washington to testify before the
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. 95 This delegation headed
by Big Looking Glass was matched by a Progressive one led to
Washington by Quanah and Ahpeahfone. In conference with the
commissioner, the Progressives denounced Shelley, the Lone
Wolf-Big Looking Glass faction, and squaw men Conover, Deitrich, Jones, and Woodard, but failed to achieve the reinstatement
of Quanah and Ahpeahtone.96 The only success Baldwin's party
achieved was the prevention of the extension of Shelley's contract,97 but this occurred only after the beginning of the Spanish-
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American War had led to the transfer of Captain Baldwin back to
regular duty. War or no war, in April, 1898, Baldwin's days as
head of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Wichita Agency had been
numbered.
Baldwin's troubled tenure had been an impressive demonstration of the influence squaw men could exercise at an agency.
Baldwin also had publicized the various techniques by which the
intermarried whites bettered themselves financially. Indeed, this
had been the origin of the trouble, as an inspector reported early
in the controversy:
There has been some friction between him and certain squaw
men, and three or four of the old chiefs, growing out of the
fact that he has undertaken to change some of their past
ways, which he thought unjust to the other Indians. He has
cut down some of their pasture and cut off the tribute money
heretofore received by the chiefs, and brought all the money
into the public treasury for an equal division among all the
Indians.98
Within three years of Captain Baldwin's departure, a modified version of the long-delayed Jerome Agreement would be
approved by Congress, and another change in agents would take
place. Baldwin's immediate successor was a political appointee,
William T. Walker, whose career in small-town journalism poorly
prepared him for the hot seat the Captain had vacated. Walker
lasted about a year, being replaced by retired Lieutenant Colonel
James F. Randlett, who already had revealed talent for reservation administration at the Unitah and Ouray Agency.
Walker's brief tenure saw the agency quiet down, apparently
because he did not exhibit the same willingness as Baldwin to
challenge the squaw men and traders. Indicative of the new
climate at the agency was the approval of the applications of
several of the squaw men, who had managed to be adopted by the
Kiowas or Comanches, for 320-acre headrights under the 1867
treaty. Despite the obvious injustice in permitting a few adopted
whites to obtain twice the amount of land to be made available to
each person on the tribal rolls under the Jerome Agreement,
George Conover, W. F. Deitrich, Thomas F. Woodard, Emmet
Cox, and others were permitted to do just that.99
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Meanwhile, those who had exploited their favored position to
secure free range continued to do so. Until the opening of the
reservation in the summer of 1901, squaw men held pastures of
about five thousand acres each, free of charge. 100 Theoretically
this amount was available to any Indian on the tribal rolls of the
Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches; but very few had the cattle, or
the connections with white men who did, to profit from the situation. Nor if every Indian had availed himself of the opportunity,
would there have been enough good grass land to go around.
As the era of the closed reservation drew to an end in western
Oklahoma, squaw men continued to do the things that agents had
complained about interminably. James Myers was accused by
Randlett of acting as agent for Baldwin's old enemy D. P. Brown
in the purchase of young cattle from the lndians. 101 On the nearly
five hundred thousand acres of range that the Kiowa, Comanche,
and Apache Indians continued to hold in common until late 1906,
squaw men were the most conspicuous users of the special rate
for Indian cattle. For example, of the -nine individuals holding
permits for one pasture in late 1902, squaw men with the familiar
names Deitrich, Woodard, Farwell, Cox, and Clark were grazing
1,700 cattle; the three Indians on the list were holding a total of
only 320 head. 102
Protests about the favored position of squaw men were now
coming from a new source, the thousands of white settlers who
thronged the Anadarko-Fort Sill area hoping to draw homesteads
when the surplus lands of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache
Reservation were distributed. For the approximately thirteen
thousand homesteads available, there were more than one hundred and sixty-seven thousand applicants. Odds like this meant
mostly disappointed home seekers, and some of them chose to challenge the allotment procedure by which squaw men and their
families had received homesteads. But an investigation of the
agency turned up only one instance of a squaw man securing
more land for members of his family than they were entitled to. 103
Intermarried whites did not have to resort to fraud to do well, as
was indicated by a bit of doggerel entitled "The Squaw Man"
appearing in a local newspaper:
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I wish I'd been a squaw man
And had raised a papoose band
To draw beefsteak and rations
And acres of choice land.

I could live in royal splendor,
As happy as a king;
For Uncle Sam would deal to me
My share of everything.
And when the day was ended,
Before my prayers were said,
I would thank the Heavenly Father,
That with my daily bread
He'd give me good sense enough
A red skin wife to wed.
Whose only charm to win me
Is not beauty thin skin deep,
For beauty fades,
But U.S. money always full the larders keep.
Not I, to choose the palefaces fair
When each increase in band
Would bring to him fresh toil and care
To me fresh beef and land.

She may not have rare beauty
She will do her part each day,
To help you cause the hungry world
To ever stand at bay.
You may not draw the rations
Or have the alloted land,
But you may have contentment
With your little pale face band. 104
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But even as the verse appeared in a paper- published within
what had been the boundaries of the Kiowa, Comanche, and
Apache Reservation, the conditions that had produced the squaw
man were passing. He had flourished on the closed reservation
where being an intermarried white carried with it a privileged
position. It was exploiting this advantage that earned him the
hostility and the envy of his fellow white man and the demeaning
title "squaw man."
Although the term had come to be applied uniformly to intermarried white men; for the record, those .among .the Kiowas,
Comanches,·and Apaches were good or bad.P:~P,.~Qc}J11g upon their
relationship with the current agent. As the case of Thomas
Woodard revealed, the squaw man might be the recipient of high
praise from one agent, only to be denounced by the next. However, as Captain Baldwin's experience demonstrated, any agent
was in for trouble who took too seriously his guardianship of the
Indians and struck at the privileged position of the squaw men.
They had too much influence to be disposed of casually.
Relative to the question my subtitle poses, the record seems
to suggest that squaw men were indeed disturbers of the peace.
Countless .agents across the West protested their activities, Washington officials deplored them, and Congress echoed to attacks on
squaw men. On the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Reservation
they shamelessly profited from their connections with the tribes
and made life miserable for any government official or Indian who
opposed them.
Yet, it is sad but true that they also were advance agents of
civilization. The more active, energetic, and grasping they were,
the more they represented the ideal type toward which the Indian
was supposed to evolve. Before 1850 the frontier had known
many generations of white men who had taken Indian wives. But
pity and contempt were dominant in the reactions of their fellow
whites, rather than the envy and hostility the squaw men inspired.
They were portents of the future. Their careers at the expense of
the Indian foreshadowed the oppression of the Indian as the
reservation was dissolved under him and he was cast out to make
his way in an alien society.
Squaw men were at the heart of reservation politics and
factionalism. They helped supply the continuity to reservation
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affairs that the ephemeral agents could never provide in their
brief tenures. Thus, regardless of how we react to the squaw men,
they cannot be ignored if we wish to understand reservation life
in the second half of the nineteenth century.
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To Shape a Western State:
Some Dimensions
of the Kansas Search for Capital,

1865-1893
Allan G. Bogue, University of Wisconsin

Addressing the Kansas legislature
in early January, 1866, Governor Crawford maintained that the
"days of trial have passed; freedom has triumphed; Kansas is free,
and now offers the immigrant a home unsurpassed in richness,
beauty and fertility. It is now for us to cultivate this magnificent
garden, and make it blossom and bloom with beauty, and bear in
rich exuberance the fruits of peace and plenty."1 When the definitive history of the economic development of Kansas is written;
it will picture the growth of the Kansas economy both in quantitative terms and in terms of the unique experience of the individual Kansan; it will describe the system of laws and institutions
in which that growth occurred and will assess and explain the
relation between the state's development and its legal and insti-
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tutional framework. This is a large order, and many tasks still
wait willing workmen. Moreover, the development of Kansas
cannot be fully understood unless the processses of growth in this
commonwealth are compared with those of neighboring states
and, no less important, with those territories and states that were
settled prior to that climactic date-1854. We must remember
also that the land, transportation, military, and Indian policies of
the federal government were of vital importance in determining
the shape of things in the frontier territory and state. In this paper
I wish to discuss some of the ways in which Kansans used their
political and legal institutions to develop the Jayhawk state during the twenty-five years that followed Governor Crawford's
message.
By the time that Governor Crawford rallied his constituents
to the task of developing their "magnificent garden," they had
prescribed certain of the ground rules of economic development
in their constitution, and such provisions reflected, of course, both
the era and the regional and political conditioning that the early
Kansans had experienced before reaching Kansas. They began
their task also at a time when the fundamental nature of the
corporation and ideas as to its relation to the state were relatively
well formed. Kansans would develop some rather definite ideas
about corporations and their place in society, and that at no distant date, but there would be none of the groping to understand
the basic concept of the corporation that Professor Oscar Handlin
has described in the early national period in Massachusetts. 2 As
Kansans turned their attention ·seriously to the conquest of the
prairies, they gathered confidence from the fact that the major
technological problems of railroading had been solved. There did
exist the means to carry the products of any future Kansas settler
to market.
.In its simplest conceptualization the economic development
of Kansas is to be seen as the application of people, technology,
and capital to the natural resources of the state. In that task the
state legislators could play an important role. In considering the
activities of government, some historians have distinguished between promotional and regulative activity, which I assume to be
much the same distinction that Oscar Handlin was making when
he described commonwealth and police-state functions. 3 But the
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terms "promotional" and "regulative" require some additional
elaboration. State action might involve promotional activity of a
positive sort, as when lawmakers provided funds for a department
of immigration, or instructed state officers to sell state lands and
use the proceeds to support the construction of state buildings-in
other words, when they intervened directly in the economy to
stimulate the development of the state stock of manpower and
capital. When the legislators passed a variety of laws authorizing
counties, cities, and townships to float bond issues in support of
railroad construction, the action was permissive only. But such
action unleashed the most important of all government promotional activity in Kansas prior to 1900, if we use expenditures as
a measure of importance.
By regulatory activity I mean the statement of the legal,
political, social, and economic relations of Kansans, one to another
-that is, the specification of behavioral patterns-and the provision of sanctions to insure that these were followed. Within the
regulatory purview of the state, for instance, fell the choice of
county boundaries, the general organization of· county government, and prescription of the duties of the various county officers.
At a different level, regulation involved establishing a penalty for
stealing livestock or controlling the entrance of Texas cattle into
the state. It takes little thought to understand that the regulative
function might have important promotional implications. Although there are still unexplored opportunities in the study of
positive and permissive promotion at both the state and local
levels in Kansas, scholars have marked out a number of the trails. 4
I wish only, therefore, to block in some of the major patterns of
government promotional activity for comparative purposes and to
devote the remainder of this paper to a discussion of an important
aspect of regulatory legislation-the credit laws, in so far as they
applied to real estate security.
In what ways could the Founding Fathers of Kansas assist in
providing the people necessary for economic development? They
could, theoretically at least, lure settlers to the state, swell the
ranks of its producers, and thereby build a massive home market.
They could achieve these ends by advertising the resources of the
state, by holding out inducements to immigrants, and by provid-
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ing the kind of institutional environment that residents would find
attractive.
The framers of the Wyandotte Constitution extended the
suffrage to persons of foreign birth who had formally declared
their intention to become citizens of the United States, after such
individuals had fulfilled the residency requirements-six months
residence in Kansas and thirty days of local residence prior to
voting. Such immigrant voting rights have not yet received the
attention that they deserve from historians, but there can be no
question that such provisions enhanced the attractiveness of a
state to the immigrant. 5
The Kansas legislators had provided in 1865 that conscientious objectors might obtain exemption from military service by
paying thirty dollars per annum to the public-school fund. 6 With
Mennonite immigration in mind, Governor Osborne recommended
in 1873 that the punitive aspect of this law be repealed; and the
Kansas legislature followed his recommendation. 7 The governor's
message was usually printed in German as well as English. 8 In
1867 the school laws were amended to allow the teaching of German in the public schools on the request of a requisite number
of residents in a school district.9 Minor bounties to assist in the
development of a silk industry during the 1880s may be regarded
in somewhat the same light, since it was French immigrants who
were primarily interested in establishing that industry in Kansas. 10
In other respects the lawmakers of the new state did considerably less to encourage immigration directly than successive
governors believed to be appropriate. 11 Although they authorized
the governor in 1864 to appoint unpaid commissioners to serve
with him as the Bureau of Immigration, their successors were
niggardly in supporting that body. 12 They did appropriate some
funds to pay for the printing of pamphlets advertising Kansas and
its resources, and they did authorize expenditures for the preparation and display of exhibits at a series of international and national exhibitions, including those in Paris in 1867 and London in
1887, as well as the Centennial and New Orleans exhibitions in
this country.13 Unquestionably these exhibits were supported
mainly in the hope that they would attract settlers to Kansas.
Kansas lawmakers, however, did not see fit to support a permanent immigration agent in New York or to send such individuals
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abroad for any length of time at state expense. Governors did
confer the title "Commissioner of Immigration" on immigration
agents employed by railroad companies that were interested in
selling lands in Kansas and in developing the traffic potential of
the regions that they served.14 In part the appropriations of the
State Board of Agriculture were justified in terms of its advertising
functions, and the annual reports of that body were among the
most impressive of their kind in this era. 15
Still fresh in the minds of the Founding Fathers of Kansas
when they wrote the state constitution were the problems which
the efforts of Eastern and Midwestern states to subsidize internal
improvement had caused. 16 As a result the Kansas Constitution
contained both a provision limiting the amount of state debt to be
incurred for the purpose of making "public improvements" to the
amount of one million dollars and a specific caveat which ran as
follows: "The State shall never be a party in carrying on any works
of internal improvement."17
Restricted by constitutional limitations, the Kansas legislators
could participate directly in the development of social overhead
capital in only minor respects. They expended the million dollars
of state debt authorized for public improvements in the construction of state buildings for the most part. They allocated to four
railroads the income from the sale of the state's 500,000-acre grant,
thereby overriding the wishes of those who had written the state
constitution and had attempted to reserve the grant for educational purposes. The legislature also served as the intermediary
custodian and supervisor of some federal land grants to railroads.18 The latter authority was a restricted one, and in many
cases in which the state legislators wished to influence the policy of
railroad corporations they could resort only to heartfelt memorials
to Congress, or, as in the case of the settlers on the Osage lands,
they might provide relief legislation to aid the members of a
group whom they believed to have been injured by federal railroad policy.19
In the field of education the direct role of the lawmakers was
more significant. It was their task to provide for the administration of the common-school lands and the landed endowment of
the institutions of higher learning as well as to provide other
support for those schools. 20 But developmental strategies might
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on occasion conflict, one with the other. Were the commonschool lands to be so managed as to deliver maximum revenue to
the state school fund, or were they to be administered so as to
assist local residents in obtaining cheap farms or speculative
gains? This was the decision that the pioneer lawmakers had to
make, and Kansas governors of the 1880s believed that the legislators had been too much concerned with fattening the pocketbooks of the settlers and too little with the long-run welfare of
their children. Sale and appraisement procedures had cost the
school fund dearly, argued Governor John A. Martin in 1885. 21
Under Article VI, Section 3, of the Constitution the school fund
must be invested, and the Kansan lawmakers authorized the state
auditor to purchase the bond issues of local school districts on
terms difficult to duplicate in the open market. In so far as these
issues were sound, and most of them apparently were, this was an
ingenious and effective use of state resources.
But if Kansas was to grow, her citizens must provide the
economic services that this generation of state-builders deemed
essential for the task, and they must somehow provide any other
services as well that the mores of the time held to be essential to
social well-being. Eventually American state legislators were to
develop various devices to circumvent constitutional limitations
on state debt, but in Kansas the pressure to do so was apparently
not great during this era. Rather, ·the state legislators adopted a
strategy of permissive development, allowing municipal governments to bond themselves. The first territorial code gave no such
general power to the counties, and as late as 1863 the Supreme
Court of Kansas described that decision with some approval. In
the opinion of that tribunal in the case of Shawnee County v.
Carter (1863), involving the validity of bonds issued by Shawnee
County's commissioners in payment of the construction costs of
a courthouse when the law authorized only the use of county
warrants and the current revenues for that purpose, State Supreme Court Justice Samuel A. Kingman held for the majority:
They had no power to bind the county by bonds, and
herein was the only safe-guard which the legislature had left
the people against oppressive burthens which might in the
end ruin them with excessive taxation. When there was no
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money in the treasury to pay the warrants, if extravagant and
speculative outlays for buildings were attempted, the measure
would defeat itself because the warrants would be of so little
value that cupidity itself would fail of a desirable object of
investment in becoming the owner of such warrants. They
would be so discredited as to become valueless in market,
and the temptation to involve the county removed. The accumulation of debt would cease from the inability of the
county officers to carry on projected improvements on a
credit. Poor as was this barrier against extravagant or visionary contracts, it is one which would be likely in a new country
to arrest the evil before it had reached the point of ruin, and
the anxiety to advance ... local interests at the general expense would receive a check for the want of means. If, however, the board could substitute for warrants, bonds bearing
a high rate of interest, it would furnish ar,. investment that
might tempt men to take contracts for the erection of such
buildings for the county as might suit the board, at ruinous
prices, and rely upon making up for the present want of
availability [of capital], by the high prices and high rate of
interest obtained in the end. 22
Was Justice Kingman's opinion in effect the dying gasp of a
Jeflersonianism dedicated to simple and economical government?
Hardly so-but the philosophy attributed to the legislators of 1855
does contrast strikingly with the actions of Kansas lawmakers a
few years later. As Kansas entered its developmental era after the
Civil War, the legislators approved general legislation, allowing
the municipal governments to bond themselves for various purposes including the building of schools and county buildings and
the encouragement of railroad construction by subscribing to ·.the
stock of railway companies or by giving other aid to such corporations. Various authors have told the story of municipal debt in
Kansas prior to 1900 in varying degrees of detail. 23 The reports
of the Kansas state auditor present a fairly good picture of the
face value of municipal debt in Kansas from 1878 onward, but we
know much too little of the workings of the municipal-bond
market and the amounts realized on the securities by the munici-
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palities and their beneficiaries, particularly the railroads. The
bonds were seldom if ever sold at face value.
A period of rather generous bonding during the late 1860s
and early 1870s was followed by a depression era in which the
lawmakers increased restrictions on bonding somewhat and aided
heavily burdened municipalities by authorizing local units of
government to compromise their debts at lower figures and to refund them by issuing new bonds. Some of the details of this
refunding appear in the records of court cases, and some indications of the amounts involved are found in the auditor's reports.
But we need further research on the compromise movement. Despite the problems of the mid and late 1870s Kansas municipalities
continued to bond themselves during the 1880s and found railroads and investors eager, or at least willing, to take their obligations. It is clear also that some of the county bonds of the late
1870s and 1880s represented Boating indebtedness that had been
accumulated in the day-to-day business of county affairs rather
than investment in capital improvements. This was, however, a
small part of county debt as was the fraudulent indebtedness
which is often mentioned. There was some tendency also for
municipal leaders to bond for objectives of a more highly promotional nature than for those purposes that we ordinarily consider
to have been an investment in social overhead capital-to build
factories and mills and to prospect for coal or salt deposits. Although the Kansas Supreme Court tried to distinguish between
aid to enterprises of a public and a private nature, some activity of
this sort marked both the 1870s and the 1880s.2~
Kansas governors of the late 1870s and the 1880s regarded
the load of municipal debt in Kansas with suspicion, and by the
mid 1880s had become particularly critical of the debt developed
in aid of railroacls. 25 Indeed Governor Martin recommended in
1889 that the Legislature repeal "every law auth9rizing the creation of municipal debts for any purpose, whatever, except,
perhaps, the building of ... school-houses."'26 Historians have in
general followed the governors' lead. We can now, however,
bring a little additional perspective to the story by comparing in
Table 1 the distribution of municipal debt in Kansas with the
findings of Harry H. Pierce, reported in his study of government
aid to railroads in New York between 1826 and 1875.27
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Our comparison unfortunately cannot be an exact one, since
Professor Pierce has provided us with an analysis of municipal
debt in New York on January 1, 1875, in those units of local
government that were aiding railroads at that time. The first
comprehensive figures available concerning Kansas date from
Table 1
MUNICIPAL DEBT DISTRIBUTION
NEW YORK AND KANSAS
Percentages

Jails&
Public
Offeces

New York:
(1875)
Kansas:
(1878)
Kansas:
(1890)

MiscelWar & Bridges &
laneous Railroads Bounties Docks

2.1

6.7

64.4

2.9

6.7

56.4

9.0

3.0

4.5

43.0

2.4

Boulevards & Cemeteries

N.Y.:
(1875)
Kansas:
(1878)
Kansas:
(1890)

19.7

Funding

Schools

2.8

1.7

1.3

16.5

11.

.6

15.8

20.6

General Improvement

N.Y.:
(1875)
Kansas:
(1878)
Kansas:
(1890)

2.5

Industrial Promotion

1.2

.6

9.2

.9

SOURCE: Pierce, Railroads of New York, Appendix, Chart l; Kansas State
Auditor, First Biennial Report, 1878, 274-305; Kansas State Auditor, Seventh
Biennial Report, 1890, 416-98.
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1878 and include all municipalities that had bonded themselves
for any purpose whatsover. It was necessary also to include in the
Kansas summary a "funding" category that included some debt
for railroad aid, but probably not enough in 1878 to have raised
the percentage of the total debt represented by railroad bonds to
a significant degree. Despite such qualifications the comparison
raises some important questions. Professor Pierce showed that
64.4 percent of the public debt in the New York municipalities
was chargeable to railroad aid, and some three years later the
Kansas figure was but 56.4 percent. Sixteen and one-half percent
of the Kansas municipal debt represented school bond indebtedness at this time, and only 1.7 percent of the New York indebtedness was of this nature. The Kansans had apparently not allowed
their desire for railroads to lead them to assume debts in support
of railroad building that were wildly disproportionate to those
assumed by the citizens of older states. And the prairie settlers
were apparently allocating a relatively larger proportion of their
public debt to the support of schools.
By 1890 the municipal debt in Kansas had risen from the
$12,442,176 of 1878 to some $36,188,893, of which some $7.5 million, or 21 percent, represented refunding. Even if the funding
category of 1890 had represented investment in railroads onlywhich it patently did not-the sum total of railroad bonds would
still have been only 64 percent of the local government indebtedness in the state. School bonds represented 16 percent of the total
debt in 1890. Such findings might appear in different light if related to the taxable resources of the state, but they seem to suggest
that the effort of Kansas to develop railroads was not, in terms of
the proportion of resources invested, so strikingly different from
that in older regions. The amount of municipal indebtedness
invested in new railroad mileage in the State of Kansas during the
1880s was slightly under $2,000 per mile-or less than one-sixteenth, probably, of the cost of construction. 28 Was this an unreasonable contribution for the local communities to make?
Answering that question is of course a problem in itself. The
proportion of the total indebtedness of municipalities, chargeable
to schools, suggests a concern with the social environment that
may have differed significantly from that on earlier frontiers and
perhaps even from that in some older regions during the 1870s.
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The investment of township, city, or county in railroad bonds
or stocks typically met only a part of the cost of the construction
of a railroad line to or through the municipality. The finished
railroad line represented an amalgam of foreign capital and the
pledge of local residents to pay the interest and principal of their
municipal obligations. Municipal bonding in aid of railroads was
a means, therefore, of attracting nonresident capital, and the
generosity of local aid would presumably affect the success of
municipal endeavors to bring railroads to aspiring, and sometimes
conspiring, communities. It was the prerogative of the state legislators to prescribe the ground rules of such activity, and a veritable welter of legislation regulated municipal bonding in the
period 1865-1890. Let us look briefly at two aspects of this legislation-those clauses governing the community decision to bond
itself and the limitations placed on the amount of such aid.
During the legislative sessions of 1865 and 1866 the Kansas
lawmakers passed general laws providing that county or city
councils might place the question of a railroad bond issue before
the voters of their community and prescribing that a simple majority of the votes cast was sufficient to approve a bond issue. 29 In
1870 the legislators extended the privilege of bonding for railroad
aid to townships, provided that fifty qualified voters petitioned
for an election and 60 per cent of the voters participating in the
election -approved the proposal. 30 Two years later the petitioning
procedure of initiation was extended to cities and counties; now
the required number of signatures on petitions in all types of
municipalities was set at 20 percent of the voters, and a simple
majority of the voters was needed for approval. 31
With the depression of 1873 a different tone began to pervade
the bonding legislation of the Jayhawk state. The legislators
developed special and general legislation allowing municipal governments to compromise and refund their indebtedness. In 1876
they also recast the general law that governed municipal bonding. 32 Municipal authorities now might hold a railroad-bonding
election only after two-fifths of the resident taxpayers had petitioned for it, and the proposal had to be approved by a two-thirds
majority of the votes cast if bonds were to be issued. Nor could
there be a second election on the same proposal unless one-half
of the resident taxpayers petitioned for it. During the years of the
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great boom of the 1880s bonding went on merrily, nevertheless,
and in 1887 the lawmakers once more "improved" the regulations
governing local bond elections. 33 The election procedure in general was allowed to stay much the same, but a majority of the
legal voters had to petition for a second election on a railroad-aid
proposition. And in this law, moreover, appeared a provision
requiring that the railroad company involved must deposit adequate funds to pay the cost of holding the election with the county
commissioners before the election.
When the legislators of 1865 considered the question of how
much railroad aid should be given by counties or cities, they provided merely that counties should not invest more than $300,000
in any one railroad and placed a comparable limitation of $250,000
on cities. 34 Their successors of 1866 closed the gate somewhat by
deciding that no city was to assist railroads to an amount greater
than $600,000 and that counties were to be limited to a figure of
$1 million. When the lawmakers of 1870 permitted townships to
join the game, they restricted the amount of their contribution
for such purposes to an amount that would not require a tax levy
for interest purposes equal to more than 1 percent of the township's taxable property. Two years later, legislators authorized
municipal officers at county, city, or township level to issue bonds
for public improvements, including railroad aid, to the extent of
10 percent of their taxable property. All counties could issue an
additional $100,000 of bonds, and those with assets of $3 million
could double this additional figure. If the assessed property in a
township was less than $200,000 in value, its citizens might swell
their contribution of 10 percent for railroad aid by an additional
10 per cent of a sum calculated by multiplying the proposed mileage of road in the township by 6,000. Bonds approved but not
issued when the law was approved, or proposed in elections then
pending, were not to be affected by the limitations of the law.
In 1876 the salons retrenched by restricting county aid to
railroads to the amount of $100,000 plus 5 percent of the assessed
valuation, while townships might raise $15,000 plus 5 percent of
their assessment for the same purpose. Aid from all sources to any
one corporation within a county was restricted by this law of 1876
to $4,000 per mile of track. The Act of 1887 lowered this maximum to $2,000 per mile.

To Shape a Western State I 215
So in both respects-that of railroad-bond voting procedures
and that of the amounts of such aid-we find that initial generosity
was tempered during the mid and late 1870s. The general-aid
laws were allowed to stand largely untouched during the boom of
the early and mid 1880s, but in 1887 the legislators placed additional restrictions upon the citizens of municipalities who wished
to float bonds in aid of railroad construction. Special legislation,
allowing deviations from the general laws in specific instances,
seems to have followed the same pattern.
Described in such stark detail, these legislative patterns are
less than colorful, but at the local level the bonding campaigns
had their full share of dramatic incident. The citizens of early
Leavenworth, city and county, cherished imperial designs, and by
the mid 1870s had bonded themselves to a figure approximately
twice the amount of the state debt allowed under the Kansas Constitution, to their own discomfort and the ultimate pain of investors who held Leavenworth bonds. 35 As elsewhere in the
Middle West, railroad corporation contested with railroad corporation in Kansas in frenzied efforts to win the favor and bonds of
township, city, and county. Local leaders orated at railroad-bond
meetings to convince their fellow citizens that railroads would
transform their locality into a wonderland of prosperous farms,
bustling factories, and commercial enterprise, while other taxpayers opposed their efforts and subsequently challenged the
legitimacy of bonding elections and the validity of local bond
issues. As the members of the county board of commissioners of
Jefferson County prepared to authorize a bond issue following an
election on the question, its clerk defiantly locked the county seal
in his office safe, pocketed the key, and thundered that he would
not be a party to the fraud that they proposed to enact upon their
constituents. He was removed from office by proceedings in quo
warranto. 36
The general bonding act of 1872 illustrates a number of
interesting facets of the bonding movement. Legislators and the
reporter of the Topeka Commonwealth considered this to be one
of the most important bills of the session.37 It's provisions required
the state auditor to record municipal indebtedness and to register
municipal bonds presented to him, certify to their genuineness,
and thereafter instruct the appropriate county treasurer to levy a
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tax sufficient for servicing such bonds. Then the local treasurers
were to forward such monies to the state treasurer, who in turn
paid the yearly interest to the bond holders. The author of The
Financial History of Kansas wrote of this legislation:
There was a vague, general feeling over the state that new
municipalities were getting heavily involved in their debts of
different kinds, but there was as yet no social consciousness
of the real magnitude of these obligations. It was deemed
advisable, therefore, to provide by law for the registry of
these bonds with the auditor of state, partly that the actual
conditions might be known, and partly that the bonds might
have a better standing with the money markets of the East.38
In this description he followed to a considerable extent the explanation given by Governor James M. Harvey when he recommended the law in his message to the legislature. 39 Letters from
the president of the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Galveston Railroad Company to the treasurer of the road, concerning this law
and the bonds of various Kansas counties held at that time by
their corporation, cast additional illumination upon this act. He
wrote, "Our act authorizing the registry of County Bonds has
passed the Kansas legislature and is a law. If it be as I suppose it
is ... those bonds must now be about as good as State Bonds and
we ought to have no difficulty in selling them."40 In a letter of a
week later, in which he enclosed a copy of the law, he wrote, "I
shall take steps to have the Bonds registered at once, when this
is done the securities are good and out of them we ought to raise
money without difficulty to meet our necessities."41
The successful development of Kansas, most of its leaders
agreed, would depend upon agriculture, at least in the immediate
future. If Kansans were indeed to transform 50 million acres of
land into prosperous farms and ranches, they required money
capital beyond their own resources. So entered the Eastern
moneylender, and I have told part of his story elsewhere.42
Lenders could not, of course, be expected to provide money capital under any and all circumstance, nor would the Kansas borrower wish to enter into transactions that did not seem beneficial
to him. That the state could specify some of the conditions under
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which the borrower borrowed and the lender loaned, no one
doubted.
Borrower and lender might, and usually did, have very different ideas of what appropriate agreements between them might
involve. Let me briefly summarize those conditions which the
lender and the borrower of the period, 1856-1896, would have
probably considered most satisfactory from their very different
perspectives. As we shall see, neither debtor nor creditor was to
have his way completely. To the lender the most attractive market
for funds was one in which he might set a rate of interest as high
as he could find borrowers willing to pay, unrestricted by state or
territorial legal maximums and unrestrained of course by penalties
for the exaction of usury. If the lender was given his choice, the
form of provisional transfer of security with which the borrower
supported his note would be the deed of trust in which the property owner transferred the title of his real estate to a trustee, who
was not a government officer, and who was authorized to advertise
and sell the security in the interests of the creditor as rapidly as
possible if the debtor defaulted on the interest or principal payments specified in his notes. If the deed of trust was not recognized in the laws of the state or territory, the lender hoped that he
might protect or recapture his investment in case of default by
invoking legal processes that were as simple, short-lived, and
economical as possible.
The debtor, on the other hand, preferred a situation in which
the maximum rate of interest chargeable had been set at a "reasonable" level by the state. He approved of stiff penalties for usury
even to the extent perhaps of canceling the debt but certainly, at
least, termination of the obligation to pay any interest on the
principal. Should he lag in his interest payments, he did not wish
to have the overdue interest compounded into the principal of his
debt. The indenture should be, not a deed of trust, but a mortgage, enforceable in the courts. If so unfortunate as to face court
action, the debtor did not desire the judgment rendered against
him to be swelled by the addition of a large allowance to pay the
fees of the creditor's attorney. If the creditor was to collect by
court action, debtors preferred that a state appraisement law
should require valuation of the property before the sheriff's sale
and that it should not be struck down at a figure appreciably
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below the appraisement figure. If the appraisal was fair and the
borrower had not exaggerated the worth of the security, such a
provision would insure that the sale price would at least cover the
amount of the debt and not leave a personal or deficiency judgment still hanging over the borrower's head after his real estate
was surrendered.
If foreclosure did occur, the debtor's situation might be
improved by a stay of execution, which would give him an opportunity to refinance his loan before the date of the foreclosure sale.
The final act of mercy that the legal system could provide the
delinquent borrower was a redemption law that would allow him
to occupy his property for a period of time after the foreclosure
sale and give him the opportunity to buy it back within the redemption period for the sum of the judgment and appropriate
interest. Mortgagors believed also that notes and mortgages
should be taxed as personal property and under some sort of
arrangement that prevented the lender or mortgagee from passing
the tax along to the borrower in the form of higher interest
charges.
We can use the number of proposals to change the land credit
laws introduced into the Kansas House of Representatives as a
kind of rough measure of the amount of interest that such legislative concerns generated in the State. When this information was
placed on a graph, it showed a major peak in 1861 ( seventeen
proposals), a trough in 1868 ( one proposal), a minor peak in 1874
(seven proposals), a trough in 1879 ( three proposals) , and thereafter steadily increasing concern until no less than forty-five bills
relating to the credit laws were introduced in 1891, falling off
thereafter but continuing at a relatively high rate for the remainder of the decade. The depression following the crash of 1857,
combined with the disastrous crop year of 1860, the hard times of
the 1870s, and finally the price conditions and disastrous crop
years that terminated the great settlement boom of the early and
mid 1880s seem clearly reflected in this graph. Confidence in it is
strengthened by comparison with one based on similar data derived from the proceedings of the Nebraska legislature, which
shows an analogous pattern, although the peaks and troughs of
the two do not coincide exactly.43 The credit legislation-that the
Kansas lawmakers approved during this era shows some very
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definite trends, and these trends help to illuminate the nature of
economic development in Kansas.
Territorial Kansas was an exciting place, but it was no
debtor's heaven. One of the legislators who helped to produce the
notorious laws of 1855 admitted that the interest law had given
them some trouble, "but at last was settled by recognizing money
as merchandise and let it bring what the demand would justifyin other words, we have no usury law."44 In the very early years
of the Territory's history the deed of trust was also a legal instrument, but of course we must remember that land became available for purchase only in late 1856 and that in limited quantities.
The legislatures of 1857-1858 and 1859 hammered out the basic
civil code of Kansas, and when their labors were complete, the
creditor's position was still a very strong one. 45 Justice Kingman
noted regretfully in handing down a decision relating to the interest law of 1859, "however obnoxious the interest law may be, and
whatever may be its effects, it is clear, definite, and explicit, that
any rate of interest, however extortionate ... may be agreed upon
by the parties in writing, and their contract has the sanction of
law."46 However, the legislators of 1859 did provide that "mortgages upon real estate, given to secure the payment of money,
shall be foreclosed by petition in the district court of the county
in which the real estate is situated" and that "all deeds of trust,
given to secure the payment of money, shall be deemed mortgages
... and shall be foreclosed in the same manner as mortgages on
real estate are foreclosed." 47
Indeed, according to Justice Robert Crozier, writing a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court in 1864, early Kansas mortgage law represented a clean break with English common law in
which the mortgage was regarded as a definite transfer of title
from borrower to lender. Under the common law, Crozier explained, the mortgage had been "a conveyance with a defeasance,"
under which the creditor or mortgagee might enjoy a right of
possession even though the terms of the loan involved had not
been broken. "If the condition was broken, the conveyance became absolute." But in Kansas, Crozier noted:
The common law attributes of mortgages have been
wholly set aside. . . . The statute gives the mortgagor the
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right to the possession, even after the money is due, and
confines the remedy of the mortgagee to an ordinary action
and sale of the mortgaged premises; thus negativing any idea
of title in the mortgagee. It is a mere security, although in
the form of a conditional conveyance; creating a lien upon
the property, but vesting no estate whatever, either before or
after condition broken [sic]. 48
The lawmakers of 1859 placed an appraisal procedure in the
foreclosure process. After the court had rendered judgment
against a delinquent borrower, the sheriff was obligated to select
"three disinterested freeholders" among the county residents, who
appraised the true value of the security. The sheriff was then
obligated to sell the security, after appropriate advertisement, at
no less than two-thirds of the value estimated by the appraisers. 49
There was a strong chance, therefore, that the sale price would
cancel out the judgment and that the debtor, although losing his
real estate security, would not have to assume a personal judgment.
But there was the danger that the appraisers might become disillusioned with the land values of their district in a time of depression and set the appraised value so low that a purchaser at the
sheriff's sale might bid two-thirds of the appraisal and still leave
a balance of the judgment unsatisfied, resulting in a deficiency
judgment. On the other hand, oversanguine appraisers might set
the value so high that a mortgagee must send good money after
bad, in the absence of other bidders, in order to obtain possession
of the property. The legislators of 1859 also approved a clause of
the civil code which provided that courts were not to add more
than two dollars to the amount of a judgment as fees with which
the plaintiff might pay his counsel-a safeguard against the writing of inflated attorney's fees into the borrower's debt. 50
The economic plight of the Kansas settlers during the late
1850s and the astronomic interest rates that they agreed to pay
have been described elsewhere. 51 When the 1860 legislature met,
Kansas had developed a hard-pressed and articulate debtor class,
and Governor Medary recommended that its members be relieved. "Money loaners" and borrowers did not, he said, "meet
on equal terms ... the one is the master of his money, the other
the slave of his necessities .... extremes should be avoided, and a
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law made, founded upon the experience of ages, fixing the
standard of interest, with the proper punishment for usurious
contracts."52 The legislators responded with a law which set a
legal maximum of 20 percent and provided penalties for usury,
excess interest to be considered as payment on the principal and
the usurer to forfeit all interest. 53 A writer in the Leavenworth
Herald scoffed that the lawmakers "might as well have passed a
law to limit the price of potatoes or eggs," and criticized them for
failing to pass a redemption law and a bankruptcy statute. 54 The
famine year that followed apparently convinced the representatives who met in the session of 1861 that more remained to be
done. They passed a redemption law, allowing debtors to retain
possession of their foreclosed property for two years, during which
time they were allowed to pay off the judgment against them.
During the redemption period the creditor was allowed to restrain
his borrower from using the security in a way that would diminish
its value. 55 Revision in 1862 was minor in nature, although by no
means insignificant. A law of this year prescribed a fine of $100
to be assessed against the mortgagee who refused or neglected to
file the release of a mortgage after having received full payment
of the note that it supported. 56
In 1863 the Kansas legislators approved another fundamental
revision of the credit laws when they established 12 percent as the
legal maximum rate of interest. Where 10 percent annually had
been the rate of interest on debts when no interest rate was stipulated and on judgments, the lawmakers substituted 7 percent.
Penalties for usury remained much as before.5 7 The revision did
not escape criticism, and the Topeka Capital printed a good
example of the creditor and promotional point of view in the
following comment:
Capitalists will not bring their money into a country
where the hazards of loss are a hundred fold increased over
those of an old well-settled country where values are fixed
and certain, to loan at a less rate of interest than can be
realized in the latter.... The best regulator is the law of
supply and demand. Give us good laws for the collection of
debts, and for the protection of the creditor, and you will do
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something that will cheapen money in Kansas, because it will
bring more here for investment. 58
With the revision of the interest law, interest in easing the money
and credit laws of Kansas subsided; and in 1866 only two measures
dealing with land credit originated in the lower house of the
Kansas legislature.
For some years, beginning in 1867, the Kansas legislators
revised the collection laws of the state to make them more attractive to moneylenders. These were years, you will remember, when
the total number of measures concerning credit that were introduced into the Kansas House was small. The first, and a very
important move in this direction, was an amendment to the redemption law of 1861, allowing mortgagors to waive their right
of redemption.59 During the next session the lawmakers decided
that a mortgagee might pay the taxes on real estate security, when
his mortgagor failed to do so, and that such tax payments were to
be added to the judgment in case of foreclosure. 60
The specific limitation on the amount of attorney fees allowed
in judgments, set by earlier lawmakers at $2.00, seems to have
been dropped when the solons approved the Kansas Code of 1868.
Two years later the legislators specifically declared attorneys' fees
to be a legitimate cost of foreclosure and left the amount to the
discretion of the presiding judges. I believe that these were
actions of some significance.61 Eastern moneylenders dreaded a
situation in which they must invest additional funds in order to
obtain the security of defaulted loans. An attorney's fee of two
dollars was unrealistic, and the law as it had stood therefore in
effect forced the creditor to pay fees to his lawyer that could not
be consolidated in the principal, interest, and costs represented in
the judgment. It is true that the creditor who assumed title to the
security might have to pay off his attorney out of pocket anyway,
but the inclusion of attorney's fees in the judgment gave promise
at least that he might not have to do so.
During the 1872 session the solons made two extremely
important changes in the credit laws. They vitiated the appraisement law by allowing mortgagors to waive appraisement. This
procedure could be eliminated provided "no order of sale or execution shall be issued upon . . . [a] judgment until the expiration
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of six months from the time of the rendition of said judgment."62
Hereafter many Kansas mortgages would contain a clause specifying that the mortgagor waived all rights of appraisement and
redemption. Although the judicial processes of foreclosure were
lengthened by six months as a result of the change in the law, the
mortgagor could now bid in the debtor's security at the sheriffs
sale for a nominal sum, thus providing the opportunity of obtaining a personal judgment and removing the possibility that he
might have to pay out additional funds to obtain the security. A
writer in the Kansas Daily Commonwealth revealed the thinking
underlying elimination of compulsory appraisement. Everyone
who had studied the matter carefully, he assured his readers, was
convinced that money was scarce because of the content of the
statute books. Local appraisals, he suggested, were anything but
true estimates of the value of foreclosed property. Instead the
appraisers inflated them to help the judgment debtor sell out to
his creditor as favorably as possible. "Make the security certain
and beyond doubt," ran the article, "and rates will be low.''63 The
legislators of 1872 also reconsidered the limitations on usury; they
modified the penalty, providing that the usurer should lose only
the amount of interest levied above the legal maximum. Such
sums were to be regarded as payments on the principal. 64
In 1873 the adjustment of the credit laws in behalf of the
lender reached a bitter climax when the members of the legislature exempted from taxation all evidences of debt secured by
mortgages on real estate. 65 The measure helped to crystallize
latent opposition both to the trend in credit legislation and to the
Kansas system of taxation. The editor of the Kansas Farmer
termed it "one of the most iniquitous laws that ever disgraced the
pages of our statute book" and snorted that the "plea urged by
some, that this law will benefit the farmers by bringing more
money into the State, and by reducing the rate of interest, is a
specious one."66 The law was an important cause that contributed
to the calling of a farmers' convention in Topeka during the spring
of 1873. Midwestern farm prices were softening, the tide of
Grangerism was about to sweep across the Middle West, and John
J. Ingalls, the brilliant young United States senator from Kansas,
proclaimed that "a gigantic struggle is already inaugurated between the vast moneyed corporations of the East, and the toiling
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millions of the West; between the bank and the corn crib."67 The
legislators repealed the mortgage exemption law in 1874.
Through seven legislatures the developers had sought to
revise the credit system of Kansas in order to attract capital. 68
Now as depression spread through the state and the cry of the
debtor was heard once more, they must desist. Significantly,
however, no other substantial changes in the credit laws were
made in behalf of borrowers in the mid or late 1870s. During the
late 1870s and early 1880s a veritable army of mortgage brokers
and mortgage companies developed contacts with Eastern and
foreign investors that allowed them to bring the mortgage money
of nonresidents to Kansas farmers as never before. Their efforts
fed the settlement boom of the early and mid 1880s. Although the
lending rates on good farmland security had dropped considerably
below the legal maximum by 1886 in most areas of Kansas, the
very magnitude of the mortgage business, the recklessness of some
brokers, the knowledge of earlier revisions in the statutes, and the
fact that broker's commissions were calculated above the contract
rate seem to have been responsible for some concern over the
situation even before the great boom began to burst in 1887.
In their state convention of 1888, the Republicans declared
themselves in favor of revising the interest law and of passing a
redemption law.69 And in the legislative session that followed,
the lawmakers lowered the maximum rate of interest to 10 percent
and set the statutory rate, chargeable against judgments or contracts in which no rate was specified, at 6 percent. The usurer
was liable for double the excess interest written into a contract.70
The lawmakers of 1889 passed two additional measures related to mortgages. One was apparently a sop to the critics of the
Kansas lending laws, while the other dealt with a problem faced
by the mortgage companies. Mortgagees who refused to release
paid-up mortgages within thirty days now became liable for a
fine and the costs of the legal action involved.71 This was aimed
at the tardiness with which Eastern investors and Western mortgage brokers recorded mortgage releases at Western county seats.
On the other hand, Chapter CLXXVII of the Laws of 1889 provided penalties for the removal of improvements from mortgaged
property, a law of considerable value to mortgage brokers and
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mortgage companies that at this time faced the necessity of assuming title to the property of many defaulting debtors. 72
Although interest in reforming the credit laws of the state was
at high pitch in 1891, the fact that the People's party controlled
the House and the Republicans ruled the Senate prevented any of
the numerous bills from becoming law. But the judiciary committee of the House did introduce a comprehensive effort to revise
the system, House Bill 540, accompanying it with a report, in
which the committee members maintained:
That the present system is absolutely bad in every part,
does not admit of dispute. It turns men, women and children
out of their homes, sometimes without even giving them a
chance to harvest a crop. It deprives them of their property,
frequently without even giving them a credit on the indebtedness it was pledged to secure; and, in addition to this,
it imposes a class of utterly useless burdens upon both debtor
and creditor. 73
The committeemen, however, admitted that the mortgage companies of the state had also sunk into a hopeless mire of debt
because of the default of mortgagors whose paper they had guaranteed to Eastern investors. The Committee maintained that there
were three great evils in the credit system. In the first place the
debtor had no right to occupy his real estate or to redeem it after
the sheriffs sale. Secondly the costs of foreclosure were both high
and unnecessary. Finally the plaintiff could buy his debtor's land
at foreclosure sale for little above the mere costs of the case,
leaving the debtor to face a judgment as large, in some cases, as
the original debt and "a standing menace for the rest o{ his life."
The members of the judiciary committee of the House of
Representatives proposed to do away with the expense of the foreclosure process on the one hand and to give the debtor two years
of redemption on the other. Under the provisions of House Bill
540, borrowers might in the future assent to a clause in their
mortgages, empowering sheriffs to sell out delinquent mortgagors
with no further legal formality than advertisement of sale for
thirty days. Total cost was to be a fee of ten dollars, payable to
the sheriff. The delinquent mortgagor, however, was given two
years in which to redeem his land after the date of sale and was
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allowed to retain possession during this period. Since the mortgagor could regain title to his land by paying the price of the
sheriff's certificate of sale plus interest, there was little danger that
creditors would not bid the full amount of their claim. The
previous method of collecting debts secured by delinquent notes
and mortgages was to remain on the statute books and could be
used if debtor and creditor so agreed when the mortgage contract
was drawn up. No doubt members of the Kansas legal fraternity
breathed a sigh of relief when the judicial committee bill failed
passage.
In 1893 the debtors of Kansas once more obtained the protection of a redemption law. 74 The lawmakers eliminated the
practice of appraisement in foreclosure proceedings and gave
debtors a redemption period of eighteen months. Waivers of redemption in mortgage contracts were to have no legal weight
thereafter. Did the law apply to contracts negotiated prior to its
passage? The Populists asserted that it did. A similar contention
had been made concerning the law of 1861, but the Kansas Supreme Court had ruled otherwise. 75
Mortgage brokers were convinced that history would repeat
itself. When the Kansas Supreme Court considered the Populist
contention in a case originating in Harper County, the attorney
for the mortgage company involved, argued that it was
almost beyond controversy that a law which postpones the
right of possession, which holds open the right of redemption
for a period of 18 months longer than the terms of the contract provide, which gives the rents and profits to the owner
of the title contrary to the terms of the contract, does impair
the obligation of the contract within the meaning of the provisions of the constitution of the United States. 76
The Court agreed, two to one, with the sole Populist member
dissenting. As far as this jurist, Justice Stephen H. Allen, was
concerned, the law did not impair the contract; it merely modified
the remedy. 77
Shortly after this decision was handed down, Chief Justice
Albert H. Horton resigned and was replaced by Judge David
Martin, an able railroad attorney who was regarded as appropriately "safe" by the leading Republicans of the state. To their
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consternation they soon observed that "the maggot of populism
... appeared to have entered . . . [Martin's] brain."78 Along with
Justice Allen he agreed to a rehearing of one of the mortgage cases
in which the retroactive validity of the Redemption Law was at
issue, and the two justices then reversed the original decision of
the Court by accepting the Populist argument. 79 At this there was
much scurrying among the fraternity of mortgage men and their
attorneys to take the case to the Supreme Court of the United
States. They were relieved to discover, as they had hoped, that
the maggot of Populism had not penetrated the minds of a majority of the members of that august body. 80
Kansas lawmakers passed the last major credit legislation of
the period when the combined Populist and Democratic majority
approved a law in 1897 providing that a mortgagor could extinguish his debt by paying the mortgagee or the last assignee of
record. If assignments were not recorded within ninety days, they
would not be regarded as evidence in the state courts. This was
in response to the efforts of Eastern mortgagees to collect payments of interest and principal from mortgagors that the latter
claimed to have already paid to intermediary mortgage agents or
companies, which had assigned ownership of the paper to the
Easterners without either party recording that fact in the county
records. 81
The assignment problem reflected the practices of the highly
competitive farm-mortgage business during the 1880s and early
1890s. Brokers and company officials became wary of recording
mortgage papers that would reveal the names of Eastern clients
lest competitors attempt to entice them away. And if Western
borrowers did not know the names of those who held their mortgages, they would not be tempted to negotiate directly with them
for renewals, thereby perhaps depriving the mortgage company
or broker of commissions. When drought and low prices forced
many Kansas farmers to default on their mortgages during the late
1880s and early 1890s, the majority of the companies went into
bankruptcy. Undoubtedly in almost every bankruptcy the interest
or principal payments of numbers of solvent farmers were caught
in the receivership and never reached the holders of their mortgages. When Eastern mortgagees took over administration of
their own mortgages, they attempted 'to obtain all back payments
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from the mortgagors and apparently sought to realize their claims
through foreclosure in some cases. Some, debtors in default found
themselves accused of owing greater sums than they actually did.
Nor can the possibility be eliminated that some dishonest brokers
or company officials took advantage of the recording laws to
appropriate some funds that should have been sent to Eastern
investors. 82 The law of 1897, regarded as relatively harsh by some
legal historians, was soon modified and the ninety-day penalty
removed.
It is clear that the general pattern of legislative action concerning the relation between debtor and creditor was similar in
some respects to legislative action related to local railroad-bond
issues. The history of the general laws allowing municipal aid to
railroads began; of course, after the Civil War, whereas the credit
legislation actually was entering its second phase at that time. But
both types of legislation reflected a generous attitude toward those
who controlled out-of-state capital between 1865 and 1872. In
each case the lawmakers tempered their position during the mid
and late 1870s, although most markedly so in the case of community bonding. After a period of stability, if not relaxation, of the
laws during the early and mid 1880s, Kansas lawmakers had become ready in both cases to impose further restrictions on the
nonresident capitalist and the capital-mobilizing corporations.
And we can, I suspect, fit other legislative activity into similar
patterns. Note, for instance, the Kansas state auditor reporting in
late 1878 and recommending changes in the tax-sale laws: "A few
years ago, and at the time of the passage of the present tax law,
money commanded from eighteen to twenty-four per cent. in ordinary business transactions. It required special inducements to
cause men to invest in tax-sale certificates."83 Much legislative
activity, therefore, can be explained in terms of the search for
capital to be used in conjunction with local resources in the task
of building the state. This motivation underlay permissive promotional legislation at the state level and considerable promotional activity at the local levels of government. But at the state
level, legislation that we usually regard as regulatory also reflected
the -search for capital; there was a promotional dimension to much
regulatory legislation.
Leland Jenks once wrote, "railway building proceeded in an
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undulating pattern, paralleling closely the general contours of
major business cycles until the First World War."84 So, too,
apparently with capital-oriented legislation in frontier Kansas.
But there was of course a difference. Railroad building, we have
been accustomed to believe, lagged during times of depression
because investors and the agencies of the money market in general
lost confidence in the future or lacked the funds to continue investing in transportation enterprises. But we find also that the
Kansas state legislators changed the rules of the game in good and
bad times, forging a variety of weapons designed to "heat up" or
to "cool down" the local economy.
Did the impulse for legislative change emanate from legislators representing the same groups in society through time, or
did alternations of economic circumstance result in the wishes of
different groups being reflected in legislation? Herbert Quick had
Old Jake Vandemark recall of the westward-moving people on
the Erie canal:
I noticed . . . that class of men with whom we became so
well acquainted later, the land speculators. These, and the
bankers, many of whom seemed to have a good deal of business in the West, formed a class by themselves, and looked
down from a far height on the working people, the farmers,
and the masses generally, who voyaged on the same boats
with them. They talked of development, and the growth of
the country ... while the rest of us thought about homes and
places to make our living. 85
Quick was in effect distinguishing between developers and producers, although it is obvious that no hard and fast line can be
drawn between the two. And he was, of course, greatly oversimplifying, as the novelist must do. But the insight was a powerful one, and it is tempting to think that the patterns described in
this paper may be explained in part by it. In times of relative
prosperity or boom the developers had their way in the legislative
halls, but as hard times and debt pressed upon the produciI;lg
elements during periods of recession, the discontent of the producer was reflected in legislation designed to curb the developers
to some degree.
These matters do, I believe, have some implications for our
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understanding of Kansas Populism. Within our context this movement in Kansas ceases to be a unique manifestation of frontier
discontent, although of course every situation is in a sense unique,
but rather the third in a series of protests against the legal-institutional structure of Kansas, fed by recurrent depression and financial stringency. Clearly the historian has explained Populism in
the Plains States too largely in terms of federal monetary policy,
federal land policy, and federal transportation policy, when not of
course chasing the chimera of declining status, the mirage of the
yeoman myth, or the will-of-the-wisp of anti-Semitic irrationality.
There was a very important local institutional dimension in Kansas Populism. The "Agrarian Revolt" was not merely, figuratively
speaking, a colonial uprising, but also, in part, a domestic insurrection against the politicians who had allowed the Kansas
statutes to be written too largely in the int'erests of the developers.
The history of credit legislation in Kansas rather uniquely
reflects the frustrations of Populism at the state level. Bowing to
the impending storm, Republican legislators lowered the legal
interest rate but not to a level that interfered in most instances
with the market price of money. Despite a veritable blizzard of
proposals for reforming the credit system, the reformers settled for
a redemption law, the same remedy as that prescribed in 1861. A
punitive measure of 1897, designed to make the real owners of
mortgages identify themselves in the county records, did not
survive in its punitive form past the next legislature.
But Populism did mark the end of an era in the development
of Kansas. Whatever the cost in human suffering, or in present
and future interest and principal payments, Kansans for the most
part now had their railroads, their schools, and their public buildings-the social overhead capital that a developing state must
have-and a foundation of improved farms and industry to sustain
it. In its capital needs, Kansas would never be quite the same
again.
I have not, in this paper, tried to present an elaborate taxonomy of legislative categories. I have not discussed certain types
of legislation, such as the use of bounties to achieve desired purposes. I have not described the precedents or models which
Kansans may have found in other states for their legislation. I
have not tried to relate the activity of pressure groups to specific
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legislation, although I have given an illustration of this type of
relationship in discussing the bonding law of 1872. Nor have I ~ndeavored to analyze the behavior of the Kansas legislators, as
reflected in the roll-call records of the legislature. I have not tried
to assess the impact of Kansas legislation on the actual behavior
of the Kansas economy. These are all valid subjects for scrutiny,
and I hope to treat them in the future. Here, I have been content
to develop some of the major patterns of legislative activity that
were, I believe, related to the developmental process and the
efforts of Kansans to attract capital to their state. If I have shown
that the subject is worthy of more attention, I have achieved my
purpose.
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The English and Kansas,
1865-1890
Oscar 0. Winther, Indiana Universffy

Englishmen were among the first
pioneering whites to venture into Kansas-even before it was
formally organized as a territory. One of the earliest of them,
George Fervins, had left his wife and children on parish relief in
Devonshire and was somewhere on Kansas soil as early as 1850.
Having supposedly come to a land of plenty, Fervins had been
asked by the Bishop of Devon to send for his family and to provide the necessary dollars for doing so. In reply, this harassed
The major portions of my research for this paper were done at the
British Museum, the Kansas State Historical Society Library, and the Newberry Library. I wish to express my thanks and appreciation to these institutions for making their materials available and for the many courtesies
extended to me.
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Englishman wrote to one of the parish overseers in July, 1850, as
follows: "Sir, what made me leave England was distress. · I could
not gain a living for myself, wife, and children. There was nothing
more to look for but relief from the parish, if I had stayed in
England. Sir, if you will send my wife Mary Fervins and children
here I am ready to receive them and here I can maintain them if
they were here." Fervins adamantly refused to send the necessary
funds for transportation, and in January, 1851, he again wrote to
the overseer: "I love my wife and children, but if you love to keep
them and maintain them you can do so and be damned. . . . You
can kiss my arse, I am living in the land of the free." 1
Even though not many Englishmen had heard about Kansas
in 1850 (for it was still Indian country), they were to do so after
passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854. Although the Civil
War produced a blackout on English publicity respecting Kansas,
cessation of hostilities brought about a renewal in England not
only of published intelligence but of overt promotional activities
leading to English migration to the land of the Kaw. There were
two receptive audiences to be reached: one, the affiuent and better educated English gentry who expressed interest in the American West as an area suitable for capital investment and for their
younger and often wayward sons; the other, indigent farm laborers and urban unemployed who, caught in the vise of adverse
economic circumstances, sought escape through emigration to
such a place as Kansas where new and glowing opportunities
supposedly awaited their arrival.
For all their reputed shortcomings, the English upper classes
did read, and a surprising amount of what they read concerned
Kansas as a place offering rich and exciting rewards alike to
English visitors, sportsmen, settlers, and investors of British capital. Among the first of several English visitors to rush West immediately following Appomattox was a barrister and member of
Parliament, Sir Morton Peto, who expressed special interest in the
promotion of steam plowing on Western prairie lands. Judging
from observations made, however, Sir Morton concluded· that the
steam plow would not be an adequate substitute for the sulky, so
instead he looked upon an area such as the Kansas plaµis as one
offering a potential market for an assortment of English-manufactured farm machinery. 2
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One travel account very widely read by educated Englishmen
was William H. Dixon's New America, first published in London
in 1867, which during the ensuing two years passed through
numerous editions. Dixon's traveling companion was the distinguished Professor Charles W. Dilke, Trinity Hall, Cambridge,
who in his book Greater Britain ( London, 1869) also wrote about
the American West. In his book Dixon devoted one entire chapter
to a retrospective discussion of "Bleeding Kansas," and another to
the "The Prairies," in which he singled out Kansas as "beyond
dispute the region in which these plains display themselves on the
largest scale, and with their points most perfect." He described
the Kansas plains ( and doubtless to an amazed audience believing
Kansas to be a part of the "Great American Desert") as "green
with trees, most of all along the lines of the Kansas River and its
many creeks and inlets." Sunflowers thrive--"not the tawny gauds
of our cottage gardens," but rather, "big and brazen bachelors,
flourishing on a single stalk" with buttercuplike blossoms "numberless as the stars of heaven."3 Dilke also had something to
report on his personal observations of Kansas. Concerned as he
was with social problems, Dilke noted that the Kansans were in
the process of emancipating their women by granting female
suffrage; that at the University of Kansas, for example, women
were not only admitted for academic work but held professorships
as well.
In their travels together Dixon and Dilke rode the Kansas
Pacific Railroad Company (KP) trains and visited several towns
along this route as far west as Manhattan-then the end of the
line. At this place the two Englishmen continued their journey in
"mule-drawn ambulance, which," Dilke wrote, "was to be at once
our prison for six nights, and our fort upon wheels against the
Indians." Passing through this open country, they had an opportunity to witness the settlement processes firsthand and to note
some of the abuses of the Homestead Act, such as using miniature,
band-whittled houses to satisfy, fraudulently, entry requirements. 4
Equally intrigued by the yet unsettled portions of western
Kansas was Joseph Frith, who, like Dilke and Dixon, had traveled
by means of covered wagon into the Indian and buffalo country
beyond the line of settlement. Much to his amazement, Frith
encountered there a countryman from Huddersfield. The man
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was long-haired, garbed in buckskin, and was living the savage
life of a "mountain man." Frith was horror-struck by the wholesale slaughter of buffalo. "My moral sense was wounded," he
wrote, "at what seemed to me wanton cruelty to, and reckless
slaughter of, a harmless animal, within its assigned and native
domain." 5
English visitors arriving after the completion or near completion of major Kansas rail lines took full advantage of improved
travel facilities, and most of them were impressed by, and reported to their countrymen, what they saw from their car windows. One such traveler, W. M. Stewart, found the scenery
picturesque and the soil rich. "Kansas," he wrote, "offers great
inducement to those of limited means."6 Another, M. Davenport,
related how the KP took him in hand and conveyed him into "the
real wilderness and solitude of the west." Davenport was awestruck at seeing from his car window a gigantic wheatfield comprising, he was told, thirteen hundred acres, and at how with
passing miles of travel the well-populated and cultivated portions
of Kansas gave way to bleak, dangerous Indian country farther
west. At Salina, Davenport was told how one of his countrymen
recently had been captured by Indians, horribly tortured-"his
finger and toe nails being drawn out, and his body then gashed
all over with knives"-before finally being put out of his misery
by means of tomahawk blows upon his skull. 7
Not all Englishmen patronized the KP, for T. S. Hudson,
another traveler, recounted how he rode through Kansas on the
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad (ATSF) and how he was
impressed by the countless numbers of cattle and sheep he saw
grazing on the green range and by the fact-so he believed-that
Kansas farmers had become rich in this "go-ahead" state. Hudson
placed Kansas next to Massachusetts in "intellectual distinction
and noted that English enterprise abounded within its rectangular
borders."8
Also extremely favorable to Kansas were Englishmen John
G. Hyde and S. Nugent Townshend who, after extensive visits to
the plains region, admonished their countrymen: Why consider
various and sundry states as emigration sites "when the fertile
fields of Kansas, Nebraska, and northern Texas are so much more
suited to their acquirements, tastes, and constitutions." They
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declared Kansas to be their favorite state, but warned against
settling there without some British pounds at their disposal. 9
It was with such resources in mind ( namely pounds sterling)
that James MacDonald, a Scot, also addressed himself with special
reference to Kansas. "Probably not one of the other 'young' states
in the Union has a reputation in Great Britain equal to that of
Kansas," he wrote in about 1877. MacDonald referred to the
state's immense acreages of land, "situated so as to escape the
pestilential climate of the South and the rigour of the North." It
was a place with "general fitness for family"; in fact, he added,
"Kansas is indeed an agricultural paradise" with lovely prairies
and rich soil that was easy to farm. He underscored the need for
capital for successful farming in Kansas and the need to produce
blooded livestock there, and he urged more sons of English
noblemen to follow the example of those who had succeeded in
this prairie state. 10
Taking cognizance of this steadily increasing interest in
Kansas on the part of English upper and educated classes, the
magazine Field, appropriately subcaptioned The Country Gentleman's Newspaper, decided in 1872 to send its roving correspondent to this promising scene of action. After spending time in
Missouri and other parts of the West, Field's astute and scrutinizing columnist made a special tour of Kansas. In his writings
that followed, this correspondent took the position that English
brains and money, not brawn, were most needed in this state, and
that of the two, "money for the direct use of the farmer . . . is
almost omnipotent." It was in the special interest of the gentleman-farmer, he felt, to discourage emigration of English agricultural laborers, and he emphatically contended that the availability
of cheap, fertile, easily cultivated land in Kansas was a "delusion
and a snare.;'11 This correspondent expressed praise for the state
as cattle country; and as for its much publicized lawlessness,
"Kansas," he wrote, "is now, on the whole, safer than England."
And as for the aridity in the western portions, he was as convinced
as were many Western farmers of that day, that humidity follows
the plow. Farming, he wrote, increases instead of diminishes
moisture; the farmer's plow "materially increases the capacity of
the soil to soak up and retain for gradual evaporation, moisture
which previously found its way more rapidly to the brooks, creeks,
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and rivers." So, concluded this correspondent, climate was changing Kansas for the better, and for this reason it was a promising
area for the investment of English capital.1 2
Not all journals of opinion, however, shared the point of view
of this Field correspondent. The Agricultural Gazette, which also
enjoyed an upper-class following, took issue with American promotors who advocated general English emigration to the Great
Plains region. In reply to particular pro-Kansas and pro-Nebraska
articles that had appeared in the English Country Gentleman, the
Gazette described this Midwest region as "a country ravaged with
insect pests." It urged its readers to take particular heed of the
grasshopper plagues then (in 1875) besetting Kansas and Nebraska and of wheat crop failures that had occurred there during
the years 1871-1873. Anyway, argued this conservative newspaper, "There is no reason for wholesale emigration from
England."13
Not all of the upper-class Englishmen who were interested in
Kansas were concerned with such materialistic aspects. Sportsmen were among those who viewed this plains state from a purely
adventurous standpoint. English hunters were much intrigued by
the North American buffalo or, as they preferred to call them,
bison. To hunt and to shoot this mighty game in its natural habitat, centered on the grasslands of western Kansas, marked for the
sportsmen not only the epitome of hunting success, but an event
worth recounting in widely read publications of their time. One
such sportsman was the English lord Grantley F. Berkeley, whose
account of his Kansas big-game hunt, published in 1861, set a
pattern for others that followed in later years.
Lord Berkeley approached his prey well armed and with
more than minimal equipment. He arrived with an arsenal of
guns and ammunition at Kansas City, Missouri, by means of public
transport. While there, he procured a two-mule spring ambulance
wagon in which to sleep and to haul his light baggage; a second
and much larger wagon to be pulled by a four-mule team, for
hauling heavier luggage such as tents and supplies for a period of
six weeks; a third, light one-horse vehicle for hauling the gentleman's hounds; and one fast-riding saddle pony to be used in the
chase. Hired to manage this caravan were eight men, plus a guide.
Then on one bracing September morning in 1859, Berkeley
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and party made what Berkeley called their "jump into the desert."
After ten days of rough, trudging travel they reached Fort Riley,
where Berkeley was courteously received. Two other hunters
assigned to the fort joined the English party, which during the
following day or two saw buffalo-a sight, wrote Berkeley, "more
magnificent than my fondest imagination could have depicted."
After having killed perhaps as many as twenty buffalo ( all but
two of which were bulls) and having removed their tongues for
eating and a tail and beard as souvenirs to be displayed in his
trophy room back home, a happy condescending English lord
returned to compose his recollections. 14
Other accounts of exciting buffalo hunts followed. Englishman William A. Bell, a Fellow of the Royal Geographical and
Ethnological Society who served as a photographer for the KP's
1867-1868 survey expedition, likewise related exhilarating experiences hunting buffalo in Kansas. 15 So, too, did John S. Campion,
who during the mid 1870s still alluded to the Kansas prairies west
of Fort Riley as the great buffalo country of the American West.
Taking off from this fort, the Campion party moved on to the
Republican River, at which place they first heard "the tramp of
thousands of feet, the splash of water ... blended into one mighty
tumult"-the prey they had come to slaughter. 16
Not only did sportsmen write about the abundance of wild
game in Kansas-an ideal place for getting "the mixed bag" ranging from buffalo to grouse, but they, perhaps more so than other
English visitors, were moved to comment ecstatically upon the
beauty of the Kansas countryside. Campion, for example, wrote
about the rolling prairie with its "ever-moving sea of waving
grass," a horizon like that of the ocean, and "a balmy, invigorating,
almost intoxicating air . . . untainted and unpoisoned by the
breaths, smells, and smoke of cities."17 Also scattered throughout
this sporting literature were at least covert bids to the English
gentry to consider Kansas as a suitable place for emigration and
investment. The response to these and other more direct overtures
became increasingly pronounced during the decades of the 1870s
and 1880s.
In contrast to this highly literate and somewhat sophisticated
introduction of Kansas to English upper-class strata, the larger,
more general English public was exposed to more deliberately

242 I Oscar 0. Winther
contrived and astutely executed techniques of various and sundry
promotional concerns. Most active among the promotional agencies were railroad companies with more than eight million acres
of lands to sell within the state. Under terms of a succession of
federal land-grant acts, specifically designated chartered railroad
companies were awarded lands from the public domain as one of
the inducements for constructing rail lines into or across the state.
The chief recipient of such a grant-one made in 1863-was the
Union Pacific, Eastern Division, which name, incidentally, was
changed six years later to Kansas Pacific Railroad Company.
Under terms of this particular grant the KP constructed 394 miles
of railroad within the borders of the state and in turn received
from the federal government 3,925,791 acres of land. 18 In turn the
ATSF, chartered in 1859, constructed 497 miles of track within
the state by 1873, receiving as its reward 2,944,788 acres of public
land. Smaller awards were made to other railroad companies
operating within the borders of Kansas, making the grand total of
federal land grants to railroads in Kansas 8,346,603 acres. Second
only to railroad-land-sales promotions were those of the Kansas
State Bureau of Immigration. Although the bureau was set up as
a state agency, it is clearly evident that its promotional activities
respecting England were closely interlocked not only with the
Kansas State Board of Agriculture but with land-grant railroad
companies and some of their private, or independently operated,
land companies as well. 19
Here, then, existed an enormous equity in land that needed
unloading, and among several areas selected for promotional exploitation was England. English immigrants were deemed to be
highly desirable, and steps were deliberately taken to tap this
particular segment of Europe's population reservoir. Several
avenues for promotion were deemed effective, and one of these
was the English press. In addition to rather skimpy general news
coverage,20 English newspapers did, however, give considerable
space to planted news releases, while paid advertisements pertaining to Kansas land sales appeared frequently and boldly in
the classified sections of the press. Among the English newspapers
most intrigued by Kansas emigration prospects were the Manchester Labourers' Union Chronicle, London Labour News, Liverpool Weekly Courier, Liverpool American Heral,d, Manchester
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American News, London Times, and ( almost exclusively concerned with English emigration to the American West) the
London American Settler. Reflecting as it did the policies and
aims of Joseph Arch, leader of the English agricultural labor
movement, the Manchester Labourers' Union Chronicle advised
emigration as a solution to farm-laborers' problems. Even though
Arch preferred Canada over the United States as a haven for his
distressed followers, the Chronicle nevertheless stated: "We perceive there is a fine opening for farmers in America!" and also
expressed the opinion that "labour in Kansas has high value." It
pointed in particular to western Kansas, where an English workingmen's colony was being founded. 21
The Liverpool Weekly Courier also favored the exodus of
Englishmen either to the United States or to Canada. The business interests of Liverpool tended to look upon emigration-the
sheer movement of people out of England-as an integral part of
trade, and for this reason, if for no other, endorsed the Courier's
position that the more embarcations at their city's busy Mersey
docks, the better.
Throughout the 1870s the London Times continued, as it had
done in the past, to report upon the United States; It took frequent note of the cattle boom on the Great Plains that involved
Kansas in particular, and it reported as well upon English colonyfounding activities then occurring in this state. The Times, however, was neither a staunch advocate of English emigration as a
cure-all for England's economic ills nor in any sense an apologist
for Kansas. For example, it did not hesitate to publicize this state's
tragic struggles with grasshoppers and with drought. During
January, 1875, the Times reported that the grasshopper plague
had left twenty thousand people destitute in western Kansas and
that assistance from Great Britain in the form of food, clothing,
and seed was desperately needed. 22
London's American Settler was, unlike the English press as a
whole, largely concerned with English emigration to the United
States, and, in particular, to the American West. The American
Settler was established in January, 1872, as a separate publication
by the London Anglo-American Times and was intended to serve,
as it states in its initial announcement to its readers, as "A Guide
to British Emigration to the United States." Its aim was to bring
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about what it referred to as "an intelligent emigration, not an
emigration of clods alike ignorant and hungry." Perhaps more
than any other single English publication, the American Settler
was to serve well the interests of the promotional agencies of
Kansas. The state was given extensive coverage, and interested
readers were kept informed of lands available under terms of the
Homestead and Preemption acts, the KP, and the ATSF-all done
in fairly glowing terms. "The Kansas Pacific, running up the Valley of Kansas," was, the newspaper stated in 1872, receiving "the
strongest tide of settlement" anywhere in the United States. "At
every junction of a branch a town has sprung up, and some of
them now number thousands of inhabitants.''23 During the same
year this newspaper also commented upon the profitable cattlefattening (feeding-yard) industry around Abilene and Ellsworth.
And that year, too, it quoted extensively from a handbook explaining why emigration to Kansas was important then, not later,
and informed its readers on how best to reach this promising
settler-hungry state.24 General human-interest accounts were also
run in the American Settler, and one of these published in 1872
was a description by Samuel Bowles of the Kansas buffalo country
as viewed from aboard a KP railroad train. Bowles had written
that "for nearly half a day we rode through open and rich pastures, meeting vast herds of grazing buffalo and numerous companies of dainty antelope.'' Bowles pointed out that the areas
through which the KP passed were "favourite pasture grounds.''25
The American Settler also had much to say in behalf of
Kansas soil and climate-the kinds, it contended, Englishmen like.
It admitted of some uncomfortable vicissitudes of Kansas weather,
but reported: "He who seeks a paradise on earth, who expects to
find a land perfect in every respect, will spend his life in a vain
quest and go to his grave a disappointed man.''26 Also during 1872
a Scottish settler in Kansas addressed himself to the readers of
this newspaper with these added words of advice: "I should select
Kansas as the most suitable field for emigration, both for the
capitalist and the working man.'' He declared the climate to be
suitable, and he asserted that if groups of about six prospective
emigrant families could arrive in Kansas with about three hundred
pounds in cash on hand, they could manage nicely: buy needed
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horses, a cow, and other livestock, some implements, and, in short,
get started with a new life on the plains. 27
In addition to surfeiting its readers with material of general
interest on Kansas, the American Settler published information
and advice on land procurement by means of homesteading, preemption, and outright purchase from railroad and other private
concerns with land to sell. The overall tone of this literature was,
however, promotional in character. Both land companies and railroad companies ( the first often subsidiaries of the other) tended
to portray Kansas in glowing colors, an impression strongly reenforced by prominently placed paid company advertisements.
The ATSF, for example, declared its land to be a "garden," "a
large portion of which is similar in almost every characteristic to
the famous 'Bluegrass Region of Kentucky.' "28
The role of the Kansas State Bureau of Immigration consisted
for the most part in the preparation of special publications specifically designed to inform prospective emigrants on definite settlement opportunities in Kansas and on the advantages that would
accrue from such settlement. By 1880 functions of the bureau
were absorbed by the State Board of Agriculture, which was then
designated the sole agency of immigration into Kansas. By 1883
the board managed to obtain legislation providing both authorization and funds for the preparation, publication, and distribution
of an official pamphlet designed not only to encourage foreign
immigration but to provide essential practical information for all
prospective immigrants. Immigrants from northern Europe were
looked upon with special favor over those from other parts of the
outside world, and provision was made for the distribution of
twenty thousand copies of this pamphlet in England and smaller
numbers of copies in Germany and the Scandinavian countries.29
Promotional work thus undertaken by the state was further
augmented by the land-grant railroads. In order to promote its
land sales both at home and abroad, the KP, for example, had
from the outset of its corporate existence maintained close working arrangements with separately organized land companies. One
of these, the National Land Company, was founded in-1868. Not
only did this concern represent KP railroad interests but it secured as well the official blessings of state agencies seeking to
promote immigration into Kansas. Even though the National
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Land Company sold KP land to all customers, regardless of national origin, it, too, made a special effort to push sales in England.
In London it established and was represented by an agency known
as the Kansas Land and Emigration Company. John Miller was
chosen to manage this London office, and_it was with Miller that
an agreement for the first of the English colonizing schemes concerning Kansas-the Wakefield Colony in Clay County-was
negotiated during the year 1869.30
In support of its overseas sales operations the KP not only
advertised its lands in English newspapers but issued an emigrants' guide, which stated on its title page that not four but six
million acres of company lands were for sale in Kansas. This
guide addressed itself especially to young people, but it also
stressed that all prospective emigrants, regardless of age, shoald
have some capital at their command before undertaking settlement in Kansas. 31 Stated land prices and terms, however, were
moderate: two to six dollars per acre, one-fourth off for cash
payment, or eleven years credit at 7 percent interest per annum.
Much less is known about promotions and sales in England
of ATSF lands. That this company did seek English immigrants
is, however, indicated by the fact that ATSF maintained an office
in Liverpool jointly with the Southern Pacific Railroad Company32
and advertised its lands for sale in English newspapers. 33
Information intended to induce settlement and the sale of
land in Kansas did not, as has already been indicated, emanate
solely from the land-grant railroads. Through various and sundry
publications, would-be English emigrants were also made fully
aware of opportunities provided by the Homestead, Preemption,
and other related federal land acts. At the beginning of the 1870s
there were approximately forty million acres of public land within
the borders of Kansas, and most of it was open for entry.34 Moreover, many emigrants preferred, or for lack of capital were
obliged, to file for homesteads; but Englishmen with adequate
:financial resources appear to have preferred the fairly generous
terms offered by the railroad companies which, subject to mortgage conditions, provided for immediate and outright ownership
of lands being purchased.35 Land procurements by the English
were not limited, however, either to railroad land or to land that
was a part of the government domain. As elsewhere in the West,

The English and Kansas, 1865-1890 I 247

there were land companies that operated independently of both
the rail lines and the state and federal governments. One of these
was the Kansas Land Company, formed in 1871. It parceled out
its land sales in sixty- to one hundred-acre lots and offered to build
a dwelling on each. Upon down-payment of eighty dollars, the
purchaser would receive a ticket entitling him to transportation
from England to the States with the White Star Line and rail
passage to "his own door, with a farm ready to be tilled." 36
The complete list of individual promoters is as varied as it is
long. Free-lance writers appear to have had their connections
with land companies ( doubtless for considerations), and their
writings contributed greatly toward broadcasting throughout
England the virtues of Kansas, especially of the lands of this state.
Religious leaders made land deals with railroad companies and
then in turn pushed land sales with their parishioners. Newspaper
publishers were also deeply involved in promotional schemes and
backed many of them editorially. So, throughout the period 1865
to 1890 the publication market appears to have been surfeited
with promotional literature that included books, guides, gazetteers,
pamphlets, directories, and newspapers-much of .it specially intended for diverse segments of the English public that included
religious elements, upper-class groups, utopian societies, agricultural workers, and industrial laborers.37
Nor was this the extent of English public awareness of Kansas. In addition to publishing paid advertisements and promotional releases, English newspapers-surprisingly interested in
and fascinated with the American West in general-printed an
impressive number of random letters and statements submitted
to the respective newspaper editors for publication. Not all such
communications concerned with Kansas were favorable to it, but
regardless of the position taken, the feelings expressed were usually quite pronounced. Many such items were published in the
American Settler, but they appeared as well in the London Times
and in the English provincial press. Some of them carried the
names of contributors, but others indicated authorship by initials
and pseudonyms. Those who might have questioned the printed
word ( and wisely so in many instances) could and sometimes did
make official inquiries concerning Kansas. One such cautious but
inquiring Englishman was Captain Bertie Cator, who addressed
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himself to, and received the following reply from, the American
legation in London concerning prospects in Kansas: "I am quite
convinced that any respectable, industrious, young man with
small capital would do well in Kansas or Nebraska; but life in a
new country is always uphill work. Still, patience and a few years'
toil are always certain to be rewarded with success." Another
communication took the form of this question: "Will you give me
space for this in your next issue [?] I should select Kansas as the
most suitable field for emigration, both for the capitalist and working man." The writer acclaimed Kansas climate, and in general
lauded this state as a land of opportunity, providing the arriving
immigrant possessed at least a few pounds sterling.
Not all communications were favorable to Kansas, and W.
Frank Lynn, member of the Royal Colonial Institute, who published letters in both the London Times and the American Settler,
denounced both the private land speculators and the railroad
companies for their gross misrepresentations. In a letter addressed
to the editor of the Times, March 9, 1872, Lynn stated that inasmuch as "hundreds of people will probably leave England in
the Spring," with a view to settling in the Kansas, Nebraska, and
Colorado area, he felt obligated to inform such prospective migrants in advance that winters in this region were of a severity
"rarely equaled in Canada." He urged emigrants going there to
arrive with "the warmest clothing" because many families there
"have been frozen to death." About three weeks later, Lynn wrote
a second letter to the Times in which he stated that in addition to
warm clothing prospective settlers should come provided with
such essentials as ploughs, horses, implements, seed, cattle, housing materials, and fencing ( presumably purchased at a place such
as Kansas City, not brought from overseas). Moreover, Lynn
warned Englishmen against going to the outer fringes of settlement without first gaining some experience in the settled portion
of the state. 88
In spite of an occasional sour note, letters of the type alluded
to tended to be increasingly favorable to eastern Kansas as a place
for settlement. Writing from Newton, Kansas, one Charles Bingham of Derbyshire addressed himself in an open letter to Charles
H. Branscombe, English land agent for the ATSF. Bingham
appears to have been overwhelmed by his observations of and
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experiences in eastern Kansas. "The transformation of these prairies into beautiful farms in about five years' time, ornamented also
with a variety of trees, and splendid orchards . . . is what no
Englishman can possibly realize who has not seen it with his own
eyes." Bingham indicated that he planned to buy from the ATSF
two hundred and forty acres of land located in the vicinity of
Atchison. 39
Most of those who published their observations on Kansas
wrote as Bingham had, about the more humid eastern portion of
Kansas, and not about the semiarid pariries of the western part
of the state. But an exception was one using the nom de plume
"F.A.G." who in 1884 commented critically upon this western
region. "We could not," he wrote, "help being struck with the
oddities of Kansas, especially the .Western part-the great timberless prairies." F.A.G., ignorant of conditions on the plains, attributed the prevalence of dugouts and soddies in this region to
the danger of cyclonic activity. The aridity of western Kansas was
further emphasized in reference to one scientist's opinion that it
was doubtful that western Kansas, "lying outside the immediate
track of vapor-laden winds, could ever have a rainfall adequate to
maintain successful agriculture." Finally, in 1886, the editor of the
American Settler concluded that local Kansas newspapers had in
fact been overrating this western region, and he declared editorially that the "line of demarcation between the farming country
and the arid land is no fanciful or imaginary line."40
While no precise cause and effect relationship can be established between this on-the-whole favorable Kansas image within
England and emigration, it is a fact that English people were
attracted to this state and that many of them emigrated to it during the first two decades following the Civil War. In 1860 there
were approximately 1,400 persons of English (including Welsh)
birth in Kansas; in 1870 there were 7,147; and in 1880 the number
had swelled to 14,748.41
Unlike the distribution pattern of Russians, Germans, and
Scandinavians in Kansas, the pattern of English settlement reveals
an absence of concentration in given areas. But even though the
English tended to spread themselves more widely than other
immigrant groups, figures indicate that by 1880 sixteen counties
reported no Englishmen, whereas one county, namely Osage, con-
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tained 1,239 of them. By 1890 there were Englishmen in all Kansas counties, with a low of 4 in Scott County and a high of 1,025
in Shawnee County ( the number in Osage County having by then
dropped to 905). Not only did the English spread, but they tended
to pursue all avenues of economic opportunities open to the
people of Kansas. 42
The reasons for this relatively wide dispersal are apparent.
Unlike other ethnic groups, the English experienced no serious
communication problems. In spite of a desire on the part of railroad companies to sell large tracts of land to individual immigrant
groups, the English demonstrated no strong desire to form cooperative colonies that normally called for closely integrated living. 48
Once decisions to emigrate to Kansas had been reached by
the English, the trans-Atlantic crossings and transits overland to
intended locations within the state followed a generally familiar
pattern. In most instances emigrating parties converged with
their personal belongings upon Liverpool, at which port they
boarded vessels of varying types and seaworthiness that belonged
for the most part to British lines. The more affiuent Englishmen
purchased first-class accommodations, but those of modest means
were obli~ed to travel steerage.44 The main port of disembarkation was New York City, where rail connections to Kansas City,
Missouri, and points beyond were obtained. Some Kansasbound emigrants landed at New Orleans, where upriver steamboat services to Kansas City awaited them. Distances traveled
to, and places reached within, Kansas kept pace with rail-line
construction, while destinations beyond the "end-of-the-track"
could usually be reached by commercial stagecoach services
offered by the prominent Kansas Stage Company or its competitors. 45 At some of their stations, railroad compa,nies maintained
hospitality houses for emigrant customers, a service which freed
heads of households from routine family cares long enough to
make necessary purchases or to transfer from freight cars such
items as horses or oxen, wagons, a few farm implements, household goods, and miscellaneous supplies needed to begin immigrant life on a Kansas farm or ranch. Once at the site of their
acreage ( or homestead), all able-h<?died hands shared in the
construction of a soddie or dugout, broke sod for seeding or plant-
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ing, and in other ways got on with the hard work of pioneer
living. 46
One of the most revealing and delightful of the available
accounts-the author of which lived his youth in Kansas and then
returned to "merrie England"-was by Percy G. Ebbutt. In a
fascinating book entitled Emigrant Life in Kansas, Ebbutt related
that in 1870 he ( then a youngster) with his father, brother, and
three other men left their native town of Blanxton, in the south of
England, and set out for Junction City, Kansas. They took with
them, he wrote, enough luggage to stock a colony. Included in
this luggage were guns of various kinds, a grain grinder containing
a large flywheel, a huge jackknife, and of course clothing and tea.
None had previously engaged in farming, and yet their reason for
emigrating to Kansas was to engage in ranching.
Junction City at the time was a small but growing western
town with a population of 2,778. Upon arrival, Ebbutt and party
stayed at the town's Empire Hotel and remained there for six
weeks before moving on to Parkertown ( a place with nineteen
houses in it), twenty-five miles distant. After two weeks of living
at a boardinghouse, the Ebbutt party moved onto land acquired in
this particular vicinity. Ebbutt relates the move to this land:
On the 18th of February, 1871, having hired a couple of
waggons, we moved up on the prairie with all our luggage,
and boards to build our house· with. On arriving at our destination, seven miles from town, the large boxes were piled
up, and the boards laid slanting from the top to the ground
for a roof, and thus we made a very comfortable shanty....
We were very well off for provisions, having a good supply of
bacon, biscuits, eggs, cheese, coffee, sugar, flour, rice, etc.
The cook, Harry Parker, made his first attempt at breadmaking ... but not over successful. The bread was baked in
a great iron pan, and was as hard as a well-done brick, and
about as digestible. The outside could not be cut with a
knife, we were obliged to use a hatchet to make any impression. 47
Finally horses and oxen and ploughs were procured, the
breaking of prairie sod and seeding of crops were undertaken, and
a routine lonely life on the prairies was at last under way. Gradu-
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ally neighbors ( the first one was another Englishman) moved in.
Occasionally Indians came to beg for food, freezing winters were
endured but not without loss of livestock, a new house was built,
a cattle herd was acquired and with it the dreary monotony of
herding, and then one day there was the report that they were
about to be visited by a grasshopper plague.
About a fortnight before they arrived with us we heard
they were at Junction City, so it took them fourteen days to
travel about thirty-five miles.
It was the beginning of August, and the small grains,
such as wheat, etc., were carried and stacked, so that these
were secure. The maize, however, ... was destroyed with
the other, after the beastly things arrived. They came on
gradually like a fall of snow. We first saw a glittering cloud
high in the sky, and all sparkling in the sun.... they alighted
on houses, people, animals, fences, crops, covering everything,
while the ground was strewn several inches thick, so that it
was impossible to walk about without killing dozens at each
step....
All the trees in the woods were divested of their leaves,
and the whole place looked as though there had been a fire
raging in every part....
After the grasshoppers had finished every green thing,
including chewing the tobacco, they began to seek "fresh
fields and pastures new.''48
Time passed and Kansas life for young Ebbutt was such that
he decided to return to England. In the conclusion to his interesting book he offered this advice to prospective emigrants: "Make
up your mind to rough it. . . . be prepared to cook your own
dinner ... wash and mend your own clothes ... handle an axe
well. . . . Show yourself willing to be taught. . . . Take due precautions against prairie fires. . . . · You must leave all idea of
luxuries behind.'' And then by way of consolation he concluded:
'1f you are not happy in the old country ... you might do worse
than go west."49
Throughout the decades of the 1870s and 1880s Englishmen's
observations on living in Kansas and its surrounding plains country continued. As settlement extended rapidly westward during
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these years, so too did the focus of attention move westward, away
from small grain-farming operations in the lower reaches of the
Kansas Valley, and out onto the semiarid cattle- and sheep-ranching areas in western Kansas, where life was more rugged and
prospects less certain. Out there on the western prairies prospects
indeed looked grim, but in spite of this, ohe English traveler was
able to write in the late 1870s that he had witnessed a "continuous
line of emigrants travelling in wagons across the prairies of Kansas, many of them from the old country. . . . These emigrants,
both young and old, are huddled together in these wagons, and all
looking as dirty and miserable as it is possible for poor creatures
to look.''50
One unidentified author, for example, described life on a
prairie sheep ranch in anything but glowing terms. Basing his
comments upon firsthand experience as a sheepherder, he described his experience as "a severe trial of endurance," a denial
of comforts and conveniences that in England would have been
considered absolutely necessary. "But the crowning touch of all,
to my mind," he wrote, "was a Colt's revolver, strapped around
the waist." He related the necessity for this by quoting the words
of an old frontiersman:" 'You may carry a six-shooter twenty years
and never use it once, except fur skunks, and at the end of that
twenty years you might want it so almighty bad, that you'd wish
you'd packed it all the time.'" The unfriendly climate and conditions of range living-heat, cold, thirst, hunger-were as nothing
compared to "the complete isolation, the almost maddening
monotony of the life."51
The English were not only heavy investors in the range-cattle
business but they also participated actively in the range life on
the prairies. Major W. Shepherd, who traveled widely throughout
the West during the early 1880s, had words of caution for his
countrymen who may have considered heedless plunges into
Western cattle business. He advised not to listen to stories of 30
percent annual profit at cattle-ranching and "to be on the safe side,
if you have capital, leave it at home; learn the business you wish
to follow by working at it with your own hands, pay no premiums,
but hire yourseH out, if active and willing, · you are well worth
your keep ... the tenderfoot who takes his dollars in his trouserpockets is a lost man.'' He reminded his English readers that
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would-be stock raisers would have to go farther west than the
farm area, but that homestead and preemption opportunities were
still available. 52
Representing but a relatively minor segment of the involvements of the English in Kansas were their attempts at colonyfounding. Nevertheless, the dramatic, even flamboyant character
of English colonizing efforts has attracted considerable attention
-more, perhaps, than is merited. During the period under review
at least five attempts were made by the English at group colonization within the state. One of these colonies was at best feeble and
scarcely merits consideration in comparison with the others. It
concerns a group of Englishmen and Scots who in 1870 formed in
England what became known as the First Excelsior Colony. The
initial contingent of this colony consisted of eight men, one
woman, and a six-weeks-old baby. The party settled on Rose
Creek, Liberty Township, in Republic County. Junction City was
its nearest land office and source of supplies. Two of the men
involved had been stonecutters in London before emigrating, and
none knew how to harness and hitch up a team of horses, let alone
how to cultivate the Kansas prairie. But they nevertheless managed to build a common dugout and to persevere. The men were
all avowed atheists and experienced no religious deprivations, but
the woman, who embraced the faith of the Church of England,
was deprived of religious services for a period of fourteen years.
Not much is known about this tiny colony except that-like many
of their fellow countrymen in Kansas-they eventually moved to
other, but unknown, locations. 53
A much more ambitious and formidable but no.more successful attempt at founding an English community in Kansas was
Wakefield Colony. Established in Clay County in 1869, this colony was founded by the Reverend Richard Wake, an English
Methodist who at the time was a resident of Wilmington, Illinois.
Wake had emigrated from England in 1854 to Illinois, where in
addition to performing pastoral duties he had contributed articles
to the English religious press, such as the London Christian
World, staunchly advocating English emigration to the American
West as a way of relieving the motherland of her excess population. Wake's special appeal was to English agricultural laborers.
In 1866 he had returned to England where he personally organized

The English and Kansas, 1865-1890 I 255

a group of 115 men, women, and children who left England to
establish, in this same year, the Palmyra Colony in Otoe County,
Nebraska. 54
In an account published a quarter-century later, Wake recounted how he came by his interest in founding a colony in
Kansas. It appears that while on his 1866 trip to England, he encountered in Yorkshire R. H . Drew, a London land agent, and
John Wornald of Wakefield, who were both seeking to found a
colony in Missouri but who in the course of subsequent developments made inquiries about settlement possibilities in Kansas. A
collaboration ensued. Drew and Wornald had in mind the founding of a cooperative colony, but Wake-with on-scene experiences
in the American West-favored what he called an "associated
immigration plan" which provided for individual ownership of
land and produce, but called for lump purchase of a large tract
of land that could in turn be resold to individual colony members
at a small profit to the founders. Wake, as indicated, returned to
the states, and nothing much happened until one day in June,
1869, when he received a cablegram from London reading: "Select
100,000 acres in Kansas for colony." Wake subsequently related
that he first went to Topeka to investigate Santa Fe lands, but he
found them too high-priced. He then went to Junction City where
he approached agents of the National Land Company ( connected
with the KP) and purchased from them 32,000 acres of land located on the Republican River sixteen miles northwest of Junction
City and in Clay County. The sale price was fixed at $102,000 and
called for 20 percent down-payment.rm
Out of this transaction there emerged during the following
August the Kansas Land and Emigration Company in which
Womald became the heaviest investor and of which Wake was
chosen president. The experienced Wake lost no time in platting
the company's baronial acres and in laying out a town to be
named Wakefield. On September 30 he wrote his London office:
"Send out as many hardworking people as you can; they need not
want of employment here, men and women, if they can work. ...
If any servant girls wish to come by all means send a few." 56 In
addition, Wake prepared copy for a guide for English consumption in which he declared that Kansas crops were surprisingly
excellent. Corn ( Indian corn), he wrote, grew twelve to fourteen
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feet high there, so high, in fact, that the ears could not be reached
with umbrella tips. Wakefield, he added, was for the "common
folks" of England truly a "Land of Promise."57 Circulars were also
prepared, and these were addressed mainly to, and circulated
widely among, poor English tradesmen. The promotions produced results. The first contingent of seventy-seven colonists left
Liverpool during mid September, 1869, and arrived at Wakefield
on October 6. These first arrivals were in turn followed by others
during the spring of 1870, and still more during 1871.58
Unfortunately there was to be little resemblance between the
glowing prospects portrayed by the Kansas Land and Emigration
Company and the actual experiences of those who emigrated to
Wakefield. Not only did the colonists come devoid of capital, but
they also came unskilled in the art of farming-either in England
or on the American prairies. They also encountered all the
devastations that nature occasionally bestows upon Kansas: grasshoppers, a summer drought, "fitful and violent changes in temperatures," and a tornado. But in spite of these adversities the
struggling neophytes made a desperate effort to survive and, if
possible, to make their colony succeed. Funds for their support
were raised in England, and the townsite was developed to include a town hall, store, postoffice, blacksmith shop, meat market,
hotel, company office, Methodist church, and private dwellings. 59
Except for the few who became involved mainly with town affairs,
there is every indication that most of the Wakefield families settled upon nearby quarter sections ( or less) which they attempted
to develop into productive and, hopefully, prosperous farms.
But for most of the colonizers it appears that such goals were
to be denied. Wrote a second-generation member of this colony:
The glowing accounts issued by immigration companies
and the sharp practice often connected with real-estate deals
were among the grievances of the colonists. . . . The greatest
drawback to the colony was found in the general economic
conditions. The country had not recovered from the civil
war.... There was no local demand for agricultural products
and the Kansas City market was easily glutted.60
By the mid 1870s, at a time of heavy locust infestation, the
Wakefield Colony for all intents and purposes ceased to exist as
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an integrated English community. The Reverend Wake moved
to Topeka, and other leaders also moved on-to such widely scattered parts of the Union as Washington, Virginia, and Texas, as
well as back to the mother country. 61
Founded one year after Wakefield, in 1870, was Nemaha, or
what was at times also called the "Old English Colony." Located
in Nemaha County next to the Kansas-Nebraska boundary, this
colony too had its identification with the KP. The distinctive
feature of Nemaha Colony was its Utopian character. John W.
Fuller, one of the original members, recalled for newsmen many
years later the circumstances surrounding its founding. Fuller
related that a meeting of workmen took place at 18 Denmark
Street in London's gay Soho district where workers customarily
congregated and discussed their problems. At this particular
meeting in 1870 someone proposed forming a cooperative colony
in Kansas, and a company known as the Mutual Land, Emigration, and Cooperative Colonization Company was founded . One
of the group, Edward G. Smith, was chosen to be superintendent,
and in due course about fifty English families ( all very poor)
migrated to Nemaha County where a 720-acre piece of land had
been acquired from the KP ( or what was then the Union Pacific,
Eastern Division) as the place for their cooperative enterprise. 62
The Nemaha Colony scheme called for allocation of ten to
forty acres of land to each member and for the construction of an
eight-room house of large dimensions that would serve as a commons. When built, this particular structure came to be known in
the county as the "Llewellyn Castle." Individual colonists built
soddies or dugouts on their acreages, which were to serve them as
family dwellings.
Unfortunately, Nemaha Colony also suffered from the ravages of nature: droughts, grasshoppers, blizzards, and prairie fires,
and, in addition, internal dissensions. By 1874 the cooperative
character of this enterprise had ceased to exist. As with Wakefield,
individual colonists tended to drift elsewhere, although a few
families remained in Nemaha County where in time they became
prosperous farmers and craftsmen. 63
By far the most publicized and most widely known English
(more properly British) settlement enterprise in-Kansas was Victoria Colony in Ellis County. The founder of this colony was
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George Grant, a native of Scotland. Moreover, the early life of
the enterprising Grant-first in Scotland and then in Londonhad an important relationship to what might well be called a
bizarre venture into the game of colony-founding on the Kansas
frontier.
George Grant was born in Banffshire in north Scotland in
1822, the son of a poor crofter. As a boy, George was apprenticed
to a Banff draper and merchant, and out of this association and
training Grant was eventually to emerge as one of London's most
prominent silk merchants-a partner of the widely known and
respected firm of Gask and Grant, Oxford Street, London.
Grant was attractive in appearance-tall, of good proportions, and in possession of an affable and generally attractive
personality. He was an interesting conversationalist and was well
informed. Not only did Grant do well in the normal course of his
business life, but his remarkable astuteness as a merchant enabled
him on occasion to reap extraordinary returns from his London
enterprise. For example, in 1861, Grant, on the occasion of the
fatal illness of Prince Albert, the royal consort, anticipated the
prince's passing. He proceeded to corner the market on black
crepe in London and to sell it to the mourning English public at
a huge profit. And again it was the sharp merchant Grant who
at the 1867 Paris Exposition managed to outdo all rivals in the
exhibition of silk, with a resultant rush of profitable business at
the London store of Gask and Grant. 64
Successful though he was as a merchant, it was apparently
a combination of health problems and a desire for adventure, at a
profit, that caused Grant in 1871 to become interested in the
American West and subsequently to establish an English-Scottish
colony in Ellis County, Kansas. There is evidence that as a prominent London merchant, Grant had established many business as
well as cultutal and artistic connections with Americans, and
perhaps not unrelated to this fact, he became interested in lands
offered for sale by the KP. Among other things Grant had been
attracted by this company's advertisements on its land si:tles. Dur'ing 1871, accompanied by KP land-office agents, he personally
examined the real estate offerings within Ellis County. Then after
having considered other moves in the United States, he accepted
the KP offer the following year. This transaction was the largest
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of its kind made by the KP land office. The land lay south of the
KP tracks, 2137 miles west of Kansas City and 11 miles east of
Hays. It consisted of seventy sections interspersed with alternating sections retained by the government for homesteading, so
that Grant's holdings were actually contained within an area that
extended thirteen sections to the south of the KP track and nineteen sections parallel with the track in an east-west direction. For
this land Grant paid prices ranging from forty cents to eighty
cents per acre and he apparently made a down payment of
$10,000. 65
In making a purchase of this magnitude it is clear that Grant
had in mind the resale of much of his land-hopefully, but by no
means exclusively-to upper-class Britishers of means, thus establishing a colony for Englishmen and Scots. It is likewise apparent
that he planned to carry on under his own management large-scale
ranching, featuring blooded stock. In order to do these things he
chose to completely sever his London business connections and
to henceforth live a new and more exciting, more health-giving
life on the Kansas prairies. As a special consideration in behalf of
the purchaser the KP offered its good offices in helping to promote
British settlement for Grant's colony-founding schemes, and it also
proposed to erect a railroad station at the site of Grant's holdings
and to give it the same name Grant adopted for his projected
colony: Victoria. 66
Once transactions had been officially completed, Grant set
out for Kansas on what for him was to be a new and an exciting
adventure. He set sail from Glasgow on the steamer Alabama on
April 1, 1873. In his party was the first contingent of prospective
Victoria settlers and Grant employees. And aboard, too, were
draft horses and blooded livestock that included black hornless
Aberdeen Angus and shorthorn bulls and long-wooled sheep. The
Alabama was destined for New Orleans, at which port transfer
was to .be made to the packet Great Republic for the upriver run
to St. Louis, whence the remainder of the journey would be covered by rail transportation. Some difficulties were encountered
when the Alabama stranded at the mouth of the Mississippi River.
During this delay the Grant party suffered from intense heat,
humidity, and mosquitos, and concern wa~ felt for the safety of
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the precious livestock. But finally both men and beasts arrived
safely at their destination on May 17, 1873.
At first, developments moved ahead as planned. The KP
more than kept its part of the bargain by building not just another
standard-type railroad station on the prairies but a formidable
two-storied, thirteen-room stone station-hotel containing a common kitchen for use by newcomers. The structure was designed
in the proper Victorian style of architecture and in keeping with
plans was given the name of Britain's illustrious reigning queen.
Plans also called for the laying-out of a new city surrounding
the station. It was to be a highly moral city-free of saloons,
gambling dens, and dancing casinos. Steps taken to realize this
dream were, however, slow and minuscule. After the first five
years of development, Victoria was at best a struggling village
containing a few residences, a grocery store, meat market, blacksmith shop, school, and the foundation for a church. As yet there
was no grain elevator in Victoria, although such was planned for
and sorely needed. 67
While Grant lost no time in pushing his colonizing or landsales plan, he at the same time proceeded to provide for his
personal living and to develop his own large-scale ranching operations. He selected as a site for his "villa" an attractive spot five
miles south of Victoria station near Victoria Creek. There, on a
rise that offered a commanding view of his broad acres, Grant
erected a substantial house of English design. When completed,
it was two-stories high, constructed mainly of stone, and had four
gables and a veranda which extended around the house on three
of its sides. On the lower floor to the right of the main entrance
was a spacious parlor, and on the left a dining room. There were
altogether ten "elegantly furnished" rooms. The house was enclosed by willow growth that was trimmed ·in Russian style by
Russian workers who had meanwhile settled in the vicinity of
Victoria. In addition, plans were laid for the planting of ornamental and fruit trees within a fenced-in area surrounding the
house. Wrote one who later visited Grant after his place was
fully developed: "It is a house that kings might covet, and we
would too were it not for the commandment."68
Grant had, however, not come to Kansas simply to live an
indulgent life in a big house on the open prairies. He had come
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to Victoria in order to engage in large-scale ranching and to
develop a colony, and he proceeded at once to realize his objectives. He designated certain portions of his land for personal use,
the remainder to be laid out in assorted sizes and placed on sale
to prospective settlers. The interspersed government lands were,
of course, out of Grant's control, but it was hoped that these too
would be occupied under terms of existing homestead and preemption laws. 69
In the development of his own ranch Grant planned to do
two important things new to the Great Plains: raise blooded stock
and introduce large-scale scientific farming by use of pure seed,
proper cultivation, and employment of equipment driven by
steam power. To implement this program he engaged the services
of S. Douglas ·Smith, one of England's noted agronomists and an
authority on the. use of steam plowing. In keeping with these
objectives Grant broke about eight hundred acres of this prairie
land on which he successfully raised wheat, oats, rye, corn, and
millet. 70
Fluctuations in the amount of annual rainfall in western
Kansas offered no assurance of bumper crops. For this reason
Grant's stock-raising program, which was dependent in large
measure upon utilization of the natural grasses not only on his
own estate but on railroad and government lands as well, proved
to be the most successful aspect of his Victoria operations. When
James MacDonald, another distinguished British agronomist,
visited Victoria in 1877, he had this to say about Grant's ranching
operations:
Exclusive of calves, Mr. Grant owns over 800 cattle,
about an equal number of cows, two-year-olds, and yearlings.
The cows are a selection of Missouri grades and improved
Cherokees and Texans; and, for crossing with these, really
good shorthorn and polled [Aberdeen Angus] bulls were imported-the former from England, and the latter from the
herd of the late Mr. George Brown, Westertown, Fochabers,
Scotland. . . . I had heard and read very favourable accounts
of this herd, and, after a careful inspection, I cannot say I
was disappointed. 71
MacDonald added that while many of the cattle were "un-
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shapely, big-boned, and of inferior quality" (judged by English
standards), they were, nevertheless, better than any "native stock
I have seen elsewhere in the Far West or South." He pointed out
that Grant supplemented grazing by feeding grain to stock slated
for market. 72 His introduction of blooded stock to the range
country to be crossbred with longhorns at a time when little effort
was being made to improve the quality of livestock remains an
important contribution to the economic well-being of Kansas.
Grant's own financial reward for having improved his stock
through crossbreeding ( such cattle were known to the range
country as "black daddies") was a better-than-average market
price for his commodity. Moreover, he kept the breeds of some of
his cattle pure, and for this he is credited by the American Aberdeen Angus Breeders' Association with being the first to import
Angus cattle into the United States. 73 MacDonald also had praise
for Grant's sheep-raising accomplishments. He indicated that
Grant had imported Southdown, Cotswold, Lincoln, and Leicester
breeds, and that by 1877 his flocks numbered about eleven thousand sheep.74
Important as farming was to Grant's scheme of things at
Victoria, it did not necessarily take precedence over his colonyfounding and land-sales efforts. What may have been rather
nebulous plans initially, soon sharpened and expanded. Once the
purchase had been formally transacted and announced, Grant,
businessman that he was, quickly recognized the need to establish
land-sales offices. He did this in the two cities from which he
expected to receive his clientele, namely, Edinburgh and London.
His Scottish agents were Curror and Cowper, located in India
House, Edinburgh; and the English Agency was that of R. W,
Edis, 14 Fitzroy Place, London. Actually, Grant also established
a New York City agency, namely, the firm of Cobbe and Fowler,
52 Wall Street. 75
It was through the work and publicity of these agencies that
Grant's scheme for Victoria colony became internationally publicized. Pamphlets, news releases, and sponsored visitations by
distinguished people all gave zest and notoriety to these promotional activities. Brochures contained the standard exaggerations
of the day. Even the publication issued by conservative D. Curror,
head of the Edinburgh firm of Curror and Cowper, for example,
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was entitled Mr. Grant's Great Property: Victoria, in Kansas. It
describes the region in which the land was located as a "Second
Eden." In no place in his publication did Curror resort to socalled British understatements. This pamphlet continued: "Those
green prairies, rolling like gentle swells of the ocean, starred and
gemmed with flowers, and threaded with dark belts of timber
which mark the windings of the streams are a joy forever." 76
The pamphlet issued by the London office was entitled New
and Attractive Field for Emigrants ... Victoria; and this one
noted that "for richness of soil, purity and abundance of water,
and supply of building material, this tract has been pronounced
by highest authority to be of the best in the State of Kansas." It
credited Ellis County with "champagne air" which "not only
stimulates nerve centres, irrigating the body, but it has also an
invigorating effect upon the mind." Thereupon this English document drew upon Albert D. Richardson's Beyond the Mississippi
for support, quoting him as follows: "I wonder if the Almighty
ever made a more beautiful country than Kansas."77
As previously stated, Grant hoped to interest the so-called
better-class Englishmen in settling Victoria and to encourage the
development of a moral community. But judging from his land
sale prices, it would appear that financial liquidity as well as
utopian goals dominated his thinking. By the summer of 1873 his
lands were widely advertised not only to his own British agents
but also by the KP's London and Liverpool offices headed by A.
MacDonald. His terms were these: £ 1 to £ 3.10.0 per acre, 20
percent down and the balance to be paid within four years. The
interest rate was set at 6 percent. Town-lot options were obtainable at£ 1.0.0, or $5.00. 78 Special low railroad fares were offered
by the KP as part of the bargain.
Interestingly enough, Grant appears to have been more interested in the dollar and the pound than in the achievement of
his declared objectives. As it turned out, one of his first major
sales was not aimed, as Grant had repeatedly stated, to provide a
haven for British gentry but for humble workingmen of England.
The purchaser was J. Bates of London, who bought from Grant
roughly seven sections of land which Bates planned to resell in
small allotments to indigent English workingmen and farm laborers. Farming caused a small flurry in English labor circles, but as
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it turned out, the plan did not materialize. The Manchester
Labourer's Union Chronicle, did, however, declare Victoria to be
"a fine opening for the farmer." This newspaper went on to say
that for the person in possession of one to two thousand pounds of
capital, Victoria offered "not simply a vast field for healthy homes
and farming enterprise, but the potentiality of vast fortunes. . . .
Away to Victoria, Kansas, and speed the plow there." 79
In keeping with his desire to gain publicity and in that way
catch the attention of upper-class Britishers, Grant's agents, in
cooperation with KP officials, sponsored a special visitation to
Victoria. Among those invited to make this tour under the joint
sponsorship of Grant and KP were R. Scott Skirving, former president of Scotland's Chamber of Commerce; H. Bethune, a Scottish
deputy lieutenant; R. W. Edis, Grant's London agent; and W.
Wester, general agent for the KP. That this visitation achieved
its purpose is indicated in the press. "When men of such high
standing append their names ... it should give confidence," said
one Kansas newspaper. 80 Among those who greeted these distinguished visitors at Victoria were the first settlers who had made
the crossing on the Alabama, namely, Grant and his nephew
Alexander, George Staples, George Philip, and George MacDonald-all Scots; also James Hider with wife and child, Frank
Mason, J. Douglas Smith, A. A. Smith-all English. Altogether
thirty persons had made up this first contingent. The resultant
publicity from this visit and the work of agents at home and
abroad ( combined with highly satisfactory crops during 1873 and
1874) produced modest, and for a time satisfactory, results.
Available estimates on the number who actually settled at
Victoria vary. Indications are that successes at recruitment were
correlated with the successes and failures of crops during the
decade of the 1870s. Grasshoppers during 1874 and severe blizzards during the ensuing winter caused some settlers to leave
Victoria, but the return of good crops brought new arrivals during
the period 1876 to 1878. One estimate credits Victoria and environs with about three hundred English at what could have been
an all-time high in 1876. In any event, the 1880 census count on
English in Ellis County ( and nearly all the English there were
located at Victoria and its immediate environs) was 128. In a
letter addressed to The Scotsman James MacDonald commented
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upon what was happening. He pointed out that the British had
found Victoria "much as nature and the buffalo had left it"; then
drought, grasshoppers, wolves, and stormy weather devoured
many of their crops and played havoc with their stock. Many
settlers lost all, and left; those with larger pocketbooks remained. 81
Grant, who had spearheaded the colony, died suddenly on
April 26, 1878, and this proved a discouragement to many. For
this and for other reasons ( among them the encroachments of
more eager and energetic Russian settlers from their adjoining
colony named Herzog) more Englishmen departed during the
1880s than arrived. By 1890 census takers counted only 107
English in Ellis County, and at the close of the century this
number had further declined to 63. 82
The importance to Kansas of Grant's British colony of Victoria cannot, however, be measured in terms of numbers. Grant
and his Victoria received international notoriety and so contributed much to outside interest in western Kansas-a region that
prior to Grant's arrival there was known simply as a sportsman's
hunting ground and as part of the Great American Desert. But if
Grant's reputation as an English colonizer has become tarnished,
the fact that he was the man who introduced purebred Aberdeen
Angus cattle into the United States gives him a lasting place
among those who made important contributions to Kansas and to
the development of the American West.
One other attempt at founding an English colony in Kansas
transpired. This one was in Harper County, and the time was the
early 1890s. The name of it, Runnymede, was unmistakably
English and so, too, were many of its characteristics. First steps
taken to found this colony were in the early 1880s when Edward
Turnley, an Irishman by birth, arrived in Kansas from England
and purchased 17,000 acres of land at $1.50 per acre. The land
was located on the bank of the Chikaskia River, nine miles northeast of Harper and forty miles southwest of Wichita. The colony
of Runnymede, however, was not formally founded until 1889, at
which time its plan was first publicized in England.
Turnley's proposal was to settle in his colony untitled English
gentlemen ( in short, remittance men) who would possess some
capital and who might wish to combine pleasures and adventures
with making a living in the American West. Runnymede was
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idyllic in concept-"a Western paradise where golden birds sing
in the trees and silver rivers run tinkling to the sea . . . [where]
corn grows as high as an elephant's eye, and the climate is so
healthy it puts to shame any reference to Elysian Fields."83
Those who chose to join this colony were required to pay a
five-hundred-dollar membership fee which entitled each holder to
a pony and saddle and the privilege of buying land. They might
either build a home on their land or, not wishing to do this, live
in barracks called Chikaskia House, which Turnley had constructed for residence and club purposes.
The first group of settlers, consisting of sixteen men and
women, departed from England for Kansas aboard the steamer
Britannic on May 29, 1889, and it in turn was followed by others
until the number reached approximately one hundred. A small
village emerged, boasting a three-storied hotel, some stores, stagecoach facilities, and several homes. 84
Runnymede did not escape the country-club atmosphere intended for it by its founder. It contained a track on which carriage
races took place. Polo was played, fox hunts were held, and
bootleg liquor was copiously consumed. But farming was slighted
-tried, in fact, by few, and successfully by none.
As it finally turned out, Kansas and the Runnymede colony
proved incompatible. A cyclone hit the area in 1890, the Panic in
1893, and crop failure in 1895. Some of the colonists returned to
England, others left to go elsewhere. One woman colonist became
a drug addict, and Richard Whetmough, Runnymede's best-liked
citizen, burned to death when his barn caught on fire following a
convivial party. The colony had hoped for railroad connections,
but when these failed, Runnymede withered on the vine. In later
years, one of its members reminisced: "Runnymede, you must
know, was a combination of British inexperience, credulity, some
money, considerable cockneyism"-a romantic idea of gettingrich-quick on "champagne and venison."85
In addition to being for the English a sportsman's paradise,
a place to see, and a suitable location for settlement for emigrating
Englishmen, Kansas is known to have attracted some English investments during the post-Civil War years. One sizable and longlived English concern founded to do business in this state was the
Kansas and New Mexico Cattle Company, Ltd. This company
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was founded in 1883, with its head office in Manchester, and was
capitalized at £ 150,000. The stated purpose of this company was
to acquire cattle ranches in the United States, in particular one
owned by Harold and Edmund S. Carlisle, located in Sedgwick
County, Kansas. The purchase was consummated. Harold Carlisle, who accepted a sizable block of shares as part payment,
became manager, and his brother Edmund for a similar reason
became secretary. The company continued in operation ( subsequently changing its name to Kansas and New Mexico Land and
Cattle Company, Ltd.) until the close of the century.86
A comparable concern was the British Land and Mortgage
Company of America, Ltd., incorporated also in 1883 and capitalized at £ 1 million with headquarters in London. The purpose
of this concern was to buy and hold land and securities in various
parts of the United States, but it is significant to note that one of
the three largest shareholders in this concern was James S. Worden, a Frankfort, Kansas, banker. 87 Worden served as the company's American agent for a short time following the inception of
the company, then during the late summer of 1883 this position
was filled by E. B. Percell at Manhattan. But American connections do not end here. Sir Stuart James Hogg, of London, the
company's president, spent considerable time in Frankfort and
Manhattan during 1883 in behaH of the company's interests.
Subsequently, Sir Stuart's son came to Kansas, where he attended
briefly the Kansas State Agricultural College. He later returned to
England, where he married an English girl whom he brought as a
bride to Manhattan. There the couple lived for several years, and
there, in 1890, Stuart, Junior, assumed the managership of the
company's Kansas operations. 88 These developments created a
stir in the Kansas press, as well they might, but in 1903 the British
Land and Mortgage Company of America, Ltd., was officially
dissolved. 89
Such phasing out of English investment companies was not
unique at the end of the century, which marks a turning point-an
actual termination in many instances-of active English participations in the affairs of Kansas. The role of the English in the
development of this state during the period 1865-1900 was, however, as significant as it was diversified; and while the aggregate
number of English immigrants to Kansas was relatively modest in
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comparison with other ethnic groups, the overall impact, first of
the land of the Kaw upon the English consciousness and then, in
turn, of the English upon Kansas was profound.
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Banks, Mails, and Rails,

1880-1915
George L. Anderson, University of Kansas

To some the title of this paper
may seem to be only a feeble attempt to strike an alliterative
note. Actually it is an effort to capsulize a series of relationships
which were basic to the economic development not only of the
Trans-Mississippi West, but to that of the entire nation. The
underlying premise of this study is that no transaction above
the level of simple barter was complete until a number of pieces
of paper had been exchanged by the persons concerned. Whether
the products involved came from the farm, the ranch, the mine,
the forest, or the sea, they could not become part of the stream of
commerce until someone, someplace, sometime, was willing to
assume responsibility for conducting them through a maze of
local markets, processing plants, commission or wholesale houses,
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and, finally, to a retail merchant who endeavored to supply the
wants of his customers. And it was not circulating currency
whether gold, silver, banknotes, or greenbacks that was needed
unless one really wanted to hand-carry the amounts required or to
pay express charges. What was needed was some form of credit
that was readily available, reasonably acceptable in all parts of
the nation, and thoroughly negotiable. By June 30, 1881, the percentage of daily receipts of banks accounted for by instruments
of credit reached 95.1 percent and remained well above 90 percent until 1909. By 1915 the use of drafts and checks in the
conduct of the nation's financial and commercial affairs accounted
for 95 percent of the total. 1
In the period 1880-1915 the kinds of paper that were used to
complete transactions included checks, drafts, bills of exchange,
acceptances, bills of lading, warehouse receipts, promissory notes,
and perhaps chattel mortgages. Even express-company and postal
money orders were used much to the bitter dismay and open
hostility of the bankers. When the student of history contemplates
the magnitude, complexity, and increasing use of instruments of
credit, he niay wonder why many of his colleagues continue to
focus their attention on, and devote their energies almost exclusively to, the volume of circulating currency, and why they accept
the contemporary premise of W estem agrarian leaders that the
per capita amount of circulating media was declining in the face
of expanding trade. Because the Pendletons, Weavers, Harveys,
Elands, and Bryans acted upon their knowledge and not ours,
they can be excused for looking backward to Andrew Jackson
and demanding that the national banking system be abolished,
although they seem to have overlooked the utter chaos that his
policy produced, instead of lopking forward to something like the
Federal Reserve system. But the same consideration cannot be
extended to historians who refuse to recognize that deep and
fundamental changes were taking place in the financial structure
of the West and of the nation. On the issue of silver or government notes versus the bank check the ·Populists among others
were backward-looking folk clinging to an outmoded treatment of
financial abuses and not well-informed, forward-looking statesmen attempting to secure improved procedures for conducting
business in the industrial-financial world of their day.
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But historians have been equally short-sighted in recognizing
what really made possible the transition from currency to instruments of credit. A few members of the profession have recognized the fundamental importance of the communications revolution, but detailed attention has not been given to the Post Office
Department. Obsessed with the notion that it was merely the
patronage agency of the political party in power, historical
scholars have made scarcely any studies of its actual working
bureaus and divisions. 2 One of the neglected organizations has
been the Railway Mail Service, whose recent demise has produced
a crisis in the distribution of the nation's mail. Additionally, they
have ignored the nationalizing impact of a federal service that
reached people even in the remote areas of the nation and
touched their lives more intimately and more frequently than did
any other federal agency. For many the United States Post Office
was their only tie with relatives and civilization. If historians
have neglected this aspect of the Post Office Department, its officials did not. In 1880 Thomas J. Brady, Second Assistant Postmaster-General, remarked: "A peculiarity of the mail service is its
more intimate relation to the daily life of the individual citizen
than is sustained by the operations of any other branch of the
government. This is particularly true of the sparsely settled and
newly developed regions of the West, where the comparative
scarcity and expensiveness of telegraph communication renders
business correspondence entirely dependent upon the mails for
transmission."3 Almost a decade was to pass before PostmasterGeneral John Wanamaker echoed and elaborated this theme.
After asserting that the Post Office Department maintained communication between the near and the remote places of the country
with "frequency, celerity, and security," he declared, "The post
office is the visible form of the Federal Government to every
community and to every citizen. Its hand is the only one that
touches the local life, the social interests, and business concern of
every neighborhood. It brings the Government to every door in
the land and makes it the ready and faithful servitor of every
interest of commerce and society."4
Historians have been guilty on another count. Together with
many popular writers they have been content to focus their
attention on the Pony Express and Overland Mail companies. It
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is true that these operations served their day and deserve careful
analysis and attractive presentation, but there is in history a
quality called perspective. If these rudimentary agencies counted
their pieces of mail in dozens or perhaps some in hundreds and
their periods of service in months and years, the Railway Mail
Service counted the pieces carried in a year in millions or even
billions and its period of service in decades. The writer has not
estimated the number of horses it would have taken to carry the
open pouches, the locked pouches, the registered boxes, and the
other kinds of matter carried in one railway post-office car, but
the number would be substantial.
Historians and writers generally can be forgiven for seeing
something dramatic in the small figure of a man or boy astride a
fleet horse, riding across prairie, desert, and mountain into the
teeth of a storm or out of the reach of hostile Indians. But there
is something equally dramatic in a highly trained postal clerk
standing deep-knee in bags, pouches, and boxes; distributing mail
at a higher level of accuracy than any of us could hope to attain
in our profession; sorting mail in the face of fire, flood, and wreck;
throwing out the pouches at his point of delivery; catching other
pouches on the run at the risk of being pulled out of his car; and,
finally, reaching the terminal with all mail distributed and ready
for immediate delivery to banks, offices, and homes. 6 Actually the
task of the railway postal clerks was more dangerous than any
branch of the federal service other than the armed forces. It is
little wonder that they developed an esprit de corps that matched
that of the U.S. Marines.
Although there is only one comprehensive history of the
Railway Mail Service in print, this is not the time or place to
attempt to produce another one. Suffice it to say that the link
between the past and the present in the Trans-Mississippi West
was forged on the old Hannibal and St. Joseph line. The close
connection between the arrival of the train from the East and the
departure of the Pony Express did not permit the sorting of the
mail in the St. Joseph post office in time to be carried westward.
It occurred to George B. Armstrong that if the mail could be
sorted en route in the mail car, all that would be necessary would
be the few minutes required to transfer the proper bags. 6 Herein
was the germ of the idea that grew by careful study and refine-
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ment until the sorting and distributing of mail by carrier routes,
substations, and individual addresses for cities like New York,
Chicago, and Boston was completed before the trains reached
their destinations.7
The Post Office Department officials tried to save time on city
and suburban as well as intercity deliveries in many other ways.
Automobiles and airplanes were scarcely in effective operation
before the postal service was experimenting with them. European
experience with pneumatic tubes was emulated in the major
cities. Post-office buildings were built above, below, or beside
depots. The Railway Mail Service placed postal cars on streetcar
lines and on electric interurban lines as well. Railway post-office
cars were subjected to constant study and redesign until every
square inch was utilized. Anything to save a few minutes seemed
to be the rule as the post-office people sought to handle an
increasing volume of mail. 8
At their level of administration the superintendents of the
Railway Mail Service literally fought to reduce time in transit. At
first, time that was saved was expressed in terms of days, then of
hours, and then of minutes. A few minutes saved in Chicago,
St. Louis, or Kansas City might enable the westbound mail from
the East to connect with a train for the Pacific Coast and thus save
a full business day in San Francisco, Seattle, or Los Angeles. , And
saving a full business day was dear to the heart of the bankers,
although so far as the writer knows, none of them took the trouble
to recognize the assistance of the Railway Mail Service. Cash
items like checks and drafts that are in transit do not contribute
to the profits made by bankers, so just as the Railway Mail Service
fought to save hours and minutes, the bankers struggled to reduce
transit or "float" time. 9
In either case the pressure was placed upon the agency that
actually pulled the railway postal cars with their bags and
pouches full of checks, drafts, notes, and acceptances. This, of
course, was the railroad network of the nation. Time will not per.mit a road-by-road analysis of this network, even if the writer
could do it. Judging by the number of contracts made, one could
conclude that every railroad, whether trunk line or countryside
jerkwater branch, carried the mail. It may be safe to suggest that
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no one has plumbed the depth and variety of American railroads
until he has scanned the printed lists of contracts to carry the mail.
Around 1880 some of the trains crept along at an average of
ten, twelve, or fifteen miles per hour. By the end of the century,
average speeds were generally in the twenty- to twenty-five-miles.Per-hour bracket. By 1915 some lines attained averages between
thirty and thirty-five miles per hour. Of course the fast mail trains
moved at a much higher level of speed. Between 1884 and 1905
the time between New York and Chicago was reduced from
twenty-seven hours and thirty minutes to eighteen hours. Just as
significantly the time between New York and San Francisco was
reduced from one hundred and eight hours and forty-five minutes
in 1889 to eighty-two hours in 1906, a time that is slow by jet
standards, but fantastically fast to a generation conditioned to
dealing with much slower speeds. 10
In railroad history as in other areas, historians have been
much too myopic. They have been too much concerned with
matters of financing construction and operation, with land grants
and construction companies, and with fraud and subsidies. It may
well be that the most important subsidy conferred by the federal
government upon the railroads, upon the business community,
and upon the American people generally was in the form of mail
contracts. But on some occasions the railroads paid a high price
for those contracts. They were under constant pressure from the
Railway Mail Service to place the post-office cars on their fastest
trains, to adjust schedules, to discard obsolescent cars and build
new ones, in short, to give preferred treatment to the Railway
Mail Service even at the cost of better and more remunerative
freight and passenger service. The fast mail trains presented a
particular problem. Anyone who has seen a train composed exclusively of mail cars moving majestically on the main line while
even the best passenger trains took to the ·sidings knows that the
mails took precedence over persons and products.11
Some historians feel that railroads have been overemphasized
as a factor in the growth of the American economy, but given the
services that the railroads contributed and the procedures and
practices of American business, it is difficult to imagine alternative
forms of transportation in the period under consideration. Certainly the telegraph and the telephone were significant develop-
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ments, but as long as banking officials and, indeed, courts of law
demanded actual signatures on the right documents, by the right
persons, at the right time, all that bankers could do by wire was
to make sure that their customer or their correspondent had adequate funds on hand to complete a transaction. Curiously enough,
the writer has encountered only two contemporary discussions of
the interrelationship between banks, mails, and rails. Under the
title "Banks and Railroads" Charles W. Stevenson discussed the
question in the September, 1909, issue of the Banker's Magazine.
In part he said:
The reciprocal relations of the bank and the railroad are
not so direct as they are important and fundamental. The
bank furnishes the sinews of trade in that it furnishes the
credit on which the buying and selling is done. . . . Again, if
there were no railroads, and the surplus of the soil must lie
rotting in the fields, there would be less need for the banks,
and less capital or stored up labor on which they might build
their foundations. Together the two institutions work in
unison for the benefit of all the people. . . . they are the
servants of the same constituency .... And the bank, outside
of the mail service of the road, may have little to transport,
yet it furnishes the means whereby the merchant buys his
goods and the farmer feeds his cattle.
Just in the matter of the mail service the bank is hardly
prepared to appreciate the benefit of the railroad. The latter
hurries the check and draft to its destination and in such a
way as to make the momentum of trade much greater than it
otherwise could be. And the bank that cannot profit by swift
railroad service has a great handicap on it, and cannot perform the full functioning of the institution. 12
Four years later in a perceptive address to the Baltimore
chapter of the American Institute of Banking, J. M. Fitzgerald,
president of the Western Maryland Railroad, discussed "The
Banks and the Railroads." Without glossing over the evils and
abuses that accompanied the development of banking and railway
transportation, Fitzgerald devoted the greater part of his address
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to a comparative analysis of the evolution of state and federal
regulation, but the following sentences indicate that he understood the fundamental relationships:
The banks by the discount of notes and the payment of
checks, facilitate the transfer of commodities and merchandise from seller to purchaser. That development which has
made commerce not only nation-wide, but world-wide, would
not be possible without the service of transportation in actual
physical distribution. That development which has made
commerce not only nation-wide, but world-wide, would have
been impossible without the service of the modem banking
system.
Therefore one analogy between the railroad business
and the banking business is that everyone of the rank and file
in either vocation takes part in performing a service that is
not only essential to the prosperity of the nation, but under
the conditions of our present civilization, is vital to the very
existence of the nation. 13
The purpose of the preceding paragraphs has been to portray
in a general way the relationships between the banks, the postal
services, and the railroads. The more detailed analysis which follows is concerned with two of the three agencies, the banks and
the mails. Three primary areas of interaction and competition
will be considered. In order of emphasis and detail of treatment
these are the problem of the country check, the development of
the postal savings system, and the use of the postal money order.
The last two subjects obviously represent areas of competition
ana are more familiar to students of history. The problem of the
country check, on the other hand, is less well known, more significant in the development of banking, and accordingly will receive
the greater amount of attention.
In a sense the postal savings system was an importation from
abroad. Its establishment testifies to the magnitude and the importance of the immigration from Europe into the United States
during the latter part of the nineteenth and early years of the
twentieth century. Accustomed to governmental savings institutions in the countries from which they came and fearful for the
safety of their savings, especially after the bank failures in the
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1890s and in 1907, the immigrants hoarded their funds or sent
them back by way of postal money orders to the old country.
It may seem curious to some that two of the most ardent
advocates of the postal savings system were John Wanamaker,
Postmaster-General under President Benjamin Harrison, and
Frank H. Hitchcock, who held the same position for a time under
William Howard Taft. In between these two men William McKinley's Postmaster-General favored the system, but those who
served in this capacity under Grover Cleveland and Theodore
Roosevelt were either silent on the issue or actively opposed to it. 14
For practical purposes Wanamaker's 1889 Report set the
stage. Indulging himself in a bit of purple prose, he said:
To connect more intimately countless numbers of citizens
with this country is a patriotic service. It would tend to
weaken incipient disturbances; it would aid in breaking down
sectional feelings. The State and private savings banks in
many of the states where small deposits can be made are few
in number. In some parts of the country there are no such
opportunities offered. The chimney comer, the trunk, the
closet, and the old stocking hide another surplus, not unlike
that heaped up in the Treasury, and practically it is as much
withdrawn from circulation. 15
Wanamaker thought that in order to reduce competition with
banks, deposits might be limited to $150 per person per year, and
the Secretary of the Treasury might be directed to redeposit the
money in banks located in the states where the deposits originated. The banks would be required ,to deposit United States
bonds to assure the safety of the funds. 16
The recommendation was repeated by Wanamaker in 1890
and 1891, and by James A. Gary in 1897. The arguments were
essentially the same: encouragement of thrift, restoration of
hoarded funds to the channels of commerce, and development of
a higher level of citizenship, especially among newly arrived
groups of immigrants, by providing a stake in maintaining the
government's credit. Attention was called to the support of the
large city banks, of the newspapers, and of labor and agricultural
associations. The opposition of rural banks and private savings
banks was noted. A decade was to elapse before the subject was
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raised again, but little was added to the earlier arsenal of arguments.17 Some of these arguments were based upon detailed
analyses. Foreign postal savings banks were advertising for
American funds. As a result in the four-year period from 1906 to
1909, more than $300 million in international money orders payable in Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Italy, Norway, and Russia
had been sold. The total amount of money in the United States
was estimated at $3 billion, nearly 65 percent of which was in the
pockets of the people or was being hoarded. If only one dollar
per capita per year could be called into circulation, it would add
$90 million to the circulating medium each year. In effect the
sixty thousand post offices would become the agencies for mobilizing funds that would enter the stream of commerce by being
redeposited in the national banks. 18
In spite of the vision of a flood of funds described by
Postmaster-General Frank H. Hitchcock, the American Banker's
Association remained adamant in its opposition. 19 Its Committee
on Postal Savings thought that 98 percent of the bankers opposed
the idea. The major premise of its argument was that it is "as
improper for the Government to extend its paternalism and enter
the banking business as it would be to enter the grocery or any
other business." At various times the committee, of which E. F.
Swinney of Kansas City was a member, asserted that the Postmaster-General was using inaccurate statistics and that more
stringent immigration laws instead of a postal savings system
would solve the problem of the immigrant worker. But in spite of
its most strenuous efforts, the committee had to confess defeat.
Yielding to pressure from the executive branch, the Congress
passed the postal savings law on June 25, 1910. 20 Within five
years, partly due to the outbreak of war in Europe, there were
more than half a million depositors taking advantage of the system. More than 58 percent of these were foreign-born, and their
deposits totaled more than $65 million. 21
The relevance of the foregoing account of the postal savings
system to the history of the Trans-Mississippi West may seem to
be a bit strained, but there are two areas of impact. The first of
these involves the intransigent opposition of Western bankers who
regarded the far more numerous post offices as their competitors
and who derived no benefit from the redeposit feature of the
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system. The second is the possibility that the postal savings banks
were in part the response of the federal government to the state
deposit-guaranty laws that had been enacted in such Western
states as Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas. In an
indirect way the federal government had a deposit-guarantee
mechanism in operation more than two decades prior to the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. At least
it was alleged that the depositors in the post offices felt that their
funds were entirely safe. Even the redeposit of funds in national
banks did not limit this assurance, because in the event of failure,
the federal government would be a preferred creditor and it
required special security for its funds. 22
If the reaction of bankers in general to the postal savings
system was somewhat ambivalent, no ambiguity characterized
their feelings toward money orders, whether sold by express companies or by post offices. They were opposed to all money orders
unless sold by banks or under the auspices of a state or national
banker's association. 23 Given the nature of banking in the period
under consideration, it is not difficult to understand the position
of the bankers. For many years prior to 1880 two of the principal
sources of banking profits were the sale of exchange and the collection of checks and drafts. For purposes of discussion, exchange
will be defined simply as a charge made for the transfer of funds,
whether specie, currency, or credit. Originally the amount
charged bore a definite relationship to the cost of shipping actual
specie or currency. Later it was more a question of supply and
demand. 24 For various reasons, exchange on New York set the
pattern and the price on exchange at the lesser financial and commercial centers. A simple illustration or two from the period
before checks and money orders achieved great popularity will
indicate how the system brought business and profit to the Western banker. A merchant in a Western town would buy a stock of
goods from a New York wholesale firm. In due course he received
an invoice and the bill which had to be paid. He went to his bank
and bought a cashier's draft or a bank draft. This was a simple
operation if his bank kept a deposit in some New York bank. But
it cost the banker something to keep his New York account replenished, so he felt justified in charging the going rate for selling
a portion of his credit to the merchant. In an earlier day the
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banker might have had on hand some bills against New York
business firms that were buying Western products. Several of
these might be put together to equal the amount of the local
merchant's bill. These the banker would sell to the merchant at a
profitable margin. In any case the banker charged his customers
for making it possible for them to pay their Eastern creditors.25
Included in this operation in some instances were the charges
made by the bankers for collecting bills of Eastern creditors
against Western debtors. Again it was a simple matter of transferring cash or credit, but the customer, whether an Eastern firm
or a Western merchant, was charged for the service. Even after
bank checks entered the scene the Western banker characteristically made a charge for cashing them. Altogether the exchange
operation could be made into an extremely fruitful source of
profits.
But it was quite otherwise when money orders, whether
express-company or post-office, increased in popularity. The
former could be bought and cashed at an express-company office;
the latter could be bought and cashed at post offices. Not only
could the bankers be by-passed, but they could be compelled to
contribute to the operation at substantial cost to themselves.
Local offices of express companies might have inadequate funds
to pay express orders, because they were required to transmit
their funds to a central or regional office. In such instances the
local manager would advise holders of express-company money
orders to go to a bank to get cash or currency for their orders. If
perchance the bank ran low on its reserves of cash or currency,
it would have to pay the express company the regular price on
shipments of currency from a city correspondent. In a sense postoffice money orders posed the same problem. If a bank was under
pressure from its customers to cash money orders beyond the
amount of cash on hand, it might be forced to have currency sent
in by registered mail. 26 Thus the banks lost the profits from
selling exchange and might be required to pay a price for the
privilege of cashing their competitor's money orders. In any case
the whole matter of money orders aroused a considerable volume
of opposition in banking circles, mixed with the expressed praise
of a few who admired the successful working of the money-order
system.
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Measured in terms of dollar amounts of postal money orders
issued, the system was a success. Beginning with a few more than
$1.3 million issued in 1865, the volume rose to over $122 million
in 1884 and to more than $600 million in 1913.27 The rapid growth
in the early years of operation was attributed to large-scale
immigration from Europe and to the rapid settlement of the
Western states and territories. 28 Other factors were at work as
well. The expansion of the mail-order business, especially after
Montgomery Ward and Co. and Sears, Roebuck and Co. entered
the field, the establishment of rural free delivery and the authorization to the carriers to sell money orders on their routes, and the
simple convenience of the system, all contributed to the popularity
of the post-office money order. 29
Two additional factors intimately related to the banking
function were at work. Long before the postal savings banks were
authorized, the postal money order was being used as a safety
device. 30 This was made possible when a general order from the
Postmaster-General authorized payment to the purchaser at the
office of issue. 31 Thus a depositor in a savings bank who was more
concerned with safety than with interest could buy money orders
payable to himself at some future date. The other factor did not
necessarily increase the volume of postal-money-order business,
but it did indicate that an arm of the federal government, in this
case the Post Office Department, was reacting more rapidly and
more effectively to changed conditions than the private sector
whose domain was being invaded. Hindsight aided by a generous
volume of contemporary evidence enables the historian to see
that improved transportation and communication facilities, including the more rapid transmission of the mails, ·required a truly
national system of banking, even, perchance, a central bank with
branches throughout the United States. This the postal-moneyorder system provided. A money order issued. in Lick Skillet,
Texas, was as good as one issued in Washington, D.C. This uniformity of value was achieved by a system ofregional depositories
capped by a central depository in the New York post office. For
example, in postal-money-order matters the postmaster at Ft.
Laramie forwarded his receipts to Cheyenne. From Cheyenne the
sequence was to Denver, to the Chicago postmaster, who deposited with the Assistant Treasurer in Chicago, who in tum
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deposited with the Assistant Treasurer in New York to the account
of the postmaster there, who functioned as the banker for the
entire system. 32 This role was even clearer because it included a
reverse How of funds as well. If the postmaster in a busy commercial or financial center did not have sufficient funds either
from the sale of money orders or by transfer from his general
account, he could draw on the New York postmaster for additional funds. The transfer was generally made by a national bank
draft which could be cashed easily and quickly. The system
worked well partly because every time a postmaster sold a money
order he had to send a card of "advice" to the paying office so
that the postmaster at that point would be prepared to pay on
presentation. Some local post offices, including the one at Topeka,
Kansas, had an established line of credit with the postmaster in
New York and had on hand a limited number of drafts that permitted him to draw against postal funds even more rapidly. 33 It
should be added that the postmasters at San Francisco and Portland were empowered to play the part of banker to offices in the
western part of the nation. 34 In 1897 the Postmaster-General
could say in summarizing the way the system worked, "In this
manner $147,879,391.86 were remitted last year."35
The express companies followed a similar pattern of having
local offices forward receipts to a regional office which in tum
forwarded them to a central office. 36 The return How was not
quite so well organized, partly because customers with expresscompany money orders to cash were urged to take them to a bank
if they were presented for payment at times when the local agent
had closed his accounts or found himself short of funds.
The significant implications of this centralized system, particularly the handling of postal money orders, should not escape
the attention of the reader. The effective system of handling the
mail devised by the Post Office Department, made possible by
the particularly efficient Railway Mail Service, was the key to th.~
whole operation. Additionally, it is possible to detect some characteristics of the Federal Reserve system in the postal operation.
The pattern of How from local to regional to national office is one
of these. Another is the return How of funds in response to local
needs from the top down to the local office. A third feature is not
quite so clear. It is suggested ·in the following statement of the
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First Assistant Postmaster-General in 1902, "The system [of postal
money orders] is unique among the substantial financial factors of
the world. Its business is of enormous extent, yet is conducted
without a dollar of capital of its own! It has the confidence of the
world, yet is without a dollar of surplus; if all of its obligations
were paid, nothing would remain. It is maintained solely through
the temporary use of the amount of its unclaimed orders."37 Here
is an idea to conjure with, especially when translated into banking
and monetary terms. If a collateral source of funds is available,
tax money for example, or in private terms, warehouse receipts or
short-term business paper, a system of temporary currency could
be maintained partly because all of it would not be presented for
payment at one time. Moreover, when it had passed its stage of
usefulness, it might be completely withdrawn.
For obvious reasons members of the banking profession disliked a competitor that paid no taxes, kept no capital or reserve
fund, and maintained no separate offices.38 When that competitor
took a substantial slice of the fees paid by the American people
for transferring funds and when that competitor made little use of
banks, the opposition of some bankers should not occasion any
surprise. But curiously the severest criticism of the system came
from within the Postmaster-General's administrative staff. Henry
M. Castle, of Minnesota, was Chief of the Auditing Bureau in
1899 and for several years thereafter. Obviously distressed by the
necessity of handling each one of sixty million money orders five
different times during the auditing process and after referring to
it as "the nation's colossal money order system," he said:
The issue and payment of money orders is not in any
strictly legitimate sense a governmental function. It is a
feature of banking business pure and simple, and is regarded
by many thoughtful men as a dangerous development of state
socialism. It is a wonderfully convenient thing for great
masses of the people, hence it is universally popular. It is
carried on with such enlightened skill, such diligent enterprise, and such marvelous success by the Department officials
who superintend its operations and by the local postmasters
and clerks who directly conduct them that one who looks
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only on the surface sees everything to praise and nothing to
condemn.
Only the auditing bureau work can disclose the dangerous possibilities that lie in the general principle involved. 39
In 1899 Castle speculated that the success of the postal-moneyorder system would lead to demands that the federal government
should own and operate the railroads and the telephone and telegraph systems. 40 In 1900 he returned to the attack, added the
parcel-post idea to his argumentum ad horrendum, and asserted
that "no banking business is or can be carried on successfully in
this [the] loose manner" of the postal-money-order system. 41 This
reference to looseness was occasioned by the fact that auditing
took place months after the orders were issued. As an alternative,
Castle proposed that Congress authorize a series of postal notes
and checks to replace money orders. These would have the same
design as government notes and "actually circulate from hand to
hand as such currency, until by writing the name of the payee on
the blank line provided, a note is transferred into a personal check
of the United States government, and made as safe for transmittal
by mail as a money order now is." 42 It is difficult to believe that
Castle was entirely serious in making this proposal. It would have
implemented the most extreme solution of the problem of an
inelastic currency, except that the Post Office Department and not
the Treasury Department would have been the channel for the
issuing of fiat currency. 43 Irrespective of Castle's criticisms and
proposed alternatives, the sale of postal money orders expanded
until the $600 million level was reached in 1914.
If the aruninistrators of the postal- and express-money-order
systems were willing to take advantage of an increasingly efficient
system of cominunication and thereby enter the twentieth century, a good many members of the banking gild, particularly those
in the rural areas of the West, were not. Still captive to pre-Civil
War procedures and principles, they opposed any form of centralization, whether of reserves, of note issues, or of redemption.
They remained adamant in their opposition to branch banking,
persisted in making exorbitant charges for exchange and collections, and sought refuge in quasi-isolation.
Students of banking history know of the chaos and confusion
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at all levels of business activity that plagued the country for thirty
years after the destruction of the Second United States bank. By
1860 fifteen hundred state banks were issuing bank-note currency
in many denominations. If fifteen hundred banks issuing circulating notes in several different denominations produced chaos
and confusion, it is instructive to consider what happened when
hundreds of thousands of depositors began to write personal
checks on thousands of banks. A cardinal rule of banking in handling checks is to require identification. Perhaps one could add
the footnote that if the person who cashes a check cannot know
the drawer, he should know the bank that it is drawn on. But how
could any cashier or paying teller know all of these persons or
institutions? This device for transferring funds, the check, became
popular after 1880, but the mechanism for handling it was not
developed at the national level for three decades and more. In the
meantime, country banks continued to charge for making collections and for what continued to be called exchange. When new
techniques appear, but people associated with them are committed to an outmoded system, a performance gap is almost
certain to appear with all of its penalties and losses.
Prior to 1913 there was no really national system of banking,
to say nothing of a central bank with branches or twelve regional
bankers' banks. Then, too, it is possible that many banks did not
have correspondent banks in regional centers or in New York.
Additionally, the New York banks were afraid of losing business
if they received country checks for collection only, thus denying
their customers the use of the funds until the check had been
collected. The effect of this would have been that business houses
would have refused checks that could not be treated as cash items.
This drastic remedy would have placed responsibility right where
it belonged, on the drawer of the check and on the bank that
permitted him to write it. Finally, these same country banks that
refused to maintain adequate correspondent relationships also
charged handsome fees for making collections. 44 These charges
fell upon precisely the wrong party, namely upon the last endorser. It cost him money for postage, stationery, envelopes, and
clerical time to send the check to a bank that he thought might
pay it. If in addition he had to pay a fee, that was too much.
Again, there were at least two other negative characteristics of
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the no-system method of collecting country items. A good deal
of time in transit or "float-time" was involved. To the banker, the
time between crediting his depositor with a cash deposit, which
reduced his own capacity to loan to other customers, and receiving a return on the item was dead-time or sterile time.
Looking at the transaction from the other side, one sees that
the drawer of the check was compelling some unknown city bank
to make him an interest-free loan for the amount of the check and
for the duration of the transit time.45 Indeed, the drawer might
be counting on the float-time to write several checks against the
same sum on deposit, hoping to replenish his account before all of
the checks came in. An interesting example of this occurred in
connection with a western-Kansas cattle buyer during the past
year. On Friday afternoon he bought several thousand dollars'
worth of cattle and gave his check in payment, knowing that his
deposit account was inadequate, but expecting to have the weekend to mobilize his resources and make it good before the check
cleared and was returned. But the banks in that area, after the
demise of the Railway Mail Service, had subscribed to a form of
banker's dispatch by which checks and other items are carried by
automobile to a regional clearing center. 46 The auction firm had
taken the buyer's check to the bank in time for the late afternoon
pickup. It was taken to the regional clearing center, where a force
of employees working all night with the benefit of advanced
machines processed all of Friday's business. By Saturday morning
the driver on the return trip started his deliveries, which included
the buyer's check, and before noon the cattle buyer had a call
from his bank to come in and make his account good.
Beyond its local and contemporary implication, the illustration indicates the importance of an effective clearing-house system. Float-time can be reduced to a matter of hours or a day or
two instead of many days, perhaps weeks. But except for a very
few financial centers like Boston, Atlanta, and Kansas City the
bankers themselves were not willing to devise regional clearing
houses, not to mention a national one like the Post Office Department operated in New York. Instead they resorted to devious and
circuitous methods of escaping collection charges. The most extreme example of this system that has come to the attention of the
writer was described by a Southern bap.ker who stated in all
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seriousness that a check for thirty-seven cents had passed through
fourteen banks and still had not been paid. In order to escape a
collection charge on such an insignificant item each bank had
mailed it to another bank. Fourteen two-cent stamps, fourteen
envelopes, fourteen pieces of stationery, fourteen segments of a
clerk's time, and still the check was afloat. 47 For some reason
direct mailing to the bank upon which the check was drawn was
prohibited either by law or by regulation. Thus the case of the
peripatetic check developed. But it was not an isolated case.4 8
Other equally extreme examples of circuitous routing to avoid
paying exorbitant collection charges could be given, but enough
have been described to illustrate the costs and penalties of perpetuating outworn and outmoded practices.
In a fundamental way the similarity of the three early
twentieth-century developments-the postal savings system, the
money-order mechanism, and the development of an agency to
handle country-bank checks-comes into clearer focus in the
discussion of the direct inclusion of the country banks in the
clearing-house process. All three were dependent upon a network
of railroads and an efficient mail service. All three were instrumental either in mobilizing small amounts of funds or in multiplying the impact of money in circulation, including instruments
of credit. All three encountered the opposition of many bankers
because they required changes in time-honored modes of banking
procedures. And all three foreshadowed to some degree certain
aspects of the Federal Reserve system.
Fortunately for this study the bankers in Kansas City, Missouri, led by their clearing-house manager, Jerome C. Thralls,
were among those who chose to enter the twentieth century. The
tributary area of the banks of Kansas City included a large segment of the Trans-Mississippi West. The system devised by
Thralls was in its technical details rather complicated; but viewed
generally and in historical perspective, it was fairly simple and so
significant that Thralls deserves mention as one of the men who
made Kansas City the financial center of the Tenth District of the
Federal Reserve system.
The reasonably simple solution proposed by Thralls to the
country-check problem was to establish the Kansas City Country
Clearing House division of the Kansas City Clearing House. Like
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this solution, the origin of the clearing house was quite simple
and entirely accidental, occurring in a London coffeehouse sometime in the early 1670s. It came to New York in 1853 and to
Kansas City in 1875. In its simplest terms the country clearing
house merely substituted the mail service for hand carriage of the
items, and it invoked the representative principle by using the city
correspondents of the country banks as an essential feature of the
clearing mechanism. Thus the country-bank checks were included
in the charging and crediting process. The Kansas City Country
Clearing House division was established in 1905. It is probable
that the idea was derived from the Boston Clearing House, whose
country section had been established earlier and was modeled
upon the Suffolk system for the redemption of country-bank notes
which was put in operation in 1824. 49
When the Kansas City Country Clearing House was established in 1905, it was limited to three hundred banks in Oklahoma
and Indian territories. Included among them were banks that
were charging particularly exorbitant collection rates and were
especially slow in making returns. The rates varied from twentyfive to thirty cents per hundred. One immediate result of concerted action was the reduction of rates by half and of the time
by an even greater proportion. Most of the skeptics among the
Kansas City bankers were convinced of the effectiveness of the
system and consented to its extension to include the banks in
Kansas, Missouri, and southern Nebraska on a mandatory basis,
and those in northern Nebraska, Colorado, New Mexico, and
Texas on an optional basis. Some notion of the magnitude of the
system is conveyed by the fact that at least 5,600 banks in several
thousand towns were involved. In his description of the system
Thralls noted that 1,600 to 2,500 banks received daily letters.
There is scarcely need for further demonstration of the significance of the mail and rail services to the entire operation. Clearly
they were in the indispensable category.
Postal costs can be approached somewhat differently. If ten
Kansas City banks had items on a particular town in Kansas it
would have required from two to four cents postage on each
letter. By consolidating the items in one letter, the estimated
saving was from sixteen to eighteen cents in postage or from
thirty-two to thirty-six dollars per day when all the banks in all of
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the towns were included. Equally important savings were made
on clerk-hire, envelopes, and stationery. A great deal of time was
made available for interest-producing investments, and, curiously
enough, as the country bankers came to understand the system,
their deposits with their Kansas City correspondents increased by
as much as 56 percent. Even after a set of rules and regulations
was adopted, the Kansas City banks could deal directly with their
country correspondents provided their rates coincided with those
charged by the clearing house. Conversely the banks could levy
any charge they wished in making collections for Kansas City
banks, but the latter agreed to charge the recalcitrant banks at
the same rate for making city collections. Thus the basic and
simple premise for most of the banks was that of reciprocity.
Stated simply, whatever the country banks decided to charge was
charged against them. No longer could country banks take advantage of city-bank competition for their deposits. When the Kansas
City plan reached its full maturity, all country checks coming in
to the banks that were members of the Kansas City Clearing
House were forwarded to the Country Bank section. Here they
were sorted, recorded on duplicate forms with the use of modified
Burroughs machines, and credited to or charged against the members. The settlement slips allowed three or four days of transit
time to (and from) the country banks. The completed collections
went directly to the clearing house, but all protested, refused, or
slow items went back through the country-bank section for investigation and appropriate action. Clearly it was an ingenious
system which influenced the economic development of a large
section of the Trans-Missouri West. It was based on complete
information with respect to each bank, its officers, its Kansas City
as well as other city correspondents, and its current condition.
The officials in charge of the Country Clearing House even knew
the times of departure and arrival of the Kansas City mails.110
The Kansas City plan was at the center of debate on the
country-check problem, which was one of the hottest issues in
banking circles in the period between 1905 and 1913.111 In vain
did its advocates try to get the plan adopted more generally. In
vain did lecturers point out that unless bankers put their own
house in order, the federal government would put it in order for
them. In addition to the handling of country checks the central
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issues in discussions of banking problems revolved about the
inelasticity of the currency, the reserve requirements of the national banking system, and inadequate provision for rural credits.
Seemingly the fact that perhaps as much as 95 percent of the
nation's business was being done by check, draft, or other credit
instruments failed to impress some of the powerful bankers in
Chicago and New York who thought that the only answer to the
country-check problem was to eliminate them or sharply limit
their use. 52
Meanwhile the so-called banker's panic of 1907 occurred;
the National Monetary Commission was established to study the
issues in 1909, and stimulated four years of debate and discussion;
and the Federal Reserve Act was passed on December 23, 1913. 53
The prediction of federal action unless the banking profession
initiated its own reforms was fulfilled. 54 Only the selection of
Kansas City, Missouri, as the site of the Tenth District Federal
Reserve Bank will be considered here.
Perhaps it would be sufficient to assert that the men who
presented the case for Kansas City before the location committee
were a remarkably able group, but they also had a full arsenal of
persuasive arguments to present. Although only eighteenth in
population, Kansas City was seventh in total bank clearings in
1913. 55 Nearly five and one-half billion dollars' worth of business
passed through the clearing-house banks of Kansas City. In that
year total clearings amounted to nearly three billion dollars compared with less than a billion for Omaha and less than half a
billion for Denver. Clearly Kansas City was dominant in this
respect in the region west of St. Louis. The impressive showing
on clearings was reenforced by the fact that the Kansas City banks
had an effective mechanism for collecting country-bank checks.
In all likelihood it was not a matter of political pressure or accident that the three cities with such mechanisms, Boston, Atlanta,
and Kansas City, each received a Federal Reserve Bank. 56 Perhaps it was, partly due to country-bank collections that Kansas
City's clearings increased 165 percent in the ten years from 1903
to 1913. Between 1906 and 1913 the increase for Kansas City was
113 percent, whereas in the same period New York's clearings
-declined 9 percent, Chicago's increased only 50 percent, and the
clearings of the St. Louis banks increased only 30 percent. In
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1913 the Kansas City Country Clearing House section handled
$107,522,900 dollars arising out of relationships with 3,300 country
banks.t>7
These figures have added significance when placed in the
context of statements made by H. Parker Willis, one of the architects of the Federal Reserve system. In an extemporaneous and
unofficial talk before the clearing-house section of the Richmond
Meeting of the American Banker's Association in 1914, Willis
compared the problem of the bank check with that of the nineteenth-century bank note, asserted the need for "a more uniform
system of domestic exchange in the United States," identified the
essential prerequisites of the check as recognizability and uniformity, and concluded that "the idea in mind in drafting the
Federal Reserve Act [was] to attain that degree of uniformity."58
On his part 0. Howard Wolfe, secretary of the clearing-house
section of the American Banker's Association, in a 1915 address
agreed with The New York Times that exchange charges were a
"common nuisance," emphasized the need for concentration and
redemption of bank checks at par throughout the country, summarized Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act, which required
the Federal Reserve Banks to act as clearing houses for member
banks within their districts, and criticized the bankers who opposed the proposed changes in the system, especially the city
bankers who thought that they would lose the deposits of country
banks and the country bankers who thought that they would lose
the profits on making charges for collections. Before concluding
his address, Wolle quoted at length from a letter that a Kansas
City banker had written to him. The relevant paragraph follows
in its entirety:
There are many bankers, both city and country, who are
anxious to have the reserve banks begin clearing operations
because it will give them a service in return for the balances
which they are now carrying with their reserve banks. The
conviction is growing that the check collection functions of
the reserve system can be made the most used and the most
valuable of all the facilities provided by the regional banks.
The most distressing feature of the panic of 1907, which was
notably a currency panic, was the breaking down of our
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check collection machinery. The result was that we could
not use the very instrument that our business habits had
taught us to look to for relief. Exception must be mentioned
with respect to those sections where country checks were
provided with facilities of collection through the clearing
house as in Boston and Kansas City. The prediction may be
made that a free and general system of check clearing will
be found to be as important a factor in the solution of our
currency problems as the issues of Federal Reserve notes.
On the basis of present statistics the one affects 95 per cent.
of our medium of exchange, bank checks, and the other is
concerned with the remaining 5 per cent. 59
Obviously the experience of the Kansas City Country Clearing House had a direct bearing not only upon the location of the
Federal Reserve Bank in Kansas City, but also upon some features
of the Federal Reserve system. 60 But the significance of two
essential prerequisites of the Kansas City system did not escape
the attention of those who presented the city's case to the location
committee. They pointed with pride to the sixteen railroad trunk
lines and the thirty-two subordinate roads that served the Kansas
City area; to the 260 passenger trains that came into the city every
day; and to the Union Depot in process of construction. Some of
the railroad lines reached as far as the Pacific Coast, notably the
Santa Fe and the Union Pacific; some as far south as the Gulf
cities; and some extended the city's transportation network far to
the north and west. The rails were clearly a significant aspect of
the city's case.61
Similarly the mails received a great deal of attention from
Kansas City's advocates. The city had a total of 126 dispatches
daily-24 to the west, 15 to the south, 21 to the north, 18 to the
southwest, 11 to the southeast, 13 to the northeast, and 6 to the
northwest. It has been said that more railway post offices came
into Kansas City than into any other city in the country, including
Chicago and New York. While the brief submitted by the city
did not include this statement, it did include the allegation that
more pieces of baggage were handled at the Kansas City Union
Depot than at any other station in the world and the assertion
that "Montgomery Ward & Co. and Sears, Roebuck & Co., two
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of the largest mail-order houses in the world, selected Kansas City
as the proper place in which to locate the largest mail-order
houses west of the Mississippi River. Their reasons for selecting
Kansas City were that this city offers better railroad and mail
facilities than does any other city in the entire west and southwestern territory." 62
Thus the case for Kansas City was brought to a close. The
bankers of the city had not chosen to spend all of their time and
energies bewailing the competition provided by postal savings
and postal money orders. Instead they had chosen to make the
bank check an inexpensive and effective instrument for the transfer of funds by devising the necessary mechanism. Rail lines had
elected to make Kansas City the center of a magnificent network
of lines reaching in every direction to almost every town and
hamlet, whether on plain, or mountain, or desert. The United
States Post Office Department by means of its most efficient arm,
the Railway Mail Service, had chosen to capitalize on the presence
of the rail lines and had given to Kansas City the best service that
was possible in 1913. Banks, rails, and mails had combined to
make Kansas City the dominant financial center in this region and
to give to Kansas City a prominent place in the formulation and
functioning of the Federal Reserve system.
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Report for 1882, 226 (2098). A writer in Banker's Magazine, 89 (November, 1914), 519, made the following comment, "Business men depend on
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interruptions occur, moneys due and forwarded in time to meet obligations
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1893, 424-25 ( 3208) .
10. These estimates have been made on the basis of tables that appeared
regularly in the Reports of the Postmaster-General. It was the Department's
practice to review rates paid to railroads for carrying the mails every four
years. In this connection data relating to speeds and number of deliveries per
week, as well as to many other aspects of the mail service, were published.
Examples of speed on Western railroads may be found in the Report for 1888,
356 and passim (2635); ibid., for 1898, 556 and passim (3755); and ibid.,
for 1906, 212 and passim ( 5116). In 1905 Postmaster-General George B.
Cortelyou was aware of the fact that commercial paper leaving New York in
the afternoon and arriving in Chicago in time to pass through the clearing
house the next day meant a gain of a full business day. Ibid., for 1905, 58
(4957).
11. Pm.-G., Report for 1905, 196 ( 4957). By 1904 fast mail trains were
in service on every trunk line in the country. Ibid., for 1904, 428 ( 4796).
As early as 1891 there were 145 mail trains arriving in Chicago and 144
departing ones. Ibid., for 1891, 65 (2932) . The fast mail trains received
regular attention in the Annual Reports of the Postmaster-General. For examples see Pm.-G., Report for 1881, 31 ( 2016); ibid., for 1884, 25 and 289
(2285); ibid., for 1888, 342--43 ( 2635); ibid., for 1905, 58 ( 4957); and ibid.,
for 1909, 168-69 ( 5739).
12. 79 (September, 1909), 341-42.
13. ]our. of the A.B.A., 6 (December, 1913), 458.
14. President Woodrow Wilson's Postmaster-General agreed with Wanamaker on many points including government ownership and operation of the
telegraph lines. Pm.-G., Report for 1913, 15. This recommendation was repeated in 1914. Ibid., for 1914, 15.
15. Pm.-G., Report for 1889, 30 (2723) .
16. Ibid., for 1889, 30--31 (2723).
17. Ibid., for 1890, 11-13 (2839); ibid., for 1891, 90--91 (2932); ibid.,
for1897, 24-32 ( 3639).
18. Ibid., for 1909, 17-21 (5739). See also Ibid., for 1907, 6-1 (5293).
19. Some bankers in order to .offset the convenience of postal savings
accounts advocated banking by mail. An especially_persuasive argument on
this point was prepared by the National Bank of Commerce of St. Louis. The
statement read in part, "Banking by mail is simply the application to the use
of individual depositors of the system in vogue among banks. It is perfectly
safe. In the enormous daily exchange between banks of different cities,
amounting to millions of dollars, there is never a dollar lost. This method of
banking is convenient, private, and time saving." Banker's Magazine, 78
(February, 1909), 297. Several illustrations of banking by mail had appeared

302 I George L. Anderson
in ibid., 76 ( February, 1908), 241--42, and a specific suggestion that banking
by mail might offset the advantages claimed for postal savings had been published in ibid., 77 ( December, 1908), 868-69. In addition the breakdown of
the inhibitions that restricted advertising by banks seems to have stemmed
from the same source.
20. U.S., Statutes at Large, 36, 814-19. Proceedings, 1909, 35, 248--49;
ibid., 1910, 36, 46--47. ]our. of A.B.A., 2 (January, 1910), 264-67; ibid., 3
(July, 1910), 192-93. Proceedings of the Annual Conventions of the American Banker's Association will be cited simply as Proceedings, plus year,
volume, and page.
21. Pm.-G., Report for 1915, 30 and 248.
22. The use of national banks as depositories was a regular although
small feature of the system. Ibid., for 1903, 526 ( 4643).
23. The bank money-order system devised by the Minnesota Banker's
Association was described by Joseph Chapman, Jr., secretary of the association, in an address to the New York Banker's Association. He stressed the
importance of centralized control, recognizability, and simplicity. He asserted that both postal money orders and express-company money orders had
the active support of newspapers, magazines, and mail-order houses and that
the Minnesota requisitions were distributed to newspapers and jobbing seed
firms in Wisconsin, Iowa, North and South Dakota, and Montana. Banker's
Magazine, 67 (October, 1903), 548-50. By 1904 bank money-order systems
were in effect in Minnesota, New York, and Texas and were either in effect or
being considered in Kansas, California, Washington, and the Indian Territory. Ibid., 66 (June, 1903), 861; 67 (August, 1903), 233; 69 (August,
1904), 218-19. On the national level, the discussion by the American Banker's Association about devising a bank money-order system continued through
1909, when the first orders were issued. The principal issues were presented
and attention was called to the fact that express companies were receiving
deposits and really acting like a "vast branch banking operation" without
supervision, without reserves, and without paying the taxes usually imposed
on banks. Ibid., 55 (September, 1897), 468-70; 67 (November and December, 1903), 758-61 and 916-20; 78 (May, 1909), 839; and 84 (April, 1912),
550-57. A full summary of the work of this committee can be found in
Proceedings, 1912, 38, 175-82.
24. A good discussion of the problem of "Exchange" was presented to
the Dallas chapter of The American Institute of Banking by H. P. May,
cashier of the City National Bank of Dallas. Jour. of the A.B.A., 5 (July,
1912), 49 ff. Bankers regarded the supplying of exchange as one of the particular functions of banks. Banker's Magazine, 74 (June, 1907), 871-72.
There was some sentiment in banking circles in favor of recovering the $700
million yearly business that was done by the government and express companies simply by offering "a better and a cheaper service." Ibid., 81 (July,
1910), 8. Additional discussions can be found in the Jour. of the A.B.A., 6
(February, 1914), 613-,14, and the Proceedings, 1910, 36, 206-8.
25. Under the title "Modem Banking Methods" the system of collecting
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notes, time drafts, and sight drafts was discussed in Banker's Magazine, 60
(May, 1900), 690-97. The explanation, including the use of the telephone,
was continued in ibid., 61 (July, 1900), 30-35.
26. Proceedings, 1908, 34, 180-81. A banker from Tacoma, Washington,
had emphasized this point several years earlier. Banker's Magazine, 63 (November, 1901 ), 781.
27. Pm.-G., Report for 1913, 29-30. A table exhibiting the growth of
the system is contained in ibid., 1910, 298 ( 5971).
28. Pm.-G., Report for 1881, 10 ( 2016). Included in the explicit recommendations were provision for money orders for less than five dollars.
Ibid., for 1889, 20-21 ( 3913).
29. The mail-order houses also competed for banking business, offering
6 percent interest on deposits by prospective customers and permitting them
to draw against these deposits in payment for orders. Banker's Magazine, 73
(September, 1906), 376.
30. Pm.-G., Report for 1907, 326-27 ( 5293); ibid., for 1908, 293
(5447).
31. Postal money orders made payable at office of issue were authorized
in 1899. The Postmaster-General was well aware of the fact that he was
establishing a postal-savings-bank system. Pm.-G., Report for 1899, 20, 175
(3913).
32. Pm.-G., Report for 1897, 142 (3639).
33. Pm.-G., Report for 1890, 967-68 (2839); ibid., for 1900, 177; ibid.,
for 1901, 143 (4288).
34. Postal-money-order payments through the San Francisco post office
assumed particular importance in 1906 because of the San Francisco earthquake. Pm.-G., Report for 1906, 285 (5116).
35. Pm.-G., Report for 1897, 142 (3639). The next year an even larger
sum was remitted, but because the practice of using coin or currency for the
transfer of funds occasioned too much trouble and loss, the post office shifted
to the use of drafts and checks on national banks and to "indirect membership" in clearing-house associations.
36. The parallel between the express companies and a central bank with
branches was drawn by a writer in Banker's Magazine, 58 (June, 1899), 814.
Express companies were also accused of accepting deposits and drawing sight
drafts. Ibid., 61 (October, 1900), 565. The competition in making remittances was emphasized the following year. Ibid., 63 (December, 1901),
939-40. A simple solution was proposed, namely, making a charge for cashing
express money orders.
37. Pm.-G., Report for 1902, 153 ( 4456).
38. The American Banker's Association carried its opposition to express
companies to the extent of providing a special committee on the matter,
which lodged a formal complaint with the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Thornton Cooke of Kansas City was a member of the committee. ]our. of the
AB.A., 2 (May, 1910), 458-62. A writer in Banker's Magazine, 59 (August,
1899), 161-63, proposed the simplest and most effective solution to the
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problem, namely, for the New York Clearing House to force country banks to
make checks on them payable at par in New York. This in effect would have
implemented an important feature of the Federal Reserve system.
39. Pm.-G., Report for 1899, 873 ( 3913) . The reference to five handlings is contained in ibid., for 1903, 658 ( 4643).
40. Pm.-G., Report for 1899, 873 ( 3913).
41. Pm.-G., Report for 1900, 854,856, and 857-58 ( 4099) . In his 1902
Report, Castle asserted that if all of the relevant costs were taken into account,
the money-order bureau actually lost $500,000 in 1899, and that the loss was
greater in 1902. lbid., for 1902, 676-77 ( 4456); ibid., for 1900, 860-61
(4099).
42. Pm.-G., Report for 1900, 860-61 ( 4099).
43. The authorization of postal checks limited to five dollars in any
amount, payable to the bearer or order had been recommended in 1898.
Pm.-G., Report for 1898, 185 ( 3755). In this way depositor's could have
monetized their deposits.
44. A St. Louis banker whose institution handled 800 to 1200 country
checks a day objected to paying a Texas bank twenty-five cents as a collection charge and then waiting for the return. Banker's Magazine, 50 ( March,
1895), 549. A woman bank official from Lexington, Texas, described the
collection problem from the point of view of a country bank. She concluded
that there was less profit in it than in any other phase of banking. Ibid., 84
(February,1812), 144-45.
45. All of these shortcomings of the country-bank checks were discussed
by John C. Russell, of St. Louis, in addresses to the Missouri Bankers' Association at Sedalia, on June 9 and 10, 1892. At various points he said, "Some of
our correspondents wish to send us all the trash they can work off on us and
have it put to their credit. . . . They wish to get as much interest on such
balances as they can.... This class of out-of-town business is the kind that
causes as much criticism of the banking business as it is causing many collections to be sent in roundabout ways in order to have them collected at
par." Russell thought regional clearing houses and not a national one was the
answer. Banker's Magazine, 47 (July, 1892), 30-31. The first editorial discussion of the country-bank-check problem appeared in the Banker's Magazine, 53 (November, 1896), 502-4. John Cofer Shirley, in an article "The
Principles and Practices of Country Clearings," ibid., 85 ( August, 1912),
135--37, described the current 1912 practice as "antiquated, slow and insufferable," and asserted that the "floating" of checks to distant points or ''hawking" them back and forth across the country really converted demand paper
into time paper.
46. Many private letter-carrying companies had been organized as early
as 1884, which indicated to the Postmaster-General that the free-delivery
system had not "progressed so far as to meet all the wants of energetic business life in large commercial cities." Pm.-G., Report for 1884, 13 (2285).
47. Banker's Magazine, 47 (August, 1892), 136. An Ohio banker de-
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scribed the collection of country-bank checks as a "burlesque." Ibid., 53
(November, 1896), 566.
48. See ibid., 57 (July, 1898), 69, for a summary of the itinerary of a
small check that originated just six miles from the bank upon which it was
drawn, traveled one thousand miles, and went through the same city as many
as four times before it was paid. In 1898 Banker's Magazine printed a detailed analysis of cost and time of collecting country-bank checks. The average time was about five days and average cost 4 percent. Ibid., 56 ( February, 1898), 221-31.
49. The Boston country-bank-check collection system was described in
Banker's Magazine, 63 ( October, 1901 ), 626-29. Some idea of the volume
of business that banks handled by mail may be dedved from the experience
of the National Shawmut Bank of Boston, the largest bank in New England.
It required a staff of fourteen men working from 8 P .M. to 4 A.M . and eight
additional men from midnight until 8 A.M. just to handle the night mail received by this one bank. Some nights checks amounting to $15 million were
received. The mail deliveries were made every half-hour until 6:30 A.M.,
when the New York mail came in. All items had to be prepared for the
clearing house by 10 A.M. Ibid., 84 (March, 1912), 397. In a proposal to
establish a country-bank clearing-house system in Connecticut, the following
phrase appeared, ibid., 60 (February, 1900), 257-58: "The mails have to be
substituted for the messengers of the local banks." The close parallel between the substitution of national bank notes and greenbacks for the irredeemable bank notes, the collection of country-bank checks through some
kind of a national mechanism, the similarity of the Suffolk system to the
Boston country-check clearing system, the role of the federal government in
bringing about the homogeneity of the bank note, and the creation of a central bank were discussed in ibid., 684-86.
50. The preceding summary of the Kansas City country clearing-house
system as devised by Jerome C. Thralls has been derived from three principal
sources. The longest account and a record of the discussion which followed
is in the Proceedings, 1912, 38, 508--24. Ibid., 1910, 36, 731-32, and /our.
of the A.B.A., 5 (September, 1912), 200-203.
51. An example of considerable attention to the Kansas City system can
be found in the full report of the debate between the Cincinnati and Pittsburgh chapters of the American Institute of Banking on the subject of transits
in the ]our. of the A.B.A., 4 (May, 1912), 702r-7. For a more general discussion of transit problems see ibid., 5 (January, 1913 ), 467~9.
52. Banker's Magazine consistently favored the use of the check, criticized the bankers who wished to curtail its use, and supported the clearing~
house system under the auspices of the banks. Central in its argument were
the importance of deposits and the expanded use of the check as the answer
to an inelastic currency. The effect of the check in monetizing deposits was
emphasized. In this connection the role of deposits was put briefly by S. R.
Flynn, a banker from Chicago. His formulation stated: "When in actual
circulation a dollar is but a dollar. When in actual concealment it might as
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well not exist. The dollar is doing its best work when seemingly dormant in
the bank vault, for there its usefulness to business is multiplied four to six
and two-thirds times." Banker's Magazine, 71 ( August, 1905), 239. Typical
discussions of the country-check problem are contained in ibid., 61 ( September, 1903), 293--97; 68 (January, 1904), 7-8; 72 (January, 1906), 7-8 and
91-93; 74 (January, 1907 ), 7; and 79 (July, 1909 ), 8-9; Proceedings, 1911,
37, 711-13; 1912, 38, 488; 1915, 41, 477-91; and ]our. of the A.B.A., 5
(December, 1912), 359-60.
53. The Federal Reserve Banks began business on November 16, 1914.
Banker's Magazine, 89 (December, 1914), 603.
54. In a kind of obituary note on its proposal for a great central bank in
New York City, Banker's Magazine, 88 (May, 1914), 547-51, said, "Again,
had the New York Clearing House been more ready to devise a system of
clearing country checks much of the irritation which gradually developed
against the banks of that city would have been avoided." Not all New York
bankers were opposed to the use of the clearing-house system. Newton
Dalling of the Nassau Bank described this feature of the Federal Reserve
plan a "great boon to country banks." Ibid., 87 (December, 1913), 636-37.
55. /our. of the A.B.A., 6 (January, 1914), 487.
56. A writer in the /our. of the A.B.A., 6 (June, 1914), 805, was impressed by this fact and ventured "the assertion that the financial importance
of all three of these cities is largely due to the fact that they have built up a
sound business and have been able to hold it on account of the fact that they
have for a long time employed the best method for the collection of checks."
57. The Kansas City brief is printed in Sen. Doc. No. 485, 63 Cong.,
2 Sess., "Location of Reserve Districts in the United States," 173-81 ( 6583).
58. Quoted by 0 . Howard Wolle in an address entitled "The Clearing
Function of the Reserve Bank in Theory and in Practice," /our. of the A.B.A.,
7 (January, 1915), 448-49.
59. ]our. of the A.B.A., 1 (January, 1915), 448-51.
60. In forming the Federal Reserve districts the location committee was
required to weigh "convenience and the customary course of business."
Banker's Magazine, 88 (February, 1914), 140. The Kansas City Journal
carried almost daily reports on the activities and itinerary of the location
committee. The Journal was critical of the Wilson administration in general
and the Federal Reserve Act in particular, but once the law was enacted, it,
like other critics, wanted a choice segment of the system. The Journal wanted
the location committee to use the criteria most favorable to Kansas City, e.g.,
geographic convenience and "the established .custom and trend of business
as developed by the present system of bank reserves and checking accounts."
Kansas City Journal, December 27, 1913.
61. The study of the Kansas City Federal Reserve District by Hurshel
E. Underhill concentrates upon banking activities and operations. It was
published by the Spaulding Moss Company about 1941.
62. The Reserve Bank Organization Committee consisted of Secretary
of the Treasury William G. McAdoo, Secretary of Agriculture D. W. Houston,
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and Comptroller of the Currency John Skelton Williams. The Kansas City
brief was presented by the Associated Banks and Trust Companies of Greater
Kansas City, but there is some reason to believe that Jerome Thralls played
an active part in preparing it. The conclusion that the mechanism for handling country-bank checks, the railroad network, and the mail service weighed
heavily in the location committee's decision is reenforced by the fact that
originally the tenth district included much more than the Kansas City committee had requested. Among the tenth-district banks that were polled, 355
gave Kansas City as their first choice, 191-all but 10 from Nebraska-chose
Omaha, and Denver received 132 votes. Of the thirty-two witnesses who
testified at the hearings on Kansas City, many were from Kansas City or
Kansas. The relevant data are to be found in Sen. Doc. No. 485, 63 Cong.,
2 Sess., "Location of Reserve Districts in the United States," 173-81 and 377
(6583); and in House Doc. No. 1134, 63 Cong., 2 Sess., "First Choice Votes
for Reserve Bank Cities," 3-15 (6755). Personal conversations with Mr.
Calvin Manon, 1969, sometime railway mail clerk and presently a member
of the staff of the Associated Press in Kansas City, Missouri. In addition to
the statement that more railway post offices came into Kansas City than into
any other city, he said that after the completion of the Union Depot in Kansas
City at least two of the larger banks handled their incoming mail in offices in
the depot, thus saving the time required for downtown deliveries.
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